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SUMMARY
Post-Cold War military conflicts have highlighted the need for a flexible, agile joint
force responsive to emerging crises around the globe. The 2005 Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (JCIDS) acquisition policy document mandates a shift away from
stove-piped threat-based acquisition to a capability-based model focused on the multiple
ways and means of achieving an effect. This shift requires a greater emphasis on scenarios,
tactics, and operational concepts during the conceptual phase of design and structured
processes for technology evaluation to support this transition are lacking.
In this work, a methodology for quantitative technology evaluation for systems-of-
systems is defined. Physics-based models of an aircraft system are exercised within a hi-
erarchical, object-oriented constructive simulation to quantify technology potential in the
context of a relevant scenario. A major technical challenge to this approach is the lack of
resources to support real-time human-in-the-loop tactical decision making and technology
analysis. An approach that uses intelligent agents to create a “Meta-General” capable of
forecasting strategic and tactical decisions based on technology inputs is used. To demon-
strate the synergy between new technologies and tactics, surrogate models are utilized to
provide intelligence to individual agents within the framework and develop a set of tactics
that appropriately exploit new technologies.
To address the long run-times associated with constructive military simulations, neural
network surrogate models are implemented around the forecasting environment to enable
rapid trade studies. Probabilistic techniques are used to quantify uncertainty and richly
populate the design space with technology-infused alternatives. Since a large amount of
data is produced in the analysis of systems-of-systems, dynamic, interactive visualization
techniques are leveraged to enable “what-if” games on assumptions, systems, technologies,
tactics, and evolving threats.
The methodology developed in this dissertation is applied to a notional Long Range
xxx
Strike air vehicle and system architecture in the context of quantitative technology evalua-




1.1 Introduction: of Guns and Butter
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,
those who are cold and not clothed.”
-Dwight D. Eisenhower
Engineering is the synthesis of creativity, technology, and science to solve practical prob-
lems. Often, these problems span domains and timescales, with complexity that changes
dynamically with the world around us. As engineering knowledge advances, man has been
able to better allocate finite resources to address challenges to his existence.
This challenge dominates thinking in the defense community: how can resources best
be allocated to provide for the common defense of national assets and citizens? In 1959,
President Eisenhower warned the military acquisition community to avoid feverishly build-
ing massive armaments, saying “expenditures demand both balance and perspective in our
planning for defense. At every turn, we must weight, judge, and select. Needless duplication
of weapons and forces must be avoided” [140]. The process of evaluating future weapon
systems on the basis of effectiveness, durability, and cost continues to be a challenge for
military planners.
The challenge is further compounded by the global nature of warfare, the ubiquitous
presence of information, and the rapid evolution of threats to our national security. Ac-
cording to General Richard Myers, to provide security in an increasingly dangerous world,
“the Armed Forces must be able to evaluate challenges, leverage innovation and technology,
and act decisively in pursuit of national goals” [306].
In 1949, the United States Department of War was renamed the Department of Defense
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(DoD) with the the mission of providing “the military forces needed to deter war and to
protect the security of the United States1” [449]. According to Nitze and McCall, “the best
deterrent is possession of superior military fighting capabilities coupled with well-thought-
through ‘use’ and ‘declaratory’ doctrines” [319]. In the 6th Century B.C., Chinese General
and military strategist Sun Tzu echoed this philosophy, saying, “the best victory is when
the opponent surrenders of its own accord before there are any actual hostilities... it is best
to win without fighting” [416]. The discovery of a robust portfolio of enabling technologies
that provide advanced capabilities against emerging challenges is the primary focus of this
work.
1.1.1 Strategic Challenges and a Revolution in Military Acquisition
On November 9, 1989, a new era in military policy began with the collapse of the Berlin
Wall marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
United States. The dramatic decline of the Soviet war machine in the early 1990’s catalyzed
a shift in U.S. military posture from monolithic systems designed to deter all-out war to
a more agile and mobile force. During the Cold War, redundancies were seen as strategic
and effective: similar effects were produced by multiple systems using different Concepts
of Operations (CONOPS), and the stark reality that no defense could stop all offensive
systems at once was the cornerstone of the policy of deterrence for forty-five years.
While system acquisition during the Cold War was designed to counter a known adver-
sary with predictable doctrine and strategy, the current strategic environment is dominated
by uncertainty and driven by opponents that seek to exploit non-traditional weaknesses in
U.S. national security. This point is illustrated by the events of September 11, 2001 and
the subsequent “Global War on Terror” which has identified the need for a flexible, agile,
responsive force against a wide range of constantly changing and uncertain threats.
According to President George W. Bush, because of this shift the focus is now on “how
an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur” [80]. As a result, a
system-centric strategy must now shift to define generic capabilities: the ways and means
1Emphasis added.
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and adversary may choose to accomplish an objective.
Also, the concept of “jointness,” or the cross-service employment of military power to
accomplish strategic objectives, evolved from the lessons of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Fu-
ture military capabilities must avoid a “stovepiped” service-centric focus and must integrate
to enable network centric warfare.
To facilitate a transition to flexible, joint, capability-based warfighting, Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a policy memorandum on October 30, 2003 that
identified the need for “an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibil-
ity, creativity, and innovation” [483]. In response, an acquisition policy called the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was developed to institute “a
capabilities-based approach to identifying current and future gaps in our ability to carry out
joint warfighting missions and functions” [123]. This process integrates with the front-end
of the Defense Acquisition System defined in DoD Directive 5000 [370, 452].
The focus of the JCIDS is on “identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military ca-
pability needs” early in the acquisition process; however, the processes and methods used
to comply with JCIDS are largely ad-hoc and inconsistent across companies and acquisi-
tion programs [370]. A key challenge facing the acquisition community is the evaluation of
technology-enabled solutions for which there is no database of empirical data. This chal-
lenge is compounded by the complex nature of systems-of-systems required to provide joint
capabilities.
1.1.2 Technological Superiority is Key
“Linear analysis will get you a much-changed caterpillar, but it won’t get
you a butterfly.”
-Robert L. Hutchings
Former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Technology, from the Greek techne meaning “craft” and logia meaning “ordering” is
“the knowledge of the manipulation of nature for human purposes” [58]. Technology is so
critical to the development of civilizations that archaeologists and anthropologists divide
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human prehistory into epochs based on the technology of the period. While technology can
be used to improve life or take it, many of the technological advances of the 20th century
were shaped by military development. Ever since the first spear-throwing devices were used
in 12,000 B.C., military technology has radically shaped the fortunes of those who possess
it and those who do not.
Over the past thirty years, exploitation of advanced technology has been the corner-
stone of U.S. military policy. This policy traces its origins to the late 1970’s when Secretary
of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
William Perry devised the “offset strategy,” which sought to offset Soviet numerical supe-
riority through the development of advanced technology in critical areas [326]. According
to Lambeth, “by 1982, the USSR was producing some 1,300 new fighters a year... or a
squadron a week and a wing a month” [253]. Outnumbered by a ratio of more than three to
one in Eastern Europe, U.S. defense planners pursued “force multipliers aimed at denying
the Warsaw Pact any advantage from its numerical edge and offensive doctrine” [253].
The policy of technological superiority is further highlighted in the National Security
Strategy of the United States: “Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experi-
mentation with new approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S.
intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and technology” [80]. Over
the past thirty years, the United States has leveraged its advanced technology in several
military conflicts with great success.
Throughout history, the concept of asymmetric warfare, where “there is a total or ex-
tremely strong difference in the opponents’ aims, capabilities, courses of action and moral
codes,” has been of interest to military planners [362]. Under this paradigm, one side is
incapable or unwilling to confront an opponent in a conventional manner and relies on
attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the physical and psychological structure of the adver-
sary. Technologies that enable or negate asymmetric warfare are sometimes called “game
changers,” which refer to the ability of a technology to change the basic rules of warfare. For
example, precision munitions have evolved since the 1970’s have changed the way effective-
ness is measured. Instead of sorties per target, air power effectiveness is now measured in
4
targets per sortie, as shown in Figure 1. Precision munitions also enable operations against
targets in urban environments that would have previously been impossible due to concerns
about civilian casualties and collateral damage.
In 1995, air theorist John Warden summarized this dramatic shift in the nature of air
warfare:
“Precision weapons allow the economical destruction of virtually all targets-
especially strategic and operational targets that are difficult to move or con-
ceal. They change the nature of war from one of probability to one
of certainty. Wars for millennia have been probability events in which each
side launched huge quantities of projectiles (and men) at one another in the
hope that enough of the projectiles (and men) would kill enough of the other side
to induce retreat or surrender. Probability warfare was chancy at best. It was
unpredictable, full of surprises, hard to quantify, and governed by accident. Pre-
cision weapons have changed all that. In the Gulf War, we knew with certainty
that a single weapon would destroy its target. War moved into the predictable.”
[475]
The discovery of such disruptive technologies or “game changers” that either enable an
asymmetric advantage on the friendly side or negate potential disruptors on the adversarial
side is an area of interest to the Department of Defense [94, 67, 374].
In addition to disruptive technologies, enabling technologies also provide similar asym-
metric advantages. Enablers are defined as those technologies which, when combined with
existing systems and tactics, can facilitate new capabilities otherwise impossible. For exam-
ple, the invention of ironclad warships in the 19th century was catalyzed by the invention
of the steam engine. According to Betz, “although ships could have been clad with iron
earlier, they would have been clumsy to sail” [58]. Currently, military decision-makers lack
techniques to rapidly assess the mission effectiveness of technology-rich systems-of-systems
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Figure 1: Precision Weapons are a Game Changing Technology.
and domains [36]. In the presence of finite budget limitations, the identification of high-
payoff technology areas, game changing technologies, and enabling technologies that provide
maximum benefit to the warfighter across these trade spaces is critical.
Finally, Colonel Michael B. Leahy, Director of the Air Vehicles Directorate at the Air
Force Research Laboratory identifies the need to “envision alternative futures and then lead
the process of discovery, development and transition into war winning solutions.” He also
notes that “increasingly those solutions can not be achieved by a single technical advance,
but rather by integrating a set of science and technology activities toward enabling a system
level capability” [256]. The discovery of technologies must therefore be focused on the
identification of a portfolio of capability-enabling technologies.
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1.1.3 Research Objective
The primary goal for this work is the development of a structured methodology, consistent
with the JCIDS, that supports the identification of a robust portfolio of technologies that
best provides a capability or capabilities. A key challenge is the integration of multiple
heterogeneous elements that comprise a “system-of-systems” that must work together to
provide capabilities. The overall research objective is defined below as:
Research Objective: The focus of this research is on the development of a
valid, defensible, and practical methodology that facilitates a quantitative as-
sessment of technology potential of systems-of-systems with respect to capability-
level gaps and provides information to decision-makers early in the design
process.
Exposition of this objective is necessary to clarify the goal and extent of the research
described herein. The terms “valid, defensible, and practical” elude to real or perceived
shortcomings in current methods for resource allocation. Does the method work? Can the
results be defended by the data and analysis? Can the analysis be produced with a reason-
able amount of resources? Successfully addressing the balance between these questions will
result in a process that is both useful and powerful.
The phrase “quantitative assessment” defines one of the requirements implicit from
the previous three terms. A structured methodology that relies on the physics of the
problem is a way to quantify the benefit of technologies, but caution is required to stay
within the bounds of the practical. The term “technology potential” is defined by Danner
as “the possibility for further development or more precisely the availability for further
improvement of a technology attribute relative to impending limits” [117]. In this work,
technology potential refers not to a forecasted investment-dependent value, but rather the
limit of physical realizability of a technology in capability terms.
The ambiguous and oft-used term “capability” is defined in detail in Section 2.1. As
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an introduction, a capability can be generally defined as “the ability to achieve and effect”
and is not tied to a specific physical implementation. The subsequent increase in design
freedom is both a curse and a blessing.
Finally, the objective of this research is to cut through the complexity caused by the
systems-of-systems nature of JCIDS-compliant acquisitions. The result should be a better
quality and quantity of information for judicious use early in the acquisition process.
To formulate a successful approach that uses quantitative analysis to aid decision makers,
it is necessary to first review existing methods for technology evaluation to identify whether
current best-in-class techniques address the need for capability-based technology evaluation
for systems-of-systems.
1.2 Establishing a Baseline: How Technology Evaluation is
Done Today
Before proposing the development of a new methodology, it is necessary to review the
current state-of-the-art to determine whether an existing methodology can be used outright
to address the problem at hand. This process is called baselining.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, technology evaluation for large-scale heteroge-
neous system architectures is confounded by two opposing constraints: the need for highly
detailed analysis and the desire to maintain the large-scale focus of the problem [372]. This
problem is also faced in other fields such as finance, meteorology, software engineering. A
review of potential approaches revealed that the ability of an alternative to satisfy require-
ments is generally determined using qualitative or fuzzy approaches due to the difficulty in
modeling complex systems such as weather patterns, financial markets, or commercial user
preference.
Within the aerospace community, some popular technology evaluation and resource
allocation techniques summarized below include:
• Experimental Approach
• Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
• Technology Development Approach (TDA)
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• Technology Performance Risk Index (TPRI)
• Technology Identification Evaluation and Selection (TIES)
• Quantitative Technology Assessment (QTA)
1.2.1 Experimental Approach
Physical experimentation, the most expensive and least elegant, yet arguably the most
effective form of technology evaluation, refers to the direct implementation of a new tech-
nology in the field. Extensively used for commercial products such as MP3 players, cellular
telephones, and computers, physical experimentation was notably used in the aerospace
industry during the 1991 Gulf War. On January 12, 1991, the E-8A Joint STARS aircraft,
still in its experimental phase2 and manned primarily by Northrop Grumman contractors,
was rushed into service in the Persian Gulf [348]. Its ability to use Moving Target Indication
(MTI) radar detected Iraqi armor moving toward the town of Al-Khafji in what would be
the only major Iraqi ground offensive of the Persian Gulf War and allowed U.S. planners to
decimate the Iraqi division with air power.
While the experimental approach provides a clear means for assessing capabilities pro-
vided by candidate technologies in a realistic operational environment, in the presence of
finite fiduciary resources an analytical technology evaluation methodology is needed.
1.2.2 Seminar War Games
According to the Department of Defense, a war game is “a simulation, by whatever means, of
a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data and procedures
designed to depict an actual or assumed live situation” [468]. Wargames are typically used to
explore new operational concepts, assess alternative force structures, or postulate technology
effects using a plausible futuristic scenario. A Seminar War Game is one class of war games
that divides a team of experts into two groups that “play” against each other using verbal
or written “moves.” A game master assesses the results of each move and describes the
resulting game board to both teams at the onset of the next move.
2Expected to be operational in 1997, but actually became fully operational in late 1998.
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Seminar war gaming is used heavily across all services. The Army’s School of Advanced
Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has conducted war games since the 19th
century [335]. The Naval War College instituted the Global War Game, a yearly exercise,
in 1978 to extend the Navy’s traditional tactical focus to the strategic domain [167]. The
Air Force uses two service-operated wargames:
• Global Engagement: “explores emerging operational concepts for employment of air
and space power” [432].
• Air Force Future Capabilities Game: “explores alternative futures and force structure
to support strategic planning inputs” [432].
These games often take months to set up and execute, require hundreds of people to
conduct, and cost millions of dollars [199]. Recent technological advances have extended
this basic methodology to include computerized consoles to input game moves; however,
few seminar war games utilize advances in computer simulation and gaming to simulate
friendly and adversary performance [115].
Seminar War Games also rely almost exclusively on expert judgement. Such exercises
may not fully capture the integrated effects brought about by systems-of-systems. Service
centric games often lack a focus on joint operations. Finally, these qualitative assessments
lack traceability and cannot be extended to off-design conditions.
1.2.3 Scientific Advisory Board
The USAF Scientific Advisory Board3 (SAB) is an organization tasked with providing
long-range forecasting of the research and development needs of the Air Force. Comprised
primarily of members from academia, “it provides a link between the Air Force and the
nations scientific community” and “promotes the exchange of the latest scientific and tech-
nical information that may enhance the accomplishment of the Air Force mission” [435].
The USAF SAB is an advisory body that responds to specific questions posed by senior
Air Force leadership and while it may not specifically identify individual technologies, its
guidance often focuses Air Force technology policy.
3Originally called the Scientific Advisory Group and directed by Theodore von Karman.
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Since the formation of the SAB, it has performed six decadal studies on S&T:
• Toward New Horizons (1944)
• Woods Hole Summer Studies (1958)
• Project Forecast (1964)
• New Horizons II (1975)
• Project Forecast II (1986)
• New World Vistas (1996)
Summarizing the SAB reports, Air Force Historian Michael H. Gorn says [181]:
“the studies seemed to be entirely random, without connection to one another.
They occurred without prior plan; no one organization produced them; their
participants varied greatly; their methodologies were not at all uniform; their
conclusions varied significantly; and, in fact, they did not even share common
purposes.”
While the original purpose of the SAB was to examine advances in science and analyze how
these advances may affect the employment of airpower, Gorn notes that over time SAB
studies have focused less on physical principles, used more internal Air Force forecasting
techniques, and rely less on independent advice [180].
In 1994, the SAB was directed to identify “technologies that will guarantee the air and
space superiority of the United States in the 21st Century” [20]. The 15 volume, 2000
page document recommends technologies for specific vehicle classes in support of a number
of Air Force missions. The study is very tightly focused on specific vehicles, qualitative
information, brainstorming, and anecdotal evidence. In addition to the lack of a struc-
tured methodology, the vehicle-centric nature of the later studies makes it difficult to assess
the overall effectiveness of proposed technologies in a systems-of-systems context. In fact,
only the 1964 Project Forecast report filtered candidate technologies with respect to cost,
capabilities, and threat assessment [181].
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1.2.4 Technology Development Approach
The Technology Development Approach (TDA), developed by Dr. Donald Dix, is a qualita-
tive method for roadmapping expected technology impacts. The TDA (Figure 2) examines
several technology efforts and objectives and proposes point-estimates for the impacts of
each technology. These technologies are then rolled up into the subarea goals (upper right
corner of Figure 2) for the proposed system, and extrapolated to expected improvements in
top level Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs)4 in the upper left corner of Figure 2. The TDA
is constructed using expert opinion, brainstorming, and qualitative analysis. Shortcomings
in this technique include the difficulty of assigning numerical values to expected payoffs, the
inability to specify a confidence in the proposed values, a lack of traceability in the analysis
process, and the absence of a method to account for the interactions between conflicting or
correlated factors.
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Figure 2: Technology Development Approach for Rotary Wing Vehicles [129].
4Section 5.2.2 defines Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance in the context of systems-
of-systems.
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1.2.5 Technology Performance Risk Index (TPRI)
Noting that the leading cause of problems with weapon system development is immature
technology transition, Mahafza proposed an approach called the Technology Performance
Risk Index (TPRI) [165]. TPRI is a method for tracking the performance gap and degree
of difficulty of a technology throughout its development program [266]. One result of this
technique is a measure of the performance achieved relative to the acceptable threshold
of performance risk for a given degree of difficulty. For each technology, the TPRI for







Where Ai is the ith Measure of Performance (MoP), DDi is the degree of difficulty for
meeting the required MoP, and n is the number of MoPs being considered. This measure
is meant to be exercised at different time levels of technology maturity until the numerical
value of TPRI is zero.
While TPRI provides transparency across the technology development life cycle, it is not
well-suited for system-of-systems programs as it tracks only MoPs and not MoEs. Further-
more, it is heavily based on qualitative information and lacks a mechanism for accounting
for multiple technologies simultaneously.
1.2.6 Technology Identification, Evaluation, and Selection (TIES)
Kirby’s Technology Identification, Evaluation and Selection (TIES) methodology is a “com-
prehensive and structured method to allow for the design of complex systems which result
in high quality and competitive cost to meet future, aggressive customer requirements”
[239]. This technique uses modeling and simulation to quantitatively assess the impact of
technologies by representing the technology impacts as “k-factors” (see Section C.2). While
TIES can be seen as a quantitative extension of the TDA approach, traditional applications
of the method have been primarily focused on the evaluation of MoPs for a system and have
to date not addressed the issue technology evaluation for large-scale heterogeneous systems.
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For example, Hale notes that technology evaluation for systems-of-systems require integra-
tion of one or more scenarios and involve “significant interactions between the platform and
specific missions” [187]. The TIES method also assumes that “the impacts of the individual
technologies are additive,” which may not be a valid assumption for systems-of-systems that
are dominated by nonlinearity [240, 484]. However, elements of the TIES method, most
notably the integral focus on modeling and simulation as a means to calculate the perfor-
mance of a system and the use of “k-factors” to represent technology impacts, provide a
framework for enabling quantitative technology evaluation for systems-of-systems.
1.2.7 Quantitative Technology Assessment (QTA)
The United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is actively engaged in a research
effort to “integrate new methodologies and tools with existing ‘industry-standard’ tools to
effectively test the effects of new technologies on air vehicle capability” [481]. The “approach
requires that the Air Force be able to quantify the impacts of any proposed technology on
each key capability” [395]. Under this paradigm, a program called Quantitative Technology
Assessment (QTA) has been initiated that aims to reduce analytical cycle time, combines
multiple disciplinary models, and enables broader design space exploration. According to
AFRL program manager David Brown, QTA provides a traceable process that enables
informed R&D decisions [76]. In addition to capability gap analysis, the QTA process
shown in Figure 3 provides “meaningful mission effectiveness analysis that quantitatively
measures the value of technologies” [76]. Under the framework of QTA, an environment can
also be constructed that enables real-time interaction between geographically distributed
design organization through direct linking of simulation tools as shown in Figure 4.
AFRL Simulation Based Research and Development Lead James Zeh says QTA is en-
abled through constructive simulation and parametric modeling [495]. Caudill and Zeh also
note than a simulation architecture should be modular and flexible to support interchange-
ability of modules and “limit dependency on system specific models” [90]. Quantitative
Technology Assessment is well suited for system-of-system studies and evaluation of tech-
nologies with respect to capability-level MoEs.
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Figure 3: Outline of the QTA Process [76].
Figure 4: Quantitative Technology Assessment Environment and Links [13].
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1.2.8 Summary of Existing Technology Evaluation Methods
After a review of the above techniques, several key attributes of popular technology evalu-
ation methods emerge:
• Quantitative: Measurable process for enumerating ways and means and comparing
solutions
• Traceable: Enables identification of the effectiveness drivers of a proposed technology
solution.
• Flexible: Generalizable to multiple problems in the same class with minimal modifi-
cation
• Reusable: Method and environment can be used to study multiple attributes of the
same problem.
• Rapid: Can be applied in a reasonable time frame without unrealistic resource re-
quirements
• Parametric: Avoids point solutions and provides visibility into behaviors previously
obscured by the complexity of the problem
• Scalable (to Systems-of-Systems): Avoids simplistic representations of interactions
between systems
• Affordable: Produces valid results without extensive manpower commitments and
uses commercial off-the-shelf tools when possible
• Simple: The steps in the methodology are reasonable, logical and teachable
Based on these definitions, the aforementioned techniques can be qualitatively compared
based on the author’s assessment across the multiple attributes as shown in Figure 5.
As the figure illustrates, none of the methods surveyed are ranked excellent in all di-
mensions. The green shaded boxes identify the best-in-class techniques for each of the
attributes as identified by the author. All things being equal, the TIES methodology is the
best-in-class technique across all identified dimensions; however, QTA is a set of “meth-
ods/tools/processes that allow an assessment of the impact/value/contribution of technolo-
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Figure 5: Characteristics of Several Technology Evaluation Methodologies.
QTA methods facilitates the definition of a new method that is well suited for capability-
based technology evaluation for systems-of-systems. To meet the increasing analysis needs
of the acquisition community, a new method should support a variable-fidelity approach to
modeling and simulation. Techniques to speed up the analysis process and enable trade
space exploration across a multivariate problem are also needed to increase the usability
of results. Furthermore, none of the methods surveyed account for the confounding im-
pact of tactics on technology selection or the difficulty in analyzing disparate architecture
technologies. These shortcomings drive the need for a new methodology that includes these
elements.
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1.2.9 A New Methodology is Needed
Since there is no existing technique that completely addresses the needs of the technology
evaluation community, the purpose of this research is to extend the basic concepts of the
existing processes through infusion of new techniques and methods. The “product” of
this research is a new methodology, “a body of practices, procedures, and rules used by
those who work in a discipline” [22]. The primary expected payoff in this research is the
codification of a structured methodology for technology evaluation that can be extended to
address a range of problems in the field of systems-of-systems engineering. Additionally, the
demonstration of this process results in the creation of a parametric tradeoff environment
for systems and technologies.
The measures of success used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology
are based on the qualitative attributes identified in Figure 5. These attributes are revisited
in the conclusion to assess the ability of the proposed methodology to address shortcomings
of existing resource allocation and technology forecasting techniques.
1.3 Defining an Example Application
A new planning framework called “Focused Long Term Challenges” (FLTCs) has recently
been implemented to provide a direct link between technology evaluation and capabilities-
based planning at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) [371]. The “FLTCs build
upon the Long-Term Challenges identified in the comprehensive S&T Planning Review
undertaken several years ago at the direction of Congress and will guide investment” in the
AFRL technology portfolio [219].
As of August 2006, the FLTCs are Anticipatory Synchronized Operations, Tailored,
Persistent Collection for Predictive Battlespace Awareness, Acquire and Engage Difficult
Targets, Assured Operations in High Threat Environments, Integrated Cyber/Info Effects,
Responsive Adaptive Theater Operations, and Affordable Aerospace Reliability and Readi-
ness (see Figure 6) [64].
To address the challenges identified in the FLTCs, the Air Force Research Laboratory Ve-
hicles Directorate defines seven supporting capabilities: Cooperative Airspace Operations,
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1. Anticipatory Synchronized                    
Operations
2. Tailored, Persistent, Collection 
for Predictive BattleSpace 
Awareness
3. Acquire & Engage Difficult 
Targets
4. Assured Operations in High 
Threat Environments
5. Integrated Cyber/Info Effects
6. Responsive Adaptive Theater 
Operations
7. Affordable Aerospace 
Reliability and Readiness
Figure 6: Air Force Focused Long Term Challenges (FLTCs), LRS-relevant Challenges
Highlighted in Red [64].
Figure 7: Capabilities Defined by the Air Force Research Lab Vehicles Directorate [444].
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Multi-Mission Mobility, Operational Responsive Space Access, Persistent ISR, Precision
Persistent Strike, Prompt Global Strike, and Long Range Strike shown in Figure 7 [444].
Of the seven capabilities, Long Range Strike (LRS) has been gaining increased importance
Congress, within the aerospace community, and in the press. Congress has noted that evolv-
ing LRS capability through an improvement of the nation’s bomber force is a high priority
[201, 408, 478].
Long Range Strike (LRS) capability can be defined as “the ability to conduct prompt,
accurate, conventional strikes anywhere on the globe on very short notice” [477]. The
concept can also be defined from an effects-based standpoint: “achieve a desired effect(s)
rapidly and/or persistently, on any target, in any environment, anywhere, at any time.”
[444]. The 2006 Air Force Posture Statement notes that “responsive capabilities will com-
bine speed, stealth, and payload to strike hardened, deeply buried, or mobile targets, deep
in enemy territory, in adverse weather and with survivable persistence” [305]. Finally, pro-
viding increased LRS capability directly addresses FLTCs three and four, highlighted in
Figure 6.
Current Air Force Doctrine defines the LRS as an element of the Global Strike Task
Force (GSTF) [230]. In this context, the primary objective for LRS assets is “kicking down
the door” to open the way for the rest of the U.S. military. According to former Air Force
Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper, the GSTF “is not necessarily your war-winning
force. It creates the conditions for the war-winning force to get close enough to do their
job” [331]. LRS capability is defined in detail in Section 2.4.
Long Range Strike capability impacts a number of the high-level strategic challenges
facing the United States through the ability to quickly degrade enemy offensive capability
with particular emphasis on high-payoff elements such as the enemy’s weapons of mass
destruction development, production, and employment assets. The relevance of this problem,
the heterogeneous nature of LRS architecture elements, and the availability of public domain
data related to potential LRS concepts and applications drive the selection of Long Range
Strike capability for the demonstration of the proposed methodology.
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1.4 Dissertation Organization
In Chapter I, a key issue facing the acquisition community, the lack of a structured methodol-
ogy for performing quantitative technology evaluation for systems-of-systems was surveyed.
This problem motivates the development of a new methodology. Chapter II further elab-
orates on the problem by defining key terms, expounding upon the example application,
and summarizing key assumptions needed to establish an appropriate “control volume” for
methodology development. In Chapter III, several technical barriers to the development
of a new methodology are revealed, research questions are formulated to address these
challenges, and hypotheses are proposed that identify enabling techniques based on each
research question. In Chapter IV, a methodology for capability-based technology evalua-
tion for systems-of-systems is proposed. This methodology addresses the shortcomings of
existing methods defined in Section 1.2 and is designed to incorporate and synthesize the
hypotheses identified in Chapter III.
A key aspect of engineering dissertations is the need to validate the philosophical argu-
ments from Chapters III and IV using an experimental test of some sort. Chapter V details
a modeling and simulation environment developed to test the proposed methodology using a
Long Range Strike system architecture. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the lessons learned
from the application of the proposed methodology to the Long Range Strike problem and
identify areas for future work.
In addition to the body of this dissertation, several appendices that summarize a search
of the technical literature are included to justify the proposed hypotheses in Chapter III.
The proposed hypotheses are summarized in Section 3.4 and a taxonomy of options is
illustrated in the form of a matrix of alternatives in Figure 22. Readers unfamiliar with the
options proposed may wish to review the appendices for a more thorough exposition of the




Section 1.2.9 identified the need to develop a new methodology due to shortcomings in ex-
isting techniques and methods. The first step of the problem definition phase is to establish
the characteristics of the new methodology. This includes a definition of relevant terms and
an identification of possible challenges related to methodology development. Next, Long
Range Strike capability is in Section 1.3 as a challenging problem to test the implementation
of the proposed methodology. LRS capability is defined in detail in Section 2.4. Finally,
a recapitulation of key observations made throughout this section is given in Section 2.5.
These observations shape the research questions and hypotheses defined in the subsequent
chapter.
The title of this work is A Methodology for Capability-Based Technology Eval-
uation for Systems-of-Systems. The scope of work can be best delineated by defining
each of these terms in turn.
2.1 Definition of a Capability
Throughout the Cold War, military acquisition was threat-based : system procurement was
based on anticipated threats posed by a known enemy, the Soviet Union. Since systems have
significant development cycle times, requirements were based on forecasted performance of
systems the enemy was expected to employ by the entry-into-service date. While this fore-
casting process was dominated by assumptions and uncertainty, degrees-of-freedom related
to the geography, policy, doctrine, and technology readiness were somewhat constrained.
While this strategy was effective, the current military situation is drastically different
from that of the past forty years. Nation-states with fixed emplacements, tank columns,
airfields, and strategic weapons have given way to smaller, fragmented, non-governmental
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enemies which generally lack sophisticated integrated defensive systems. For example, dur-
ing Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, B-2 bombers only operated for two days, by
which time a majority of Afghanistan’s air defenses were destroyed [183]. Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld went on to say that “[The Afghans] do not have high-value targets or assets that
are the kinds of things that would lend themselves to substantial damage from the air”
[361].
Furthermore, the acquisition policies for traditional weapons systems were driven by
service-centric requirements codified in an Operational Requirements Document (ORD).
“These documents have tended to spawn rigid acquisition programs that focus too narrowly
on achieving specified and sometimes overly optimistic levels of performance” [463]. In the
interest of protecting cost and schedule, new technologies that add programmatic risk may
be excluded. The result of the ORD-based process was that systems were approaching
obsolescence by the time they were fielded. Furthermore, performance shortfalls often led
to increased costs, loss of political support, and a reduction in the number of aircraft to be
procured.
The Air Force is in the midst of a transformational process to address the mismatch
between the current force structure and a more responsive system architecture [434]. In the
2002 Air Force Posture Statement, former Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper
said, “Our goal is to make warfighting effects and the capabilities we need to achieve them,
the driving factor for everything we do. This enables (us to develop the capabilities needed)
to answer a broad range of challenges posed by potential adversaries, while also developing
the (assets needed) for the future” [231]. This shift has two primary elements. The first
is that of effects-based operations1, which relates to the actual employment of military
systems [112]. The second is capability-based acquisition which directs the Air Force to
procure capabilities instead of systems. The shift is explained by Col. Mike Holmes, Chief
of the Air Force Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine Division at the Pentagon [174]:
1The concept of “effects-based targeting” was matured by Lt. Col. David A. Deptula during the 1991
Persian Gulf War. The concept has spawned a number of proponents and detractors over the past fifteen
years.
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“In the past, we sometimes started with a new (weapons) system that we
could buy and then we tried to figure out what to do with it. What the chief
of staff has asked us to do now is identify the effect we want to achieve on the
battlefield and the capabilities required to achieve that effect. This requires us to
determine what options are available to us – do we already have something in
the inventory that can achieve this desired effect, or do we need to look for a
new solution? This new solution may require purchasing a new weapons system,
or it might be just finding a new way of doing business. It will require the Air
Force to start with a problem and then determine what can be done to overcome
that problem in order to accomplish the desired mission.”
The goal of capability-based acquisition is to field “militarily significant capabilities as
soon as they become available” [463]. By constantly improving fielded systems through block
upgrades, the military can keep up with threats that are constantly evolving. Dickerson
notes that this process centers on the acquisition of a family-of-systems or system-of-systems
that enables operations across one or more missions [134].
The fundamental shift toward capability-based acquisition and design is best described
by a shift away from “things” to “ways to do things” as embodied in several key definitions
of a capability:
“the ability to execute a specified course of action. A capability may or may
not be accompanied by an intention” [468].
“the combination of military equipment, personnel, logistics support, train-
ing, resources, etc. that provides Defence with the ability to achieve its opera-
tional aims” [47].
“the ability to achieve an effect to a standard under specified conditions
through multiple combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks”
[454].
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The use of the term “capability” in the context of military planning first originated in
the British Ministry of Defence and has also been incorporated in Australia and Canada [45].
The final oft-cited definition was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation
of the JCIDS. The word “ability,” common to all three definitions, identifies the shift from
stovepiped, service-centric, asset-based acquisition to a more flexible system that looks at
the ways a mission can be accomplished. Because military objectives are often defined in
terms of desired effects, the notion of a capability has a certain course of action or desired
outcome in mind. The phrase “to a standard” implies that certain thresholds of desired of
effectiveness are also tied to a capability. The standard defines how well a set of tasks must
be performed. Different systems employed in different ways may provide the same capability
to different standards. The “specified conditions” refer to the assumptions and the scenario
in which the capability is employed. The employment of a system under conditions for which
it was not designed may result in dramatically different consequences. Finally, the JCIDS
definition of capability notes that multiple ways and means are employed in a combination
of ways to achieve an effect. Complex interactions derived from the multiple potential
combinations of ways and means confounds the analysis process and contributes both to
design freedom and analysis challenges.
2.1.0.1 Capability-Based Planning is Not a New Concept
Also of note is a historical analysis capability-based planning concept. Early in the Cold
War, the Department of Defense issued “General Operational Requirements” which were
open-ended documents that specified the need for a new weapon system to fulfill a purpose.
For example, General Operational Requirement No. 38 “called for an intercontinental bom-
bardment weapon (a piloted bomber) that would replace the B-52 and stay in service during
the decade beginning in 1965” [176]. This document was the genesis of the XB-70 Valkryie.
General Operational Requirement No. 96 which “outlined the military need for three north-
ern radar sites capable of detecting and tracking Soviet ICBMs” led to the Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System (BMEWS) [396, 426]. Other General Operational Requirements
resulted in systems such as the MIDAS early warning infrared satellite constellation, the
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CORONA surveillance satellite, the U-2 surveillance aircraft, and the supersonic SR-71
[396]. These documents were primarily issued to address a military need when the specific
physical implementation of a solution was not paramount. General Operational Require-
ments were also used when the technological advancements of the day were best understood
by a handful of experts or when specific requirements were difficult to quantify due to the
extreme technical risk of the programs undertaken. As technologies such as satellites and
supersonic aircraft matured, the need to issue open-ended requirements statements were
replaced by extremely specific requirements that required exact satisfaction for customer
acceptance. Such arrangements were especially critical in multi-contractor competitions
that sometimes involved litigation by the losing party. Today we see a shift back toward
the more unconstrained approach, driven by the need to leverage new technologies and
quickly adapt to changing threats and evolving capabilities.
2.1.0.2 Why Doesn’t a Structured Process Already Exist?
Given the presence of policies that mandate a shift to capability-based acquisition, how is
it possible that a structured method that supports JCIDS is not ubiquitous in the litera-
ture? While the Defense Acquisition University has published a number of documents on
acquisition policy and the mechanics of JCIDS compliance, the mandate is still relatively
new [124].
In March 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent a memo to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff directing a new way to evaluate requirements across a spectrum of alternatives [359].
The text of this memo, considered the birth of the JCIDS, is shown in Figure 8. The first
revision of the JCIDS instruction (CJCSI 3170.01C) was published in June 2003. This was
then superseded by CJCSI 3170.01D in March 2004 and CJCSI 3170.01E in May 2005 [370].
During this time, it is believed that many organizations have developed internal policies











As Chairman of the JROC, please think through what we all need to do, individually or 
collectively, to get the requirements system fixed.
It is pretty clear it is broken, and it is so powerful and inexorable that it invariably 
continues to require things that ought not to be required, and does not require things that 
need to be required.
Please screw your head into that, and let’s have four or five of us meet and talk about it.
Thanks.
 
Figure 1: memo from the Secretary of Defense that began JCIDS. 
Predictably, a considerable amount of activity followed (led by the decision to banish the word 
“requirement” from the new process). This effort resulted in three principles that form the 
foundation of JCIDS: 
• Describing needs in terms of capabilities, instead of systems or force elements. One 
of the major frustrations of the previous requirements processes was that solutions were 
introduced to the system without any higher-level rationalization. The intent was to 
replace statements such as “we need a more advanced fighter,” with “we need the 
capability to defeat enemy air defenses.” The latter statement provides the rationalization 
for needs, and also allows for competition among solutions. 
• Deriving needs from a joint perspective, from a new set of joint concepts. The JCIDS 
architects recognized that a new set of documents would be necessary to link strategic 
ends to warfighting means. Furthermore, these documents would have to go beyond 
doctrine, which are beliefs about the best way to do things with existing resources. The 
joint concepts would have to challenge existing approaches and provide impetus for 
improvement. Also, these documents would broaden the strategic view and force the 
DOD to consider the needs of a variety of military problems, not just one or two 
canonical warfights. 
• Having a single general or flag officer oversee each DOD functional portfolio. One 
problem with the existing requirements process was that no one organization had 
responsibility for knowing what DOD was doing in, say, command-and-control systems. 
As a result, senior DOD decision makers became involved only after an unacceptably 
small set of options were defined. In JCIDS, each Functional Capability Board (FCB) is 
directed by a general or flag officer who has that responsibility. 
By the summer of 2003, JCIDS was up and operating. The FCBs began functioning, and the 
production of joint concept documents began. 
We do not claim that this transition has been straightforward or painless. CJCSI 3170.01, the 
governing instruction for JCIDS, has been revised five times in its first three years. Also, debate 
continues on what exactly a capabilities-based approach is, what task structures should be used, 
Figure 8: Genesis of JCIDS: March 2002 Memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace [220].
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2.2 Quantitative Technology Evaluation
“For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public
relations, for Nature cannot be fooled.”
-Richard P. Feynman
Technology evaluation is the assessment of the relative benefit of a proposed technology
with respect to one or more capability-level metrics. Several government organizations in-
cluding the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Army Re-
search Laboratory (ARL), and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) are tasked with
the identification and evaluation of advanced technologies for future application. For ex-
ample, DARPA’s mission statement is to “maintain the technological superiority of the
U.S. military and prevent technological surprise from harming our national security by
sponsoring revolutionary, high-payoff research that bridges the gap between fundamental
discoveries and their military use” [125]. The AFRL is “a full-spectrum laboratory, respon-
sible for planning and executing the Air Force’s entire science and technology budget, basic
research, applied research and advanced technology development” [423]. These research
entities, by definition, have traditionally focused on the maturation of low readiness tech-
nologies which have the potential for high-payoff, asymmetric capabilities that change the
fundamental dynamics of how systems operate.
It is difficult, in practice, to tie technologies with high uncertainty and revolutionary
capabilities to direct application on existing platforms: a platform that uses a proposed
technology may not even exist today. Furthermore, the ubiquitous nature of information
across the globe means that new technologies are simultaneously available to all mankind2.
This is a stark contrast to the historical pace of technology proliferation, for example, “the
western world had not heard of gunpowder at a time when it was being used in China”
[234].
2The spread of technology into society is referred to by Luce as technology diffusion [263].
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These organizations are at an even greater disadvantage with the shift to a capability-
focus. Under this paradigm, the functions a proposed system may perform may be analyzed
at the early stages of design. While the addition of these degrees of freedom provides the
ability to more thoroughly explore non-traditional means of providing a capability, it also
confounds the technology evaluation by increasing the available design space without bound.
In contrast to a bottom-up exploratory forecasting approach where candidate technolo-
gies are proposed and their effectiveness is assessed against one or more measures of merit,















Inverse Design is a “Normative Forecasting”
method and is equivalent to a TOP-DOWN
assessment. There are no specific systems, 
technologies, and tactics in mind. You are 
discovering them based on desired capabilities.
Forward Design is an “Exploratory 
Forecasting” method and is equivalent to 
a BOTTOM-UP assessment. There are 
specific technologies, tactics, and systems 
in mind that are explicitly defined. 
Capabilities provided by these systems 
can be analyzed and compared.
Proposed
Methodology
Figure 9: Relationship Between Forward Design and Inverse Design.
After defining one or more capabilities, the design space must be focused using systems
engineering techniques to identify one or more system architectures to be examined. Next, a
technique is needed to quantitatively explore the technology aspiration space with respect
to capability-level MoEs.
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A top-down approach is used to decompose capabilities into systems. A bottom-up
approach is used to assess the capability gaps of one or more systems and close the loop
between technology discovery and technology evaluation.
2.3 Introduction to Systems-of-Systems
While technology evaluation methods for systems have become more popular over the last
several years, there has yet to be an emergence of a dominant technique for performing
such assessments for systems-of-systems. The subsequent sections introduce a terminology
for systems-of-systems and delineate between systems and architectures for the purpose of
defining a nomenclature for use throughout this dissertation.
2.3.1 What are Systems?
“Life was simple before World War II. After that, we had systems.”
- Admiral Grace Hopper (1906-1992)
A system, from the Greek sunistanai meaning “to combine,” is “a combination of in-
teracting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes” [217]. Systems can
be generally categorized as either simple or complex. Simple systems, examples of which
include oscillators and pendulums, can usually be described using closed-form analytical ex-
pressions and thus exhibit predictable behaviors. On the other hand, complex systems are
often comprised of multiple, heterogeneous, interrelated elements and are difficult to study
mathematically [260]. Complex systems are ubiquitous in engineering applications and de-
mand a multidisciplinary approach to their study. Examples of complex systems include
electrical distribution grids, a network of related computer software and data transmission
devices, weather, and the human body.
A key aspect that distinguishes a complex system from a simple system or component
is that a system generally has the property of emergent behavior: the combination of
elements reveals a new function that the parts cannot provide in isolation. Bar-Yam notes
that emergent behavior results when “the behaviors of many simple parts interact in such
a way that the behavior of the whole is complex” [54].
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In the context of systems, “complex” and “complicated” are not synonyms: while com-
plicated tends to refer to large systems with many components, complexity is derived from
the interwoven and interconnected nature of complex systems. Unlike simple systems that
can be studied through Newtonian mechanics and decomposition, the interactions within
a complex system are sometimes more important than the characteristics of the system
components themselves. For this reason, a decomposition-based approach that ignores the
strong interactions between system elements is inappropriate for the study of complex sys-
tems.
Although many subdisciplines have emerged to develop certain types of systems, the
overarching scientific study of systems and their behavior is called Systems Engineering.
Systems engineering is “a standardized, disciplined management process for development
of system solutions that provides a constant approach to system development in an envi-
ronment of change and uncertainty” [130]. A major focus of systems engineering is the
development of total systems solutions, including supportability, operations and training,
that satisfy customer requirements while balancing cost, schedule, performance, and risk.
Systems engineering combines technical aspects of design with management techniques to
ensure that these criteria are met. The systems engineering definition of system is particu-
larly relevant to this research: “an integrated composite of people, products, and processes
that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective” [130].
The DoD 5000 series of directives on acquisition policy also identifies the need for systems
engineering in acquisition, primarily to transform operational needs and requirements into
a system solution that fulfills customer needs throughout the life cycle. It also ensures the
compatibility and interoperability of the disparate elements in large-scale military systems
and uses science and engineering to identify risk areas and mitigate them [452].
2.3.2 The Challenge of Heterogeneity
The primary difficulty with assessing military capabilities is not the hierarchical nature of
the modeling requirements, but rather the complex interaction between the components of
a system architecture. The Air Force alone has over 7,500 aircraft of 45 different types with
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many variants, derivatives, and blocks [423]3. These systems must interact with each other,
command and control entities, communications satellites, joint forces, and with coalition
countries that may communicate using different languages, frequencies, standards, and units
of measurement. Interactions between these elements can be temporary, evolutionary, or
unpredictable, complicating the analysis of heterogeneous system architectures.
The primary difficulty in designing multidisciplinary systems with complex interactions
and many components is the evaluation of different options that provide the same overall
capability. Different architectures provide a different level of effectiveness and varying levels
of cost, technology, and time to implementation. Currently, many elements of an architec-
ture are optimized in isolation and seen as ideal by the members of their respective design
organizations. There is no structured methodology for the comparison of dissimilar systems
against the same top-level measures of effectiveness using constant assumptions.
2.3.3 Characteristics of Systems-of-Systems
In recent years, the term “system-of-systems” (SoS) has become increasingly popular termi-
nology for a large-scale system that is comprised of a variety of heterogeneous, interoperable,
collaborative systems4 [27]. While the precise origin of this term is unclear, a 1964 paper by
Berry on New York City refers to “cities as systems within systems of cities” [56, 250]. “The
term ‘systems-of-systems’ is generally used to define a class of systems wherein a set of in-
dependent systems, each having unique behavior and performance, is organized to perform
collaboratively and coherently to achieve a purpose” [110]. Definitions for system-of-systems
abound in the literature:
• The Department of Defense defines a “system-of-systems” as “a set or arrangement
of systems that are related or connected to provide a given capability” [370].
• The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) refers to the definition
by Krygiel: “a system-of-systems is a set of different systems so connected or related
3There are also nine major commands, 35 field operating agencies, 352,000 active duty members and 423
active facilities around the world [16, 423].
4Since a system is comprised of parts, and a system-of-systems is comprised of systems, it is true that a
system-of-systems is in fact a system.
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as to produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone” [217, 250].
• The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board defines a “system-of-systems” as “a config-
uration of systems in which component systems can be added/removed during use;
each provides useful services in its own right; and each is managed for those services.
Yet, together they exhibit a synergistic, transcendent capability” [36].
Systems engineering fundamentals generally hold for larger-scale systems-of-systems ex-
cept that interfaces are more difficult to define, coupling between systems is generally more
complicated and less direct, and the problem of designing a system-of-systems is a very
large scale effort that often requires extensive collaboration between geographically sepa-
rated design entities [235].
Maier [267] identifies five principle characteristics in distinguishing complex systems
from systems-of-systems that are widely cited in the literature5:
1. Emergent Behavior: The system performs functions and carries out purposes that
do not reside in any component system. These behaviors are emergent properties of
the entire system-of-systems and cannot be localized to any component system. The
principal purposes of the systems-of-systems are fulfilled by these behaviors.
2. Evolutionary Development: The system-of-systems does not appear fully formed.
Its development and existence is evolutionary with functions and purposes added,
removed, and modified with experience.
3. Operational Independence of the Elements: If the system-of-systems is disas-
sembled into its component systems the component systems must be able to usefully
operate independently. The system-of-systems is composed of systems which are in-
dependent and useful in their own right.
4. Managerial Independence of the Elements: The component systems not only
can operate independently, they do operate independently. The component systems
5Order changed
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are separately acquired and integrated but maintain a continuing operational existence
independent of the system-of-systems.
5. Geographic Distribution: The geographic extent of the component systems is
large. Large is a nebulous and relative concept as communication capabilities increase,
but at a minimum it means that the components can readily exchange only information
and not substantial quantities of mass or energy.
The first two characteristics are valid for systems as well. Specifically, all systems are
designed to provide an emergent behavior. This emergent behavior is the useful outcome
of component integration that can be used to provide capabilities.
Some systems also also developed incrementally or in blocks. An example of evolutionary
development can be seen with derivative aircraft that have features added or removed over
time. The next three characteristics are unique to large-scale systems-of-systems.
First, the elements of a system-of-systems have operational independence. If an aircraft
(system) is decomposed into its subsystems, the avionics and engines don’t do anything
without the rest of the aircraft. On the other hand, a classic example of a system-of-
systems is the national air transportation system which is comprised of aircraft, air traffic
control facilities, runways, baggage handlers, ticketing agents, fuel trucks, and airports of
varying sizes [207]. If an aircraft is removed from the air transportation system, both can
still operate. The aircraft in turn can also operate independent of baggage handling and
certain airports. This is not true of an aircraft system as it cannot operate if an engine is
removed and vice versa.
This example also demonstrates managerial independence. Aircraft are controlled by
their pilots, and guided by air traffic control. If radio contact is lost, the pilots can usually
find an airport and land. If the digital engine control on an engine fails, it ceases to operate,
regardless of whatever guidance may be provided by the pilot.
Finally, systems-of-systems are usually geographically distributed and their emergent
behavior is derived by the exchange of information. In a national transportation system-of-
systems, the primary means of coordinating interaction and deriving the emergent behaviors
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is by communicating with the various systems and providing instructions.
Maier’s criteria are often used to definitely identify a system as a system-of-systems;
however, ten years after his publication, disagreements bristle regarding the classification of
systems as a systems-of-systems, families-of-systems, federations-of-systems, complex sys-
tems, complex adaptive systems, coalitions of systems, collaborative systems, interoperable
systems, netcentric systems, supersystems, and others [342]. The INCOSE has recently
offered another set of challenges that are unique to systems-of-systems [217]:
1. System Elements Operate Independently: Each system in a system of systems
is likely to be operational in its own right.
2. System Elements Have Different Life Cycles: SoS involves more than one system
element. Some of the system elements are possibly in their development life cycle while
others are already deployed as operational. In extreme cases, older system elements
in a SoS might be scheduled for disposal before newer system elements are deployed.
3. The Initial Requirements are Likely to be Ambiguous: The requirements
for a system of systems can be very explicit for deployed system elements, but for
system elements that are still in the design stage, the requirements are usually no
more explicit than the system element requirements. Requirements for SoS mature as
the system elements mature.
4. Complexity is a Major Issue: As system elements are added, the complexity of
system interaction grows in a non-linear fashion. Furthermore, conflicting or missing
interface standards can make it hard to define data exchanges across system element
interfaces.
5. Management Can Overshadow Engineering. Since each system element has
its own product/project office, the coordination of requirements, budget constraints,
schedules, interfaces, and technology upgrades further complicate the development of
SoS.
6. Fuzzy Boundaries Cause Confusion. Unless someone defines and controls the
scope of a SoS and manages the boundaries of system elements, no one controls the
definition of the external interfaces.
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7. SoS Engineering is Never Finished: Even after all system elements of a SoS
are deployed, product/project management must continue to account for changes in
the various system element life cycles, such as new technologies that impact one or
more system elements, and normal system replacement due to preplanned product
improvement.
According to these guidelines, many military systems are systems-of-systems whose
complexity is compounded by the fact that military procurement agencies seldom buy the
entire system-of-systems at once, preferring a spiral approach that forces interoperability
with legacy systems during the initial spirals.
While the delineation between a system-of-systems and a system can be difficult to
identify, the classification between systems and subsystems can be equally difficult. To an
airline, an aircraft is viewed as a system and an engine is viewed as a subsystem. To an
engine manufacturer, the engine itself is a system comprised of subsystems such as turbines,
compressor blades, and fuel nozzles. The scope of this challenge is summarized by Hatley:
“every system below the level of the whole universe is a component of one or more larger
systems. The larger systems are the context or environment in which the component system
must work” [193].
While Lewe [258] identifies the level of certain systems hierarchically6, an alternative
definition is to understand a system as that which you are, a subsystem as that which you
require to function, and a system-of-systems as that in which you belong. This “three-level
sliding scale” is dependent on the view of the user, noting that most entities cannot see
or understand much beyond their own field of view. An example of one such hierarchy for
military system-of-systems analysis is shown in Figure 10. Aircraft and engines are placed
between levels to underscore the message that the selection of labels is dependent on your
point of view.
6Lewe notes the identification of system levels using Greek letters is credited to Robert Calloway.
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Figure 10: System-of-Systems, Systems, and Subsystems View of Military Architectures.
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2.4 Application: A Next-Generation Long Range Strike Sys-
tem Architecture
Long Range Strike (LRS) capability, introduced in Section 1.3 as a suitable example ap-
plication for a capability-based technology evaluation methodology, can be defined as “the
ability to conduct prompt, accurate, conventional strikes anywhere on the globe on very
short notice” [477]. The concept is also defined by the AFRL as the ability to “achieve a
desired effect(s) rapidly and/or persistently, on any target, in any environment, anywhere,
at any time.” [444]. According to the 2006 Air Force Posture Statement, “responsive capa-
bilities will combine speed, stealth, and payload to strike hardened, deeply buried, or mobile
targets, deep in enemy territory, in adverse weather and with survivable persistence” [305].
Current Air Force Doctrine defines the LRS as an element of the Global Strike Task
Force (GSTF) [230]. In this context, the primary objective for LRS assets is “kicking down
the door” to open the way for the rest of the U.S. military. According to former Air Force
Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper, the GSTF “is not necessarily your war-winning
force. It creates the conditions for the war-winning force to get close enough to do their
job” [331].
The primary motivation for future long range strike systems is that they address a
critical shortcoming in the existing strike force. Currently designated “long range strike”
systems (see Section 2.4.2) were primarily designed against Cold War threats. They are
exceptionally effective against conventional military, economic, and infrastructure targets.
As previously noted, rogue states and terrorist groups have a notable lack of targets for
our existing systems. Elements such as weapons of mass destruction have an extremely
high value to terrorist enemies: uncertainty about their location is a force multiplier and
a large deterrent ability is required to avoid their use. This dichotomy between what our
capabilities are and what they should be in the face of these threats is illustrated in Figure
11.
Currently, the U.S. military is very effective against traditional targets such as economics
and infrastructure while lacking a robust capability against things which rogue states and




























































Figure 11: Comparison of Existing US Capability Against Enemy Value (Based on Ref-
erence [326]).
to provide capability against C2, leadership targets, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) facilities although it may also be effective in a traditional role. Subsequent sections
summarize current and future LRS systems. These next-generation systems should be able
to provide rapid, persistent, penetrating strike options in a denied-access environment in
the presence of limited basing options.
According to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, desired capabilities for a future LRS system-of-systems include [479]:
• Long-range: Global from the continental U.S. (CONUS) or forward operating bases
• Persistent: 24/7 capability in anti-access environment
• Responsive: Respond globally within hours to minutes
• Flexible, Precise Weapons Payload: Mixed load, nuclear capable
• Highly Survivable/Self-Defending: Reduces support
– Low observable, standoff weapons, speed, altitude
– Manned, unmanned, or optionally manned
• Global Situational Awareness: Robust, fused sensor suites
• Real-Time, Robust Beyond Line of Sight Connectivity: Fully netted
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• Autonomous Operations: Onboard sensors, offensive, defensive, non-traditional
ISR
• Flexibility/Adaptability: Easily incorporate new capabilities, open architecture
The first five attributes are used to qualitatively examine existing and proposed LRS
aircraft with respect to capability gaps (see Figure 17). The next four attributes are de-
sirable features of an LRS architecture: no present-day systems possess these attributes.
A process for quantitatively assessing potential LRS architectures with respect to these
metrics is defined in a subsequent section.
2.4.1 The History of Long Range Strike Systems
Range has always been a defining factor in military operations, and the technology to extend
the range of weapons has often led to revolutionary capabilities on the side of the aggressor.
Without technology, projectile attacks are essentially limited to the distance over which a
human can hurl a projectile (about 30 meters). Siege weapons such as the catapult emerged
during Greek times (around 400 B.C.) and were used by Alexander the Great for battlefield
cover in addition to attacking hardened fortifications. Other variations including the onager,
trebuchet, and ballista which were capable of hurling stone projectiles to distances up to
around 300 meters [271]. Artillery emerged as the dominant technology in the 14th century
with the proliferation of gunpowder. Cannon of the 16th and 17th century extended the
strike range of military forces to several thousand meters [269]. Modern Paladin howitzer
self-propelled field artillery pieces are capable of launching a standard shell about 18 km
and a rocket-assisted shell over 30 km but are limited in their mobility and speed [16]. The
largest gun ever produced was the German “Paris Gun” which was able to launch a 94 kg
shell over a distance of up to 130 km, but required an extensive support system and rail
mountings for transportation.
The advent of the battleship combined the lethality of long-range ground attack with
the mobility of ocean-going vessels. The U.S. Iowa-class battleships have nine 16-inch
guns that can fire a 1,225 kg projectile nearly 39 km [16]. Since many of the world’s
population centers and military facilities are located near coastlines, battleships provided a
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cost-effective means of holding these targets at risk until their decommissioning in the early
1990’s. Despite their utility in the fire support role, the power projection capabilities of
the battleship were largely outstripped by the flexibility and mobility of aircraft operating
from sea-based carriers [97]. Naval aircraft extended the range of strike systems to several
hundred kilometers. This capability is complimented by ship and submarine-based cruise
missiles which essentially hold at risk any target within about 1,600 km from shore [464].
While ground-based aircraft are limited to fixed base locations, the advent of aerial
refueling in the late 1940’s extended the range of aircraft nearly indefinitely, enabling global
reach for the first time. Heavy bombers from the 1950’s and 1960’s have ranges that exceed
8,000 km [422]. If refueled over international airspace, long range bombers can attack nearly
every target on the surface of the globe.
The advent of ballistic missiles in the 1940’s opened the ultimate high ground for long
range strike systems. The V-2 missile, produced by Germany during World War II had a
range of approximately 300 km and could deliver a 1000 kg warhead with a 50% probability
of being within 17 km of the intended target [16]. In contrast, the Minuteman III ballistic
missile which entered service less than 20 years after the introduction of the V-2 can deliver
a similar payload to a distance of over 10,000 km with a hundred times greater accuracy
[423].
The exponential development of weapon system capability through technology infusion
has increased the range of combat from the limits of hand-thrown projectiles to weapons
that can deliver large payloads with global reach. Technological shortfalls still exist in
response time, lethality, accuracy, and the reduction of collateral damage.
2.4.2 Current “Long Range Strike” Systems
In 2001, The U.S. Air Force released a document called “U.S. Air Force Long-Range Strike
Aircraft White Paper” [24]. Curiously, this is an update of a 1999 document entitled “U.S.
Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers” [21]. Recently, the Air Force equates
long range strike capability with the three active heavy bomber systems that provide “long
range strike” services to the military: the venerable workhorse B-52 Stratofortress, the
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rugged supersonic B-1B Lancer, and the stealthy flying-wing B-2A Spirit (Figure 12). The
document was altered primarily to support the transformational shift of the LRS mission to
the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF), an expeditionary force that “kicks down the door”
to clear the way for other U.S. and allied assets. Unfortunately, “U.S. forces arriving in
a theater in the opening days of a major conflict will be badly outnumbered” [385]. To
be successful, the GSTF must leverage the best technology, tactics, and training to gain a
qualitative advantage over a numerically superior force.
• Conventional workhorse
• Largest payload
• Fastest, most agile
• Stealth penetrator
• Denies enemy sanctuary
• Most accurate bomber
• Long-range standoff
• Key conflict enabler
• Most diverse weapon load
B-1B Lancer B-2A Spirit B-52G/H Stratofortress
Figure 12: Air Force Long Range Bomber Force (Adapted from [24]).
2.4.2.1 B-52 Stratofortress
The B-52 bomber first entered service as a long range nuclear bomber in February 1955.
Of the 744 B-52’s built, 102 B-52H models were delivered to the Strategic Air Command7
between May 1961 and October 1962 [148]. The unrefueled range of the aircraft exceeds
14,172 km (7,652 nm) with a maximum speed of over 1000 kilometers per hour (Mach 0.86)
and a ceiling of 15,240 m (50,000 ft) [422]. Its payload capacity is 31,752 kg (70,000 lbs) and
it has the ability to hold 45 weapons (27 internal and 18 on externally mounted pylons).
The H model can carry over 32 types of conventional or nuclear munitions including the
JDAM, JASSM, sea mines, and air-launched cruise missiles [7]. Up to eight AGM-88 cruise
missiles can be carried internally on a rotary launcher and another six can be mounted
on wing pylons [202]. Though the B-52H airframe is over 40 years old, recent upgrades
7now Air Combat Command
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allow the aircraft to utilize advanced electronic offensive and defense systems, function at
extremely low-altitudes with terrain-following radar, and operate over longer ranges due
to upgraded Pratt & Whitney TF-33 turbofan engines [401]. Following the retirement of
the B-52G model in 1993, there are 94 aircraft in the inventory, of which 44 are combat
coded [408]. Despite certain opposition from Congress, the Air Force has recently indicated
a desire to decrease the number of B-52’s to 56 airframes [205].
2.4.2.2 B-1B Lancer
Design studies for the B-1 bomber began with the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft pro-
gram in 1965. Following the cancellation of the North American XB-70 Valkryrie program
in 1969, the North American Rockwell (now Boeing) B-1 was conceived as a supersonic
strategic penetrator with a top speed in excess of Mach 2. Its primary weapon was the nu-
clear AGM-69A SRAM. The CONOPS for the B-1 relied on a mix of subsonic/supersonic
flight as the Soviet surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems of its era were primarily calibrated
for medium to high altitudes. “Studies of the period showed that the best chance of suc-
cessful penetration of a heavily defended area lay in high subsonic speed at low altitude
combined with Mach 2 performance at high altitude to reduce transit time through lightly
defended areas” [380]. This assessment led to the swing-wing design of many aircraft of
this period. After a very successful flight test program, President Carter cancelled the B-1
program in 1977 in favor of the new “wonder weapon,” the cruise missile. Due to antic-
ipated delays and technical risk associated with the Advanced Technology Bomber (later
the B-2), President Reagan reinstated the B-1 program on October 2, 1981 announcing
the acquisition of 100 aircraft to serve as interim solutions to America’s bomber shortage.
There were several notable differences between the B-1A and B-1B programs. First, the
Mach 2.2 cruise speed was reduced to Mach 1.25. This allowed less complicated inlets which
had the added benefit of decreasing radar cross section. The maximum takeoff weight of
the aircraft was increased from 179,170 to 216,364 kg (395,000 to 477,000 lbs) and Radar
Absorptive Materials (RAM) were applied to the aircraft to counter the main threat for
low level penetrators: fighter aircraft with down-looking radar [380]. Finally, the B-1A’s
43
two-plane radar system was replaced with the single electronically-steered Westinghouse
APG-164. This system featured intermittent pulses instead of continuous operation and
further decreased Radar Cross Section (RCS). It is said that the B-1B had an order of
magnitude reduction in signature over its predecessor.
After the end of the Cold War the B-1B was transitioned to carry conventional muni-
tions. The B-1B, through avionics upgrades, is the only bomber that can carry three types
of weapons simultaneously in its three weapons bays. The $200 million dollar bomber has
the largest payload capacity of any US bomber, 34,019 kg (75,000 lb), and its payload can
be increased to 56,700 kg (125,000 lb) with external carriage although this is disallowed by
the START I treaty [16, 380]. Over ten types of weapons can be employed including up to
eighty-four 500 lb GBU-30 JDAMs or twenty-four AGM-158 JASSMs. This heavy bomber
has an unrefueled range of 12,000 km (6,479 nm) although the range is reduced to 5,543
km (2,993 nm) with a standard weapons load [5]. Though some critics believe the B-1 is
redundant, its supersonic capability makes it the only bomber with reasonable response
time for time critical targets (TCTs). The B-1 has been used to great effect in Operation
Iraqi Freedom using a tactic where it loiters subsonically outside enemy airspace and dashes
into the battlespace supersonically for close air support when called by ground forces [478].
Though there is some continuing debate about the required number of B-1 bombers, there
are currently 67 aircraft in the active force, all of which are combat coded [423].
2.4.2.3 B-2A Spirit
The most advanced heavy bomber in the world is the B-2A Spirit Stealth Bomber. Begin-
ning as a “black program” called the High Altitude Penetrating Bomber (later Advanced
Technology Bomber or ATB) in the 1980’s, the unique flying wing design is based on early
Northrop designs such as the propeller-driven XB-35 and the jet-powered YB-49. Although
Northrop lost the F-117 contract to Lockheed in the late 1970’s, experienced gained with
stealthy, curved aerodynamic shapes in the 1978 Tacit Blue program contributed to design
experience for the B-2 [380]. Due to the extreme secrecy of the ATB program, there was
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little opportunity for public criticism of the massive development cost of the bomber. Ac-
cording to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), by 1997 the total program cost
of the B-2 bomber approached $45 billion dollars [354]. Originally conceived as a replace-
ment for the aging B-52 in the nuclear attack role, the B-2 is currently the only US aircraft
with a long-range capability to penetrate defended airspace [186]. No country has either an
equivalent or an effective defense against the B-2 and it is considered the ideal first-strike
weapon against fixed targets in all weather conditions anywhere in the world. Its ability
to deploy on strike missions from Missouri with little logistics support make it the only US
system, other than submarine launched cruise missiles, that can effectively use the element
of surprise. With the exception of its low cruise speed (Mach 0.85), it is arguably the closest
aircraft system to the capability statement for Long Range Strike.
In the early 1980s, threat projection experts decided that low-altitude penetration was
the key to avoiding Soviet radar systems (see section 2.4.2.2) due to the masking properties
of the Earth’s curvature. For example, a radar that can detect an aircraft flying at 8,000
meters altitude from 370 km has only a 23 km range when the same aircraft operates at
an altitude of 30 meters [386]. Although the B-2 was less visible at high altitudes than its
predecessors, rapid advancement in Soviet radar systems revealed that it was only a matter
of time before radar systems could track stealth aircraft. As a result, during the design
process for the B-2, threat projectionists dictated that the bomber should use low-altitude
maneuvering. The large wing area and low wing loading of the B-2 did not make it ideal
for this mission because structural flexing would alter the RCS and destroy the stealth
characteristics [380]. Extensive redesign was undertaken, further driving up the cost. In
practice today, the B-2 operates primarily at high altitudes although it was designed to fly
at very low altitudes. This example underscores the importance of Frits’ hypothesis that
tactics should be developed concurrently with system design [159].
The B-2 has a maximum takeoff weight of around 154,211 kg (340,000 lbs) and can carry
18,143 kg (40,000 lbs) of munitions. In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was the first aircraft
to demonstrate the GPS-guided JDAM in combat [467]. Although the B-2 is capable of
in-flight refueling, its unrefueled range is generally assumed to be approximately 12,000 km
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(6,500 nm) although some estimates are as high as 14,800 km (8,000 nm). Supporters of
the $2 billion dollar aircraft cite reduced life-cycle costs: the high survivability afforded by
the stealth design eliminates the need for an armada of support aircraft to provide standoff
jamming and destruction of enemy air defenses. There are currently 21 B-2 bombers, 16 of
which are combat coded [408].
2.4.2.4 F-22A Raptor
Although it is not included in the 2001 White Paper on long range strike systems, the
designation of the F-22 Raptor was changed to F/A-22 at the 2002 Air Force Association
National Convention. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper said, “the
change is meant to more accurately reflect the aircraft’s multimission roles and capabil-
ities in contemporary strategic environments” [170]. In December 2005, the F/A-22 was
redesignated F-22A when it entered service to reflect the importance of its original mission.
Although it was originally intended as an air dominance fighter and is currently employed in
this manner, this extremely advanced, maneuverable, and stealthy aircraft can also provide
limited long range strike capability. Its internal weapons bay was primarily designed for
the air-to-air combat role, but the F-22A can also be outfitted with two 1,000 lb GBU-32
JDAMs along with two AIM-120C AMRAAMs in the main bay and two AIM-9 Sidewinder
missiles in the side bay [170]. The top speed of the F-22A is classified (estimated to be at
least Mach 1.8); however, its high thrust-to-weight ratio Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100
engines are designed to allow the F-22A to cruise at at least Mach 1.5 without using after-
burners8 (Jumper flew the Raptor to Mach 1.7 without afterburners on January 12, 2005
[346]).
Although it is widely assumed that the F-22A can operate at Mach 1.5 for its entire
mission, supercruise is only used for the last 90-180 km (50-100 nm) of the mission and
greatly impacts range, as shown in Figure 13. This is still a large advantage over traditional
afterburning aircraft that can typically only travel 18.5-37 km (10-20 nm) before exhausting
their reserve fuel supplies. The maximum internal payload of the F-22A is approximately
8Termed “supercruise.”
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1,776 kg (3,915 lb), and it can carry approximately 8,618 kg (19,000 lb) of external payload
although this would likely not be used for stealth operations [2].
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ground forces that may often be deep
behind enemy lines, enveloped in the
heart of an enemy’s air defense sys-
tem. To deliver that promised punch,
the Air Force will need a system with
long range, a high degree of stealth,
precision strike capability, and the
ability to defend itself against enemy
fighters, as well as the capacity to
serve as a forward node in a network
of intelligence-surveillance-recon-
naissance systems.
In the future, that capability will
likely be provided by a “system of
systems,” Goldfein said. The portfo-
lio could include hypersonic cruise
missiles, unmanned combat aircraft,
and orbital strike systems, as well as
the emerging F/A-22 and F-35 fight-
ers and today’s aircraft.
However, “we’re going to have a
bridge between where we are and where
we might end up,” Goldfein said.
Now in agreement with Congress
on the need, the Air Force in April
released a request for information to
industry, seeking ideas for systems
that could provide a rapid-action,
long-range strike capability by 2015.
The responses ranged from con-
ventionally tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles to all-new big bomb-
ers (see “Long-Range Strike in a
Hurry,” November 2004, p. 26). The
FB-22 was among the ideas Lockheed
Martin offered to the Air Force.
The service accepted the concepts
and discussed them with the various
companies, but has not yet specified
how it will proceed. However, after
receiving the pitch from Lockheed, it
asked for follow-up briefings on how
the company would meet performance
and cost targets quoted in its response
to the RFI. Lockheed briefed the Air
Force F/A-22 Integrated Product Team
on those details in early November.
The new FB-22 differs markedly
from the one originally conceived, ac-
cording to John E. Perrigo, senior
manager of combat air systems for
Lockheed Martin’s business develop-
ment branch. One major change is that
it will be stealthier than the F/A-22.
“This thing will have improved
stealth capabilities over any other air-
plane ever built,” Perrigo said. The
FB-22 will incorporate all the advances
in low observable or stealth technol-
ogy that have come since the F/A-22
design was set, roughly 12 years ago.
Perrigo claimed that the FB-22 will be
even stealthier than the B-2 bomber.
“It can go places other airplanes
can’t go. Even the B-2 can’t go back
there [far behind enemy lines] and
survive and ... do global persistent
attack.”
“More Stealthy”
Compared to the F/A-22, the FB-
22 will be “more stealthy, and it
needs to be, because it’s going to
operate in an environment where the
F/A-22 may not. ... It could be down
in very direct support of forces on
the ground—we see that as one of its
prime missions.”
The FB-22 would also take advan-
tage of a very significant break-
through: the ability to carry stores
external to the airplane but still do
so in a stealthy way. On the FB-22,
this takes the form of what Lockheed
calls a “wing weapons bay” but which
resembles a faceted pod.
The exact shape of the container is
classified, and published artist’s con-
cepts will likely be intentionally in-
accurate “for years,” Perrigo said,
but the under-wing bay can substan-
tially add to the payload of the FB-
22.
Until recently, it was believed that
an aircraft could only be stealthy if it
carried its weapons internally in its
fuselage. The development of the
stealthy pod—as well as a “stealth
pylon” on which stealthy missiles
can be carried—has changed that
equation.
“We used to say that had to be
internal, but we don’t anymore,”
Perrigo said. He called it “low ob-
servable carriage.”
Lockheed offered the Air Force
six different versions of the FB-22,
each one tuned to a particular set of
requirements and targets. This was
necessary because targets, payload,
and range have yet to be defined and
are still subject to trade-offs with
other platforms and munitions.
However, the most likely version
will feature the fuselage of the “ba-
sic” F/A-22 with few modifications.
Lockheed discovered that lengthen-
ing the fuselage immediately added
a 25 to 30 percent cost penalty in
weight, materials, and development,
Perrigo said. Instead of making the
airplane longer, a very wide, fuel-
carrying “wet” wing will be added,
with capability for two to four of the
under-wing weapons bays. The wing
would be three times the size of that
on the F/A-22.
With the additional internal fuel,
the FB-22 could have a combat ra-
dius of about 1,800 nautical miles—
more than triple that of the F/A-22.
While the F/A-22 can carry eight
250-pound Small Diameter Bombs
for precision attack, the FB-22 would
be able to carry at least 35. It could
reach that number by using not only

































Combat radius with 100 nm Mach 1.5 dash
Combat radius with 50 nm Mach 1.5 dash
Maximum radius with only subsonic cruise
F/A-22 FB-22
Figure 13: Difference in Mission Radius for F-22 Variants [410].
In April 2003, the Air Force issued a request for information on long range strike systems
tha could notionally be fielded by 2025. One of th proposed solutions is a variant of the
F-22A called the F/B-22. This aircraft would be designed to carry at least 30 GBU-
39 Small Diameter Bombs (the F-22A would carry eight), penetrate enemy airspace and
persist with its enh nced survivability [409]. The concept has also been referred to as a
“regional bomber” [201]. A comparison of the F-22A and the F/B-22 (see Figure 14) and
their respective mission ranges for differing amounts of supercruise is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 14: Comparison of the F-22A (Left) and F/B-22 (Right), Adapted From References
[2, 410].
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2.4.2.5 BGM-109 Tomahawk Cruise Missile
Military operations inherently involve cooperation between joint forces and international
coalitions. This further complicates the interoperability issue and increases the difficulties
faced by commanders. Nevertheless, although the Air Force is the primary branch of the
US military with LRS capability, other branches can also provide support in this role.
The Navy Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is a subsonic cruise missile deployed
from U.S. Navy vessels and U.K. Royal Navy submarines. The current generation Block
IV TLAM-E, or “Tactical Tomahawk” is manufacured by Raytheon Missile Systems. The
$569,000 (FY99 $) missile has a range of 1670 km (900 nm) with a speed of about 885
kph (550 mph). The TLAM-E features the ability to loiter over a target area and assess
battle damage or designate new targets using an on-board camera. This missile is the first
Navy cruise missile that can be reprogrammed in flight to strike any of 15 pre-programmed
alternate targets or redirect to any GPS coordinates [464]. The Navy plans to convert 1,253
anti-ship variant missiles to the TLAM-E configuration and procure over 3,000 more [149].
Navy vessels that can use the TLAM include the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers,
DD-963 Spruance-class destroyers, CG-47 Ticonderoga-class cruiser surface ships and the
SSN-688 Los Angeles-class, SSGN-726 Ohio-class submarines [14]. British Royal Navy SSN
Swiftsure-class subs can also employ the weapon [99].
A cutaway of the Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile with the major Block III and Block
IV upgrades listed is shown in Figure 15 and a summary of the estimated range of the above
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•Forward Fuel Tank: 200 
lbs
WEIGHT: Approximately 3,000 lbs
RANGE: ~900 nautical miles
SPEED: Subsonic – About 550 mph
WARHEAD: TLAM-C/E – 1,000 lb unitary warhead
TLAM-D – Combined Effect Submunitions
TLAM-N – W80 Nuclear Warhead
COST: ~$550,000-$750,000 USD


















0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000
B-2 (estimate from various sources)
B-52 (10,000 lb bomb load)
B-1B (full weapons load)
F/B-22 (Subsonic Cruise)
Tactical Tomahawk Cruise Missile
Lockheed F-35C JSF CV
Lockheed F-35A JSF CTOL
F/A-18E/F (at max takeoff weight)
F/A-22 Raptor (Subsonic Cruise Only)
Lockheed F-35B (STOVL)
Tupolev Tu-22M
Rafale (with 4 external tanks)
General Dynamics F-111 C/G (Australia)




Combat Radius (hi-hi-hi, nm)
U.S. Systems
Foreign Systems
Figure 16: Combat Radius Summary for Foreign and Domestic Strike Systems, Compiled
From References [2, 8, 10, 15, 246, 247, 410].
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A qualitative assessment of the LRS attributes of the previously mentioned current LRS
systems is shown in Figure 17. The figure qualitatively shows why the DoD has highlighted
a capability gap in Long Range Strike. While several of the concepts have a global range
from CONUS, few have the ability to persist in denied airspace (although the B-52H and B-
1B have standoff weapon capabilities). The capability shortfall is most seriously manifested
in the lack of responsiveness of current systems. While long-range bombers can deploy from
CONUS, their subsonic speed constrains the response time to nearly a day and their support
requirements severely restrict sortie rates. In addition to identifying compliance with the
first five LRS attributes highlighted in Section 2.4, a qualitative assessment of life-cycle cost
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Figure 17: Current Long Range Strike Systems (Supported by Data from Reference [68]).
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2.4.3 Future Long Range Strike Systems
The Long Range Strike White Paper identified the years 2035-2037 as the appropriate date
for the IOC of a next-generation bomber [21]. By this date, attrition is likely to have
reduced the fleet below the minimum 170 aircraft desired [169]. This date is also based on
conservative peacetime estimates of bomber utilization, and the impact of continuous usage
in Afghanistan and Iraq is unclear. Air Force leadership is now in the process of examining
long range strike systems that could come online between 2015 and 2025 [201]. The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review report and a recent article in MarketWatch identified a push
to utilize existing technology to field a solution by 2018 [456, 95].
Over the past several years, a number of studies have examined alternatives to supple-
ment Long Range Strike capabilities, in fact, as Thompson notes, “on average, one study of
long-range strike requirements has appeared per fiscal quarter since the Cold War ended”
[403]. The Future Strike Aircraft (FSA) program, a $1M study directed by the Aeronauti-
cal Systems Center at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio identified several high-speed platform
concepts capable of global strike missions. Deployment from CONUS was a requirement
and the primary trade space identified for this study was the degree of speed or stealth
required9. Vehicles with top speeds from Mach 2.7 to 14 were examined [169]. The Long
Range Strike Aircraft (LRSA-X) study expanded upon FSA to examine LRS in a system-of-
systems context. Supersonic through hypersonic solutions were examined for their ability to
penetrate current and next-generation IADS to defeat time sensitive and hardened targets
[171]. Also, the Long Range Strike Platform (LRSP) study aimed to identify technology
investment areas in platform concepts, weapons systems, and C4ISR that enabled concept
refinement for a future LRS system. In 2004, the Air Force planned to use a portion of
a $45M Congressional plus-up to establish a program office for the analysis of future LRS
concepts [172]. Several of the concepts identified from these studies are shown in Figure 18.
A subsonic penetrator is a vehicle similar to the B-2A Spirit. Its primary attribute is
stealth. Two other subsonic platforms were identified. A “missileer,” also known as an
9The simultaneous application of both is anticipated to be very costly.
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“arsenal plane” is a long-range, unstealthy vehicle, usually a cargo plane, that is designed
to fire standoff weapons outside defended airspace. A variation on this concept is a wing-in-
ground effect vehicle. These vehicles generate a high lift-to-drag ratio by flying very close to
the ground or water to reduce the impact of tip vortices. Such vehicles, called ekranoplanes,
were flight tested in the former Soviet Union. In 2003, Boeing proposed a wing-in-ground
effect vehicle called the Pelican with a 152 m (500 ft) wingspan and a 1.3 million kilogram
(2.8 million pound) payload [2]. As an LRS concept, these vehicles would fly subsonically
under radar and launch cruise missiles or even other strike platforms. Supersonic bombers
with speeds from Mach 2-4 were also examined. A major technical challenge in sustained
supersonic flight is the development of materials: existing stealth materials are not well
suited for high speed flight regimes and new coatings to mask infrared signatures in the
presence of high heating rates would be required [478].
Reusable hypersonic cruise vehicles were also examined. Air Force General David Dep-
tula noted that hypersonics offers “revolutionary responsiveness, reach, and range” [200].
A concept called the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), a maneuvering reentry vehicle designed
to attack deeply buried hardened targets by deploying submunitions as it reenters the at-
mosphere, is also being considered. The CAV is one of the elements of the DARPA/Air
Force Application and Launch from the Continental United States (FALCON) technology
demonstration program. A CAV could be launched using refurbished strategic missiles or
deployed directly from low Earth orbit. Other orbital weapons and reusable spaceplanes
that deploy precision weapons from orbit are also being considered [175]. Recently, the
CAV has been redesignated to the “Hypersonic Technology Vehicle” (HTV) to shift the
focus away from direct weaponization of the technology [131]. It is important to note that
this list is by no means all-inclusive: the Air Force has performed at least 24 studies on LRS
since 1999 and additional concepts may be under development in a proprietary or classified
environment [132].
A qualitative comparison of proposed next-generation systems is shown in Figure 1810.
10A 2006 Congressional Budget Office study generally supports the results of Figure 18 and proposes a




















































































































































































































While Watts and the Congressional Budget Office identify these concepts as potential op-
tions for LRS systems, the AFRL classifies the potential solutions in terms of near-term,
mid-term, and long-term potential [101]. This research focuses on technology infusion to
near-term and mid-term systems due to the technological uncertainty of long-term concepts
and the dearth of high-fidelity models to support quantitative analysis of hypersonic vehicles
and their respective propulsion systems, ballistic missile guidance systems and trajectories,
and orbital constellations.
2.4.4 Summary of LRS Capability
Long Range Strike capability is gaining increasing interest within the acquisition commu-
nity:
• The 2005 Air Force Handbook recognizes that the requirements for a future LRS sys-
tem have yet to be defined and that LRS is pre-decisional and is within the framework
of the JCIDS process [132].
• Current leadership suggests an interim approach phased for IOC in the 2015-2020
timeframe that can provide 24/7 stealth, deliver rapid and persistent effects against
moving targets, hardened targets, and deeply buried targets, day or night and in all
weather conditions [95].
• The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review notes that the Department of Defense “begin
development of the next generation long-range strike systems, accelerating projected
initial operational capability by almost two decades.” Goals for this activity include a
50% increase in capability, a 500% increase in penetrating capability11. DoD estimates
that about 45% of the future LRS systems will be unmanned. [456]
• Recently, “the Air Force Studies Board of the National Research Council (NRC)
was asked by the USAF to investigate combinations of speed and stealth that would
provide U.S. aircraft with high levels of survivability against potential enemy air
defense systems in the 2018 time frame. The missions considered were to include but
not be limited to long-range strike” [311].
11The units of measure and standards of comparison for these goals are not given.
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Acquisition authorities are currently conducting an analysis of alternatives to identify
requirements for a Long Range Strike system [403], the AFRL has recently reopened a wind
tunnel to support LRS aerodynamic studies [445], and the 2007 USAF Budget Request
projects a dramatic increase in funding for Next-Generation Long Range Strike projects
over the next five years (see Figure 19). Regardless of the concept chosen, advanced tech-
nologies will be infused into the system and its supporting architecture to prevent technology
obsolescence as new threats to national security emerge. The urgent need to refine America’s
bomber fleet coupled with the myriad of technologies required across the system architec-
ture to enable revolutionary LRS capabilities drives its selection as the proof-of-concept
application for the proposed methodology.























Figure 19: United States Air Force 2007 LRS Budget Request (Compiled from Reference
[437]).
2.4.5 How Large of an Architecture is Needed to Demonstrate the Methodol-
ogy?
History indicates that there are many ways to project strike power over long distances and
recent LRS studies summarized in Figure 18 identify possible multi-domain solutions that
may offer revolutionary capabilities; however, aircraft-based LRS solutions remain an area
of interest for military planners. While aircraft may be one of the most vulnerable long range
attack systems, they also offer benefits in terms of operational flexibility, response time, and
payload capacity. For the proof-of-concept study, the LRS architecture under consideration
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is limited to solutions in the air domain; however, future work may extend the proposed
methodology to demonstrate the approach with additional degrees of exploration.
In addition to the air vehicle which serves as the centerpiece of an LRS architecture, other
enabling “architecture technologies” including communications, ISR, jamming support, C2,
theater missile defense, and others contribute to the success of the LRS mission. One key
constraint in the definition of an example problem is establishing an appropriate “control
volume” to demonstrate the proposed methodology without inducing “analysis paralysis.”To
draw a control volume, it is necessary to classify the the level of heterogeneity in the LRS
architecture to be studied.
While the proposed methodology addresses the need for technology evaluation for systems-
of-systems, how much is enough? A system comprised of identical elements are of little in-
terest as the complex interactions between systems define the major complexity issue that
defines the need for a structured methodology. On the other hand, the design of commu-
nication systems, network architectures, new smart munitions, command facilities and the
like is outside the scope of effort defined for this research. Architecture technologies related
to the employment of the aircraft and the interfaces between these technologies and the
LRS systems to be examined are the primary focus of this research effort. The specific
technologies that will be examined in the architecture context are defined in Section 5.7.
The acceptable degree of heterogeneity is in the middle of the spectrum between an entire
system-of-systems and a singular system comprised of physically similar elements.
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2.5 Recapitulation of Problem
The first step of the scientific method is problem definition. Through a review of non-
technical literature available on capability planning, systems engineering, and technology
assessment several key observations that focus the definition of the problem are made:
1. Technology evaluation is a resource allocation problem. Identification of high-payoff
technologies is only critical in a resource-limited environment. Since fiscal resources
are always limited, technology evaluation must balance performance and cost to max-
imize the overall benefit.
2. The JCIDS process is a policy mandated by DoD to address the need for a military
architecture that is robust against constantly changing threats.
3. There is a general lack of structured processes and methods that are consistent with
the JCIDS process. Efforts to comply with the policy are largely ad-hoc and vary
from entity to entity.
4. A capability-based approach looks at the ways and means of performing an action
and is not tied to a single physical solution.
5. Military systems-of-systems are dominated by heterogeneous, interoperating assets
with different life-cycles that must be integrated to provide capabilities.
6. Systems-of-systems engineering is an emerging field rife with jargon and terminology
that must be crisply defined as the field matures.
7. Existing system-of-systems engineering approaches and methods for technology eval-
uation do not rely heavily on quantitative analysis. This is primarily due to the
confounding effects of the complex interactions across the hierarchical system of sys-
tems.
8. While a capability-based approach can be used to decompose strategic challenges into
a variety of capabilities, Long Range Strike capability is a pressing issue facing the
military acquisition community and has the necessary elements and interactions to
demonstrate a methodology for capability-based technology evaluation
9. To limit the scope required analysis, potential solutions are confined to the air domain.
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10. To further constrain the scope of the modeling and simulation activity to a represen-
tative experiment that does not confound the methodology proof with unnecessary
overcomplication, a medium level of heterogeneity is proposed.
While the above statements focus the demonstration activity on a manageable problem
that can be addressed using available resources, the original problem domain is actually
much larger. An appreciation for the complexity of system studies can be observed using a
matrix of alternatives or morphological matrix12 as shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Matrix of Alternatives for Observations and Assertions.
In this example, the matrix of alternatives lists key decisions required to focus the
problem as the rows of the matrix. The columns of the matrix identify potential choices to
address each decision. While at first it appears that there are only four alternatives for the
problem definition phase, the actual number of combinations is defined by the items in each
row multiplied by the items in every other row (assuming each decision is independent of
other decisions). This innocent looking matrix has 1,572,864 possible combinations: with
each variation defining a different research plan. The green highlighted elements in Figure
20 identifies the attributes chosen to scope the problem based on the observations made in
the previous sections.
12See Section C.5.1 for an overview and history of this technique.
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2.5.1 Modeling and Simulation Enables Quantitative Technology Evaluation
“Only the most naive scientist believes that the perfect model is the one that
perfectly represents reality. Such a model would have the same drawbacks as a
map as large and detailed as the city it represents... its specificity would defeat
its purpose: to generalize and abstract.”
-James Gleick
Chaos [168]
Section 1.2 notes that most techniques for resource allocation are based on qualitative
information and subjective analysis. For example, the Technology Development Approach
(TDA) evaluates system-of-systems level Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) using a commit-
tee approach [129]. Unfortunately, a committee approach is only valid when the physics of
the problem are well understood and seldom extends to the system-of-systems level where
the complex interactions between heterogeneous elements do not follow intuitive or pre-
dictable patterns. Also, since the experience base of subject matter experts is bounded by
tacit information based on known situations and scenarios, an expert-driven process is often
not appropriate to produce quantitative estimates of system effectiveness.
One method for quantitative evaluation would be to build and test the systems in ques-
tion; however, for a military system architecture, such exploration would be cost prohibitive.
An alternative that balances cost and fidelity is to use modeling and simulation as an en-
abler for quantitative analysis. Based on the aforementioned observations, modeling
and simulation is a necessary component of a methodology for capability-based
technology evaluation for systems-of-systems.
Modeling, “a simplified description of a complex entity or process,” is literally the cre-
ation of a model [22]. Its complement is simulation, defined as “the process of imitating a
real phenomenon with a set of mathematical formulas” [9] Simulation can also be described
as the repeated exercise of a model under various conditions.
The use of modeling and simulation in the defense community is not new and has co-
evolved dramatically with advancement in digital computers [308]. Since the introduction of
59
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) in late 1993, Schrage has advocated
a generic methodology that leverages a computer integrated environment to enable robust
design simulation [34, 368]. This methodology “provides the means for conducting parallel
process/product (cost/performance) design trades at various levels (system, component,
part)” and enables “distributed design and development” [39].
According to the National Science Foundation, simulation “can be used to explore new
theories and to design new experiments to test these theories” and “also provides a powerful
alternative to the techniques of experimental science and observation when phenomena
are not observable or when measurements are impractical or too expensive” [35]. The
National Research Council notes that modeling, simulation, and analysis “is of value in
the early stages of defense modernization, when roughly defined concepts can be examined
and adjusted in virtual worlds” [310]. Furthermore, the DoD’s Transformation Planning
Guidance reaffirms a commitment to expanding M&S capabilities, noting “DoD must be
able to support a capability-based planning process that accounts for greater uncertainty
in threats and capabilities and must be capable of comparing risks across time and between
multiple theater-level operations” [310].
While modeling and simulation is an enabling technique that provides a means to cal-
culate MoEs for candidate technologies and system architectures, many technical chal-
lenges arise from its use. The technical challenges and resulting research questions
are enumerated in Chapter 3. Hypotheses that recommend the infusion of techniques and
methods from other fields are proposed in Section 3.4 to address each of these in turn.
2.6 Synthesizing a New Methodology: First Attempts
Based on the aforementioned observations, a new methodology to support capability-based
technology evaluation is needed. To determine the necessary elements of this methodology, a
functional analysis is used. A successful methodology must perform at least three functions:
• Outline a structured process (methodology)
• Establish analysis goals (capability-based)
• Analyze results (technology evaluation)
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From this basic functional decomposition, several other required functions are derived.
• Define the control volume for analysis (scenarios)
• Build models to study phenomena (models)
• Produce results (execute simulation)
Defining the control volume and building models identifies what is to be studied, how
it is to be studied, and under what conditions the study is performed. The production of
results is directly related to the need to analyze results. These six elements form a “common






























































Note: The synthesis of these elements
is the sixth required function.
Figure 21: A Baseline “Common Sense Process” for Capability-Based Technology Evalu-
ation.
While the process shown in Figure 21 has all the basic elements needed to analyze
technologies, it suffers from several critical shortcomings. These are expanded as technical
challenges in Section 3.1:
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• The modeling and simulation architecture requires physics models (performance) and
cognition models (actions).
• The mapping of top-level objectives to tactical execution is time consuming.
• Humans are often used in the analysis loop to make decisions about the next actions.
• Tactics are not variable as technologies are changing.
• Results analysis is difficult for large dimensionality problems.
Because of these challenges, the five step methodology shown in Figure 21 is not sufficient
to solve this problem. As a result, a technical literature search was conducted to identify
techniques and methods that can be synthesized to address a variety of technical challenges.
These are summarized in Chapter III. The “common sense process” depicted in Figure 21




TECHNICAL CHALLENGES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS,
AND HYPOTHESES
A problem is “a question to be considered, solved, or answered” [22]. Chapter I outlined
the nature of a problem facing the military acquisition community: the need to perform
quantitative capability-based technology evaluation for systems of systems. A study or
analysis applies a series of existing well-established techniques and best practices to the
problem in an effort to discover a solution. Unfortunately, as summarized in the subsequent
chapter, the best practices that apply to the identified problem are not well developed. No
single “cookbook” for capability-based technology evaluation exists today.
In addition to the lack of a standardized methodology, the analysis of system archi-
tectures is also confounded by a number of technical challenges. A literature search was
conducted across the technical domain to enumerate these challenges and identify mathe-
matical techniques or methodical approaches that directly address critical shortcomings.
In this dissertation, a new method is proposed that leverages advances in modeling and
simulation to enable quantitative technology evaluation with respect to top-level capabil-
ities. While the selection of modeling and simulation as a technique provides the ability
to calculate the change in capability-level MoEs as technologies are applied, the use of
modeling and simulation is not without penalty.
3.1 Technical Challenges
While the National Science Foundation notes that “computer simulation is an indispensable
tool for resolving a multitude of scientific and technological problems facing our country,”
[35] the implementation of computer simulations of complex systems is hindered by several
technical challenges :
• The run time for military simulations is often extreme. Processes must be sped up to
63
the point where running cases is trivial to allow effective design space exploration.
• A system-of-systems relies on many heterogeneous, interoperating assets to provide a
capability. Each element requires a model of some kind. The problem space quickly
becomes unmanageable.
• The models which must be accurately constructed to represent the phenomena under
test with the appropriate degree of fidelity.
• Techniques are needed that reduce the scale of the simulation to the relevant phenom-
ena while retaining the emergent behavior derived from system interactions.
In addition to the challenges that arise from the need to simulate results, some general
technical challenges are also present:
• There is no structured process for performing quantitative technology assessments for
systems-of-systems.
• The importance of individual elements and the sensitivity of the overall design envi-
ronment to changes in fidelity at the asset level must be understood and accounted
for.
• Uncertainty grows as multiple elements and interactions are implemented in the en-
vironment. This uncertainty must be quantified where appropriate.
• Capability-level MoEs are often difficult to define and may be scenario dependent.
• Military simulations often use a human-in-the-loop to make decisions at major junc-
tions in time. It is not practical to have a human make thousands of decisions as cases
are executed in bulk for technology forecasting.
• A variation in tactics or doctrine may have a much greater impact on top-level capa-
bilities than a change to asset-level attributes. The relationship between tactics and
technology must be managed.
• Optimization for a system-of-systems may be inappropriate as few systems-of-systems
are employed according to point design conditions.
The proposed methodology must effectively use simulation to address the need for
capability-based technology evaluation. Appendix C details several approaches to address
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the aforementioned shortcomings by cross-fertilizing techniques from other disciplines into
the military modeling and simulation community. The current state-of-the-art is limited
by these technical challenges: they act as roadblocks that prevent further realization of
benefits due to simulation.
3.2 Research Questions
These technical challenges result from a detailed definition of the problem and many mod-
eling and simulation activities have been limited by one or more of the above challenges.
These challenges stimulate the development of research questions that must be answered
to address the motivating problem. The research questions below seek to identify tools,
techniques and methods to overcome one or more of the technical challenges in the previous
section.
1. How can the impact of technologies infused at the system level be analyzed at the
system-of-systems level and compared to measurable performance metrics related to
capabilities?
2. How can military simulation runs be executed without a human in the loop to make
strategic and tactical decisions?
3. Should the goal of the methodology be to identify an optimum technology portfolio
that maximizes effectiveness or to seek a balanced portfolio that is robust across
envisioned operating conditions?
4. How can the scale of the problem be appropriately reduced without losing the essence
of the problem?
5. For a given problem, what is the best way to determine the necessary elements of a
system architecture?
6. How can the simulation process be sped up to allow examination of the design space
in a reasonable time frame?
7. What sampling techniques and modeling techniques are valid for non-linear systems-
of-systems simulations?
8. How can the importance and sensitivity of individual elements (or degrees of freedom)
65
of the system architecture be evaluated?
9. How can uncertainty be quantified for this class of problems?
Capability-based technology evaluation has not been realized to date due to the tech-
nical challenges that serve as roadblocks in any previously proposed process. The above
research questions directly address the technical challenges. While completely an-
swering the set of questions removes the roadblocks and enables a solution to the problem,
answering some questions reveals additional questions that were in the noise until the first
“layer” of questions was answered. The analogy to modern air combat is direct: techni-
cal challenges are like air defenses that must be rolled back, revealing additional defensive
layers. Each “threat” must be dealt with in turn. Research questions stimulate the devel-
opment of courses of action to address the technical challenges. The proposed courses of
action are hypotheses.
3.3 Hypothesis Genesis and Development
“A fact is a simple statement that everyone believes. It is innocent, unless
found guilty. A hypothesis is a novel suggestion that no one wants to believe.
It is guilty, until found effective.”
-Edward Teller
A hypothesis is “a statement of conjecture subject to proof” [188] and is derived from
the Greek, hypotithenai meaning ”to put under” or ”to suppose” [16]. Although these
suppositions are critical to the development of scientific theories, according to Polya there
is no universal or logical process for the development of new ideas. They are only developed
by creative intuition. The experience base from which intuition results is contingent on
the beliefs of the examiner [343]. Hypotheses can be proposed based on commonly held
beliefs or myths. They can also be reasoned by analogy to a similar, yet well understood
phenomenon.
One of the concerns about hypothesis formulation is that formal hypotheses are too
constrictive and thus impede serendipitous discovery; however, scientists should always be
66
on the lookout for non-intuitive results. Awareness of the possibility of unintended outcomes
is critical to the discovery of asymmetric solutions. Furthermore, Kass notes that another
criticism of hypothesis development for warfighting experiments is that hypotheses “are
supposed to be derived from theory and there is no military theory” [233]. He addresses
this concern by advocating a thorough literature search prior to hypothesis formulation and
says “few, even science experiments, are derived from formal scientific theories” [233].
Since Aristotle’s time, scientific progress has relied on philosophical reasoning as a means
of establishing a line of inquiry and observations to establish a system of beliefs. Central
to the development of hypotheses is therefore a development of beliefs and observations
through series of literature searches. The subsequent section identifies and categorizes a set
of hypotheses proposed to address the research questions previously stated.
3.4 Hypotheses Taxonomy and Exposition
Continuing the analogy between warfare and research, a hierarchy of hypotheses can be
generated which addresses the complexity and method for answering the research questions.
20th Century air power theorist John Warden defines the levels of war as follows [474]:
• Grand Strategic: “where the most basic but most consequential decisions are
made.” Hypotheses at this level are philosophical and directly address the problem
statement in the motivation. The primary research objective is stated at the Grand
Strategic level.
• Strategic: “concerns the overall conduct.” Philosophical arguments that fundamen-
tally shape the research activity are appropriate at this level. Strategic aims shape
the overall approach and derive lower-level research questions.
• Operational: “is primarily concerned with how to achieve the strategic ends.” Gen-
eral methodology-specific approaches are formulated at this level.
• Tactical: where “objectives are unambiguous.” Though most frequent in number,
hypotheses at the tactical level are primarily implementation related. Selection of
techniques at the tactical level is primarily conducted through a literature search of
best practices. Just as individual “mistakes” at the tactical level in war rarely turn the
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tide in combat, selecting the “wrong” techniques at the tactical level seldom impact
the strategic aims of the methodology.
The hypotheses are summarized in Section 3.4.5; however, first it is necessary to sum-
marize the results of a search of the technical literature to formulate the hypotheses. The
specifics of the literature search are given in Appendices A, B, and C.
3.4.1 Grand Strategic Hypothesis: Research Objective
The single grand strategic hypothesis is the overarching research objective that comes pri-
marily from the motivation section of this dissertation and directly addresses a top-level
need. While the proposed methodology must be consistent with this objective, the research
plan outlined in subsequent chapters may not be a panacea that complete addresses the
community’s need due to the large scope of the motivating problem. Simplifications are
made where appropriate to facilitate methodology development. As a result, generaliza-
tion of the single test case (application to a Long Range Strike system architecture) to the
domain of all possible problems is inappropriate.
Hypothesis: The focus of this research is on the development of a valid, defensible,
and practical methodology that facilitates a quantitative assessment of technology potential
of systems-of-systems with respect to capability-level gaps and provides information to
decision-makers early in the design process.
3.4.2 Strategic Hypotheses
Strategic hypotheses must be consistent with the research objective and are more philo-
sophical in nature. They shape the definition of lower level hypotheses and define the basic
structure of the proposed methodology. Exposition of the hypotheses defined herein can be
found in Section A.
In Section 2.5.1, simulation was identified as a key enabler to facilitate quantitative
analysis of technologies. The hierarchical structure and heterogeneous nature of military
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system architectures demands that the simulation be holistic because the interactions be-
tween system elements make it extremely difficult to analyze elements of the system in iso-
lation and integrate the results a posteriori. Furthermore, constructive simulation (which
involves simulated people in a simulated world) is most appropriate for analysis in which
large numbers of cases must be run. Finally, an object-oriented architecture is appropri-
ate when instantiating multiple elements with similar properties. Interfaces are generally
more well-defined than hard-coded simulations and reusability and flexibility are enhanced.
Object-oriented simulations are the standard in the military simulation community [333].
Section A.1.7 reviews existing simulation tools and selects one for this work.
With rare exceptions, wargames are generally not used for technology evaluation but for
operational analysis against projected threats [87, 167, 187]. These monolithic simulations
usually take days or weeks to execute and require a large staff to support and execute the
simulation [196]. Since technology evaluation requires a thorough design space exploration
consisting of many parametric runs as opposed to a single point design, the current mode of
operation is not appropriate for this research. As a result, techniques to relieve the burden
of human-based tactical decision making are needed to facilitate large-scale design studies.
Machine learning and agent-based modeling techniques lend themselves to this application.
According to Anderson, Campbell, and Chapman, “analyzing performance of several
design options of a complex system-of-systems across external parameters and multiple
MoEs can generate a massive number of trade space combinations to be assessed, presenting
extreme computational issues” [44]. While Section 2.3.1 noted that complex systems are
often dominated by several strong interactions that cannot be decomposed without losing
the essence of the system, weakly coupled interactions that do not contribute significantly to
the variability of the MoEs should be set to default values to reduce unnecessary complexity.
Most simulations have near infinite degrees of freedom: assumptions must be defined to
constrain the problem to a geographic region, a force size, technology level, political state,
and the like. Weather conditions, sea states, supply availability, morale, and component
failure rates must often be set to default settings to reduce the degrees of freedom to
a manageable set. Recently, an increasing body of work relating to the optimization of
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system-of-systems has been published [237, 482]. While technically an extension of existing
optimization techniques to the system-of-systems level, optimizing a system-of-systems for
a single design point that may never occur may not be a valid approach to systems-of-
systems design. Due to the sensitivity of large-scale complex systems to initial conditions,
assumptions, and inflection points (or turning points in military terms), the concept of a
robust technology portfolio is more appropriate than an optimum design.
3.4.3 Operational Hypotheses
If strategy is “the art and science of developing and employing instruments ... to achieve
objectives” then operational hypotheses should focus on the mechanics of how these instru-
ments may be comprised [468]. The primary focus of new methods application is
directed at the operational hypotheses1.
First, a technique is needed to prioritize targets within the simulation in a similar manner
to the Master Attack Plan created by campaign planning experts [177]. A simple and rapid
technique for prioritizing alternatives is through the use of an overall evaluation criterion.
This multiple-attribute decision making technique relies on preference weightings. These
weightings can either be directly specified or derived from another source. In this work,
the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) technique is coupled with an Overall Evaluation
Criterion (OEC) to decompose top-level strategic objectives into actionable tactical actions
that can be implemented at the agent level. The specifics of this approach are detailed in
Section B.1.
Next, a migration from a single point design to a design space exploration that examines
cases in bulk to develop trends for architecture technologies requires a number of runs
through a suitable simulation environment. Using a human to make every minute decision
in the environment is not reasonable. After reviewing potential approaches (see Section B.2),
a proposed approach is to use machine learning coupled with surrogate models to create an
intelligent battle manager or “Meta-General” that has a rudimentary understanding of basic
1Because strategic hypotheses are mostly philosophical in nature, they must be generally accepted to
justify research in an area. Tactical hypotheses are primarily implementation related and answer only esoteric
research questions. As in warfare, the operational level provides a means to link tactics and strategy.
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strategic decisions. The basis for this technique is well established in the field of computer
science; however, it has not been applied to technology forecasting to date [3, 133, 375, 487].
Finally, one of the key problems in technology evaluation is the confounding impact
of tactics on the operation of systems in the simulation. While the simplest approach
uses hard-coded rules and assumptions to define agent performance, this approach is not
scalable as new technologies are examined: each technology requires a new rule set. To
overcome this difficulty, a more flexible set of rules and conditions can be used to formulate
a “playbook” of tactical options. If the agent can gather enough information about its
environment and its own performance within the environment, it can select the appropriate
“play” to maximize its effectiveness. By using surrogate models of the performance space,
an agent can explore the trade space of potential future decisions before those decisions are
encountered. While chess-playing supercomputers attempt to emulate intelligence by ex-
amining an extremely large number of potential moves, an elegant approach that minimizes
computational resources is preferred [209].
3.4.4 Tactical Hypotheses
Tactical hypotheses are focused on the application level and are derived directly from de-
cisions made at higher levels. For example, three tactical hypotheses result from the first
strategic hypothesis which advocates the use of an object-oriented constructive simulation to
quantitatively assess technologies with respect to measurable capability-based performance
metrics.
To begin, a simulation is comprised of models. These models can be simple linear trends,
tables, empirical or semi-empirical models based on historical data, or models based on the
laws of physics and natural constraints. The latter is most appropriate for the analysis of
unconventional systems for which there is little historical data.
Once a simulation has been created within a framework and the simulation has been
populated with models, how can technologies be simulated? For most technologies, a phe-
nomenological simulation of the relevant physical effects is seldom available at the early
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stages of the design process, in fact, most of these phenomenological engineering simula-
tion tools are written long after a technology has become commonplace and data exists
to use for tool validation. A useful formulation developed by Mavris, Mantis, and Kirby
uses “k-factors” as scale parameters on discipline level metrics2 [293]. This allows existing
simulation tools to emulate potential future technologies.
A technique called the Unified Tradeoff Environment (UTE) results from coupling
physics-based models in a hierarchical modeling and simulation environment that uses k-
factors across design variables, technologies, and assumptions [49]. This technique allows
simultaneous trade studies across a variety of dimensions and enables migration from a
point design to a parametric analysis of a variety of solutions; however, full realization of
the UTE requires two other enabling techniques discussed below. The approach is also
useful for assessing the relative sensitivity of a technology as assumptions are changed and
uncertainties are applied.
The next series of tactical hypotheses relate to techniques used within the simulation.
A major challenge in systems-of-systems modeling is the large scale of the problem.
Creating a simulation comprised of a variety of elements that must interoperate and pass
information amongst each other in the form of messages is not unlike the issues faced by
object-oriented software designers. The standard approach to software modeling is to use
the Unified Modeling Language (UML) to formulate a storyboard of how code modules
integrate together. An extension of the UML, the Systems Modeling Language (SysML)
can provide a similar function when designing engineered systems. Additionally, the concept
of the matrix of alternatives used throughout this dissertation to narrow the scope of the
problem and to highlight method alternatives is traditionally used to delineate elements of
a physical problem and the potential alternatives for subsystems or functions. The matrix
of alternatives is a convenient way to identify the “threads” through the architecture that
are the subject of a simulation.
Next, techniques are needed to identify what elements are included in the architecture to
2Originally termed “k” factors in the literature, the term gradually evolved to the more popular “k-
factors” nomenclature subsequently used [240].
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be modeled. One technique from systems engineering is the use of functional decomposition.
According to the Defense Acquisition University, “concepts or designs are developed based
on the functional descriptions that are the products of Functional Analysis and Allocation”
[130]. A functional decomposition directly identifies the rows of the matrix of alternatives
and brainstorming techniques and literature searches can be used to populate the columns
with potential alternatives. Variations on this process are considered standard practice
for systems engineers [217, 312]. In addition to functional decomposition, traditional brain-
storming techniques and the SWARMing process advocated by Mavris (see Section C.6) are
useful means to define system elements that satisfy the functions identified using functional
decomposition.
While the previous techniques can address the technical challenges and are consistent
with the grand strategic research objective, a key enabler is missing to make the proposed
process a useful one. The concept of a surrogate model, a highly accurate approximation
of a physics-based tool, is necessary to migrate from point designs to a rapid parametric
tradeoff space. After a number of false starts and isolated applications at a variety of design
organizations, Mavris successfully introduced surrogate models to the aerospace community
in 1995. Since that time, they have become ubiquitous in the modeling of complex systems.
The ability to reduce the speed of a process from minutes or hours to less than a second with
no noticeable loss of fidelity enables the analysis of large volumes of data without supercom-
puting resources. While the integrated design environment previously mentioned is capable
of analyzing technologies one point at a time, with minimal additional computational bur-
den, a surrogate model can be created that enables a large design space exploration in a
reasonable time frame.
While surrogate models based on a second order Taylor series expansion have become
popular in the aerospace community, a major drawback of this approach is its inability
to capture nonlinear or discontinuous behaviors endemic to military simulations. In the
1980’s, researchers began experimenting heavily with artificial neural networks to specifically
address this issue [195]. By the late 1990’s, this technique had proliferated through the
control systems community and was first applied to conceptual design [82, 116, 264]. Since
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2005, the technique has become standard for any pattern matching process that cannot
be approximated using a polynomial surrogate model: artificial neural networks are a key
enabler for this research.
Surrogate models are created by developing a predictive capability that closely matches
experimentally derived data, but models are most accurate when data is gathered in a
structured manner. The concept of a “design of experiments” (DOE) is “a systematic,
rigorous approach to engineering problem-solving that applies principles and techniques at
the data collection stage so as to ensure the generation of valid, defensible, and supportable
engineering conclusions” [318]. Put another way, allocation of experimental runs has shifted
from “costly and time-consuming trial-and-error searches to powerful, elegant, and cost-
effective statistical methods” [366]. While a variety of experimental designs have been
created (and advocated) through the years to solve a variety of problems, an experimental
comparison between several popular techniques was conducted (see Section 5.5.7). This
experiment revealed that for this class of problems, a space-filling design using a sphere-
packing scheme is the most effective technique for generating neural network surrogate
models with the minimum expenditure of computational resources.
Since the strategic hypotheses identified the primary objective for capability-based tech-
nology evaluation to be robustness as opposed to an optimum point, a method for assessing
the relative importance of input variables to the MoEs is needed. The prediction profiler,
developed by Bradley Jones of the SAS Institute, is a graphical method for viewing partial
derivatives as a function of all design parameters simultaneously. The ANOVA technique
statistically assesses the relative contribution of a number of inputs on a response across
a user-defined range of input values. Both of these techniques can be used to identify the
significant parameters with respect to capability-level MoEs.
Engineering processes have many sources of uncertainty. A standard technique for the
quantification and evaluation of uncertainty is the use of Monte Carlo simulation. In ad-
dition to uncertainty analysis, this technique is also useful for design space exploration.
A linked, hierarchical, physics-based system-of-systems simulation provides the ability to
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quantitatively examine point designs. Creating a surrogate model of this simulation envi-
ronment allows these point designs to be generated very quickly. By adding Monte Carlo
simulation to the surrogate-enabled environment, data can be examined in bulk. Instead
of searching for a needle in a haystack by running a handful of singular cases, a sweep
of parameters can be quickly executed and the results graphically analyzed to find multi-
dimensional optima using the technique developed by Bandte [52].
3.4.5 Summary of Hypotheses
The previous section summarizes the proposed solutions to each research question. Further
exposition of the potential options for each decision and the process by which the preferred
techniques are selected are given in Appendices A, B, and C.
The hypotheses postulated for this dissertation are summarized as follows:
1. Grand Strategic (Research Objective):
The focus of this research is on the development of a valid, defensible, and practical
methodology that facilitates a quantitative assessment of technology potential with
respect to capability-level gaps. The methodology must be consistent with the JCIDS
approach and focus on delivering additional information to the earliest stages of the
capability planning process to assist technology analysts and military decision makers.
2. Strategic:
2.1 A top-down capability-based evaluation of technologies can be performed us-
ing a holistic, object-oriented, hierarchical constructive simulation of systems-of-
systems.
2.2 Techniques from machine learning and agent-based modeling can be leveraged to
provide an intelligent battle manager with an “understanding” of basic strategic
and tactical decisions.
2.3 For systems-of-systems, determination of a technology portfolio that is robust to
changing threats and variable operating conditions is more useful than a portfolio
optimized for maximum effectiveness.
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3. Operational:
3.1 Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and Multi-Attribute Decision Making (MADM)
techniques can be used to prioritize targets based on desired strategic objectives.
3.2 An “intelligent battle manager” created using agent-based modeling, machine
learning techniques, and surrogate models can remove the confounding effect of
tactics on technology evaluation.
3.3 At the agent level, intelligence can be provided by surrogate models and tunable
cognition models that allow the agent to forecast future decisions based on the
effect of technology on system-level measures of performance.
4. Tactical:
4.1 Physics-based models, implemented across hierarchical levels, are most effective
because they can be mathematically validated.
4.2 The concept of k-factors has emerged as a useful method for mapping technology
impacts to surrogate model inputs.
4.3 A hierarchical, integrated tradeoff environment is needed to analyze metrics at
multiple levels.
4.4 The inverse design technique is useful for setting targets at the top level and trac-
ing these targets to measurable system attributes and technology performance
metrics.
4.5 A matrix of alternatives is a useful technique for reducing the scale of the problem
using a defensible downselection process. The Systems Modeling Language is
useful for diagramming code and programming modules.
4.6 SWARMing and brainstorming were identified as techniques that are useful for
scoping the problem and defining the appropriate “control volume” to be ana-
lyzed using modeling and simulation. A functional decomposition is a systems
engineering technique that is useful in relating operational activities to system
functions.
4.7 Surrogate modeling is a proven approach that balances speed and accuracy to
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enable rapid design space exploration.
4.8 Neural Network surrogate models are appropriate for this class of problems be-
cause they can capture discontinuities endemic to systems-of-systems.
4.9 For non-linear systems-of-systems problems a space-filling design provides excel-
lent coverage of the design space and facilitates the creation of neural networks.
4.10 The prediction profiler (essentially a matrix of partial derivatives) or the ANOVA
technique can be used to ascertain what variables are significant with respect to
the capability-level metrics.
4.11 Monte Carlo simulations are a convenient and uncomplicated method for quan-
tifying uncertainty that have been used successfully for this class of problems.
A matrix of alternatives for the formulation of a design methodology results from the
above questions (Figure 22). The RQ column identifies which research question is addressed
by each row. Note that a research question can be answered at more than one hierarchical
level. The Hyp column identifies the hypothesis within which the research question is
addressed. Each of the options in the matrix of alternatives is detailed in the appendices:
Strategic hypotheses are detailed in Appendix A, Operational hypotheses are addressed
in Appendix B, and Tactical hypotheses are expounded upon in Appendix C. The orange
shaded areas indicate options selected to address the research questions/hypotheses based
on a review of the literature. Green shaded areas indicate selections that are justified by
experiments performed in the course of this research.
What if different options are chosen in this matrix of alternatives? Figure 22 contains
over 4.15 x 1022 options that could define variations on the proposed methodology. While
changing the method options in Figure 22 modifies the proposed methodology, changes
at the lower levels do not significantly impact the methodology’s strategic aims. Over
time, new techniques will be developed that can be added to this matrix of alternatives
to potentially improve upon the methodology developed in this research or to apply it to
different classes of problems.
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RQ Hyp
1 2.1 Hierarchical System-of-Systems Yes No
1 2.1 Level of Heterogeneity None Low Medium High
1 2.1 Type of Simulation Live Virtual Constructive Interactive
1 2.1 Programming Approach Custom (hardcoded) Object-Oriented
2 2.2 Make Decisions in Simulation Human-in-the-Loop Decision Tree Computer Assisted
Artificial 
Intelligence Other
3 2.3 Methodology Focus Optimization Robustness Other
2 3.1 Prioritize Targets Random Experience QFD OEC/MADM Other
2 3.2 Incorporate Tactics Hold Constant Include All Use Static Mapping Optimize for Each Technology Other
2 3.2 Type of Battle Manager Agent Reactive Deliberative Mixture Human





2 3.3 Type of Subordinate Agent Reactive Deliberative Mixture Human










1 4.1 Type of Models Physics-Based Empirical Hybrid Other
1 4.2-3 Analyze Technologies k-Factors Unified Tradeoff Environment Other
1 4.4 Trade Study Attributes Point Design Bottom-Up Top-Down Middle-Out Other
4 4.5 Reduce Scale of Problem Committee Approach SysML
Matrix of 
Alternatives Other None





6 4.7 Speed Up Processes None Linear Approximations Qualitative Mapping Surrogate Models Other




Neural Networks Radial Basis Functions Kriging Other
Random Full Factorial Box-Behnken D-Optimal Uniform
Orthog. Array Space-Filling Central Composite Latin Hypercube Other













7 4.9 Sample from Design Space





The product of this dissertation is a methodology for capability-based technology evalua-
tion. Section 2.6 outlined a generic method for military systems-of-systems analysis. This
“common sense process” shown in Figure 21 is not realistic due to several key technical
challenges enumerated in Chapter III. Following a literature search on enabling techniques
and methods, a new holistic processes that addresses the observed shortcomings is proposed
in this chapter.
4.1 Synthesizing a New Methodology: Refinement
After examining the functions that must be performed to quantitatively assess technology
impacts, the baseline five step process in Figure 21 is extended to the ten step process
shown in Figure 23. This process, which results from synthesis of enabling techniques and
methods from Chapter III, is proposed as a methodology for capability-based technology
evaluation. The process addresses the need for a structured approach to system analysis
for large-scale systems-of-systems, and is validated through a proof-of-concept experiment
based on a Long Range Strike system architecture in Chapter 5.
What are the appropriate measures of effectiveness to evaluate the process? The most
necessary condition is that the process works: by using the proposed process, engineers can
quantitatively evaluate the impact of technologies across the system-of-systems hierarchy
shown in Figure 10. The next measure of merit is that the methodology works correctly.
By using the proposed method, do engineers get the “right” answers, or are the answers
overly confounded by the large number of degrees of freedom? Another measure of merit is
the speed with which the analysis can be conducted. While all processes generally add time
to the analysis, the standardization of a structured method should add value by providing
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Methodology for Capability-Based Technology Evaluation for Systems-of-Systems
Figure 23: Evolution of a Ten Step Process Proposed to Address the Research Objective.
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just to say “there is a process” is not a valuable activity. Finally, does the proposed
methodology provide designers with information they do not already have, or does it merely
restate the obvious? Can designers use the proposed methodology to make design decisions
and validate those decisions against real-world models, or is the proposed method merely a
curiosity?
These questions are revisited in the summary and conclusion to evaluate how well the
proposed methodology satisfies these measures of effectiveness using the LRS system archi-
tecture as a testbed example. Also, a comparison is made to existing methods for technology
evaluation using the metrics outlined in Section 1.2.8. The key aspects of the process shown
in Figure 23 are described below.
4.2 Setting Up the Simulation Environment: Steps 1-3
Step 1 in a top-down, capability-focused technology evaluation is the establishment of
the objectives of the technology evaluation study. This involves identifying capabilities,
specifying the MoEs to evaluate capability gaps, constraining the simulation parameters,
defining the timescale of the simulation, identifying models and tools that can calculate the
needed MoEs, and selecting a simulation framework to perform the study.
Once the requisite capability or capabilities to be evaluated and the corresponding MoEs
have been defined, Step 2 is to create a relevant scenario or scenarios that exercise the
system architecture in the appropriate operational environment. A technique called the
“Estimate of the Situation” (see Section 5.2.1) provides a useful means to define the “who,
what, where, when, how, and why” aspects of the scenarios used to evaluate a capability.
The performance of a given architecture may be dependent on the conditions of the scenario:
a robust technology portfolio for a wide range of military situations can be discovered by
using the proposed methodology for multiple capabilities and multiple scenarios.
Step 3 in the process is the identification of system architecture components and a mod-
eling and simulation environment to exercise those components in the selected scenario(s).
The identification of models, linkages between models, required model fidelity, operational
constraints, etc. must be defined in this time-consuming step.
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It is important to note that steps 1-3 are required for any quantitative evaluation of
technologies, and different processes in different organization exist to describe how a simu-
lation can be created. Currently, the more ad-hoc processes emerge following step 3: once
a simulation has been created, what do we do with it? Steps 4 through 6 are aimed
at addressing the primary technical challenge of capability-based technology
evaluation and are the primary focus of new methods development in this work
4.3 Accounting for Technologies and Tactics: Steps 4-6
In Step 4, the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) technique is used to map top-level
strategic objectives to actionable operations. In the testbed example, the “operation” to
be performed is “strike ground targets” and the ranking methodology identifies the order
in which targets are to be struck (see Section B.1 for a technical overview and Section 5.4.1
for the implementation). It is important to note that while step 2 identified a scenario for
analysis, by changing the importance of strategic objectives in this step, variations from the
baseline scenario can be examined.
Next, Step 5 takes the actionable operations from step 4, the simulation environment
from step 3, the scenarios from step 2, and the MoEs that define a capability from step 1
and trains an intelligent battle manager to make decisions about force structure, technology
options and tactical considerations with respect to the information provided in the previous
steps. The output of step 5 is a “Meta-General” that is capable of performing the targeting
and weaponeering functions, that is, matching weapons/platforms to targets with respect
to their physical and functional properties. This step is useful in decoupling the human
from the analysis loop, which is one of the major technical challenges for simulation-based
technology evaluation. Background research on the techniques involved in this step can
be found in Sections A.2 and B.2 while the proof-of-concept implementation is detailed in
Section 5.5.
Step 6 addresses the need for centralized control and decentralized execution. Once
assets (or agents) have been given technologies, what do they do with them? Given a variety
of options, humans use a reasoning process to determine the “best” option based on their
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knowledge about each option and a prediction of possible outcomes. Intelligent agents can
be used to simulate this process. In this case, information about each alternative comes
from sensors that determine the attributes of the environment surrounding the agent. Since
the agent has no intuition about which options are best, it must evaluate its predicted
performance in each option and choose the option with the highest probability of success.
While the human neocortex allows this process to happen almost intuitively (we seldom
think about how we think), surrogate models can be used to enable the agent to forecast
its performance under changing conditions. By creating a surrogate model that calculates
MoPs as a function of discipline level metrics such as TSFC, drag coefficient, and weight,
an agent can forecast how the MoPs change as technologies are implied. In this manner,
an individual agent can forecast potential future actions and optimize tactical choices to
maximize its probability of success with respect to information provided in steps 1-5.
In steps 5 and 6, surrogate models are used inside the simulation to provide tunable
cognition at the battle manager and platform level. These surrogates are created a priori
and inserted inside the code for the individual modules. This is in contrast to the surrogates
used in step 9 that are created around the entire simulation and are generated after analysis
cases have been executed.
4.4 Evaluating Technologies: Steps 7-10
In Step 7, specific technologies are identified for evaluation. Technologies can be a mix
of specific system and subsystem level technologies or “architecture technologies” that rep-
resent a fundamentally different way of employing air power. The technology trade space
must be defined in terms of k-factors that represent the impact of the technology on the
system or subsystem-level metrics and the trade space must be bounded by realistic ranges.
Furthermore, models must have been defined in step 3 that support evaluation of the tech-
nologies in question. For this reason, the proposed methodology may be an iterative process:
as the technology space is better understood through modeling and simulation, additional
models may be developed or fidelity may be increased to focus the technology evaluation
study in different regions of interest.
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This step facilitates the optimization of tactics with technologies because cognition mod-
els for the agents from step 6 can be “tuned” to alter the behavior of the agents within
the simulation: the variation in the k-factors triggers different behaviors based on the out-
come of the surrogate models. The purpose of step 6 is to identify how the agents should
react to technology changes and the purpose of step 7 is to provide the agents with specific
technologies to react to if a gap analysis is of interest.
Step 8 is where the computational effort occurs. After the simulation has been tested
for execution errors, a design of experiments (DOE) across the technology space should be
set up and executed in the simulation framework identified in step 3 using the scenario from
step 2 with the adaptable agents from steps 4-6. This step is very computationally intensive
and the end result is a table of data that represents the effectiveness of various technologies
across the scenario(s) identified in step 2 for the capabilities defined in step 1.
Step 9 creates surrogate models of the simulation model that was executed in step 8.
In contrast to the surrogate models inserted inside individual elements of the simulation in
steps 5 and 6, the surrogate models in step 9 are created around the entire simulation system.
The purpose of these surrogate models is to allow rapid domain-spanning explorations of
the technology and tactics trade space. The hierarchical structure of the surrogate models
is used to evaluate technologies across the simulation hierarchy depicted in Figure 10.
The use of surrogate models around the simulation allows a designer to examine cases
that were not included in the original DOE and also enables implementation of probabilistic
techniques for design space exploration, uncertainty analysis and visualization.
Finally, Step 10 is where knowledge is gained by the process and where conclusions
can be drawn regarding the effectiveness of a technology or portfolio of technologies. Using
the surrogate models from step 9, a series of “what-if?” games can be played to evaluate
technologies under a variety of conditions. Depending on the level of detail provided in the
previous steps, iteration to any previous step may need to be performed. If the identified
scenario(s) do not sufficiently evaluate the candidate capabilities, additional scenarios may
need to be implemented in the modeling and simulation environment. Furthermore, some
technologies may have been left out of step 7 and that step may need to be revisited.
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4.5 Summary of Proposed Methodology
The methodology proposed is SOCRATES: Simulation-based, Object-oriented, Capability-
Focused, Real-Time Analytical Technology Evaluation for Systems-of-systems.
Figure 24: The Death of Socrates, Jacques-Louis David (1787).
Socrates, the Athenian philosopher and mentor to Plato who lived from ca. 470 B.C.
to 399 B.C “was the first person to question everything and everyone” [16]. This acronym
is chosen because the proposed methodology is Socratic in nature, that is, information is
gained by asking a series of questions to sequentially increase understanding1. Finally,
Socrates realized that true wisdom comes from knowing that one knows nothing. Although
designers may possess a large amount of tacit information about a system, when systems-
of-systems are analyzed, expert designers must acknowledge that the additional degrees of
freedom can confound even the most seasoned analyst.
The acronym incorporates the key elements of the solution. Object-oriented simula-
tion is the medium chosen to enable capability-focused real-time analysis of technologies
for systems-of-systems. The proposed methodology is designed to address the research
questions from Section 3.2. The methods and techniques utilized in this methodology are
explained in detail in Appendices A through C. The steps in the proposed methodology
are summarized in Figure 23 and the specific options to address the hierarchical research
questions are summarized in Figure 22.
1The Socratic method, described by Plato in the Socratic Dialogues, uses a series of questions to determine
the beliefs and knowledge of a person of group of people. Using this technique, progressive hypotheses are
eliminated by identifying contradictions based on known evidence and inferences [16].
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CHAPTER V
APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Chapter III proposed a series of enablers in the form of hypotheses to answer a set of
research questions and address technical barriers to quantitative technology evaluation and
Chapter IV identified a ten step process that synthesizes these elements into a structured
methodology. However, postulating a methodology for the analysis of system effectiveness
does little to address the need without a means to validate the proposal: imagination and
philosophy can only carry an argument so far.
In contrast to inductive proofs and reasoning by analogy, the scientific method provides
a means to deduce objective truths about the world around us [243]. “An integral part
of this method is the idea of controlled, repeatable experiments to test hypotheses about
how the world can be the way it is. Without a laboratory in which to perform these kinds
of experiments, there can be no such thing as a bona fide scientific theory of anything,”
says John L. Casti of the Santa Fe Institute. The lack of an experimental environment to
generate quantitative evidence of the method’s effectiveness is much “like the barrier faced
by early protobiologists without microscopes” [168]. To use the scientific method as a means
to validate the proposed methodology (essentially an unproven theory), an experimental
environment that exercises the proposed methodology on an example problem (Long Range
Strike) is required.
As mentioned in the Motivation chapter, computer simulation “provides a powerful
alternative to the techniques of experimental science and observation when phenomena are
not observable or when measurements are impractical or too expensive” [35]. In the spirit
of the scientific method, this chapter validates the proposed methodology by constructing
a computer-based simulation environment to test the predictions made in Chapters III and
IV. The subsequent sections of this chapter describe how this “virtual laboratory” is used
to test the proposition through a proof-of-concept exercise.
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5.1 Step 1: Define Objectives and Constraints
The first step of the SOCRATES method is to define the goals, objectives and constraints
for the technology evaluation activity. These factors must be defined with respect to the
research objective:
• Must be consistent with the JCIDS process
• Identifies a robust portfolio of technologies that best provides one or more capabilities
• Integrates multiple heterogeneous elements that comprise a “system-of-systems”
• Assesses the effectiveness across a broad trade space encompassing multiple concepts,
technologies, tactics, missions, and domains
The objectives listed above guide the identification of analysis questions and “what-
if?” games to be played in Step 10. Although the identification of a robust portfolio
of technologies would ideally be conducted across multiple scenarios and capabilities, the
proof of concept exercise is limited to a single capability and a single scenario comprised of
multiple missions. Both of these are detailed below.
5.1.1 Identify Capabilities to be Studied
Next, a capability or capabilities to be examined must be defined to establish the baseline
against which a technology performance can be measured. As highlighted in Section 1.3,
Long Range Strike capability is selected as a relevant problem of interest to demonstrate the
proposed methodology. The definition of this capability defines the trade space of potential
technology options and suggests MoEs used to measure the ability of a solution to provide
a capability.
An initial list of candidate MoEs includes the duration of the conflict (hours), the
attrition levels across all target sets (%), number of strikes flown, number of munitions
fired, cost of munitions fired ($), number of TBMs fired, average time to target (hours),
number of blue units lost, and percentage of time critical targets killed. A detailed definition
of specific MoEs is described in Section 5.2.2 because the calculation method is dependent
on the scenario definition. In practice, not all desired MoEs may be calculable. The Air
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Force Task List defines several high-level MoEs for precision engagement and global attack
including percentage of effects achieved, percent of successful engagements, time for the
desired effect to be achieved, percent of Earth’s surface area accessible to USAF strategic
attack, and cost to perform attack; however, no common set of MoEs has been defined
across all scenarios and missions [428].
5.1.2 Define Analysis Questions
The primary focus of quantitative technology evaluation is the identification of a portfolio of
technologies that best provide the required capability. Section 3.4.3 noted the confounding
impact of tactics on technology forecasting. Any analysis must enumerate or account for the
relative contributions of technologies and tactics on the MoEs either directly or indirectly.
The “virtual library” created to demonstrate the validity of the SOCRATES method-
ology for technology evaluation is also used to demonstrate the usefulness of the technique
by answering a series of “what-if?” questions that highlight the benefits of parametric
quantitative analysis. Some analysis questions include:
• What is the composition of a robust portfolio of technologies that provides Long Range
Strike capability?
• What is the relative contribution of tactics and technologies to the overall effectiveness
of the proposed portfolio?
• How do different aspects of the system architecture such as sensors and munitions
contribute to the effectiveness of a technology infused platform?
• Can new munitions be leveraged with existing platforms or are platform technology
advancements required for an effective system?
• How does the selection of a technology portfolio depend on the evolution of enemy
capability?
• How does the definition of a mission influence the composition of a technology port-
folio?
• Can the flexibility of the object-oriented framework demonstrate the reusability of the
simulation components for the analysis of multiple architectures?
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The identification of analysis questions defines to some degree the selection of scenarios
and requirements for analytical models as they must be developed to answer the analysis
questions. Furthermore, the assumptions and constraints imposed on the scenario may also
be defined by the specification of these analysis questions: a study on logistics and resupply
may ignore the impact of terrain while the analysis of sensor systems would require precise
geometric models of the targets to be analyzed, a detailed treatment of signatures, and
high-fidelity terrain models for masking effects and line-of-sight calculations germane to the
calculation of sensor effectiveness.
5.1.3 Define Models Needed to Address Analysis Questions
The development of the appropriate models is a time consuming process necessary to “set
up the experiment” and is analogous to building a wind-tunnel model to the appropriate
size and scale with pressure taps at the right location for the test in question. This step
is detailed beginning in Section 5.3. It is important to note that models should not be
implemented for the sake of implementing models. Since every calculation uses computer
cycles that could be otherwise allocated to other models, the instantiation of every model
should be traceable to the objectives of the simulation and the analysis questions identified
for a particular study.
5.1.4 Define Timescale
It can be said that in war the first thing you lose is the plan. This is due to the Clausewitzian
“friction” of war and the fact that the enemy adapts rapidly to a static plan [100]. Gordon
and Trainor note that during Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi forces moved planes around
every three days because they had determined it took at least three days for a nominated
target to be written into the Air Tasking Order (ATO) [179]. To maintain consistency with
the Global Strike Task Force’s objective: “kick down the door into denied battlespace by
rapidly degrading, and thereafter defeating, the adversary’s C4ISR, anti-access weapons,
WMD delivery systems, and threats to friendly ground or naval forces,” a simulation time
of three days is defined [249]. Beyond this time period, the logistical constraints of resupply
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and the adaptiveness of the adversary would need to be considered for an accurate simu-
lation. Based on available resources, three eight-hour operational days were simulated for
the longest of the operational missions defined. This assumption is predicated on the need
for nighttime operations for current generation stealth aircraft. This also balances available
computational resources with the size of the analysis DOE.
5.1.5 Constrain Unnecessary Degrees of Freedom
While constructive simulation can be used for a variety of analysis tasks including force mix
determination, optimization, analysis of enemy defenses, and logistics analysis, the focus of
the proposed methodology is on using simulation for quantitative technology evaluation. To
assess the benefit of technologies on a system architecture, the following degrees of freedom
are held constant:
• Systems types and numbers employed by both sides
• Logistics (resupply of ammunition and fuel)
• Command and Control algorithms and communications pathways
• Jamming technologies are not used
• All aircraft of the same type carry the same parametric munitions for each simulation
run
• SEAD effectiveness is modeled through a scale factor on SAM density
This is not to say that these degrees of freedom cannot be altered; however, their
variation confounds the issue of technology evaluation. Constraints are also important in
bounding the problem within an acceptable control volume. The testbed activity focuses
on mid-term LRS technologies that can be implemented within the 2018-2025 time frame
based on estimates of LRS IOC date from the 2006 QDR [456]. While JCIDS seeks to
develop integrated joint capabilities, the development of high fidelity models for joint force
interoperability and network centric warfare are outside the scope of this research.
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5.1.6 Select a Simulation Framework
In a physical experiment, a framework could be interpreted as the simulation apparatus,
wind tunnel, or stress testing machine used to perform the experiment. In the case of
simulation, a framework is the software used to execute simulations. While a variety of
government and commercial simulation tools are available, a simulation framework should
be object-oriented, able to be executed without a graphical interface, allow creation of
additional models and interfaces, and should be unclassified and available for the simulation
activity. A literature search of existing simulation tools was conducted in Section A.1.6.
Comparisons based on the above criteria identified FLAMES by Ternion Software as the
appropriate simulation framework for this work.
While the subsequent sections describe models developed in FLAMES, it is important
to note that both the models and methodology are independent of the framework selected.
5.1.7 Determining the Relevant Experiments to Be Performed
As previously mentioned, the experimental setup (model development, linking, verification,
and validation) for systems-of-systems is a complex and time consuming process that is not
unlike devising a wind tunnel test to observe a phenomenon. In addition to the validation
of individual models, interactions between multiple models and interactions with the exper-
imental framework itself must be examined. The large scale of the modeling endeavor limits
the scope of phenomenological investigation to a single case: analysis of a Long Range
Strike architecture. This selection was made based on community interest, suitability of
available models and tools for this problem, and the representative nature of the system
architecture. While the steps of the methodology are not specific to the LRS example,
future work is needed to validate the proposed process across multiple systems-of-systems
before a more general statement regarding its universal applicability can be made.
91
5.2 Step 2: Establish Scenario(s)
“If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war
will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different
that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one.”
-Former RAF Marshal, Sir John Slessor,
Air Power and Armies (1936)
The next step in the SOCRATES method is to establish one or more scenarios for
analysis. The simulation uses the scenario as a “game board” on which to evaluate the MoEs
that contribute to the capabilities defined in step 1. Scenario construction “establishes the
context and boundaries of subsequent performance and technology evaluations” [187].
The dependence of the analysis process on the scenarios chosen poses several unique
challenges. First, most scenarios of interest are sensitive or classified. Secondly, validation
of a notional scenario is extremely difficult as there is no baseline for comparison. While
several recent conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have demonstrated the value of
airpower, it is necessary to select a scenario for which some validation data exists. To
test the proposed methodology, a scenario based on the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Operation
Desert Storm), has been selected due to the large amount of data on this conflict available
in the public domain1.
The conflict between the United Nations coalition and the Iraqi Regime to liberate occu-
pied Kuwait was a 42 day campaign dominated by the judicious use of airpower. Recreating
elements of the air campaign meets the needs for validation and will provide an unclassified
scenario for analysis. It is important to note that the next sections do not describe an
animation or a replay of events past, but rather build upon known information to create
a relevant scenario for exploration of new technologies and tactics against threats that can
be parametrically varied in the presence of real geographic constraints.
1A number of after-action reports on the Serbian (1995) and Kosovo (1999) conflict remain classified as
of 2006. In-depth analysis of post-2001 conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has not been completed.
92
5.2.1 Estimate of the Situation for the Testbed Scenario
The initial assumptions can be defined, with some liberty to focus on the Long Range
Strike elements of the air campaign, using the commander’s “estimate of the situation” as
advocated by Dupuy [138]. Based on a U.S. Army process, the estimate of the situation has
five key elements (Figure 25). Each of these elements are defined in turn in the subsequent
sections.
Analyze Enemy's Courses of  
Action
Compare Own Courses of  
















Own Courses of Action
Situation
Mission
Estimate of the 
Situation
Figure 25: Estimate of the Situation (Adapted from Reference [138])
5.2.1.1 Mission
The stated goal of Operation Desert Storm was “to neutralize Iraqi National Command
Authority, eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait, destroy the Republican Guard, destroy
Iraqi’s (sic) ballistic missile, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capabilities as early
as possible, and assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait” [104].
To this end, the LRS mission is focused on the initial strategic air campaign, identified as
Phase I by Glosson [177] and the first phase of the notional “Operation Colorado Springs”
advocated by Dupuy [138]. In this phase, strategic targets including leadership, C4, and
WMD facilities are aggressively targeted. Air bases and materiel production facilities may
also be included on the prioritized target list. This phase was formally defined by the
operational plan for the war as:
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“. . . attack Iraq’s strategic air defenses, aircraft/airfields, strategic chem-
ical, biological and nuclear capability; leadership targets; command and control
systems; RGFC (Republican Guard Force Command) forces; telecommunications
facilities; and key elements of the national infrastructure, such as critical Lots
(lines of communications) between Baghdad and the [Kuwaiti Theater of Op-
erations], electric grids, petroleum storage and military production facilities.”
[104]
Planners expected Phase I to last six to nine days [104]. Although strategic targets
were attacked with air power throughout the conflict, air supremacy was declared after 10
days [457]. Given the time critical objectives of the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF), the
simulated strategic air campaign simulated for the proof-of-concept activity is executed over
at most six days. A more reasonable estimate based on GSTF operations in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is between two and three days.
5.2.1.2 Situation and Relevant Circumstances: Overview of Iraq
Located in Western Asia, Iraq (Figure 26) has a land area 437,072 km2, or roughly twice
the size of Idaho. The geography for the simulation is bounded between 35◦ and 70◦ east
longitude and 25◦ and 40◦ north latitude. Iraq is bordered by Iran (1,458 km), Jordan (181
km), Kuwait (240 km), Saudi Arabia (814 km), Syria (605 km), and Turkey (352 km) [91].
The population of 26,783,383 is largely confined to major population centers as shown
in Figure 27, and nearly 50% of the country is uninhabited except for small nomadic groups
[91]. A side effect of this population clustering is a relatively undeveloped transportation
infrastructure confined to a few major highways linking the largest cities as shown in Figure
28. There are 45,550 km of roadways, 2,220 km of 1.435 m gauge rail lines, 5,418 km of oil
pipelines, and three major ports at Al Basrah, Khawr az Zubayr, and Umm Qasr [91].
While the highest point in the country is at 3,611 meters elevation, the desert country
is dominated by gently rolling hills and sparse vegetation [164]. A majority of the terrain
is less than 400 meters above sea level. To further develop the scenario, the terrain of
the region can be examined in detail. Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), a matrix
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Figure 26: Overview Map of Iraq [315]
95
Figure 27: Population Density of Iraq [93]
96
Figure 28: Transportation Infrastructure of Iraq [93]
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of terrain elevation values used for mapping and integration of geospatial information, has
three levels of classification [150]:
• DTED Level 0: Unclassified, publicly available elevation information spaced at 30
arc seconds (one kilometer).
• DTED Level 1: For Official Use Only. Basic medium resolution elevation data
used for military activities. This level is spaced at 3 arc seconds (approximately 100
meters).
• DTED Level 2: Secret. High resolution elevation data for military activities spaced
at 1 arc second (30 meters). DTED level 2 was created using the results of the NASA
STS-99 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) in February 2000 [313].
Figure 29: Baseline FLAMES Scenario Using DTED Level 0 Terrain Model.
High resolution DTED data can be used for line of sight calculations, navigation and
targeting, route planning, and flight simulation [313]. Since none of these uses are planned
with the current simulation, DTED level 0 is sufficient if terrain data is needed. DTED
Level 0 for the region was obtained from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
[316].
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The geographic coordinates of countries in this region were calculated using Google
Earth [33] and were superimposed on the FLAMES scenario as airspace regions (areas of
responsibility). The baseline FLAMES scenario including the NGA terrain files, local air-
fields, and estimated geographic coordinates of local nations is shown in Figure 29. Loading
the FLAMES dataset containing the terrain files significantly increases the time required
to initialize the scenario. After examining a majority of the country for which operations
are planned, the terrain features do not contribute significantly to the calculation of MoEs
for this scenario.
The climate of Iraq is similar to that of southern Arizona, with summer highs reaching
above 38◦ C (100◦ F) and winter lows below freezing. Precipitation is limited to less than
about 18 cm per year, mainly between April and November. Dust and sand storms caused
by wind patterns are the dominant weather phenomena, complicating operational issues for
ground-based men and machinery as well as increasing the difficulty of aerial targeting. The
desert has been described by World War II German General von Ravenstein as “a tactician’s
paradise and a quartermaster’s hell” [138]. The lack of major terrain features provides
near-infinite tactical mobility for ground units; however, high temperatures severely impact
aircraft performance and pervasive sand and dust complicate the lubrication of machinery.
As a result, aircraft takeoff field length, range, and loiter time are adversely impacted with
respect to nominal conditions. In this harsh environment, sortie rates would be lower than
a theoretical ideal due to increased maintenance demands.
While the weather of the region is generally clear, the period of January/February
1991 saw the worst weather in at least 14 years2. “Approximately 15 percent of scheduled
aircraft attack sorties during the first 10 days were canceled because of poor visibility or
low overcast sky conditions” [457]. Although pre-war estimates predicted cloud cover of
13% the average cloud cover was 39% over the duration of the conflict [208]. Low cloud
ceilings (5,000 to 7,000 feet) impeded the ability to collect target imagery and perform battle
damage assessment (BDA). Since no accurate weather model is available, clear weather is
2Although Reference [164] notes “conditions were no worse than what would probably be the best ones
likely in other conflicts.”
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assumed for the short duration of the LRS mission; however, a scale factor for percentage
of canceled sorties can be added to the environment to simulate negative effects of weather
for future research activities. The FLAMES jamming model, while designed to simulate
electromagnetic interference, can also be tuned to the visible spectrum, disrupting optical
calculations if such detail is desired.
The 97% Muslim country has deeply rooted religious beliefs that restrict targeting
around religious and historical sites. Additionally, military operations may be constrained
by the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which is based on the lunar calendar and hence
migrates from year to year. In 1991, Ramadan fell between March 19th and April 17th. Con-
strained on the forward end by United Nations Resolution 678, military operations could
begin no earlier than January 15th of that year, limiting the entire scope of the campaign
to 63 days [420].
5.2.1.3 Enemy Situation: Defining the Centers of Gravity and Locating Enemy Targets
Only by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring all to win
all, will one really defeat the enemy.
-Carl Von Clausewitz,
On War [100]
The center of gravity, a concept from mechanics3 extended by Clausewitz to military
theory is best defined as the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”
[100]. In contrast to absolute war4 the purpose of targeting is to efficiently attack the
enemy’s center of gravity, ending military conflicts as quickly as possible with minimum
cost and casualties. To accomplish this goal, it is first necessary to identify the elusive
center of gravity which changes based on the condition of the scenario and the disposition
of enemy forces.
3In mechanics, the center of gravity is the point through which the application of a force yields more
work than the application of the same force through a different point.
4Absolute war is defined as the limitless expenditure of resources to utterly destroy the adversary. Clause-
witz believed that absolute war was impossible because the constraints of politics and morality would define
a point of mutual capitulation at which hostilities would cease [100].
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In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, strategic targets were classified according to twelve target
sets as described in Table 1 [457]:
Table 1: Apportionment of Targets Across the Twelve Target Sets [104, 450]
Dec 1990 15-Jan-1991 Modeled
Leadership/Command 32 33 40
Electricity Production 16 17 10
Telecommunications and C3 Nodes 26 59 53
Strategic Integrated Air Defense System 28 101 126
WMD Research, Prod. and Storage 25 23 40
Missile Launchers, Production and Storage N/A 43 54
Air Forces and Airfields 28 31 54
Naval Forces and Port Facilities 4 19 3
Oil Refining and Distribution 7 12 25
Railroads and Bridges 28 33 23
Ground-Based Army Units N/A 37 1
Military Storage and Production 44 68 46
Total 282 476 475
Table 1 identifies (1) how these target sets were apportioned across the 282 targets
identified by CENTCOM in December 1990 and (2) how the number of targets increased
prior to the initiation of the air campaign on January 15, 1991 [104] and (3) how the targets
were modeled in the experimental scenario5. Differences in the actual versus modeled values
indicate the degree to which information is available on the targets struck during the conflict
and encompass the fact that some targets belong to more than one target set.
Specific examples of facilities that fall into these target classes are listed in the Gulf
War Air Power Survey [105]. The first five target sets represent 13% of strategic sorties
(2,583) during the Gulf War while the sixth target set (mainly involving time critical theater
ballistic missile (TBM) launchers) represents a surprising 15% of the strategic sorties (2,767)
[118].
One of the properties of each target in the simulation is the target set(s) to which it
belongs. While the first six target sets are traditionally priority targets for LRS assets, each
target is prioritized by the battle manager for attack based on the relative importance of
each type of target relative to the overall campaign goals. For example, if the primary goal
5Based on information in the public domain.
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is an early halt to advancing ground forces, priority would be given to the destruction of
air defenses, tactical communications systems, and the interdiction of fielded combat forces
[119]. On the other hand, a “decapitation strike” aimed at quickly toppling a regime would
utilize surprise attacks almost entirely centered on leadership and C3 targets. Nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons production facilities would almost certainly be a
priority target in any engagement scenario.
When considering the role of LRS assets to attack airfields and aircraft located on the
ground, priorities for the first seven target sets are defined according to the guidelines set
forth by Glosson and Brigadier General Larry Henry [177]:
• “Destroy the leadership, NBC targets, Republican Guard, Air Force, and Sad-
dam’s security forces, in that order.”
• “Disrupt C3, industrial infrastructure, and other military facilities.”
A method for parametrically varying the relative importance of each target set with
respect to strategic goals is discussed in Section 5.4.1.
Initial developments in capability-based technology evaluation were focused on a set of
identical targets uniformly distributed across a randomly shaped country [289, 61]. This
simplifying assumption is a poor one due to an adversary’s exploitation of the home field
advantage provided by their geography. Analysis of the Iraqi region indicates that defenses
were heavily clustered around a few population centers leaving large areas of the country
undefended, as Cordesman notes, “Iraqi territory is too large to attempt territorial defense,
and Iraq has always concentrated on defending strategic targets” [107]. Although this
strategy is likely not the same for other countries with next-generation layered air defenses,
detailed information on such arrangements is not available in the public domain. The
representative setup used can be parametrically “tuned” to represent different capabilities
within the same adversarial architecture. Using public domain sources, many of the high-
value targets of interest enumerated by target set in Table 1 can be located:
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• Generic regions of the country can be identified from map collections such as Reference
[93] and Reference [466].
• Major targets in the Baghdad, region are defined by Davis [118]. The National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [315] also provides public domain reference maps for
Baghdad, Kirkuk, Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul.
• Additional strategic targets around Iraq are defined by Cheney [457], Cohen [104, 105,
106], Cordesman [107], and Putney [348].
• Airfields in the region can be identified from the Gulf War Airpower Survey [104],
O’Malley’s seminal 2001 report for the RAND corporation [330], and a more recent
online database of worldwide airfields [48].
• While the GAO states that only 15% of fixed NBC facilities were known before the war
[164] these targets can still be simulated using information identified by the CIA in
Reference [92] and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Reference
[421].
• The U.S. Air Order of Battle, the dispersion of air assets across the area of responsi-
bility, is given by Glosson [177] and Cheney [457].
• Refueling tracks and AWACS flight paths were established in Saudi Arabia according
to the Gulf War Air Power Survey [105].
• SAM coverage regions for the major population centers were also defined in the Gulf
War Air Power Survey [105].
• The number of SAM sites in each region are given in the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War Final Report to Congress [457], which are mapped generically to the previously
identified coverage regions. Defenses around Baghdad are primarily located around
the outskirts of the city, “extending over the general Baghdad area, as far as 60 miles
outside the city” [164]. Individual SAM fire units were located randomly within the
range circles specified in the Gulf War Air Power Survey [105].
• Since their exact locations were unknown at the time, mobile TBM launchers are
distributed randomly across western and southern Iraq in regions identified by Rostker
[357] and Hallion [190].
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• The position of U.S. naval units can be determined from References [457] and [106].
Since the focus of the simulation activity is on Air Force LRS assets, the exact order
of battle of naval forces is not needed for this scenario.
• B-52G aircraft operating outside the area of responsibility launched thirty-five Air
Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM’s) in the opening hours of the conflict [457]. These
assets are positioned over the Mediterranean Sea.
Using this information, a resulting buildup of friendly forces and hostile targets in the
FLAMES framework can be created and is shown in Figure 30 for the Iraqi region and
Figure 31 for the Baghdad area. The red circles indicate the SAM coverage regions identified
in Reference [105] and the black lines indicate command and control pathways between
elements of the Iraqi air defense system. Different icons are used to identify factories,
palaces, chemical, biological and nuclear facilities, oil-related targets, military storage sites,
airbases, bridges, SAM sites, radars, and other targets of interest.
Finally, while the Iraq scenario serves as a baseline for the demonstration of the SOCRATES
methodology, Hallion notes that “every developed nation has within it a remarkably similar
number of key targets (about 500) and aiming points (about 3,000)” [190]. Parametric vari-
ation of the target characteristics, geography, and friendly asset properties and locations




































































































































5.2.1.4 Own Situation: Alliances and Order of Battle
Nearly 50 countries participated in the 1991 Gulf War, either through financial aid, troop
commitment, or geographic basing. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)6,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE committed bases and logistics support to U.S.
forces [457], with a majority of Air Force assets forward deployed in Saudia Arabia. Outside
the main theater of operations, B-52G heavy bombers operated from RAF Fairford in the
U.K., Moron airbase in Spain, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Other major regional
concerns which relate to the experimental setup include:
• Syria contributed special forces troops to the coalition, but its territory was not used
for air operations.
• While Iran condemned the invasion of Kuwait, it also declared neutrality in the con-
flict.
• Lebanon did not play a role in the war.
• Egypt contributed ground troops, based in Saudi Arabia.
• The historical role of Jordan is not clear. The fairweather supporter of the Iraqi
regime deployed troops to thwart a potential invasion of their largely undefended
border. Jordan is considered neutral, but overflight is not permitted.
• Yemen and Sudan vocally supported Saddam Hussein.
• While 42 Scud missiles were launched at Israel, at the behest of America, the Israelis
did not participate in the war7.
The status of friendly (blue), neutral (white), and hostile (red) countries is shown in
Figure 32. The basing situation of U.S aircraft are based on historical records from Reference
[457].
The “Order of Battle” refers to the “number, type, and composition of forces available
to a country or present at a battle” [106]. As shown in Table 2, the primary aircraft
6The GCC also includes Kuwait.
7While many historical accounts note that U.S. diplomatic efforts and defense with Patriot missile bat-
teries kept Israel out of the war, a lesser known fact is that Israel requested, and was denied, access to
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes used by coalition forces [190].
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Figure 32: Disposition of Neighboring Countries for the Simulation Activity.
used for bombing included the F-111F, the F-117A, the F-15E, and the B-52G8. Due to
their relatively short range, F-16 aircraft were not utilized heavily in the strategic bombing
campaign at the start of the war [177]. The Gulf War Air Power Survey also gives the
unclassified basing information related to the initial deployment of forces at the 23 airbases
in the area of responsibility [106]. Strike aircraft were generally based at Al Kharj (F-
15E), Taif (F-111F), and Khamis Mushait (F-117A) [177]. Only the largest airfields in
Saudi Arabia could support refueling aircraft and heavy bombers such as the B-52G, some
of which flew from Moron, Diego Garcia, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Several of the
aircraft used are depicted in Figure 33.
8While the F-117A constituted less than 2.5% of the aircraft in theater, Nighthawk crews attacked 31%
of the strategic targets on the first day of the war [424].
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Table 2: Order of Battle for USAF Forces During the Persian Gulf War, January 1, 1991
[106].
Aircraft Type Number Aircraft Type Number
F-15C Fighter 96 E-3A AWACS 7
F-4G Electronic Combat 48 EF-111 Electronic Combat 18
F-16 Fighter/Attack 168 EC-135 Electronic Combat 0
A-10 Attack 120 KC-10 Refueling 6
AC-130 Gunship 4 KC-135Q Refueling 164
F-117A Bomber 36 C-20 Airlift 1
F-15E Bomber 46 C-21 Airlift 8
F-111F Bomber 64 C-29 Airlift 0
B-52G Bomber 20 C-130 Airlift 96
TR-1A Recon 2 HC-130 Special Ops 4
U-2 Recon 3 MC-130 Special Ops 4
RF-4C Recon 6 MH-53 Special Ops 8
RC-135 Recon 4 MH-60 Special Ops 8

















Figure 33: Aircraft Used in the Persian Gulf War (Adapted from Reference [417]).
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Despite the recent reluctance of Saudi Arabia to support U.S. operations in the region
[166], during the 1991 conflict, Saudi Arabia hosted a large percentage of U.S. strike assets.
Support equipment such as jammers, SEAD aircraft, tankers, and short-range ground attack
aircraft are based in Saudi Arabia according to the positions specified in Reference [457].
LRS assets are positioned at Khamis Mushait where F-117A aircraft were bedded down.
Future work may examine other locations in Qatar, UAE, Oman, and the British island
base of Diego Garcia to examine LRS effectiveness from multiple bases when Saudi facilities
are denied.
5.2.1.5 Enemy Capabilities: Review of Air Defense Threats
At the outset of hostilities, Iraq boasted the fourth largest army, and the sixth largest
air force in the world [190]. Protected by thousands of anti-aircraft systems, Baghdad
was arguably more heavily defended than Moscow [404]. Using primarily Russian anti-
aircraft equipment, a French-built Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) called KARI9
linked Western and Soviet radar, SAMs, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) while providing
redundant command and control. The KARI system was optimized to defend from the
west (Israel) and the east (Iran), leaving a “dead zone pointed directly at Baghdad from
Saudi Arabia” [105]. While the air defense system was primarily concentrated around Iraq’s
major population centers, a large number of high-value targets were located in and around
these centers and along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Iraqi doctrine, which emphasized
defense of the capital and these centers, enabled allied air operations within portions of
the country to some degree. The centralized nature of KARI was both a strength and a
weakness. On one hand, when integrated, the system was incredibly powerful; however, if
the central nodes could be disables or destroyed, individual fire units would be forced into
autonomous mode. Turning on their individual radars for target acquisition and tracking
made them easy targets for U.S. radar-homing missiles.
Iraqi SAM air defenses were provided by the Soviet SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and the Franco-
German Roland systems [457]. Additionally, the 16,000 radar-guided and heat-seeking
9KARI is Iraq in French (IRAK), spelled backwards.
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missiles included man-portable and other Iraqi army missiles such as the SA-7, SA-8, SA-9,
SA-13, SA-14, and SA-16 [338]. Track information for KARI was provided by a network of
early warning radars. The approximate SAM and Early Warning (EW) radar coverage of
Iraq is shown in Figure 34.
Figure 34: SAM and Early Warning (EW) Coverage of Iraq in 1991 [105].
Additionally, over 7,500 pieces of AAA including the 23-mm ZSU-23/4 and the 57-mm
ZSU 57/2 self-propelled systems protected high value targets [447]. As demonstrated on
several notable occasions during the Gulf War, the threat environment below 10,000 feet
creates an envelope where it is impossible to safely operate. A lower-bound for operational
altitude is defined at this level. While operation at medium and high altitudes contributes
to survivability, these heights limit accuracy, target identification, and target acquisition.
“Medium and high-altitude tactics also increased the exposure of aircraft sensors to man-
made and natural impediments to visibility” such as smoke, camouflage, foliage, sandstorms,
fog, haze, clouds, and high humidity [163].
While the properties of each type of SAM can be defined using References [447] and [327],
to avoid sensitivity concerns with identification of realistic system properties, SAM sites are
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given uniform properties representative of 1991 SAM systems. Because, the maximum range
of surface to air missiles and their target tracking radar systems are parametric variables
in the simulation, current and future threats can be analyzed as well. The process of
calibrating the simulation for the 1991-level IADS is discussed in Appendix E.2.
The Iraqi air force contained more than 700 fighters, including less than 350 third-
generation (MiG-23, MiG-25, and Mirage F-1) or fourth-generation (MiG-29 and Su-24)
fighters [457]. The remainder of the aircraft were older Soviet/Chinese technology, oper-
ated by relatively unskilled pilots. Hussein’s conservative doctrine preferred to keep his
air forces as a reserve for the final defense of Baghdad. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi tactics
were dominated by survival, even when the numerical advantage was on their side. Despite
intensive use of jamming and countermeasures by U.S. forces, during the war “the Iraqis
employed few, if any, electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposi-
tion” [164]. Based on the performance of U.S. assets in air-to-air engagements over the past
fifteen years, it is reasonable to assume that the primary threat to U.S. air assets comes
not from hostile fighters but from ground-based SAMs and AAA. According to Khalilzad,
“loss rates have been reduced by more than two orders of magnitude since World War II,”
with the loss rate during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied force at 0.4 and
0.1 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties respectively [236]. As Bolkcom notes, “Since Operation
Desert Storm, 100% of all U.S. combat aircraft losses have been due to enemy air defenses.
No U.S. aircraft has been lost to an enemy aircraft since 1991” [66]. Therefore, to reduce
the simulation burden, offensive counter air (OCA) and defensive counter air (DCA) sorties
are not simulated.
Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), “with a mix of warheads have the capability to alter
the course of campaigns. Thus, Joint counterair operations are a key to successful future
campaigns” [490]. Due to their potential to distribute NBC weapons, ballistic missiles are a
major target of interest in the LRS scenario. While fixed missile launch sites and production
facilities can be often be detected using overhead imagery, time critical targets such as
mobile TBM launchers also pose a great threat to friendly forces. Approximately 600 Scud-
B missiles and twenty-two mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) were purchased from
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the Soviet Union between 1976 and 1979 [104]. An example of a mobile TEL is shown in
Figure 35.
Page 1 of 1
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Figure 35: Scud Mobile Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) [462].
Approximately 200 of these missiles were fired in the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980’s. The
reported number of TELs, 37, includes an estimated 15 indigenously constructed launchers.
During Persian Gulf conflict, Iraq fired “88 modified Scuds, 42 toward Israel and 46 at
Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states” [457]. “The Iraqi version of the Scud, the
Al-Hussein, had a circular error probability of more than 2,000 meters and carried less
than 180 kilograms of high explosives” [105]. Despite General Schwarzkopf’s assertions
that the Scud missiles posed no military significance, on February 25, 1991, an Iraqi Scud
missile hit an Army barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 Americans and wounding
nearly a hundred causing the largest single loss of life in the conflict [85]. Although post-
war accounts noted that the U.S. counter-Scud effort “did in fact reduce Iraq’s ability to
launch missiles,” historical records indicate that no mobile Scud launchers were confirmed
destroyed in Operation Desert Storm [345].
In addition to the number of TELs destroyed in counter-scud operations, one measure
of effectiveness of critical interest in the simulation activity is the number of Scud missiles
fired. Technologies which either suppress Scud activity or eliminate launchers, missiles, fuel
depots, and other processing facilities support the GSTF mission of eliminating potential
WMD delivery systems.
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5.2.1.6 Own Courses of Action: Defining Specific Analysis Scenarios
“The first thing for a commander in chief to determine is what he is going
to do, to see if he has the means to overcome the obstacles which the enemy can
oppose to him, and, when he has decided, to do all he can to surmount them.”
-Napoleon, Maxim LXXIX
The Operation Desert Storm scenario was chosen to demonstrate the proposed method-
ology primarily due to the availability of data to assist in the validation phase. As previously
mentioned, the development a robust portfolio implies that a technology suite is effective
across a number of scenarios. Therefore, in addition to simulating the relevant events of the
opening phase of the Gulf War, the same backdrop can be used to demonstrate multiple
scenarios and assess the robustness of a technology portfolio. Three scenarios that test
different aspects of a robust LRS capability are a decapitation strike, an attack against
hardened deeply buried targets, and time critical target strike.
Decapitation Strike
Originally defined in the context of nuclear war, a decapitation strike is a first strike
attack whose operational aim is to neutralize the command and control structure of an
adversary in an attempt to severely degrade an attempt at response [430]. This strategy
was used on March 20, 2003 when the United States launched an attack on leadership
targets in Iraq in an attempt to “undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war” [81]. In
addition to more than 40 Tomahawk missiles launched from three U.S. Navy vessels, “two
U.S. F-117A Stealth fighters were also involved in the attack, dropping ‘bunker buster’
bombs on targets” [238]. This marked the first combat use of the EGBU-27, a laser-guided
bomb capable of support from both inertial navigation and GPS [203]. The choice of this
munition was critical, as Baghdad was obscured by low-level clouds on the morning of the
strike. The entire mission was planned and executed in only five hours, which Pilot Mark
J. Hoehn noted was “unprecedented.” Hoehn’s F-117, landing at al Udeid airbase in Qatar
is shown in Figure 36.
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In another “pop-up” opportunity to strike at Saddam Hussein on April 7, 2003, a B-
1B bomber loitering in Western Iraq hit a target in downtown Baghdad only 47 minutes
after being assigned. According to officials, “most of the 47 minutes was consumed in the
discussion about whether or not to attack” [203]. The B-1B flew to the target at subsonic
speeds in only twelve minutes and delivered hard-target penetrating BLU-109B/GBU-31
JDAMs shown in Figure 36.
BLU-109B with JDAM Tailkit
EGBU-27
Figure 36: F-117A Nighthawk Returning from a Decapitation Strike (left) and Munitions
Used in Two Decapitation Strikes (right) [203, 439].
According to national security analyst James S. Robbins, “this technique is only effective
against dictatorships, in which a single person or small group comprise the center of gravity”
[352]. A decapitation strike can be simulated by prioritizing leadership and C3 targets while
essentially ignoring air defenses and other strategic targets. The time critical nature of the
decapitation strike can be measured by simulating only a very short simulation time (on the
order of one hour) to assess whether or not the leadership targets were successfully struck
before relocating to more secure facilities.
Hardened Deeply Buried Target Strike
One of the primary missions for the Global Strike Task Force is the defeat of hardened
deeply buried targets (HDBT) [326]. According to the Department of Defense, future
“adversaries will employ sophisticated deception tactics, including hard and deeply buried
targets, which pose significant identification and force application challenges for our forces”
[453].
The National Research Council, defines hard and deeply buried targets as “all types of
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intentionally hardened targets, either aboveground or belowground, that are designed to
withstand or minimize the effects of kinetic weapons.” The Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) estimates that there are “10,000 known or suspected hard and deeply buried targets
worldwide... About 20 percent have a major strategic function, and of those, about half are
in or near urban areas” [309]. According to the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, “in
general, as the military importance of a target increases, the number of targets decreases,
and the header and deeper they will be buried” [160]. While most of these targets are
between 100 and 400 meters deep, several are up to 700 meters deep and surrounded by
granite or limestone. Examples of several types of hardened deeply buried targets are shown
in Figure 37.
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• Of the 10,000 HDBTs identified, about 20 percent are estimated to have a major strategic function.
• Over half of these strategic HDBTs are located near or in urban areas.
• The number of known strategic HDBTs is increasing at a rate of about 10 percent per year. This
increase is attributable mostly to discovery by the U.S. intelligence community and to a lesser extent to
construction in countries seeking protection from U.S. military capabilities.
• With the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, a number of the more important strategic HDBTs cannot be
held at risk of physical destruction of the functional area.
• A few hundred of the strategic HDBTs could be candidates for targeting with the robust nuclear
earth penetrator (RNEP) weapon currently under study.
EXAMPLES OF STRATEGIC HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGETS
Examples of strat gic HDBTs are shown in Figure 2.1 and detailed n th s section. Representative
actual overburdens, not their reinforced concrete equivalents, are described in the following examples.
Missile Tunnel
Hard Target Type: Deep underground tunnel
Function: Deployment area for short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that have a chemical weapon
warhead; warhead mating performed in maintenance area
Site Location: Remote valley; nearest civilian population center is 30 kilometers away





For CW/BW Aboveground Bunker
C3I, Shallow Underground Bunker
Deep Underground C3 Complex
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons   
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html
Figure 37: Examples of Strategic Hard and Deeply Buried Targets [309].
The DoD states that current “weapons development efforts prove inadequate to over-
come adversary use of hardened and deeply buried facilities to protect key capabilities”
[455]. For example, while Tomahawk missiles were used in the opening days of Operation
Desert Storm, the Gulf War Air Power Survey notes that “the small size of the missile
warhead as well as its inability to penetrate hardened targets had limited its effectiveness”
[105].
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Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, efforts have been made to produce weapons
systems to overcome this shortfall. In May of 1997, the GBU-37B, a 4,700 lb GPS-aided
“bunker buster” was test dropped from a B-2A [334]. In addition to limited operational
use in Kosovo, in 2003, two GBU-37B munitions were dropped on an Iraqi communica-
tions tower during Operation Iraqi Freedom [254, 108]. Advanced penetrator concepts such
as hypersonic weapons, nuclear Earth penetrators, and large conventional munitions are
also being considered for conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability [160, 309, 384, 59].
According to Air Force historian Dr. Richard Hallion, future concepts may also include
“robotic micro-munitions to attack deeply buried hard targets” [189].
A HDBT mission can be simulated using a limited strike against one or more super-
hardened targets. An example of one such target is the National Air Defense Operations
Center (ADOC) in downtown Baghdad [139]. According to the DoD, “the ADOC maintains
the overall air picture and establishes priorities for air defense engagements” [458]. It also
connects to the five Sector Operations Centers (SOCs) that control air defense operation
and BM/C4ISR assets. ABC military analyst Anthony Cordesman also notes that “the
SOCs cannot communicate effectively once the ADOC [is] destroyed or deactivated” [107].
A functional or physical kill of this target would allow friendly assets to overwhelm the
defenses of each sector in isolation.
In contrast to the decapitation strike scenario, the attribute of timeliness is outweighed
by the need for a large payload capacity and survivability in the presence of anti-access
threats.
Time Critical Strike
According to Brown, one of the critical areas for technology evaluation for LRS is the
ability to respond to time critical threats [76]. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA)
Center defines a time critical target (TCT) as “a lucrative, fleeting, land, or sea target of
such high priority to friendly forces that the JFC or component commander designates it as
requiring immediate response” [427]. Such targets may also be called flex targets, emerging
targets, fleeting targets, mobile targets, or time-sensitive targets [272]. Notable examples
include C2 vehicles, mobile terrorists, SAMs, mortar teams, and Scud missile TELs.
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The primary technical challenge associated with the time critical strike mission is the
extreme importance of timeliness and compression of the kill chain. In 1991, U.S. Air
Force assets were unable to destroy mobile Scud launchers that could “shoot-and-scoot”
in less than 90 minutes [355]. Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, General
Bruce Carlson noted that although progress was made during the 1990’s, “TCTs remained a
considerable challenge” during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo [86]. According to General
James Morehouse, the “key to achieving the right effects is [the] warfighter having the right
information at the right time to make the right decisions. Seamless, integrated C4ISR
is [an] enabler for making that decision” [301]. The time critical targeting problem is
also confounded by weather, communications delays, and administrative tasks [255, 204].
Detection and tracking of present day TCTs is further degraded when time critical targets
also use Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D) [226].
Despite the notable capability gap with respect to TCTs, in 2001 General Jumper stated
a desire to reduce the characteristic time of the kill chain to “single-digit minutes” [232, 204].
A thirty minute timeline used for the 2002 Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX
02) is shown in Figure 38.
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Figure 38: Example Timeline for TCT Attack [301].
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The location of targets depends on “solid” intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Based on this figure, 83% of the kill chain time is allocated to the engage function, which
details positioning and employment of the weapon; however, the decision time allocated to
the fix, track, and target functions and the “seams” between stages is also extremely com-
pressed [204]. Technologies which contribute to better target location information reduce
the characteristic time of the find function, while integrated C4ISR technologies compress
the time allocated to the fix, track, and target functions. Different schools of thought exist
on how to reduce the time allocated to the engage function, with CONOPS that vary be-
tween high-speed aircraft that minimize flight time or “area dominance” concepts where a
persistent, survivable platform loiters within denied airspace and waits for instructions.
To assess the effectiveness of an LRS architecture at the TCT attack mission, elements
of these disparate architectures can be compared. Time critical targets will consist of mobile
Scud TELs (see Figure 35) capable of moving, firing, and hiding according to the activity
diagram shown in Figure 67. Section 5.5.9 describes model development to support the
TCT attack mission, which differs dramatically in character from the other two scenarios.
In addition to MoEs related to targets killed and time to target, MoEs for this scenario also
include enemy TBMs fired.
GSTF Attack Three Day Scenario
Each of the three aforementioned scenarios are designed to test different aspects of an
LRS architecture, as well as subsystem, system, and architecture technologies that enable
LRS capabilities across the characteristics identified in Section 2.4. In addition to these
three defined scenarios, a fourth scenario was added to test the integration of all LRS
elements into a single long-duration campaign. Unfortunately, the complexity and number
of elements in the overarching scenario including Tomahawk cruise missiles, ALCM’s, area
dominance munitions, and LRS assets confounded the results. For this reason, the “all-out-
war” scenario was reduced in complexity to represent six LRS assets operating against 420
targets over a period of three days. This scenario is called the “Global Strike Task Force
(GSTF) Attack Three Day Scenario” and is intended to analyze the impact of technologies
with respect to multiple sorties over an extended period of time. A summary of the major
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Figure 39: Summary of Characteristics for Four LRS Scenarios.
5.2.1.7 Analysis of Courses of Action and Decision Making
A unique feature of the methodology proposed in this dissertation is the use of machine
learning and surrogate models to address the final three branches of the “estimate of the
situation” depicted in Figure 25.
Since World War II, the offensive power brought to bear by U.S. forces has limited the
enemy’s courses of action to primarily defensive maneuvers with the notable exception of
TBM launches and suicide attacks. For this reason, cognition models have been developed
to support the actions taken by the IADS, prioritizing threatening assets and coordinating
the attack against them. TBM launchers have been pre-programmed to move, hide, and
fire at specified intervals. A major coalition course of action is to eliminate these launchers
before they fire and to destroy infrastructure across all target sets.
120
The decisions on the courses of action for targeting and weaponeering are primarily
performed by the intelligent battle manager, whose development is summarized in Section
5.5.1. The specific elements of the “decision” branch in Figure 25 are defined below:
• Who: The countries involved in the conflict are defined above in Section 5.2.1.4. In
the simulation, the actual actors and their actions are defined using intelligent agents
that mimic human-like decisions.
• What: Coalition aircraft are tasked to engage targets based on the capabilities they
provide. Decisions on what to attack are made by the Meta-General. The apportion-
ment of assets will be guided by the air order of battle defined in Figure 2 with the
addition of LRS assets as an element under test.
• When: The order in which to attack target sets is defined using the QFD method of
target prioritization summarized in Section 5.4.1.
• Where: While the location of hostile assets has been defined as described in Section
5.2.1.3, friendly assets are positioned at Khamis Mushait airbase in Southern Saudi
Arabia, the strike base for the F-117A as defined by the Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War report. Most of the support forces are not simulated due to the weak coupling
between the LRS and these simulation elements.
• How: Cognition models guide intelligent agents in the performance of a mission ac-
cording to realistic constraints on their operation, noting that the tactics, techniques,
and procedures manuals that would define the exact operational limits more defi-
nitely are not publicly available. Cognition models used in the simulation activity are
detailed in Section 5.3.2.1.
• Why: The philosophical reasons for the conflict are defined by policymakers at the
highest levels of government. The main reason for coalition involvement in the 1991
Gulf War was to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restore its legitimate government, and
eliminate Saddam Hussein’s ability to threaten his neighbors. The strategic objectives
that motivate involvement in the conflict are summarized in Section 5.4.
121
Using the “estimate of the situation” to set the stage and establish the boundaries of the
scenario to be used for the proof-of-concept activity, a simulation was created that uses this
scenario as the “game board” for the quantitative evaluation of technologies and systems.
The details of the models developed to support this simulation are described in subsequent
sections.
5.2.2 Establish Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs)
A Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) “provides a standard by which it can be establish how
well some thing achieves the purpose for which it is intended” and is the primary output
of the simulation and analysis activity [381]. They provide a measurable way of evaluating
how well a proposed DOTMLPF10 solution provides capabilities to achieve a desired result.
There are numerous synergistic definitions including:
• A measure provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance [428].
• “standards against which the capability of a solution to meet the needs of a problem
may be judged” [382]
• MoEs are “the metrics by which a customer will measure satisfaction with products
produced by a technical effort” [216].
• The Department of Defense further clarifies MoEs as “a qualitative or quantitative
measure of a system’s performance or a characteristic that indicates the degree to
which it performs the task or meets a requirement under specified conditions” [370].
These metrics should be the top level goals to which the system-of-systems is designed.
To quantify the impact of solutions, MoEs should be measurable quantities with defined
units where appropriate. Furthermore, the MoEs must be calculable using the simulation
tool. While Roche and Watts note that formulating “good” MoEs is a difficult task that
has continually confounded operations researchers [353], some guidelines for formulating
appropriate MoEs are given in Reference [428]. The definition of MoEs is critical because
10In the JCIDS parlance, DOTMLPF stands for “Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,
Personnel, and Facilities,” all possible solution domains to close a capability gap. This work primarily
focuses on materiel solutions in the system and technology domain although tactics may be classified under
doctrine or training.
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they provide an objective means to measure a capability. On the other hand, Measures of
Performance (MoPs) may be tied to a specific physical implementation, making it difficult
to compare dissimilar concepts. According to the Defense Acquisition University, MoPs
“quantify a technical or performance requirement directly derived from MOEs” [130]. When
the simulation environment is constructed correctly, different MoPs may be used to calculate
the same MoEs. Consistency in the transfer function between MoPs and MoEs enables
evaluation of dissimilar concepts with respect to the same top-level capability metrics.
The relationship between MoEs, MoPs, and lower level Technical Performance Para-
meters (TPPs) as defined by the Defense Acquisition University is shown in Figure 40.
Systems engineering decomposition techniques define the relevant MoPs for one or more
MoEs. A similar decomposition can be performed to identify the relevant TPPs. Model-
ing and simulation is used in this research to quantify the impact of changes in TPPs on
top-level capability metrics.
MoEs














Figure 40: The Relationship Between Effectiveness, Performance, and Technologies.
Since the effectiveness of a proposed DOTMLPF solution relies on the numerical value of
MoEs, the identification of the appropriate measures of effectiveness to evaluate capability
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gaps is critical. Matsumura notes that it is “hard to get beyond the measures of success
used in the Cold War” where the primary objective was aimed at halting a massive armor
invasion of eastern Europe [276]. Although the term was first used by Morse and Kimball in
the 1940’s, Green and Johnson claim that an explicit theory for the development of MoEs
does not exist [303, 184].
MoEs can be identified through references to Air Force doctrine, determined from brain-
storming desired outcomes (for a given capability or capabilities), or by examining the
simulation tool to find information that is available and then determining whether that
information is of interest. A list of MoEs for the Long Range Strike testbed activity were
determined using all three methods and are enumerated as follows:
• Duration of Conflict: The total time in hours that elapses from the assignment
of GSTF assets to the conclusion of strategic operations. Conclusion is defined as
the point at which attrition levels across all target sets have reached a user-defined
percentage11.
• Number of Strikes Flown: A sortie is defined as “an operational flight by one
aircraft” [468]. A strike is “an attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize,
or destroy an objective” [468]. As noted in the Gulf War Air Power Survey, the
distinction between strikes and sorties is confusing [106]. For the calculation of this
measure of effectiveness, a strike is defined as “each time an aircraft successfully
releases a weapon toward a unique target.”
• Munitions Fired: If each aircraft delivers only a single munition to each target, the
number of munitions fired is numerically equal to the number of strikes flown. This
simplifying assumption is used for the proof-of-concept demonstration.
• Cost of Munitions Fired: Every munition fired has a cost associated with its
replenishment. Reference [106] provides an excellent reference for weapon prices in
the 1991 time frame. The cost of each weapon fired is recorded.
11For a discussion of military target sets, please see Section 5.2.1.3.
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• Number of Red TBMs Fired: Since Theater Ballistics Missiles (TBMs) are pre-
programmed to fire at allies in predefined intervals, minimizing the number of TBMs
fired is an MoE that represents effectiveness at the TCT attack mission.
• Number of Blue Units Lost: The number of blue assets of all types lost in a
user-defined time interval.
• Number of Blue Aircraft Lost: The number of blue aircraft platforms of all types
lost in a user-defined time interval.
• Number of Blue LRS Aircraft Lost: The number of blue Long Range Strike
aircraft lost in a user-defined time interval.
• Percentage of Red TCTs Killed: In addition to attrition numbers related to TBM
launchers and production, the number of mobile TBMs in the simulation is known a
priori12. The percentage of these time-critical targets killed at a user-defined time
interval is tracked to assess effectiveness of the LRS architecture at the time critical
strike mission.
12Even though this may not be true in reality.
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5.3 Step 3: Problem Definition and Creation of a Simula-
tion Environment
The creation of a modeling and simulation environment with the necessary systems, link-
ages, physics, cognitive models, and appropriate level of fidelity at each hierarchical level is
arguably the most time consuming step in the process shown in Figure 23.
A methodology for making decisions at the system-of-systems level first requires an
analysis environment that allows a holistic view of the entire system-of-systems so that
design studies can be performed on various system architectures and the elements of those
architectures. As noted by Soban, a conceptual model or “plan of attack” aids a designer in
identifying which models need to be designed to accurately represent the system-of-systems
[378]. A paradigm for the modeling and simulation of complex systems containing the
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Figure 41: Modeling and Simulation Paradigm (modified from Reference [258]).
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A simulation is based on reality. Due to the nature of this work, not all “real” infor-
mation is available for analysis (eg: classified, FOUO, etc.) As a result, through a process
called clarification, a perceived version of reality is constructed. This perceived vision of
reality can also include the scope of a reduced order problem that represents a real world
phenomenon. Literature searches and the SWARMing technique facilitate progress in the
clarification phase.
Next, through explanation, a conceptual model is created. A conceptual model is an ab-
straction of an experiment to be performed that defines the process to be followed, necessary
elements of the experiment, important inputs, and expected outcomes of the experiment.
This process follows the steps of the scientific method. This prevents the creation of un-
needed models and is analogous to modeling in the software community in which modules
are laid out in a pseudocode form prior to actual programming [155]. Storyboards used
by animators in the motion picture industry are another analogy to the conceptual model
[83]. Creating a detailed conceptual model avoids the development of overly specific math-
ematical models that have hard-wired assumptions or insufficient degrees of freedom to be
useful for real problems. Ideally, the conceptual model is independent of the simulation
framework chosen and physics-models used: it identifies what is needed to perform the
simulation under defined standards to accomplish an objective. Brainstorming tools, mor-
phological matrices, the Systems Modeling Language and the systems engineering methods
facilitate the creation of a conceptual model (see Section C.6).
Furthermore, Zaerpoor and Weber add: “In making the conceptual model, one starts
with the questions of interest and conceives of the leanest physical experiment that would
result in satisfactory answers for the questions” [494]. This observation is critical to the
design of systems-of-systems. Without somehow narrowing the space of interest, the design
problem is intractable. On the other hand, Ilachinski notes that decomposition of complex
systems can sometimes destroy the emergent behavior derived from the complicated interac-
tions at the lowest hierarchical level [213]. A balance between these two schools of thought
is needed to include high-fidelity models where appropriate and lower fidelity effects-based
models when the impact on MoE variability is low. The challenge of balancing fidelity and
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scope is one of the fundamental problems of system-of-systems design.
The next three steps, verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) process are
defined by DoD directive 5000.61 and must be performed for any simulation tool certified
to operate within the acquisition community [419]. Since the environment constructed to
validate the proposed methodology will not be directly used for acquisition decisions, it
does not require the costly and time consuming VV&A process; however, efforts must be
undertaken to ensure that the models are correct and that they are being used correctly.
The verification process is one by which a computer model is made to match the con-
ceptual model, and essentially answers the question, “are the models correct?” This code-
intensive phase uses the FLAMES framework and will require extensive testing and eval-
uation to ensure that the computer models are doing what they are supposed to do. The
computer model is an instantiation of the conceptual model and “allow[s] for the changing
of the values of a parameter or set of parameters and then determining the effect that this
has on the variables of interest” [41].
When the computer models match perceived reality, this is called validation. Essentially,
the validation phase answers the question “are the models being used correctly?” If the
validation phase is successful, then the simulation is an accurate representation of the real-
world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation. If the simulation
does not match perceived reality, the lower half of the process shown in Figure 41 must be
repeated.
The process by which a model is certified (matches reality) is called accreditation. This
final step is the most time consuming and expensive phase and results in a model that is
certified for acquisition purposes. The accreditation phase is not needed for the proof-of-
concept exercise.
In practice, the VV&A process is difficult for agent-based constructive simulations of
future concepts for which there is no empirical database to validate against. This situation
is typical for advanced development labs and the best practice for VV&A for this type of
simulation is to independently assess each of the physics-based models and ensure that the
physics is being modeled correctly. For cognition models of agent behavior, the agents must
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be tested under various conditions to ensure that they follow the correct decision paths
in isolated tests. It is then usually inferred that the aggregated behavior is as correct as
possible. Periodic evaluation of results is helpful to determine whether this assumption is
correct.
Within step three, there are a number of subfunctions that must be performed to as-
semble a validated simulation environment that can successfully demonstrate the proposed
methodology as applied to the sample problem. These steps are (1) creating the conceptual
model, (2) creating the physics-based models defined by the conceptual model, and (3) as-
sembling a simulation and verifying that the modeling and simulation environment can be
applied to the example problem.
5.3.1 Step 3.1: Creating the Conceptual Model
The first step in creating the conceptual model is identifying the elements that must be
in the simulation environment to model the Long Range Strike architecture. The second
step is the creation of models in support of this conceptual model, and the final step is the
development of a simulation that uses these models with the scenario(s) defined in Section
5.2 to validate the proposed methodology.
5.3.1.1 A Process for Architecture Definition
The first step in creating a modeling and simulation environment is to identify the char-
acteristics of future LRS architectures. An architecture is described by both systems and
the means to link them together: both physical and functional attributes. Defining the
modeling and simulation environment begins with defining these architecture elements.
Creating a system architecture from a top-down, capability focus can be difficult. En-
gineers have a tendency to jump immediately to physical systems because these “widgets”
are what designers are most familiar with. Since the goal of a systems engineering process
is to define the attributes of this equipment that maximizes value to the customer, a top-
down decomposition process should begin using the top-level goal of “secure and defend the
nation,” which is the “first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government” [80].
This top-down decomposition is notionally depicted in Figure 42. The Quality Function
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Deployment technique forms the backbone of this decomposition of requirements to systems
[135, 325].
Since is desirable to identify capabilities in relation to specific challenges to national
security, the first QFD matrix in Figure 42 relates a single goal (Provide National Security)
to a number of national security challenges. The Air Force refers to these as Focused
Long Term Challenges (FLTCs). The roof of QFD #1 shows how different challenges
may be positively or negatively correlated. The second QFD matrix identifies how joint
capabilities can answer the identified national security challenges. The roof of this QFD can
identify redundant or complimentary capabilities, and the joint focus of this matrix allows
the formulation of joint strategy and doctrine to maximize effectiveness across military
services. This is consistent with the focus of the JCIDS process. The superset of all
military capabilities is defined by the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [460]. Air Force
tasks are defined by the Air Force Task List (AFTL) [428] and Air Force doctrine documents
[431, 433]. While these capabilities encompass the range of air warfare, for this study, only
Long Range Strike capability, a subset of the AFTL also identified by the AFRL Vehicles
Directorate (Section 1.3), is examined in detail.
Next, a third QFD matrix can be formulated that relates joint capabilities to operational
activities. For this study, the operational activities are defined by the generic elements of
the Air Force kill chain, as summarized in Section 5.3.1.3. The fourth QFD shown in Figure
42 shows how the elements of the kill chain can be performed by various system functions.
This QFD is identical in purpose to the DoDAF SV-5 operational activity to system function
traceability matrix. While these system functions are independent of physical systems, it
is often useful to look to the “as-is” military architecture to determine generic functions
that are performed by systems today. For example, the Air Force Fact Sheet for the E-3
Sentry aircraft says, “The radar combined with an identification friend or foe subsystem
can look down to detect, identify and track enemy and friendly low-flying aircraft” [440].
From this statement, the system functions detect targets, identify targets, and track targets
can be defined. To interoperate with existing military assets, one or more elements of the
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Figure 42: Quality Function Deployment for a Long Range Strike System Architecture.
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Furthermore, the establishment of these system functions aids in the creation of cognitive
models that allow assets to perform these functions. The fifth QFD matrix is actually a
matrix of alternatives (see Section C.5.1). Instead of decomposing system elements against
system attributes, the rows of the matrix of alternatives are the system functions that
must be performed and the columns indicate different physical systems that can perform
these functions. Selecting one or more elements in each row defines a single architecture.
Architectures of interest are then analyzed using a physics-based modeling and simulation
environment.
It is evident that, given enough resources, all possible architectures could be examined
over all functions, all operational activities, across all domains, capabilities, branches of
service and against all strategic challenges for every potential threat. The design space
for this “ultimate architecture” that satisfies all customer requirements for all anticipated
threats is beyond the computational power of any known organization. This work holds
the elements of QFD matrices 1-3 constant and focus on identifying system functions and
physical systems that can perform these functions. Intelligent agents are used to examine
the infusion of technologies to a defined Long Range Strike architecture; however, the
environment assembled for this study is available for future work to expand these additional
degrees of freedom.
5.3.1.2 Using the DoDAF OV-1 to Describe the Architecture
Given the desire to examine Long Range Strike capability, it is first necessary to lay out the
“big picture.” The DoDAF OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept Graphic [137], shown
in Figure 43, pictorially describes what the LRS architecture is intended to do. Software
such as MagicDraw UML, RationalR© Software Modeler, or ARTiSAN Studio can be used
to define an architecture consistent with the OV-1 while also laying the groundwork for
implementation of FLAMES code. The OV-1 shown in Figure 43 defines the architecture
in general terms and was created through a literature search of public documents and a
brainstorming activity described in the subsequent section.






















































































































































































“actors” in the simulation are the LRS platforms that are the primary element under test.
These platforms can fire different types of munitions including JDAM-like guided bombs,
low speed cruise missiles, and high speed supersonic and hypersonic missiles. Additional
shooters include a B-2 like TCT finder/shooter. This asset has an onboard radar and
searches for areas where time critical targets may be located. Upon detection, it releases
one or more loitering area dominance munitions that are equipped to search an area and
destroy targets of a certain type within that area. Fixed targets are detected from an
airborne sensor with an infinite field of regard. This simulates the intelligence gathering
process that occurs in the months leading up to the conflict. Perfect communications are
assumed, although LRS systems may be plagued by sensor-to-shooter time delays and other
lags defined by the rules of engagement. Potential targets include SAM sites, radars, and
mobile time critical targets. Other high value targets and deeply buried hardened targets
are included in the scenario.
5.3.1.3 Create Hierarchical Functional Architecture
The OV-1 concept graphic defines the general focus of the LRS architecture. The next
step is to define the functions that this architecture must perform using a top-down, sys-
tems engineering decomposition. A functional architecture “identifies and structures the
allocated functional and performance requirements” [130]. By decomposing requirements
at the highest level into lower level functions, a product (system or system-of-systems) can
be described “in terms of what it does logically and in terms of the performance required”
[130]. The traditional functional decomposition process must be modified somewhat for the
new capability-focus, as hard requirements are not always handed down from the acquisi-
tion authority [359]. Brainstorming of potential CONOPS at the highest level should define
functions consistent with the overall capability. From Figure 42, a reasonable starting point
for the functional decomposition in this research is with the operational activities in the
fourth QFD matrix, known in the Air Force as the “kill chain.”
It can be argued that the functions of warfighting have not changed since the dawn
of armed conflict. A functional decomposition for a military system reveals two primary
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functions: find and kill. Traditionally, the more difficult of the two functions is find. In
ancient times, armies marched great distances to engage enemy forces. Campfires, trampled
trees, and rustling animals assisted the find function when remote sensing technologies were
limited to the spyglass and mounted scouts [416].
Current military systems use a combination of satellites, manned and unmanned aircraft,
special forces troops, and other human intelligence to find targets of interest. The success of
the find function varies depending on terrain, weather, information sharing, and a myriad
of other confounding factors. In the difficult urban warfare situations faced today, the find
function is arguably the most difficult: potential terrorists look like ordinary citizens.
The endgame of combat is the kill function. Once the find function has been performed
successfully, the kill function is comparatively easy. The above examples have obvious
corollaries to how the kill function is executed. The combination of these two functions
comprises the “kill chain” for military combat. As noted by Frits, every function has an
associated probability of success (in this case, Pfind and Pkill ), and an associated time
(Tfind and Tkill) [159]. The probability of success of this kill chain can be found as the
product of all the subjective probabilities for the functions defined.
Psuccess = Pfind × Pkill (2)
While the characteristic time to complete the kill chain is given by the sum of the
characteristic times to perform each function.
Toperations = Tfind + Tkill (3)
It is obvious that if the probability of any element in the kill chain is zero, the probability
of success is zero. It is also important to note that Tfind and Tkill may be on very different
timescales13.
The Air Force decomposes the kill chain into six elements: find, fix, track, target, engage,
and assess (see Figure 44). The first four functions shown in blue can be loosely mapped
to the find function described above whereas the last two describe the kill action.
13Special forces troops have been attempting to find Al Qaeda terrorist leaders for a number of years.
If the find function were completed successfully, it could be argued that the kill function would occur in a
dramatically smaller timeframe.
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In 2005, the AFRL appended this mantra with a preceding “anticipate” and “anyone,
anytime, anywhere” on the back end [371]. Abbreviated AF2T2EA4, this modified kill
chain reflects the focus of current technology innovation efforts [229]. According to Brown,
“The A’s are where most of the capability gaps exist” [78]. This is primarily due to the
uncertainty associated with these functions and the rapid pace with which enemies update
their tactics to confound attempts to thwart them.
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AF-ICE Industry Team Demo Update
Leveraging Functional Decomposition
“The functions of warfighting have not changed in 5000 years!*”
Find something
Kill something
Anticipate Find Fix Track Target Engage Assess
* Comment made by Mr. Andrew Daw, BAE Systems
PredatorHumint Satellite JSTARS F-16
Humint Satellite U2 JSTARS F-16 Predator
Persistent Area Dominance Munition
Human Intelligence Special Forces
Space-Based Laser with Surveillance Capability
Battle Manager “Airborne Sensor” “Platform” “Weapon” “Sensor”
Figure 44: Functional Decomposition: The Kill Chain.
Anticipate, which means “to feel or realize beforehand,” refers to the ability of Air Force
leadership to predict when and where targets are present [22]. This function is greatly aided
by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and relies on efficient battle management
and communication with in-theater assets. The next function, find, is where the Air Force
is currently devoting a majority of its technology and tactical development efforts [407].
Operation Allied Force relied heavily on the in-flight redirection of U-2 spy aircraft to
areas of interest. Advanced multi-spectral sensors allowing visu lization through ground
clutter and sensor fusion with various battlefield assets are increasing the effectiveness and
reducing the time of the find function. Fixing refers to “making an accurate determination
of location” [407]. Today’s precision weapons require very precise information for targeting.
Fixing the location may involve laser designation or comparing real-time imagery to satellite
photos to determine GPS coordinates of the target. Target, defined as “to aim at or for”
is the act of calibrating the location information with the fix function to the asset that
engages the target [22]. The engage14 function, according to former Air Force Chief of
Staff John Jumper, has always been the “strong suit” of the Air Force [407]. The Air
Force has a variety of munitions to engage various targets including moving targets, combat
aircraft, fixed emplacements, and hardened deeply buried targets, albeit with different levels
14Note that search and rescue teams can also “engage” a “target,” although the functions are fulfilled by
physical implements consistent with the search and rescue mission.
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of effectiveness depending on the target type and the conditions under which the weapon is
employed. The final function, assess, determines whether the engage function was successful
and the target has been destroyed. UAV-mounted cameras have greatly increased the
effectiveness of this function. One tactic to assist with battle damage assessment is to
fire two weapons with nose-mounted cameras at a target. The first weapon strikes the
target and the second one will photograph the target after the impact of the first weapon,
although admittedly this doubles the cost of combat operations. The assess function can be
challenging: Tirpak notes that in Operation Allied Force, on-site inspectors were required to
assess whether or not Serbian tanks were destroyed by NATO bombings [407]. A controversy
later erupted when the official NATO damage assessment overestimated Serbian claims by
an order of magnitude [46]. Clearly, the assess function is critical to overall mission success,
as it reveals whether or not a hostile asset has been sufficiently damaged to negate the need
for retargeting.
Multiple systems are often employed to perform the functions of the kill chain. Gaps
indicate opportunities for the target to escape, breaking the kill chain. In some cases,
multiple systems work together to provide location information using a technique Jumper
refers to as “Wolfpack ISR” [407]. While it is possible for a single system to perform all
functions in the kill chain, a more likely implementation relies on fusing sensor data from
multiple ISR assets, directing the appropriate asset(s) to engage the target, and assessing
damage using multiple means. The integration of these functions to increase the probability
of success and decrease the characteristic time to complete the links in the kill chain is the
primary objective of Network Centric Warfare [23]. To aid in the mapping of system
elements to functions, it is necessary to further decompose these operational activities into
system functions.
5.3.1.4 Map Operational Activities to System Functions
The fourth QFD in Figure 42 relates the operational activities to the system functions that
must be performed. In the kill chain, all operational activities must be performed; however,
different combinations of system functions can lead to the completion of the kill chain
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depending on the circumstances of the scenario. For example, due to their high mobility,
air targets are usually not detected from surveillance photos. Radar is the primary means
of detection for air targets. The Find operational activity for air targets would therefore
follow a sequence such as the ones shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Functional Decomposition of Find Function for Air and Ground Targets.
Air Targets Ground Targets
Select Airspace Region Select Region of Interest
Detect Targets Gather Imagery
Classify Targets Relay Imagery
Identify Targets Gather Radar Data





Relay Probable Target Location
The DoDAF Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix (SV-5) “de-
picts the mapping of operational activities to system functions and thus identifies the trans-
formation of an operational need into a purposeful action performed by a system” [137].
A generic SV-5 matrix is shown below in Figure 45. The DoDAF mapping is rotated 90◦
from the depiction shown in Figure 42 because the QFD formulation traditionally lists the
“what’s” on the left side and the “how’s” across the top.
The SV-5 matrix for the Long Range Strike system architecture is shown in Figure 46.
The functions in this matrix were determined by examining existing systems and the func-
tions performed by them. It is important to note that these representative system functions
are particular to the conceptual model for this research and are not necessarily the exact
functions performed by Air Force assets. This canonical set includes the majority of the
functions associated with supporting the Air Force Global Strike task force and defines the
functions that must be performed by cognition models in the scenario [230]. Simulations
over longer timescales requires cargo resupply, logistics, personnel management, health ser-
vices, and other functions consistent with the “Agile Combat Support” core competency of



































































Figure 45: DoDAF (SV-5) Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix
[137].







Fuse Sensor Data X X
Assess Target X
Track Until Stopped X
Geolocate Target X
Update Target List X
Assess Engagement Capability X
Relay Target Coordinates X
Assign Targets X
Plan Route(s) X X
Execute Force Order X
Support Weapon Flyout X
Lock Weapon onto Target X
Destroy/Degrade Target X
Collect Battle Damage Information X
Assess Battle Damage Information X










Figure 46: DoDAF (SV-5) Matrix for the strike mission of an LRS Architecture.
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5.3.1.5 Brainstorming to Find Potential System Elements of an LRS Architecture
Once the functions for the LRS architecture has been determined from the aforementioned
functional decomposition, the next step is to identify types of systems that comprise the
LRS architecture so that physics-based models of their performance can be defined. A lit-
erature search of public documents, Air Force posture statements, transformational plans,
and fact sheets was conducted to identify potential elements of an LRS architecture. This
was supplemented with a brainstorming activity as shown in Figure 47. The mind map
brainstorming technique was used with LRS capability as the central focus, systems, soft-
ware, missions, support capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and technologies can all be connected
to this link: the mind map contains anything that is of interest for LRS capability. Several
of the branches are expanded to show detail. Several links are also provided, for example,
noting that weapons are subsystems and they require logistics for their resupply. This de-
piction was created using the OpenMind software, which allows files, pictures, video, and
other documents to be attached to each item in the mind map [273]. In a collaborative
design activity, team members can use it to link to a repository of information, which then
serves as a knowledge base for new team members. For example, photographs and specifi-
cation sheets for each of the existing military systems in the architecture are linked to this
mind map.
This activity is also useful in identifying elements of the current and proposed military
architecture which a new asset must interoperate with. For example, KC-135 Stratotanker
and KC-10 Extender aircraft utilize a boom for refueling operations. The maximum fuel
transfer rate through the boom is 7,524 lb/min [441]. This constraint limits the maximum
fuel transfer rate of a future LRS aircraft unless a new tanker is part of the architecture
under consideration. Examination of the current Air Force systems and a review of pending
development programs reveals that a majority of Air Force assets will not receive extensive
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Figure 47: Mind Map Brainstorming Exercise for LRS Capability.
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Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft, the E-10A [376] to replace E-3 Sentry and E-
8C JSTARS aircraft15, and the gradual replacement of the A-10 and F-16 fleet with F-35A
fighters. The specific systems selected for the LRS architecture and the reasons therefore
are summarized in a subsequent section.
5.3.1.6 Map System Functions to Physical Systems Using a Matrix of Alternatives
A large part of architecture development is design for interoperability with existing assets.
While a LRS architecture is comprised of many support assets that perform functions
such as air superiority, SEAD/DEAD, combat support, jamming, and the like, the focus
of this step is the identification of the physical systems required to perform the system
functions identified in Figure 46. The final QFD is the decomposition process introduced
in Figure 42 is a matrix of alternatives that relates system functions to physical systems.
In 2005, Engler developed an Interactive Reconfigurable Matrix of Alternatives (IRMA)
to decompose a Long Range Strike asset within the physical domain while tracking the
dependencies between multiple rows [144]. This technique can be extended to list system
functions as the rows of the IRMA and system options as the columns. Each row should
include an option for “other,” leaving room for infusion of new systems at any point in the
architecture. Also, rows can be left blank, indicating that some system functions identified
in the “as-is” military may be eliminated in the proposed LRS system architecture as
technologies are infused and capabilities are provided by different systems. The matrix of
alternatives for the modeled Long Range Strike architecture is shown in Figure 48. Finally,
it is interesting to note that over 3.54 x 1025 combinations of system architectures can be
composed from this matrix of alternatives. This large number results from the fact that
many selections in the matrix of alternatives are non-unique, as multiple elements from the
same row can be synthesized to perform a given function.
It is also of interest to specify a matrix of alternatives to define the adversary in the
simulation. The options in the matrix of enemy alternatives (over 4.0 x 1018 combinations)
15Which, according to the most recent QDR, may be replaced by a constellation of Space Based Radar
assets [456].
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encompass various degrees of threats from a Soviet-like enemy to a rogue state or non-
state actor terrorist group. For this testbed demonstration, it is desired to calibrate the
enemy architecture based on the parameters of the Iraq scenario presented in Operation
Desert Storm. Section 5.2 details the specific characteristics of the enemy scenario, which
is summarized in Figure 49. Notable differences from the actual situation include the
selection of generic SAM sites to avoid sensitivity issues with the identification of specific
threat systems and the removal of air-to-air combat assets from both the hostile arsenal
and the order of battle of friendly forces (Figure 48).
The green highlighted boxes in the matrix of alternatives show decisions that have been
made to date based on the goals of the methodology, the up-front motivation for the study,
and a literature search of available bases, systems, and architecture elements. Traditionally,
the number of elements in a matrix of alternatives can be calculated by multiplying the





The definition of system-of-systems architectures is more complex. In most cases, the
rows have the property of non-exclusivity, which means that each row does not have a single
unique solution. As a result, the number of combinations in each row is not additive, it is
combinatorial! The number of alternatives defined by a matrix of alternatives that has







Through the use of intelligent filters and parametric decomposition of the space, the
number of combinations can be greatly reduced. For example, if a fighter aircraft in Figure
49 has parametric properties that range between a Generation 2 and Generation 4+ fighter,
then the “air-to-air assets” row decreases from 513 combinations to 1. In the spirit of
Thoreau, “simplify, simplify, simplify!” is the guiding mantra of the architecture setup
[405]. The matrix of alternatives in Figure 48 explains this simplification.
To summarize the major downselections in Figure 48, although a variety of overhead
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Gather Images Predator U-2 Global Hawk Airship Milsat Commercial Other
Process Images NGA DCGS JIOC
Detect Targets JSTARS MC2A Sensorcraft PISR SBR Global Hawk Other
Locate Targets CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A PISR SBR Other
Classify Targets CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A Self
Identify Targets CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A Self
Fuse Sensor Data CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A Self
Locate Target Coordinates GPS Other
Track Ground Targets JSTARS MC2A Self Other
Relay Target Coordinates MILSTAR DSCS FLTSATCOM UFO SDS Iridium Other
Assign Targets CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A Self
Develop Track to Target CAOC DCGS JIOC MC2A Self
Relay Target Track MILSTAR DSCS FLTSATCOM UFO SDS Iridium Other
Obtain Permission to Attack Target NCA Cmdr. Self
Fly to Target (LRS Asset) Aircraft Spaceplane Missile Satellite Airship Helicopter Other
Lock Weapon onto Target Radar Laser Visual GPS
Fire Weapon Energy Bomb Missile Gun Self Submunition Other
Observe Attacked Target Predator U-2 Global Hawk Airship Milsat Self Other
Determine Target Status Predator U-2 Global Hawk Airship Milsat Self Other










Figure 48: Matrix of Alternatives: Mapping of System Functions to Physical Systems.
Theater of Interest Western Asia Northeast Asia Eastern  Europe CONUS Other
Enemy Allies Involved Yes No
Nearby Friendly Bases Available Many Some Few None
SA-2 SA-3 SA-5 SA-8 SA-XX
Other Soviet Roland MANPADS Generic Other
Anti-Aircraft Guns ZSU-series Other None
MiG-29 MiG-31 SU-27 F-15 UCAV
Gen 2 Fighter Other Gen 3 Gen 4+ Fighter Other None
TBM Launcher Technology None SCUD-B Modified SCUD Extended Range Other
Fixed Base/Airfield Density None Low Medium High Unknown
Surface-to-Air Defense Density None Low Medium High Unknown
Air-to-Air Asset Density None Low Medium High Unknown
High-Value Fixed Targets None Low Medium High Unknown
High-Value Moving Targets None Some Few Many Unknown
High-Value Target Types WMD Facilities WMD Launchers Leadership C&C Other
NBC Capability None Limited Extensive Ubiquitous Unknown
Deeply Buried Target Prevalence None Some Few Many Unknown
C4ISR Capability Integrated Distributed Localized Ad-Hoc None
Willingness to Attack Civilians None Low Medium High Unknown





Figure 49: Matrix of Alternatives for Hostile Elements.
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imagery assets are available, targets are detected and identified by either an overhead satel-
lite in the case of fixed targets or an airborne sensor like a Predator, Global Hawk, or U-2.
To simplify the command and control process, the Distributed Common Ground System
(DCGS) gathers target information and parcel it out to the Combined Air Operations Cen-
ter (CAOC) to task individual assets. Communication between these entities and strike
aircraft uses a communications system based on the MILSTAR satellite communications
system and the Link-16 protocol, assuming that a MILSTAR satellite is always overhead
and sufficient bandwidth is available to support transmission of targeting information. In
the simulation, the rules of engagement allows individual aircraft to select and attack their
own targets, eliminating the need to receive engagement orders from a national command
authority or the battlefield commander for each target. It is assumed that once a target
has been assigned by the battle manager, engagement permission is implicit. As mentioned
in Section 2.4.3, even though many different assets are proposed for the LRS mission, this
research focuses exclusively on aircraft-based solutions. Munitions will be limited to bombs
and missiles, although both are assumed to be guided projectiles. Battle damage assessment
(BDA) is conducted by the same overhead assets that detected and identified targets, and
the same MILSTAR communication setup is used to transmit battle damage information
back to the battle manager.
5.3.1.7 Identify Models and Linkages Required for Scenario Development Using the
SysML
In a system-of-systems, “everything impacts everything.” Elements of the system-of-systems
and the linkages between them will impact an architecture. The first desire of a systems
engineer is to model all of these elements and their interactions. For a system with n
elements, the number of models is:
Nmodels = nelements + 2nconnections (6)
For a 20 element system, the number of models required for all elements and connections
is only 1,048,596. In reality, everything does not impact everything directly.
As Ilachinski notes, the reductionist philosophy of the Western scientific method that
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decomposes a system into smaller pieces causes the emergent properties of a system to be
lost: “In the act of exploring properties reductionism loses sight of the dynamics. The
analysis of complex systems instead requires a holistic, or constructionist, approach” [214];
however, although a system-of-systems relies on these interactions to derive its emergent
behavior, the required connectivity between systems should be defined by the sensitivity
of MoEs to the system connections. The previously mentioned techniques of functional
decomposition and matrices of alternatives narrow the simulation space by focusing on a
canonical set of models and the ANOVA technique can be used to statistically determine
the sensitivities.
A technique from the software engineering field, the Systems Modeling Language, will
refine this space even further. The SysML, detailed in Section C.5.1, can be used to quickly
diagram objects that are modeled in the simulation framework [388]. This technique is
useful for diagramming existing code and planning the conceptual model of a modeling
and simulation environment. It is important to note that while, in general, the simula-
tion approach and proposed methodology are framework independent, after the conceptual
model is created the simulation becomes somewhat dependent on the framework. This is
because specific models must eventually be coded and linked within a simulation software
tool. Choices such as the coding language, variable names, interface types, and physics-
based algorithms must eventually conform to framework-specific standards, but the SysML
diagrams that describe the conceptual model are independent of the framework choice.
One SysML depiction, an activity diagram, “shows a sequential flow of actions” and
“is typically used to describe the activities performed in a general process workflow” [145].
An activity diagram can also be used to depict the flow of information between various
cognition models that make up the kill chain as shown in Figure 50. The colors indicate
the six central functions of the Air Force kill chain (further explained in Section 5.3.1.3).
Several cognition models including the GITBattleManager, the GITFCGroundController,
the GITBomber, and the FLAMES example model FQWASFire16 are used to perform
ground attack functions for the LRS. The functions listed are consistent with those described
16The weapon firing routine within the air-to-surface weapon system.
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in the SV-5 matrix in Figure 46 and the matrix of alternatives in Figure 48.
Model development was required across all of these cognition models to provide realistic
cognition effects in the testbed simulation. The development of each of these models is
described in Section 5.3.2.1. Model development could include creation of new models from
scratch, modification of existing models to fix errors, or modification of the fidelity level of
existing models.
Various SysML diagrams were used throughout the model building phase to identify
model interfaces, specify module functionality, and maximize the reusability of developed
models for other simulation activities. Once the scope of the simulation has been reduced to
“the leanest physical experiment that would result in satisfactory answers for the questions,”
using the aforementioned techniques, the next step in the process is to begin to construct
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5.3.2 Step 3.2: Develop Representative Models to Evaluate Technologies
“By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of
certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification
of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to
work.”
-John Von Neumann
After the learning curve associated with the computational framework has been over-
come, the next step is the creation of a representative testbed scenario that examines LRS
in a system-of-systems context.
5.3.2.1 Development of Models to Support Scenario
Creating an object oriented simulation requires a myriad of models to represent the behavior
of elements within the system-of-systems. Central to this desire is the creation of validated
models, that is, models that are syntactically correct17. Models in the FLAMES framework
are of two primary types:
• Physics models, which describe the behavior of entities with respect to physical laws.
• Cognition models, which define the actions that an entity performs, emulating the
behavior of the real system.
Section 5.3.1.6 described a process that uses a matrix of alternatives to identify which
physics models need to be created to support the LRS development effort and Section
5.3.1.7 showed an example of how the SysML is used to specify cognition models and their
linkages. The validation of physics models is fairly straightforward. FLAMES example
models, created to showcase the abilities of the framework, have several notable errors in
their physics which are often easily corrected with several lines of code. The cognition
models, on the other hand, require far more development to produce a realistic simulation
where the agents perform functions as they would in the “real world.” According to Alberts
and Hayes, “Models are often a mix of what we know (or think we know) and what we
17Verification is “doing the right thing” and validation is “doing it right.”
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think (conjecture or hypothesize)” [41]. The verification and validation of cognition models
is therefore an iterative process: observing the behavior of the model provides the designer
with more information that can be used to tune the model. The first step in developing
robust cognition models for the simulation environment is to identify the primary cognition
models that are needed to realistically simulate a LRS system architecture.
There are two general ways to develop cognition models in FLAMES. First, the FLAMES
code generator can be used to create empty models with the appropriate linkages to support
model development from scratch; however, the learning curve on this method of model
development is very high. An approach recommended by Ternion is the modification of
several example models shipped with the software to suit the needs of the user.
5.3.2.2 Identifying Example Cognition Models for Modification
There are several rudimentary cognition models that are shipped with FLAMES to demon-
strate the ability to perform a defensive counter air mission. While this mission differs
greatly from the parameters required for an LRS scenario, the logic in some of the example
models can be modified to support LRS modeling. Example cognition models of interest
include:
• FCSAMController (fcsc): Air defense controller that detects airborne targets, calcu-
lates track information on the targets, and conveys the track information to a fighter
controller.
• FCAirController (fcac): Fighter controller that receives track information on hostile
fighters and assigns air-to-air fighters to attack the identified targets.
• FCFighter (fcftr): Air-to-air fighter cognition model that receives track information
about hostile fighters or bombers and is vectored near them. The FCFighter then
begins to search for hostile targets in that area, engages targets, and returns to a
patrol after engaging targets.
• FCAirInterdiction (fcain): Air-to-ground attack aircraft that can be vectored toward
a geographic feature, a coordinate, or a unit. The FCAirInterdiction entity attacks
only one target that is defined in the script of the scenario.
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In the command hierarchy for the models defined above, the commander of an FCFighter
is an FCAirController, and the commander of the FCAirController is an FCSAMController.
The FCSAMController is capable of assigning either fighters or SAMs to attack hostile air
targets. Unfortunately, the FCAirInterdiction cognition model is very simple and cannot
be coupled to any of the other cognition models.
5.3.2.3 Modification of Cognition Models to Create an Intelligent Battle Manager
One of the stated objectives of the proposed methodology is the development of an in-
telligent battle manager that has some knowledge of strategic and tactical decisions to
eliminate the need for a trained operator to observe individual case runs and make tedious
platform/weapon allocations. The creation of the intelligent battle manager partially relies
on the development of cognition models that support realistic processes consistent with the
activity diagram in Figure 50.
First, the example models are copied and their properties are altered to perform new
functions. The FCAirController model was copied and defined as a GITFCGroundCon-
troller18. The goal of this cognition model is to allocate ground targets (as opposed to air
targets) for assignment to friendly LRS aircraft.
Next, since the ground controller model does not have a method of detecting, identifying,
and prioritizing targets, it was necessary to copy the SAM controller model and define it
as a GITBattleManager. The FCSAMController model is actually an air defense controller
capable of directing both SAM sites and fighters to perform a Defensive Counter Air (DCA)
mission. The battle manager has the same functions as a SAM controller, except that it
only identifies ground targets. A combination of GITBattleManagers with subordinate
GITFCGroundControllers and FCSAMControllers with FCAirControllers can be used to
provide both ground and air coverage of the battlespace.
The next logical step would be to modify the fighter cognition model to pursue ground
18The prefix GIT stands for “Georgia Institute of Technology” and was defined by Ternion to identify
models developed at GIT. The prefix BOE is used by Boeing, VAC is used by the Vehicles Directorate at
AFRL, and the prefix GTI is used by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).
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targets instead of air targets and maintain the same command chain, communication proto-
cols, and subordinate registration methods between the originally defined command chain;
however, the logic in the fighter model is “too smart.” In the default model, a fighter is
vectored near an enemy since air targets move frequently from place to place. Once in the
area, the fighter begins to look for a viable target. When this cognition model is applied to
ground targets, the fighter attacks any target on the ground that is near its current posi-
tion, often ignoring the target that it was vectored to attack. While this cognition model is
useful for pursuit of mobile targets, an alternate approach to attacking fixed ground targets
is needed.
As an alternative, the relatively “dumb” FCAirInterdiction could be upgraded to receive
commands from a ground controller. The FCAirInterdiction model was copied to create a
GITBomber cognition model. After creating the necessary message models and registration
protocols, GITBombers can be assigned targets from a GITFCGroundController (which in
turn receives targets from the GITBattleManager). Unfortunately, the cognition logic in
the GITBomber model does not support multiple targets assigned to the same bomber.
The bomber only attacks the last target in its prioritized list. As a result, a complicated
target management routine was created that feeds each bomber only a single target. After
completing the engagement with one target, the bomber again becomes available for tasking
and can be assigned targets from its ground controller.
The air-to-surface weapon system used by the bomber did not have a method to account
for the lack of availability of the weapon system once all munitions were expended. A query
method was written to ensure that only GITBombers with available weapons were tasked
to an engagement.
If the weapon system is unavailable (all munitions expended), the GITBomber is vec-
tored toward its commander, located at its home airfield. This required modification of the
“MOVE TO LOCATION” function to accept altitude and speed inputs in addition to the
location value. When within 10 km of the airfield, the GITBomber executes the “LAND”
function of the GITFQPFixedWingPlatform which brings the platform to minimum air-
speed and zero altitude. After a user-defined time period, the GITBomber is rearmed and
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the maximum assignments is incremented by one so that the battle manager recognizes this
platform as an active unit available for tasking.
Section B.1 defined a method for prioritizing targets within the battle management
routine. Applying this technique to the FLAMES models required extensive model devel-
opment. First, a majority of the strategic targets in Operation Desert Storm were fixed
facilities. A new platform model called GITFQPFacility was derived from the ground ve-
hicle model and implemented in FLAMES. The ground vehicle model was used so that
“facilities” could be mobile or stationary. Several of the inherent properties of the vehicle
model were also of interest for the facility model, for example, the properties of “vehicle
length” and “vehicle width” can be used to store runway length and width for facilities
representing airfields. An example of the platforms window showing several platforms of
the GITFQPFacility class is shown in Figure 51.
Next, a method was needed to assign the properties of the “threat value” to each plat-
form. An approach was developed that utilizes a powerful function in the FLAMES kernel.
All platforms (and for that matter munitions) in FLAMES can be assigned a signature, a
generic property that is visible to a sensor. Signatures are defined in terms of a radar cross
section (m2) and a lower and upper frequency bound (MHz). Since the signature property
can be attached to any properly defined entity in the simulation, a series of pseudo-signatures
were created to emulate the threat value. It is important to note that these signatures are
not real RCS values that describe the visibility or vulnerability of the platform and are only
a simplified way to assign properties to any entity in the simulation.
Four levels of threat intensity were defined for each target set with the severity repre-
sented by a RCS of 1, 3, 9, or 81 m2. A false frequency between 7000 and 7055 MHz at
increments of 5 MHz was used to define the threat level using the FGroundRCS attribute
of the signature. The defined frequency bounds are shown in Table 4.
For each platform, the “signature selector” window, shown in Figure 52, is used to assign
physical signatures and pseudo-signatures to a given platform. In the example shown, an
airfield can be assigned a Ground RCS and an Air RCS so that it can be detected by both
air and ground sensors, as well as several threat signatures representing its characteristics
153
Figure 51: The Platforms Window in FLAMES, Showing a GITFQPFacility.
Figure 52: Using the Signature Selector Window to Assign Pseudo-Signatures to a Plat-
form.
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Table 4: Pseudo-Signatures Used to Prioritize Strategic Targets (MHz).
Target Set Frequency Target Set Frequency
Leadership/Command 7000 Air Force and Airfields 7030
Electricity 7005 Navy and Ports 7035
Telecommunications/C3 7010 Army 7040
IADS 7015 Oil Production/Storage 7045
Nuclear, Chem and Bio 7020 Roads and Bridges 7050
TBM Launchers/Prod. 7025 Military Storage/Prod. 7055
in the target sets of (12) military production and storage, (5) NBC, (3) telecom and C3, (1)
leadership, (7) air force and airfields, and (4) IADS. In the example shown in Figure 52, all
of the signatures used have an RCS of 1.0 except the air force and airfield signature which
has a medium value of 3.0. Using this mix-and-match approach, platforms can be created
which have threat characteristics of varying levels across all target sets.
This setup uses 48 discrete signature options (4 levels for each of 12 target sets) to
define the threat level of a target. Continuous values cannot be used for individual targets
because the FLAMES kernel does not support a method for altering an existing RCS.
Doing so would require defining a signature and a platform element for each target in
the scenario, which is inconsistent with the object-oriented paradigm of inheritance. An
alternative method would be to create signatures in each target set in increments of 1, 2,
4, 8, 16, 32, and the like. By converting a desired continuous value to binary and adding
the appropriate discrete signatures using the signature selector to reach the desired value,
finer discrimination between the threat levels of individual targets can be achieved. That
level of resolution was not required for this work.
At runtime, the FPlatformGetSignature command in the FLAMES kernel can be used
to retrieve the RCS in a given frequency band. To calculate the overall threat value of the
target, this function is used twelve times across the band of pseudo-signatures defined in





Where the Target Set Importance is defined by the QFD exercise as summarized in
Section B.1. Equation 7 is used within the “RANK” function of the GITBattleManager to
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rank the list of detected targets based on priority. After ranking the target list, the battle
manager then assigns the highest priority targets to platforms that are under the control of
its subordinates. The GITBombers receive a target from the Ground Controller, ingress to
the target, release a weapon, and either indicate their availability to receive a new target
or return to base.
The aforementioned cognition models primarily address the issue of identifying targets,
prioritizing targets, and tasking subordinates to attack the identified targets. The next
major shortcoming that must be remedied is the fact that platforms are assigned in order of
availability: the battle manager assigns the “next” platform in the list of available aggressors
to attack the next most important target in the target list with no regard for the abilities
of the platform or its associated munitions. This issue is addressed in detail in Section 5.5
which describes how the battle manager is trained.
5.3.2.4 Improving the Visualization of the FLASH Scenario Output
The FLASH two-dimensional viewer is useful for debugging both the cognition and physics
of the developed models to ensure that the assets in the simulation exhibit realistic behavior.
To aid in the analysis of the generated models, a routine was written to change the color of
assets based on their state:
• Red, Blue, and White units represent hostile, friendly, and neutral units (FLAMES
default)
• Black units are units detected by the battle manager. If a target cannot be seen by
the battle manager, it retains the red color.
• Magenta units are hostile units currently being engaged.
• Yellow units are friendly units currently being tasked for an engagement.
• Green units are friendly units that have expended all munitions and are returning to
base.
• After landing at the base, while idle the friendly units return to their original blue
color.
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Additionally, background images of the Earth, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Bagh-
dad were imported as GeoTIFF files. The TIFF file format is a versatile raster data format
used by the digital imaging community. This file can encapsulate metadata through “tags”
within the image [351]. “GeoTIFF refers to TIFF files which have geographic (or carto-
graphic) data embedded as tags within the TIFF file. The geographic data can then be
used to position the image in the correct location and geometry on the screen of a geo-
graphic information display” [364]. JPEG files from the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) were converted to TIFF format and metadata tags for the correct geospatial
information were added through an iterative process that matched the graphical image to
known coordinates in the FLAMES scenario. This addition allows rapid identification of
major geographic features such as borders, rivers, and lakes.
5.3.3 Step 3.3: Integrate Models to Create a Holistic Simulation
The third element of step 3 is the integration of the models described in Section 5.3.2 and
the simulation elements detailed in Section 5.2 within the simulation framework. FLAMES
requires the definition of platform elements that use physics models, dictionary entries that
synthesize specific pieces of equipment from platforms, sensors, and munitions, and unit
descriptions that specify the properties of individual elements in the simulation. Validation
is conducted by attempting to calibrate the parameters of the existing models to match
known outcomes of the initial sorties of Operation Desert Storm. In an example of one such
test, appendix E.2 describes the calibration of the IADS model used in the simulation.
This integrated simulation forms the basic “game board” upon which technology eval-
uation studies are performed. As a final note, up to this point, all steps are required to
perform a single simulation and generate a single data point. Subsequent sections describe
how this simulation environment or its equivalent can be used to examine large amounts
of data to discover valuable solutions throughout the design space. Infusion of new tech-
niques and methods to provide output useful for capability planning and technology is also
discussed throughout the next several sections.
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5.4 Step 4: Map Strategic Objectives to Actionable Opera-
tions
“No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he
intends to conduct it.”
-Carl Von Clausewitz,
On War [100]
One of the primary technical challenges in creating an intelligent battle manager is how
to prioritize targets for attack. In order to create a software solution to model real-world
behavior, it is first necessary to define how the targeting, weaponeering, and battle damage
assessment (BDA) functions occur in reality. The USAF targeting guide defines a process
(see Figure 53) that can be used as a model of the interaction between the battle manager,






























Figure 53: Cognition Model for Scenario Execution: The Target Cycle (Adapted from
Reference [429]).
The first step, “Objectives and Guidance Derivation” identifies “what is to be achieved
and under what conditions and parameters” [429]. A top-level objective such as “win the
war” is realized through the satisfaction of multiple strategic objectives. Consistent with
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the GSTF mission, the primary objective of the LRS scenario is to clear the way for other
friendly forces while neutralizing leadership targets, C3, IADS, and NBC elements in the
opening stages of the conflict. The objectives and guidance for the Persian Gulf War used
in the testbed activity are based on the National Policy Objectives specified in the U.S.
Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (USCINCCENT) mission statement [457]:
• Neutralize Iraqi National Command Authority
• Eject Iraqi Armed Forces from Kuwait
• Destroy the Republican Guard
• Destroy Iraq’s Ballistic Missile and NBC Capability
• Assist in the Restoration of the Legitimate Gov’t of Kuwait
This list can be supplemented with some additional strategic objectives which are im-
plied in the above and inferred from the priorities noted by Horner [98]:
• Obtain and Maintain Air Supremacy
• Cut Supply lines to the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations
• Destroy Saddam’s Capability to Threaten Neighbors
These statements clearly define what needs to be achieved. The conditions and pa-
rameters include qualifiers such as “as quickly as possible” and “with minimum civilian
casualties” that must be mathematically related to the MoEs and constraints defined for
the scenario of interest.
The correlation of strategic objectives to functional target sets is consistent with Air
Force doctrine: “airmen view the application of force more from a functional than geographic
standpoint and classify targets by the effect their destruction has on the enemy rather than
where the targets are physically located” [430]. While the locations determined in Section
5.2.1.3 define the operational constraints for aggressor aircraft, the functional and physical
characteristics of a target will delineate its importance. A method for prioritizing targets
with respect to the objectives and guidance is defined in the next section.
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5.4.1 Target Development
The next step in the target cycle is target development, and is simplified to include only
detection and identification of targets. It can be said that the target identification function
seeks to identify the Clausewitzian “centers of gravity” within each target set. Addition-
ally, “every target has distinct inherent, acquired, functional, physical, environmental, and
mobility characteristics” as defined by the USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide [429]. The
purpose of intelligence is to determine as many of these characteristics as are necessary for
accurate targeting. Sensor assets in the simulation are tasked with detecting targets and
relaying information on one or more characteristics to the battle manager. When sufficient
information has been obtained to make a targeting decision, the battle manager assigns
weapons to assets and construct an attack plan called the Air Tasking Order (ATO) which
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Figure 54: The Role of Target Identification in the Target Cycle (Adapted from Reference
[429]).
Top-level leadership prioritizes military objectives in terms of the strategic guidance
in the previous section; however, targeting experts need a means to map the functional
properties of potential targets to the strategic objectives. Quality Function Deployment
(QFD) is a popular approach in systems engineering that can be adapted for this purpose.
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The mechanics of this technique are summarized in Section B.1. In this case, the “voice
of the customer” maps directly to the strategic objectives (WHAT military planners want
to do) and the “engineering characteristics” are in fact strategic target sets that must be
struck to accomplish those objectives (HOW the objectives are accomplished). A QFD
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Eject Iraqi Armed Forces from 
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Destroy the Republican Guard 0 H G F F
Destroy Iraq's Ballistic Missile 
and NBC Capability 5 H G F F G G G G
Assist in the Restoration of the 
Legitimate Gov't of Kuwait 0 G G
Obtain and Maintain Air 
Supremacy 8 G H F F G
Cut Supply Lines to the KTO 0 H H H F F F F
Destroy Saddam's Capability to 
Threaten Neighbors 2.5 F H F F F F F G F H H H










Figure 55: Quality Function Deployment Approach to Target Prioritization.
Filled circles indicate a strong relationship, open circles depict a moderate relationship,
triangles indicate a weak relationship, and empty boxes indicate that there is no relationship
between the strategic objective and the target set. The percentages at the bottom of the
figure represent the relative importance of each target set with respect to the importance





The multiple attribute decision making technique described in Section B.1 mathemati-
cally ranks concepts based on the data that describes a concept and the subjective impor-
tance of the various data categories. While the subjective importance for each target set
can be defined from the output of the QFD in Figure 55, ranking of the nearly 450 targets
in the simulation requires a means of specifying the “threat value” in each target set. A
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representation of the overall priority of a given target, T, is the threat value for target
T in target set j multiplied by the relative importance of that target set with respect to






Note that the threat value for each target, T, is defined using the pseudo-signature
method detailed in Section 5.3.2.3. Using the QFD matrix and the overall evaluation
criterion specified above, each target can be given an overall priority where the highest
priority indicates the most important target on the battle manager’s list.
This ranking scheme is depicted in Figure 56 for a Phase I-like campaign where the
primary objectives are the establishment of air supremacy and the degradation of major
NBC facilities. In this case, the highest priority targets are nuclear research facilities,
IADS sector operations centers, communications relays, high-profile leadership targets, and
mobile Scud missile launchers. Using alternative settings for the strategic objectives, the
same algorithm can be applied to a Phase IV-like operation where the battlefield is prepared
for ground forces. In this case (Figure 57), the primary targets are the Republican Guard
headquarters, Petroleum/Oil/Lubricant (POL) storage facilities, and refineries. Army units,
roads, bridges, and storage facilities become a priority in this scenario. It is also important
to note how the pie chart depicting the relative importance of target sets changes between
the two disparate scenarios. While this graphical depiction shows how the QFD and OEC
can be used to prioritize targets, this algorithm was converted to FLAMES code and placed
inside the GITBattleManagerRank function. As shown in the activity diagram in Figure
50, the rank function is executed every time a new target is nominated by the battle
manager. When the target list is updated, the battle manager searches through the list
of available subordinates to see if any asset can successfully engage the highest priority
target. A technique for matching platform/weapon combinations to high priority targets







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.5 Step 5: Develop and Train Intelligent Battle Manager
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without
strategy is the noise before defeat.”
-Sun Tzu
Targeting is the “process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appro-
priate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities,” the
first part of which is currently handled by the battle manager [468]. Section 5.4.1 described
a technique for arranging targets in order of importance based on the target set(s) to which
they belong. This gives the battle manager the first level of intelligence: it knows what it

























pairings can be 
determined using 
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Figure 58: The Role of Weaponeering in the Target Cycle (Adapted from Reference [429]).
The next function in the Air Force Target Cycle (see Figure 53) is weaponeering, which
is “the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons
required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target” [468]. These two functions
work together to match weapons to targets to achieve a desired effect. The battle manager’s
domain is limited to targeting and weaponeering, and after these functions are completed,
the output is the ATO which essentially lists the weapon/target pairs which have been
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selected to achieve the warfighter’s desired effects for the mission at hand.
A cumbersome method for emulating the real-world behavior of weaponeers would be to
create a table that maps target types to weapon types and allow the battle manager to use
this table lookup to map weapons to targets at runtime. Such a table would be full of bias
and reflect the knowledge of experienced weaponeers, which is unavailable for this task. If
distinct rules could be defined to emulate the behavior of real-world weaponeers, a decision
tree (see Section A.2.4) could be created that represents the allowable decisions. Unfortu-
nately, a hardcoded decision tree would not be adaptable for new weapons and technologies.
Only existing options on the tree would be available to the battle manager. Additionally,
the search time to fathom the decision tree at each decision point for each potential target
would be excessive. An alternative is to define the physical and functional properties of each
target and allow the battle manager to learn which weapon/target pairings are effective.
The lack of computational resources and experienced weaponeers drives the decision to
utilize agent-based modeling and machine learning to discover valid asset/weapon/target
pairings depending on the state of the scenario and the assets and technologies available.
The proposed approach uses two modes of operation, training and analysis, to create an
intelligent “Meta-General” that has experience in a number of battlefield scenarios. The
general description of this approach is given in Section B.2.1. To avoid the shortcomings of
a decision tree, a neural network surrogate model is used to encapsulate the “intelligence”
of the Meta-General and enable rapid execution at runtime.
5.5.1 Training the Intelligent Battle Manager
To train the battle manager, a “simple” scenario was defined that retains the properties of
the IADS developed for the testbed scenario, but uses only a single target and a single strike
aircraft (bomber). While all the properties of the target except its geographic location are
held constant, the properties of the strike aircraft can be varied to represent a wide range of
potential platforms and munitions. The ranges of the system and subsystem level metrics
for the battle manager training exercise are shown in Table 5.
The technology parameters shown in Table 5 enable exploration of a range of platforms
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Table 5: Ranges for the Design of Experiments to Train the Battle Manager.
Variable Low High
Max Speed (Mach) 0.72 4
Cruise Altitude (m, ft) 3,048 (10,000) 15,240 (50,000)
GTOW (kg, lbs) 15,876 (35,000) 544,311 (1,200,000)
Empty Wt Ratio 0.4 0.55
Payload Wt (kg, lbs) 907 (2,000) 36,287 (80,000)
Thrust/Weight 0.35 1.5
Wing Loading (lb/ft2) 20 150
Drag Coefficient 0.01 0.09
Max CL 1.5 3
RCS (m2) 0.01 10
TSFC (lbm/lbf -hr) 0.3 0.8
Munition Range (km, nm) 18.52 (10) 2,222 (1,200)
Munition Speed (Mach) 0.72 6
SAM Density (%) 0 100
(in the air domain) detailed in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 as well as a wide range of munitions
from the existing arsenal and notional future concepts. For example, platform speeds up to
Mach 4 and munition speeds up to Mach 6 are encompassed by these ranges. Additionally,
by varying the starting and ending geographic coordinates of both platforms19, the threat
context and platform range constraints can be captured. Coordinates were varied to rep-
resent a range of about 2,800 km (1,500 nautical miles), defined by Shlapak, et. al as a
reasonable range to conduct high-tempo operations on the Arabian Peninsula [373]. Finally,
a missing element is the density of SAM sites in the region. If a platform flies over a dense
area of SAMs, the battle manager will learn that direct paths between those two coordinates
are undesirable; however, if the SAM sites have already been destroyed, this path becomes
acceptable. A routine was written in FLAMES to randomly kill a user-defined percentage
of SAM sites around the conflict region. Since the same random seed was used for each
simulation, the SAM sites are always destroyed in the same order. The simulation setup
for the battle manager training exercise is shown in Figure 59.
The purpose of training the Meta-General is to expose it to many possible situations
19The design of experiments table defines two square regions that encompass Iraq and the areas south of
Iraq in which most platforms are located. Defining these ranges as square regions allows the target to be







Figure 59: Scenario for the Battle Manager Training Exercise (Background Image from
Reference [315]).
to build a database of what weapons and platforms are effective. As an initial test, 4,000
random points were executed across the range of input parameters defined in Table 5. All
parameters except the target location were uniformly distributed throughout the range of
input parameters in Table 5. The target location was biased so that more than 50% of the
training targets were within the boundaries of Baghdad, which is consistent with the actual
distribution of targets and defenses in Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
The DOE was executed using two Pentium IV computers for a total of 11 CPU-hours.
Of the 4,000 cases run, in 800 instances the target of interest was placed outside the borders
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of Iraq. These cases confound the training of the battle manager because the platform either
gives up or attempts to attack a SAM site. In the actual simulation, targets outside Iraq
would not be prosecuted by the battle manager. These failed cases are an artifact of creating
a geometric square that must encompass an irregularly shaped region.
While the regression on these cases was underway, an additional 6,000 random cases
were run using the same computer setup over a period of approximately 16 CPU-hours. Of
the 10,000 total cases, 8,922 were usable.
5.5.2 Summary of Meta-General Training Data
A summary of the 8,922 valid cases used in the training of the battle manager is shown in
Figure 60. This type of plot is called the multivariate profiler and is useful for determining
the relationship between parameters for systems-of-systems. The term “multivariate” refers
to any process that considers multiple variables simultaneously. In contrast to simplified one
or two dimensional analyses, the multivariate profiler provides the designer with a view of
all variable interactions simultaneously. Along the diagonal, the variable names are listed.
The convention used in this work places more general variables (MoEs) in the upper left
corner and specific technology or design parameters in the lower left corner. The top level
measures of effectiveness for targets killed and platforms lost are shown in the upper left
hand corner. Along the diagonal, platform design variables, munition design variables, and
geographic parameters are also indicated. Each of the boxes above the diagonal shows
the relationship between the two variables that comprise the intersection while all other
variables are also simultaneously varied over the ranges shown. This depiction is analogous
to viewing the total derivative of the design space across the range of all parameters in the
system-of-systems hierarchy. Designers use this plot to gain insight into the behavior of the
design space and should use a combination of colors, symbols, density plots, and constraint
lines to understand the character of the space.
In Figure 60, blue points represent “successful engagements” where the blue platform
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Figure 60: Multivariate Plot Illustrating the Results of the Battle Manager Training.
engagement” where the friendly platform died and the hostile target survived. The remain-
der of the cases are indicative of neutral engagements, where both entities died. In this
case, it is not clear when the friendly platform died, or if the death resulted from missile fire
or fuel depletion. From the coloration in Figure 60, several interesting trends are visible.
First, it appears that blue points dominate the region of long munition range. Second, as
shown in Figure 61, successful engagements are more prevalent at high wing loading and
low thrust-to-weight ratio. A higher thrust-to-weight ratio (at cruise) is not favored because
higher weight leads to higher thrust. For a given cruise TSFC, greater thrust corresponds
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to a greater fuel burn. For a given gross takeoff weight and a defined fuel fraction, a plat-
form with greater thrust-to-weight ratio will therefore have reduced range or run out of fuel
before completing its mission. The plot in Figure 61 supports the fact that bombers tend
to have high wing loading and low thrust-to-weight ratios [278]. Higher thrust-to-weight
ratios would tend to be valued by the battle manager if the asset under test engaged in
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Figure 61: Successful Engagements Tend to Favor High Wing Loading and Low
Thrust/Weight Ratio (High Density Shown in Red).
Other trends from the battle manager training are summarized in Table 6 for success-
ful, neutral, and unsuccessful engagements. The “difference” column is indicative of the
variation between successful and unsuccessful engagements.
While parameters like gross takeoff weight, empty weight ratio, lift coefficient, radar
cross section, and munition speed do not seem to contribute significantly to bomber effec-
tiveness in this scenario, design parameters such as wing loading, thrust-to-weight ratio,
drag coefficient, TSFC, cruise altitude, and munition range contribute significantly to the
success of the engagement. This is because the contribution of the second set of parameters
is so much larger than the first set, it appears they have little or no influence. This result
is related to the fact that all degrees of freedom are simultaneously varying.
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Table 6: Analysis of Mean for Successful, Neutral, and Unsuccessful Engagements for
Battle Manager Training.
Parameter Successful Neutral Unsuccessful Difference
Gross Takeoff Weight (kg) 146,006 141,181 136,083 -6.8%
Empty Weight Ratio 0.4723 0.4793 0.4812 1.9%
Thrust-to-Weight Ratio 0.8931 0.9743 1.0055 12.6%
Wing Loading (lb/ft2) 91.91 72.54 64.45 -29.9%
Drag Coefficient 0.046 0.059 0.061 32.4%
Lift Coefficient 2.25 2.24 2.23 -0.7%
TSFC (lbm/lbf -hr) 0.5266 0.5858 0.6110 16.0%
Platform Speed (Mach) 1.92 2.14 2.11 9.9%
RCS (m2) 0.5038 0.5244 0.5091 1.0%
Munition Range (km) 752 829 389 -48.3%
Munition Speed (Mach) 2.84 2.81 2.80 1.3%
Unit Altitude (m) 9,731 8,019 7,545 -22.5%
Data Points 6,361 1,154 1,392
Munition range has the single greatest impact on mission success since the success
criteria were defined in terms of the ability to kill a target without losing the aggressor
platform. Scaling parameters, drag coefficient, and TSFC all relate to the platform’s ability
to complete its mission without running out of fuel. According to the training results, a
higher altitude is favored, although it is not clear whether this effect is due to the decreased
density (and hence increased range) or a decrease in SAM effectiveness at higher altitudes.
Further investigation into the cause of platform losses is required to definitively answer
this question. Finally, the most curious result is that munition speed has no impact on
the success of the mission. This is because the target being used for this engagement is a
fixed target. It is expected that munition speed has a first-order impact on mission success
against moving targets; however, additional cognition and physics models must be created
to support the prosecution of moving targets.
5.5.3 Results of the Meta-General Training Experiment
If the research questions in Section 3.2 can be subdivided into Grand Strategic, Strategic,
Operational, and Tactical levels, the research questions that arise within this section can
best be termed “procedural.” For example, in medicine a patient may be identified as
being ill, their illness may be classified as cancer, identified as a certain type of cancer,
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located within the body, and a treatment regiment that includes radiation therapy may be
prescribed. All of these categorical determinations lend themselves well to downselection
by morphology. On the other hand, procedural questions such as “how much radiation to
deliver?” are more quantitative and are not easily expressed using a matrix of alternatives.
Many such procedural research questions arise in the training of the Meta-General and are
answered by an exploratory process of testing and verifying hypotheses. For example:
• What kind of surrogate model is most appropriate?
• What is the optimum topology of the neural network?
• Is the validation set error, test set error, or the overall predictive ability of the equation
a better method for evaluating the overall “goodness” of a neural network?
• What level of predictive error is “acceptable” for the trained Meta-General?
• How should computer resources be allocated between the amount of time to spend on
training, and the number of iterations to perform during Meta-General training?
• How do different types of DOEs compare in terms of their ability to generate a valid
decision model?
• How many cases are needed to develop a valid fit for the neural network?
Each of the above procedural research questions must be completely answered to not only
validate the proposed approach to using a Meta-General to replace human decision makers
(answers the operational question “Can it be done?”) but also to specify the procedures
that must be performed at the lowest level to use the Meta-General approach effectively
(answers the tactical question “How can it best be done?”).
The first situation examined was the development of a Meta-General for fixed targets.
Originally, it was believed that a single neural network would be able to handle targets
of all characteristics; however, results from the Meta-General training (see Section 5.5.2)
identified several input parameters including munition speed that have little effect on the
success of an engagement. For this reason, a second training algorithm for moving targets
was developed after additional cognition models for moving target prosecution were created.
The results of the moving target training exercise are detailed in Section 5.5.9.
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5.5.4 Neural Networks Outperform Polynomial Response Surface Equations
by a Large Margin
Section C.7 identifies polynomial response surface equations and neural networks as two
effective types of surrogate models. The non-linear nature of the military system-of-systems
problem does not lend itself well to approximation using polynomial surrogates. The neural
network technique is an enabler to model discontinuities endemic to this class of problems.
5.5.4.1 The Optimum Topology Can Be Determined Using BRAINN
Topology in network theory refers to the structure or layout of a network in terms of nodes
and connections. To train a backpropagation neural network, the number of input, output,
and hidden nodes must be explicitly specified. The BRAINN tool developed by Johnson
and Schutte iteratively tests multiple network topologies to identify the optimum network
configuration for a given set of data. In the Meta-General training procedure, a given set
of data can be analyzed using this tool by specifying the range of hidden nodes to try. The
number of input nodes is a function of the number of input parameters (in this case 17)
and the number of output nodes is defined by the number of responses (in this case two).
To maximize the effectiveness of the method while minimizing the computational resources
expended, at least two passes are used for each set of data. In the first case, a “coarse
pass” is used where the training time and number of iterations is lowered and the number
of hidden nodes to examine is variable. After this pass identifies the optimum topology, the
training process is repeated using the optimum number of hidden nodes and the coefficients
of the equation are identified.
5.5.5 Four Measures of Error are Available
There are four primary types of error analysis used for the neural network equation. The
first error measure is the error in the training set. This error measure should be extremely
low, because it defines how well the neural network was able to match the data used to create
the neural network and is analogous to the model fit error defined by Kirby and Barros [55].
The second error measure used is the validation set. The validation set is used to assess the
ability of the network to generally match behavior throughout the design space. Johnson
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and Schutte note that “by using the validation set to determine the ‘optimal’ network the
program is slightly distorting the validation set as a measure of the generalization error.
It is no longer an independent test of the network’s generalizability [225].” In contrast,
the test set is a set of random data that is neither explicitly or implicitly used for neural
network training. This data set is usually a much smaller percentage of the overall data
set and is analogous to the model representation error identified by Kirby and Barros [55].
The final measure of error is the total error (also called predictive error) of the equation
which examines the overall ability of the neural network equation to predict data values in
the training, validation, and test sets as well as any other data points that are added that
were not included in the data used to train the neural network. This measure is calculated
in JMPR© by assessing how many times is the neural network correct in comparison to the
total number of cases in the data set.
While the test set is the most independent measure of the generalizability of the neural
network, this data is usually a small portion of the overall data set (typically 3-5%). For
this reason, the test set error must be compared against the total error, which is a measure
of how well the neural network can predict values across the entire design space. While low
test set error for any size neural network is a good property, maintaining low total error in
the presence of large data sets may be equally valuable.
5.5.6 An Acceptable Error Threshold is 5%
These results implicitly define the next procedural question: “what is an acceptable level
of error?” Given the myriad of interacting factors that are involved in the simulation of a
military system-of-systems, an ability to forecast weapon/platform/target pairings within
5% accuracy is likely sufficient for the purposes intended. The resulting data shown in
Table 11 indicate that the Meta-General training approach proposed in this dissertation is
extremely accurate at forecasting such pairings.
5.5.6.1 Computational Resources Should be Allocated to Training Time
Another procedural question addresses how computational resources should be apportioned
between two user-defined settings in the BRAINN graphical interface: training time and
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number of iterations. The training time is a period of time over which the training algorithm
attempts to maximize the R2 value of the validation set, while the number of iterations is
the number of times this process repeats for different initial conditions. The total time
required for the training process is given by Equation 10.
TotalT imehr =
[







Where the NodesLow and NodesHigh define the starting and ending number of hidden
nodes to examine. Generally, the total time is constrained to a period of approximately 12
hours (overnight) and the remaining parameters are set accordingly.
A comparison was performed between two training cases for a 10,000 case data set run
through the FLAMES simulation and regressed using the BRAINN tool. In the first case,
the training time was set higher than the number of iterations. The opposite was true for
the second case. The fit for the equation “platforms lost” was used for comparison. The
resulting error distributions between the two cases are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Comparison Between Two Training Cases to Determine Apportionment Between
Training Time and Iterations.
Case 1 Case 2
Parameter Training Time Focus Iterations Focus
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 300 120
Hidden Nodes 10 10
Iterations at Each 200 400
Training % Correct 97.5583 97.3872
Validation % Correct 93.1034 92.6108
Test % Correct 93.6567 92.9104
Total % Correct 96.256 96.110
Number of Cases 10,000 10,000
The predictive error for Case 1 was 3.74% (374/10,000) while the error for Case 2 was
3.87% (387/10,000). While Case 1 outperforms Case 2 across the board, the training times
used were generally long enough to obtain excellent fits for the data used. The results shown
in Table 7 confirm the hypotheses that Meta-General training is more effective when the
training time is larger and the number of iterations is smaller. This gives the Meta-General
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more time to examine the topology as opposed to giving it more chances to start over with
new initial guesses. Through a comparative experiment, it was determined that a longer
training time for a lower number of iterations minimizes the error of the resulting neural
network.
5.5.7 Comparison of DOE Types for Meta-General Training
Since the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence has yet to generalize the type
of DOE that is best suited for training an intelligent agent, a comparison between two
options for DOEs was conducted. Johnson recommends a space-filling DOE supplemented
with a central composite design (CCD) for the generation of neural network surrogate
models [225]. A DOE consisting of purely random cases is generally easier to create than
a space-filling DOE, and both are easier to create than a Latin Hypercube. The first test
is to compare the correlation between independent variables in a random DOE consisting
of 10,000 cases and a sphere-packed lattice with the same number of cases. The random
DOE was generated using the RandomUniform() function in JMPR© 6.0, while the lattice
was created using the MATLABR© Model Based Calibration toolbox [274]. Each DOE was
created in approximately ten seconds; however, creating a space-filling DOE in JMPR© 6.0
takes considerably longer. Both DOEs were examined using the multivariate analysis feature
in JMPR© and the magnitude of the correlation coefficients between independent variables
were calculated and are shown in Figure 62. Red shading indicates that the magnitude of
the correlation is greater than the opposing method, while green shading indicates that the
magnitude of the correlation is lower. From the coloration in Figure 62, it is obvious that
a space-filling scheme has much lower correlation than a purely random DOE.
To further analyze Johnson’s recommendation, a latin hypercube was created for 10,000
cases. The addition of the constraint of uniformity increases the generation time from 10
seconds to 72 minutes. For this reason, any benefit gained from using a latin hypercube
design of experiments must be weighed against the computational burden that increases as

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While Figure 62 compared the correlation coefficients of the random DOE and the space-
filling DOE to each other, Figure 63 compares the 10,000 case latin hypercube correlation
to both the random design of experiments (top) and the space-filling DOE (bottom). When
compared to the random DOE, a universal judgement cannot be easily made as to which
is better: it appears to be a wash. On the other hand, a space-filling DOE is universally
better than the latin hypercube. Almost all the correlation coefficients between independent
variables are higher for a latin hypercube created using the same tool as the space-filling
DOE. Surprisingly, the additional time expenditure required to generate a latin hypercube
for this problem results in a less effective design than a sphere-packing scheme that can be
created almost instantly.
While this experiment demonstrated that a space-filling design tends to have the lowest
independent variable correlation, the next step is to ascertain whether the quality of low
independent variable correlation matters when training the intelligent battle manager. For
this experiment, two types of DOEs are compared. The first, a random DOE consisting
of 10,000 points was created and run through the simulation. Of these, only 8,922 were
usable.
Additionally, a 15,000 case space-filling DOE was created using the model-based cali-
bration toolbox and supplemented with a 512 case central composite design created using
JMPR©. One key problem with this setup is that by definition, the CCD tends to place
points at the extremes of the design space. In the case of the geographic parameters, target
coordinates outside Iraq are excluded. As a result, the CCD cases were nearly all excluded.
Of the 15,000 cases in the space-filling DOE, only 8,132 were inside the borders of Iraq and
were considered valid. This number of cases is close to the number of cases run for the ran-
dom DOE so that the subsequently generated neural network equations can be compared
against the same basis. The following sections describe the process for creating a neural
network equation for the two DOE types. In general, this process follows two steps: first,
the topology of the neural network equation must be determined. This involves running a
shorter training time for an number of network configurations to identify the ideal number
of hidden nodes. Once the topology has been identified, a second pass is conducted that
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optimizes the coefficients based on the selected topology by using longer training times and
more iterations for only a single network configuration. In some cases, the error is so low
after the first pass that a second pass is not necessary.
5.5.7.1 Random DOE Exploratory Phase (Case 1): Determining the Topology of the
Neural Network
A neural network equation was used to approximate the two primary outputs of the training:
whether a blue platform was lost and whether the red target was killed. The regression
was performed using the BRAINN interface developed by Johnson and Schutte [225]. The
maximum and minimum values for the hidden nodes were defined using past experience and
an observation that topologies with greater than 10-15 nodes may overfit the data. The fit
statistics for this experiment are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training, Random DOE Ex-
ploratory Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 1 1
Training Time (s) 120 120
Hidden Nodes (low) 6 10
Hidden Nodes (high) 11 16
Iterations at Each 100 100
Training % Correct 95.9385 98.5217
Validation % Correct 93.4169 95.4322
Test % Correct N/A N/A
Optimal Nodes 10 10
Number of Cases 8922 8922
The total percent error for the “platforms lost” equation was 4.62% (413/8922) and the
percent error for the “targets killed” equation was 2.21% (197/8922). An analysis of the
distribution of the error indicated that there was no bias to any particular region of the
design space and the error still exhibited random scattering. The main outcome of Case
1 is the identification of the optimum number of hidden nodes as 10 for each of the two
responses.
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5.5.7.2 Random DOE Optimization Phase (Case 2): Optimizing the Neural Network
Using the Identified Topology
To improve the fit of the neural network equations, the second iteration of training was run
using the same data with a longer training time and more iterations for a topology that
uses 10 hidden nodes. The results of this training run are shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training, Random DOE Optimiza-
tion Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 300 300
Hidden Nodes 10 10
Iterations at Each 200 200
Training % Correct 97.5583 98.5692
Validation % Correct 93.1034 95.2978
Test % Correct 93.6567 93.6567
Number of Cases 8922 8922
The total percent error for the “platforms lost” equation was 3.74% (334/8922) and
the percent error for the “targets killed” equation was 2.36% (211/8922). Although the
additional training time at the optimal number of hidden nodes did not commensurately
improve the accuracy of the equation, the total error of both equations was less than 5%.
5.5.7.3 Space-Filling DOE Exploratory Phase (Case 1): Determining the Topology of
the Neural Network
As with the random DOE, an initial coarse training pass was used to identify the optimum
topology for the space-filling DOE. The resulting goodness of fit statistics for the resulting
neural network equations are shown in Table 10.
The total percent error for the “platforms lost” equation was 0.92% (75/8132) and the
total percent error for the “targets killed” equation was 0.38% (31/8132). Because the
percent error is so low for the equations identified in this round, further training of the
neural network to optimize the coefficients is not necessary.
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Table 10: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training, Sphere-Packing Scheme
Exploratory/Optimization Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 120 120
Hidden Nodes (low) 5 5
Hidden Nodes (high) 10 10
Iterations at Each 100 100
Training % Correct 99.4193 99.7438
Validation % Correct 98.0817 99.213
Test % Correct 99.1803 100.00
Optimal Nodes 9 10
Number of Cases 8132 8132
5.5.7.4 Summary: A Space-Filling DOE is Most Effective for Meta-General Training
The initial procedural equation that defined this experiment was “how do different types of
DOEs compare in terms of their ability to generate a valid decision model?”
When comparing the optimal results for a random DOE (Table 9) and a space-filling
DOE (Table 10), a space-filling DOE universally outperforms a random DOE. While both
DOEs cover the same range of input variables, the space-filling DOE has lower independent
variable correlation and all measures of error are unequivocally lower. Furthermore, the
space-filling DOE had slightly fewer cases and required less training to converge to a better
result. Generally, the space-filling DOE should have validation and test set points that are
randomly generated, as opposed to actual points in the space-filling lattice. Although the
lattice points were randomly selected for error analysis, a combination of a lattice DOE for
training and a random DOE for validation and test could be used to further improve the
model fit. For this reason, another training pass was performed using the full 17,054 cases
to maximize the ability of the neural network to cover the design space while minimizing
predictive error. The goodness of fit statistics from the optimal training pass for each type
of DOE are summarized in Table 11. As this table shows, the space-filling DOE always
outperforms the random DOE.
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Table 11: Summary of the Comparison Between Random and Space-Filling DOEs for
Meta-General Training.
Random DOE Space-Filling DOE
Platforms Targets Platforms Targets
Parameter Lost Killed Lost Killed
Training % Correct 97.5583 98.5692 99.4193 99.7438
Validation % Correct 93.1034 95.2978 98.0817 99.213
Test % Correct 93.6567 93.6567 99.1803 100.00
Overall % Correct 96.256 97.6351 99.08 99.619
Number of Cases 8922 8922 8132 8132
5.5.8 Developing the Final Form of the Neural Network Equation
For a final training pass, the two previously used data sets were combined to produce a
single DOE that combines the properties of a space-filling DOE with a random DOE. 4,000
of the 8,132 random DOE points were used for the validation set (23%) and 500 points were
used for the test set (3%). The results of the exploratory DOE are shown in Table 12.
Table 12: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training, Combined DOE Ex-
ploratory Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 120 120
Hidden Nodes (low) 5 5
Hidden Nodes (high) 10 10
Iterations at Each 100 100
Training % Correct 97.5336 99.2757
Validation % Correct 95.7571 92.8
Test % Correct 95.1172 93.8
Optimal Nodes 8 9
Number of Cases 17,054 17,054
From these results, the optimum topology was identified as eight and nine hidden nodes
for the “platforms lost” and “targets killed” responses respectively. The results of the final
optimization pass using the combined data set are summarized in Table 13.
The total percent error for the “platforms lost” equation was 3.46% (590/17054) and
the total percent error for the “targets killed” equation was 2.56% (437/17054). At first
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Table 13: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training, Combined DOE Opti-
mization Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 23 23
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 300 300
Hidden Nodes 8 9
Iterations at Each 200 200
Training % Correct 98.3603 99.2836
Validation % Correct 91.575 92.425
Test % Correct 90.60 91.20
Total % Correct 96.54 97.44
Number of Cases 17,054 17,054
glance, the predictive capability of the combined data set appears inferior to the neural
network devised using only a space-filling design (Table 10). Despite the fact that all error
measures increased, does the greater coverage of the design space improve the overall fit of
the neural network equation?
When the neural network created in Section 5.5.7.3 using the pure space-filling DOE was
applied to the full 17,054 case data set, the total error increased from 0.92% to 12.8% for
the “platforms lost” response and from 0.38% to 6.9% for the “targets killed” response. The
error distribution was disproportionately allocated to the random DOE points that were
not used to train the previous neural network. This means that the neural network created
using solely the space-filling DOE is not as accurate with off-DOE points as previously
expected.
From the series of experiments in this section, it is evident that although the space-filling
neural network is the most accurate, the final form of the neural network equation to be
used in the simulation activity is the variant that combines data from both previous trials
to create a single data set of 17,054 runs.
The lessons learned from the previous tests are applied to the training of the Meta-
General for moving targets: instead of using a random DOE, a space-filling DOE of at least
20,000 points is executed. When training the Meta-General, the amount of “experience”
provided is a key measure of the performance of the neural network: the training set should
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include as many cases as are reasonable given the computational constraints of the analysis.
The results of all training passes are summarized in Figures 64 and 65. One key observation
from these figures is that the percent correct is generally higher for the “targets killed”
response than the “platforms lost” response. This is partially due to the fact that the
settings used for the DOE resulted in a “kill” approximately 85% of the time and a “loss”
only about 32% of the time: there is simply more data available to understand the cause
of a kill than there is to determine potential causes for a loss. Also, although the neural
network created using only the space-filling DOE appears to have the highest accuracy, as
described in Section 5.5.8, it is not as accurate at predicting off-DOE points for the full
17,054 case set.
When taking into account a balance of design space coverage and predictive error, the
best overall equation that most thoroughly approximated the space of poten-
tial engagements with minimum predictive error was the neural network that
resulted from the 17,054 case combined DOE, although all training passes resulted
in acceptable equations with less than 5% total error. The goodness of fit statistics for all





















































Training Validation Test Overall
Random DOE (8,922 pts) Space Filling DOE (8,132 pts) Combined DOE (17,054 pts)




















































Training Validation Test Overall
Random DOE (8,922 pts) Space Filling DOE (8,132 pts) Combined DOE (17,054 pts)
Figure 65: Error Comparison for Three Different Training Cases- Targets Killed.
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5.5.9 Meta-General Training for Moving Targets
The first experiment with Meta-General training in Section 5.5.3 revealed a shortcoming of
the initial experimental setup: certain performance inputs produced no realizable benefit
on the system although they were originally expected to do so. Most notable of these was
the weapon speed. After analyzing the data, it was determined that this resulted from
the focus of the training on fixed targets. The battle manager had no logic to deal with
moving targets. While the trained battle manager described in Section 5.5.3 is valid for
the HDBT, decapitation strike, and conventional strike missions, it is not appropriate for
the TCT attack mission. This sparked the development of a modified cognition model that
could prosecute moving targets.
The cognition model for the GITBomber was designed to obtain target information
from an initial sensor track and plot a course to that target. When the bomber was within
weapon range, the weapon would be released and begin its fly-out to the target; however,
the GITBomber had no on-board sensor to track the target after it received the initial
coordinates. As a result, if the target relocated while the bomber was enroute to the target,
the weapon would miss its intended target unless the lethal radius of the munition was
extraordinarily large.
This realization led to the development of a more sophisticated cognition model based on
the FCFighter example cognition model that was originally ruled out in favor of the FCAIN
example model as described in Section 5.3.2.2. An activity diagram for the GITFCFighter
cognition model and supporting modules is shown in Figure 66. While the GITBattleMan-
ager looks for targets using the same processes used for fixed targets, if a target is identified
as a moving or movable target, it is assigned to a platform using the GITTimeCriticalTar-
getAssign function as opposed to the ground controller module developed for fixed targets.
The fighter cognition model was modified to receive ground targets from the Time Critical
Target Controller, and establishes a vector to the last known coordinates of the target.
Once this waypoint is within the range of the onboard sensor, the GITFCFighter activates
its sensor and begins to look for the target.
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boxes indicate states where the target is visible, while the red boxes enumerate states in
which the target is hidden. The TBM must be visible to fire and move, although this does






















Figure 67: Activity Diagram for a Theater Ballistic Missile Launcher.
If the TBM is in a visible state and the blue fighter is attempting to acquire the tar-
get and is within sensor range of the target, the GITFCFighter attempts to choose the
closest TCT to its current position. The fighter then vectors towards the target and re-
lease a homing weapon using the onboard weapon system. After releasing the weapon, the
GITFCFighter will then attempt to acquire another target in its sensor range. If another
TCT is found, the engagement process continues as long as the aggressor finds additional
targets. When no targets are found near the vector coordinates, the platform returns to
base. While returning to base, the fighter executes the ASSESS method in continuous
mode, which attempts to search for any additional TCTs along its flight path as it returns
to base. Additionally, after the fighter begins to return to base, it is flagged as available for
tasking by the Time Critical Target Controller. While in theater, the fighter is much closer
to potential targets than a fighter at a distant base. Provided that a fighter has both fuel
and munitions available, it is highly likely to be tasked to intercept additional TCTs while
in the theater if they are detected by the Time Critical Target Controller.
190
The scenario used to train the battle manager against moving targets is shown in Figure
68. Based on the lessons learned from the training of the Meta-General for fixed targets, a
space-filling DOE was created using the ranges of inputs shown in Table 14. The original
DOE was populated with 45,000 cases; however, after cases outside Iraq were excluded,
only 25,822 were executed through FLAMES in approximately 50 CPU hours. Of these,
24,271 (94%) resulted in valid engagements. Preprocessing the DOE to remove extraneous
cases saved approximately 37 CPU hours. Also, in addition to adding several parameters
related to the moving target properties, the blue bomber was allowed to start inside Iraq
as well as anywhere on the Arabian peninsula in contrast to the fixed target training where





Figure 68: Scenario for the Battle Manager Training Exercise (Background Image from
Reference [315]).
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Table 14: Ranges for the Design of Experiments to Train the Battle Manager for Moving
Targets.
Variable Low High
Max Speed (Mach) 0.72 4
Cruise Altitude (m, ft) 3,048 (10,000) 15,240 (50,000)
GTOW (kg/lbs) 15,876 (35,000) 544,311 (1,200,000)
Empty Wt Ratio 0.4 0.55
Thrust/Weight 0.35 1.5
Wing Loading (lb/ft2) 20 150
Drag Coefficient 0.01 0.09
Max CL 1.5 3
RCS (m2) 0.01 1
TSFC (lbm/lbf -hr) 0.3 0.8
Munition Range (km, nm) 1.85 (1) 2,408 (1,300)
Munition Speed (Mach) 0.72 6
Sensor Range (km, nm) 1.85 (1) 2,222 (1,200)
Target Speed (m/s, mph) 0 22.35 (50)
Target RCS (m2) 0 10
Target Heading (deg) 0 360
Target Movement Time (hrs) 0 1
SAM Density (%) 0 100
The data from the moving target training experiment are shown in Figures 69 and 70
where blue points indicate situations where the target is killed without losing a platform
(11,489/24,271), and red points indicate situations where the opposite is true (1,392/24,271).
The remaining points are situations where either both died (204/24,271) or where no en-
gagement took place because the platform was unable to locate the target (11,186/24,271).
The ANOVA technique can be applied to the output data to examine the impact on
the two responses, resulting in the Pareto chart shown in Figure 71. The green shaded area
corresponds to the 80% threshold of importance. While munition speed still has little direct





And the munition is automatically destroyed if its flight time exceeds the dwell time.
Therefore, munition speed is implicit in the dwell time parameter.
While the Pareto chart is useful in ascertaining the dominant factors, it is also important
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Platforms Lost Targets Killed
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Figure 71: Pareto Plot Showing the Relative Influence of Design and Tactical Parameters
on the Platforms Lost and Targets Killed Response.
The prediction profiler tool is useful in comparing partial derivatives as design variables are
locked at different settings, but the trendlines are difficult to interpret for discrete responses.
Instead, cases are partitioned into successful engagements (Targets Killed = 1, Platforms
Lost = 0) and unsuccessful engagements (Targets Killed = 0, Platforms Lost = 1) and
distributions of each subset are examined in turn. An example of one such distribution for
sensor range is shown in Figure 72. Successful engagements tend to be distributed fairly
uniformly throughout the span of sensor range while unsuccessful engagements are prevalent
at short range. While such distributions are useful in identifying general trends, system-
of-systems problems are dominated by the interactions between a variety of parameters.
While the amount of data is overwhelming, only the multivariate profiler allows complete
analysis of the total derivative, that is, an analysis of the change of responses while all input















































Figure 72: Analysis of the Sensor Range Distribution Reveals that Unsuccessful Engage-
ments are Dominated by Low Sensor Range.
From analysis of the multivariate profiler, Pareto charts, and distribution plots, several
trends can be discerned. Successful engagements were dominated by solutions where the
platform was already located inside Iraq, while unsuccessful engagements were predominant
along the southeastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula where the distance to theater was in
excess of 1,852 km (1,000 nm). Long munition range and sensor range were key contributing
factors to successful engagements. Holding these dominant factors constant would reveal
the effects of other design parameters.
The data from the moving target experiment were analyzed using the BRAINN algo-
rithm. Using the process outlined in Section 5.5.7, an initial exploratory pass was conducted
using a lower training time and a range of topologies. The results of this phase are shown
in Table 15. Using the optimum topology identified in this phase, a second set of regression
was performed. The results for this phase are shown in Table 16. All measures of error for
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the two responses were below the 5% threshold identified as appropriate in Section 5.5.6.
Based on the successful training of the battle manager for moving targets, the final form of
the equation determined from the optimum pass was implemented inside the Time Critical
Target Controller within the FLAMES simulation.
Table 15: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training for Moving Targets,
Exploratory Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 300 300
Hidden Nodes (low) 6 6
Hidden Nodes (high) 15 15
Iterations at Each 20 20
Training % Correct 97.0587 98.5465
Validation % Correct 96.1437 97.6599
Test % Correct 95.7418 96.978
Optimal Nodes 8 11
Number of Cases 24,271 24,271
Table 16: Results from Battle Manager Neural Network Training for Moving Targets,
Optimization Phase.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (%) 25 25
Test Data (%) 3 3
Training Time (s) 3600 3600
Hidden Nodes 8 11
Iterations at Each 12 12
Training % Correct 96.6638 98.7525
Validation % Correct 96.4239 97.4127
Test % Correct 96.2912 97.3901
Total % Correct 96.593 98.4385
Number of Cases 24,271 24,271
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5.5.10 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Situations
In contrast to the scenario-level MoEs defined in Section 5.2.2, the MoEs for the one-on-
one engagement are extremely simplified. Of primary interest is (1) whether the friendly
bomber was killed and (2) whether the enemy target was killed for each experimental run.










Because the cognition model for the GITFCBomber is programmed to release the mu-
nition at its maximum range, the distance the platform flies is the difference between the
starting range between the target and bomber (defined by geographic coordinates) and the
distance flown by the munition.
To calculate the effectiveness of a given situation, a notional engagement cost is defined
by Equation 13.
Cost = (TK)TargetBonus−(BK)BomberCost−(ResponseT ime)TimeCost−MunitionCost
(13)
Where Bk and Tk are boolean parameters indicating whether the bomber and target were
killed respectively. The BomberCost is a negative cost which penalizes the overall engage-
ment cost for each bomber lost. Using cost estimates for the JSF, F-22A, and B-2A as a









Which provides a rough dollar value to penalize the overall cost function20. The FLAMES
platform model requires empty weight as an input and calculates gross weight as the sum
of fuel weight and empty weight. Since the fuel weight changes throughout the mission,
this is not a reliable way to calculate platform cost. Equation 14 can be written in terms










To calculate the cost penalty for a munition fired, a neural network surrogate model was
created for eight munitions for which weight, range, and cost information could be obtained
from references [106] and [218]. These munitions provide a rough estimate of the cost of
munitions across the spectrum from guided bombs to long range cruise missiles. The values
used are shown in Table 17.
Table 17: Parameters Used to Calculate the Munition Penalty Cost [106, 218].
Munition Penetrating? Weight (kg) Range (km) Cost
MK-82 No 227 5 $9,000
MK-84 No 907 5 $22,000
AGM-65B No 462 8 $64,100
AGM-65D No 484 20 $111,000
AGM-65G No 675 25 $269,000
AGM-84B No 1386 95 $346,000
CALCM No 1474 1200 $1,500,000
UGM-109C No 1315 1250 $1,100,000
A cost of $100,000 per hour was applied to the TimeCost to illustrate the benefit of
speed for the GSTF mission. Finally, the “cost” of the target was defined at $20,000,000
to provide a bonus for attacking the target. In this case, the value of the target exceeds
the cost of all munitions while it is much lower than the cost of the platform. This means
that no target is worth losing a platform over and all targets are worth a munition. While
this situation may not always be true, alternative settings may teach the intelligent battle
manager when a better option is not to engage the target at all or when a suicide mission
is justified. The above doctrine is guided by observations from past conflict that place an
extreme value on platforms and pilot lives.
According to Garner’s review of Operation Desert Storm, the estimated cost of the con-
flict was approximately $56B (1991 USD). During the first 24 hours, the U.S. launched ap-
proximately 100 cruise missiles ($100M), 500 HARM/Shrike anti-radiation missiles ($50M),
20,000 tons of bombs ($200M), expended $50M in fuel for the 1,000 participating aircraft
and incurred approximately $100M in cost due to damaged and destroyed aircraft [162].
The primary objective of assigning a cost to each engagement is to place emphasis on using
highly capable and expensive weapons when necessary, but to switch to equally capable and
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less expensive munitions as conditions warrant. Future work will examine economic trades
in more detail.
5.5.11 When is it Appropriate to Use a Meta-General?
The cognitive approach highlighted above is only one of the model paradigms for modeling
human or organizational behaviors. In 1998, the National Research Council performed an
overarching study of existing and proposed paradigms as well as their applicable domains of
application [307]. Oeltjen notes that a hybrid approach that synthesizes elements of these
paradigms is often needed to create computational cognitive models for military simulations
[324].
While the Meta-General is useful for identifying platform/weapon combinations based
on simple knowledge of strategic decisions, the technique is resource intensive for relatively
simple decisions when the same answers are always true regardless of the state of the
scenario. The best example of such a decision is the allocation of weapons against hardened
targets: striking a hardened target with a weapon that has a zero probability of kill for
that type of target wastes a strike that could otherwise have been allocated to a worthwhile
mission. Adding the property of weapon hardness and target hardness to the battle manager
training algorithm would have resulted in the addition of two variables to the DOE when
the underlying logic in the strike function dictates that weapons whose capabilities do not
exceed a target’s hardness requirements are non-functional. To avoid unnecessary code
execution, a simple check statement was added to the battle manager’s target allocation
routine.
Another example is the allocation of platforms to attack time critical targets. If a
detected target has a maximum speed greater than zero, it is capable of movement and it
is assigned using a Time Critical Target Controller. If, on the other hand, the maximum
speed is zero, the target is assigned using a Ground Controller. In these types of situations,
a knowledge-based rule set is the most appropriate cognition method.
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5.5.12 Combining the Meta-General with Knowledge-Based Rule Sets
To reinforce this point, the trained Meta-General was combined with a knowledge-based
rule set for target hardness properties for the reasons described above. While this choice
has an operational benefit in terms of reduced computational time, it also demonstrates
that the Meta-General approach can be combined with existing hard-coded rule sets where
appropriate: implementing the SOCRATES methodology on a legacy code does not neces-
sarily require rewriting the entire simulation. The following experiment demonstrates that
the techniques in this work can be applied in a useful manner to existing simulation efforts.
Just as the properties of each target set were assigned to individual targets (see Section
5.4.1), the pseudo-signature technique can be used to identify weapon and target hardness.
A property called “target hardness” can be defined by using a pseudo-signature at 8,000
MHz with RCS values of 1.0, 3.0, and 10.0 to represent low, medium, and high hardening
respectively. Using the signature selector (shown in Figure 52), the hardness property
can be assigned to both the platform to be attacked and the munition to be used in the
attack. A routine was added to the GITFCGroundController’s assign function that queries
the hardness pseudo-signature of the platform to be attacked. This routine compares the
hardness value of the target to the RCS value of the munitions on the blue platform preferred
by the battle manager for this engagement. If the hardness value of the blue munition is
greater than or equal to the hardness value of the target, the platform is assigned. Otherwise,
the platform is skipped and the next most desirable platform identified by the Meta-General
is checked for this compatibility.
If no subordinates assigned to a ground controller can accept the engagement the battle
manager is notified and tries to reassign the target to a different ground controller. Future
modifications will allow the battle manager can add the desired munitions to an idle platform
and generate the sortie if both weapons and aircraft are available. When such a sortie is
generated, a time delay is added to the platform to represent the time it would take to
reconfigure the aircraft on the ground21.
21Future work may examine the sensitivity of the results to the variability of ground events and logistical
concerns.
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5.5.13 Implementing the Meta-General in FLAMES
The surrogate model developed in the subsequent sections are mathematical equations that
require as inputs (1) the location of an enemy target (2) the location of a friendly asset and
(3) the physical parameters of the friendly asset in question. The output of these equa-
tions is the expected cost of the engagement as given in Equation 13. The neural network
equations were coded within the GITFCGroundController and the GITTCTController cog-
nition models for stationary and time-critical targets respectively. For each detected target,
the latitude and longitude can be queried from the FLAMES kernel. This specifies the
fixed input values for the neural network. Next, the battle manager iterates through all
available platforms under its control. For each platform, the latitude and longitude of its
current position are known. By querying the platform and its weapon system, it is possible
to obtain the current weight, maximum speed, munition speed, munition range, and other
parameters required to evaluate the neural network equations. With this information, the
inputs to the equations are completely defined and the expected cost of the engagement
can be calculated. After iterating through the list of available platforms, provided that the
engagement can be completed successfully by one or more platforms, the platform with the
lowest expected cost is tasked to take the engagement. If the battle manager determines
that the engagement cannot be successfully completed by any platforms under its control,
it ignores this target and proceeds to the next target on the prioritized list. As the simula-
tion continues, the original target remains on the top of the priority list. When a suitable
platform becomes available or when the density of SAM defenses drops below a dangerous
level, a platform is automatically assigned to destroy this target since it remains the highest
priority target in the ranked list.
After being tasked, the individual agent performs additional checks to see if it can
complete the engagement with a high probability of success. The development of the on-
board intelligence to enable realistic decentralized execution and exploitation of technologies
is described in the subsequent section.
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5.6 Step 6: Create Intelligent Agents Using Response Sur-
face Equations
“So a military force has no constant formation, water has no constant
shape: the ability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the
opponent is called genius.”
-Sun Tzu
While the Meta-General supports the Air Force’s weaponeering function, the doctrine
of centralized control and decentralized execution avoids micromanagement of flight plans
and tactical employment of air power. According to Air Force doctrine, “the tactical level
of aerospace warfare deals with how ... packaged forces are employed and the specifics of
how engagements are conducted and targets attacked” [430]. While the targeting function
(Section 5.4.1) primarily addresses “why” we fight, and the weaponeering function (Section
5.5) addresses “what” we fight with, the tactical employment of airpower deals with “how”
we fight [430]. The role of tactical employment and mission planning in the Air Force target
























Once an asset 
has been tasked 
to an 
engagement, it 





Figure 73: The Role of Mission Planning in the Target Cycle (Adapted from Reference
[429]).
The mission planning phase requires as inputs the list of targets to attack and the
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preferred pairings from the battle manager. The product is a mission plan, which is executed
until one or more completion criteria are reached.
The purpose of the battle manager is to formulate the Air Tasking Order (ATO), which
identifies “projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions,” the
“supporting commanders execute the ATO as tasked and recommend changes as appro-
priate” [468, 430]. Under this directive, the actual employment of aerospace power and
determination of effective courses of action falls to the individual air wings and eventually
to the pilots themselves. Therefore, within the simulation, the weapon selection phase is
performed by a single battle manager and the mission planning phase is conducted by each
individual agent that is tasked for a mission.
5.6.1 Using a Playbook of Tactical Options
While some techniques in artificial intelligence and machine learning focus on the develop-
ment of new maneuvers or tactics based on real-time learning and adaptation, such behaviors
are difficult to quantify for multi-agent systems where the evolving behaviors of individual
agents confound the actions of each other. A workshop held in 2002 by the Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems Foundation noted that “multi-agent learning poses significant
theoretical challenges, particularly in understanding how agents can learn and adapt in the
presence of other agents that are simultaneously learning and adapting” [25]. Paradigms
under development to address this issue include Q-learning, game theoretical approaches,
network optimization, and reinforcement learning. While Section A.2.7 outlines some of
these emerging techniques, most of the research in this field has been confined to simple
games and AI-based learning which has not been synthesized into a practical application
to this problem domain as of yet. Furthermore, in the short time frame of hours to days
that the GSTF operates in, pilots are unlikely to adapt new tactics for which they have
not been trained. For these reasons, the proof-of-concept exercise primarily focuses on the
ability of intelligent agents to synthesize tactics from existing basic maneuvers provided in
a “playbook” of options that are defined a priori.
Examples of potential tactical options include the ingress altitude, flight speed, route
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to target, refueling options, and distance to target at the point of weapon release. The
space of potential tactical option defines the allowable “plays” from which the CONOPS of
a particular agent are derived. The choice of different tactical options depends greatly on
the properties of the intelligent agent, which often rely on technologies. As Lambeth notes:
“low observability further ensures an increase in a stealthy aircraft’s effective
operating radius, owing to its capacity for enabling the aircraft to operate at fuel-
efficient speeds and altitudes and for reducing the need for weight-adding and
space-occupying electronic countermeasures that otherwise would be required for
self-protection against enemy defenses” [253].
While decision trees and logic gates provide a means to establish the heuristics of the
playbook, a method is needed to rapidly evaluate which “plays” are preferred under different
operational conditions and in the presence of new technologies.
5.6.2 Response Surface Equations Can Be Used to Calculate Performance
Metrics
As noted above, the selection of a particular tactical maneuver depends on the properties
of the agent for which the maneuver is employed. For example, height, weight, and build
are three properties that can be attributed to a person. The person’s ability to swim
100 meters in a specific time may be a function of these three parameters. Similarly,
the ability of an aircraft to perform specific tactical maneuvers is constrained by one or
more design/operational parameters. A method is desired to related the design/operational
parameters to quantitative measures of performance for the given aircraft. By establishing
thresholds based on these measures of performance for each “play” in the playbook, the
allowable tactical maneuvers based on the state of the agent may be defined. One way to
realize this objective is by providing surrogate models to each intelligent agent.
Section B.3 demonstrates a proof-of-concept of this technique using a Performance Vec-
tor of Attributes (PVA) for an air-to-air combat scenario. In a LRS scenario, however, this
objective function is not as important because a long-range bomber does not typically en-
gage in air-to-air combat nor is it designed to do so. Two primary measures of performance,
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survivability and range, can be used to define the playbook constraints for an LRS aircraft.
Once a target has been identified, the straight-line distance between this target and
any blue aircraft can be calculated using the FLAMES kernel; however, this distance is of
little use. Unless an aircraft possesses unusually high survivability characteristics, a friendly
aircraft would choose to avoid unnecessarily high concentrations of SAM sites and plot a
minimum threat “blue line” around hostile air defenses22. To simulate such paths, a series
of airspace corridors are defined in the FLAMES framework as shown in Figure 74.
Figure 74: Airspace Corridors in the FLAMES Simulation.
22The creation of this path assumes that the locations of SAM sites are known. For stealth aircraft,
“mission planners [construct] a rigid flight plan known as the ‘blue line,’ designed to optimize both the
[aircraft’s] low-observable characteristics and the support available from jamming, defense suppression, and
air superiority aircraft” [186].
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Twenty different pathways are illustrated in Figure 74. These notional routes are par-
tially based on operational data from the Gulf War Air Power Survey [105]. The length of
each route can be calculated in FLAMES by calculating the vector distance between each
point in the corridor. Available airspaces are partially constrained by relating this length to
the range of a platform, taking into account locations of nearby bases and refueling aircraft.
Additionally, conditions for entry into each corridor may be constrained by the platform
RCS and the speed of the platform. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1.5, the air defense en-
vironment of the Iraqi theater makes it impossible to operate below 10,000 feet. Several
“high-risk” airspaces that shortcut through densely defended regions allow flight below this
level if the speed of the platform is sufficiently high to avoid dense anti-aircraft artillery
(AAA) and man-portable air defenses (MANPADS).
An algorithm developed by Tangen iterates through available flight path options and
identifies intersections with active SAM sites based on missile range [394]. This calculation is
used to determine the threat level of each potential option. Then, the agent uses a random
search to query a surrogate model at multiple altitudes and speeds for each airspace to
determine the optimum flight path that maximizes the probability of successful mission
completion. A demonstration of this technique using the Operation Desert Storm scenario
is described in the subsequent sections.
When contrasted with the straight-line vector calculations, significant increases in sur-
vivability are observed when the route planning algorithm is used. In an example ten-hour
engagement using notional LRS platforms, all platforms were lost when straight-line vector-
ing was used. When this scenario was replayed using the twenty airspace corridors shown
in Figure 74 and intelligent agents, no platforms were lost in the ten hour time span.
5.6.3 Demonstration of Intelligent Agents Using Surrogate Models
Since the choice of allowable airspace regions is partially dictated by range and speed, a
method is needed to rapidly calculate both parameters at runtime to evaluate which airspace
corridors may be used for an attack. The process diagram shown in Figure 75.
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Figure 75: A Process for Calculating Measures of Performance Using Surrogate Models
at the Agent Level.
variables including the gross takeoff weight (GTOW), the empty weight ratio, and the
number of munitions can be used in conjunction with runtime variables such as the current
fuel and munition weights to calculate the weight of a platform at run time. Also, for
straight and level flight, the thrust-to-weight ratio is the inverse of the lift-to-drag ratio
which is also a defined input parameter. Given these inputs, the cruise thrust-to-weight







Also, noting that thrust and drag are equal for straight and level flight, the equation







Where the density, ρ, is a function of altitude and can be found by querying the at-
mosphere record in the FLAMES kernel and the drag coefficient, CD, and wing area, S,
are design parameters of the aircraft that can be found by querying the platform. Cruise
velocity is then used as an input to the propulsion system surrogate model and the range
estimate.
5.6.3.1 Development of a Surrogate Model for Propulsion Systems
To calculate platform range, it is necessary to provide an accurate estimate of the fuel burn
over the remaining distance to and from the target area. To address this issue, a surrogate
model that calculates TSFC as a function of altitude and velocity is needed. Altitude can
be determined by querying the atmosphere record in the FLAMES kernel, and a process
for defining cruise velocity was defined in the previous section. These values define the
“state” of the agent at a position in space. When combined with the design variables for a
propulsion system, a thermodynamic model that calculates TSFC can be created.
While a number of thermodynamic cycle codes are available to calculate engine perfor-
mance including the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS), the NASA Engine
Performance Program (NEPP), and commercial codes such as GasTurb, a simple and robust
model for calculating basic properties is the Thermodynamic Properties (THPROP) analy-
sis tool [314, 242, 252, 469]. THPROP is a series of MicrosoftR© Visual Basic routines that
calculate the properties of basic thermodynamic functions such as compression, expansion,
and combustion. When the routines of THPROP are appropriately configured, a designer
can model propulsion system architecture such as turbofans, turbojets, and ramjets. A
MicrosoftR© Excel interface to the THPROP routines is shown in Figure 76.
The original THPROP routine was not well-suited for a design of experiments: the
worksheet is extremely unstable and crashes when unrealistic combinations of efficiencies,
temperatures, and pressure ratios are applied. Error trapping routines were added to the




  jtype = 1 -- compression with known pressure ratio
             2 -- expansion with known pressure ratio
             3 -- expansion with known work (enthalpy drop in btu/lb of local gas)
             4 -- enthalpy & gas properties(cp,ga,rgas) with known temperature
             5 -- flow function & gas properties (wff, ga, rgas) with known temperature
             6 -- combustor fuel-air ratio with known T3 and T4    ( f/a )
             7 -- temperature with known enthalpy and fuel-air ratio
Calculation:
Inlet
Inputs: Inputs for compression w / known pressure ratio: Outputs: Outputs for compression w / known pressure ratio:
P1 5.85952 P2 5.85951669
Inlet PR 1 T2 567.7821688
T1 567.782
FAN
Inputs: Inputs for compression w / known pressure ratio: Outputs: Outputs for compression w / known pressure ratio:
pr 3.4 compression ratio    (pout/pin) touti 802.24 ideal temp. out   (deg r)
tin 567.78217 temperature in          (deg r) T25 826.50 actual temp. out  (deg r)
far 0 fuel/local air ratio delHFan 62.89 actual enthalpy difference for compression  (btu/lb gas)
eta 0.9052844 adiabatic efficiency (fraction) P25 19.92235675 psia
BPR 1.67 P8 19.32468605 psia
COMPRESSOR
Inputs: Inputs for compression w / known pressure ratio: Outputs: Outputs for compression w / known pressure ratio:
pr 1.4705882 compression ratio    (pout/pin) touti 919.96 ideal temp. out   (deg r)
tin 826.5043 temperature in          (deg r) T3 928.04 actual temp. out  (deg r)
far 0 fuel/local air ratio delh 25.07 actual enthalpy difference for compression  (btu/lb gas)
eta 0.92 adiabatic efficiency (fraction) P3 29.29758345 psia
THPROP
Thermodynamic Properties Calculator
Figure 76: THPROP Thermodynamic Properties Calculator for Propulsion System Ar-
chitectures.
In 2005, Engler demonstrated the viability of using neural network surrogate models
to approximate the performance space of a turbofan, turbojet, and ramjet engine using
GasTurb [143]. Based on the success of this approach and the limited applicability of
polynomial surrogates to the engine problem when altitude and speed are input parameters,
a neural network was selected as an appropriate type of surrogate for this demonstration.
This defines the need for a large space-filling design to provide the necessary data needed for
regression. The rapid run time of the spreadsheet model does not preclude this approach.
Using the MATLABR© Model Based Callibration toolbox, a 35,000 case space-filling design
was created. The ranges of the DOE are shown in Table 18.
Table 18: Ranges for the Design of Experiments for Propulsion System Surrogate Models.
Parameter Low High
Mach Number 0.75 5
Altitude, m (ft) 0 16,000 (52,493)
Fan Pressure Ratio 1 4
Fan Efficiency 88% 94%
HPC Efficiency 88% 94%
Bypass Ratio 0 4
Overall Pressure Ratio 5 25
Turbine Inlet Temperature, ◦R (◦K) 2000 (1111) 4000 (2222)
HPT Efficiency 88% 92%
LPT Efficiency 88% 92%
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The 35,000 case DOE was executed on a single Pentium IV 3.0 GHz computer in ap-
proximately three hours. Error trapping features added to the THPROP routines prevented
program crashes during execution, and resulted in identification of 25,719 viable data points
for regression. Of these, 4,078 resulted in negative TSFC and 18,650 resulted in negative
specific net thrust. This behavior was primarily driven by combinations when the exit tem-
perature of the compressor was greater than the design turbine inlet temperature, resulting
in a negative fuel/air ratio or when the efficiency values for the turbine components were
too low to provide enough work to drive the fan and compressor. While these cases result
in infeasible engine solutions, the data is still valuable in the creation of a neural net: the
network models these infeasible values which can be used to understand both viable and
non-viable design spaces.
Fitting the TSFC response proved extremely difficult with the full data set: failed cases
could have TSFC values as low as -6390 and as high as 143.6 lbm/lbf -hr. While it was
possible to fit a neural network to all the points in the data set and capture the behavior
of failed cases, the error in the region of interest between 0 and 2 lbm/lbf -hr was as high
as 50%. To address this issue, a two-phased approach was used to regress TSFC. First, the
response for the specific gross thrust of the core (SFG Core) was converted to a boolean
where zero indicated an engine configuration that was infeasible and unity corresponded
to a valid engine configuration. A nine hidden node neural net with a training percent
correct of 99.973%, a validation percent correct of 99.8755% and a test set percent correct
of 100% was created from the SFG Core response using the BRAINN tool. Then, cases
with a negative SFG Core were removed from the TSFC data set.
The BRAINN tool was used to regress the 25,719 data points for the responses of specific
net thrust (SFN) and the 11,770 valid data points for specific fuel consumption (TSFC). An
exploratory pass identified 15 hidden nodes and 16 hidden nodes as the optimum topology,
respectively. A second training pass was conducted using five iterations with a 3600 second
training time at the optimum node setting. The resulting goodness of fit metrics of the two
responses are shown in Table 19.
While high-thrust engines like the Pratt and Whitney F-119 that powers that F-22A
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have demonstrated the ability to power a supersonic cruise up to approximately Mach 1.7
without using afterburners, it is anticipated that an afterburner would be required for long
duration flight above Mach 2.0. While the thermodynamic model converges to high speed
solutions without an afterburner, these architectures are not realistic. Therefore, the above
process was also performed for a turbofan engine architecture that featured an afterburner,
with an allowable temperature from 2000◦R to 4000◦R (1111 ◦K to 2222 ◦K). A fifteen
node neural network of the SFG boolean response was created with 100% training percent
correct, 99.8613% validation percent correct, and 99.6146% test set correct. The goodness
of fit metrics for the SFN and TSFC responses for both engine architectures are shown in
Table 19.
Table 19: Goodness of Fit Metrics for the Neural Network Equations for the Turbofan
Propulsion System.
No Afterburner Afterburner
Parameter SFN TSFC SFN TSFC
Validation % 25 25 25 25
Test % 3 3 3 3
Training Time (s) 3600 3600 1800 1800
Iterations 5 5 3 3
R2 Training 99.8243 99.4956 99.8140 99.9399
R2 Validation 99.8079 99.2020 99.7683 99.1800
R2 Test 99.8371 99.0535 98.7440 99.8747
Optimum Number of Nodes 15 16 14 15
Number of Points 25,719 11,770 7,836 7,836
In FLAMES, Neural networks from both the SFG Core and TSFC are required to
evaluate TSFC: first, the input data is used to evaluate whether SFG Core is unity, and if
so, then the second neural network is used to evaluate the specific value of TSFC. In this
manner, an intelligent agent can identify flight regimes where its propulsion system does not
work using the first neural net, and if the propulsion system is functional, it then uses the
second neural net to evaluate how good the fuel consumption is based on the technologies
applied. If the propulsion system is not efficient in the airspace corridor that the agent is
trying to fly through, the agent needs to change altitudes or select a different route. Logic to
enable these decisions was coded in FLAMES within the platform “fly” routine and engine
subsystem definition routine.
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The neural network equation for TSFC was used to formulate a range estimate for each
platform, as defined in the subsequent section.
5.6.3.2 Development of a Surrogate Model for Platform Range
When a platform is tasked to engage a target, it selects the “best” route to ingress to the
target area and egresses along the same route. The distance from the current position to
the nearest point of the desired route, the length of the route, and the distance from the
exit of the route to the weapon release point is used to calculate the necessary range of the
platform. Surrogate models that calculate speed are used to constrain entry into “high-
risk” airspace corridors while surrogate models for range are used to assess the ability of a
platform to complete its mission with available fuel reserves.
While a number of vehicle synthesis and sizing routines such as NASA’s FLight Op-
timization System (FLOPS) and AirCraft SYNThesis (ACSYNT)23 or DARcorporation’s
Advanced Aircraft Analysis (AAA), a simple surrogate model for aircraft sizing is the










As shown in Figure 75, this equation requires as inputs the velocity, which is calculated
from the assumption of straight and level flight, the lift-to-drag ratio (which is the inverse
of the thrust-to-weight ratio for straight and level flight), the empty weight (a design pa-
rameter), the weight, which can be determined from the FLAMES kernel, and the TSFC.
The development of a surrogate model for the calculation of TSFC is summarized in Section
5.6.3.1.
A multivariate plot showing a 10,000 case exploration of the sizing surrogate described
in Figure 75 is shown in Figure 77. To obtain a first-order impression of the design and
requirements sensitivity, a filtered Monte Carlo technique can be applied to examine regions
23Now marketed as a commercial product, ACS, by Avid, LLC.
24The first known publication of a range equation for piston aircraft was published by Coffin in 1919 [103].
The same equation was later independently derived by Louis Charles Breguet in 1923 and came to be known
as the “Breguet Range Equation” [73]. Reference [57] reviews the development of range equations for jet
aircraft, a variant of which is used herein.
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Figure 77: Multivariate Profiler Showing 10,000 Cases Analyzed Using the Breguet Range
Equation Formulation.
Based on the requirements exploration for LRS concepts in Section 2.4, the upper bound
for platform range is established at 5,556 km (3,000 nm). The blue line in the range box
indicates a constraint of 2,778 km (1,500 nm) established by Shaplak as a reasonable range
constraint to operate on the Arabian Peninsula [373]. Speeds in excess of Mach 5 were
eliminated from consideration. The red line in the speed box indicates a constraint of Mach
2.4, one of the speed boundaries that change the definition of LRS concepts according to
Watts [478]. The green points are indicative of solutions with a range greater than 2,778
km and a speed less than Mach 2.4, while the blue points identify solutions with a range
greater than 2,778 km and a speed greater than Mach 2.4. The gray points identify other
solutions across the spectrum of cases examined.
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5.6.3.3 Implementation: Using Surrogate Models to Provide Tunable Cognition
Due to its simplicity, it is not appropriate to model the Breguet equation with an RSE or
neural net since the first tends to under-fit and the second tends to over-fit the equation.
Equation 18 was coded directly into the cognition model for route planning. The surrogate
model for TSFC and the Breguet equation for range were added to the vector to target
function of the bomber cognition model. For each of the twenty available routes, the
current platform range is compared to the vector distance through each corridor to the
assigned target. If no path can be successfully navigated based on the available fuel load,
the platform attempts to rendezvous with a tanker closer to the corridor entry point and
decline the engagement. This makes the target available for tasking to other platforms.
Once the refueling operation is completed, the platform again becomes available and may
be reassigned a new target. The process repeats and the platform continues to evaluate
potential ingress routes against its fuel load until weapons are depleted or the scenario
concludes.
In addition to calculating the distance along the corridor to the target, the platform also
calculates the “threat density” along the airspace by adding up the number of SAM sites
within firing range of the airspace corridor. This calculation is a simplification, because in
reality the pilot would not have access to such information in real time. The best assessment
of active SAM locations would be provided during a pre-flight briefing by intelligence officers
[436].
Using thresholds on response time and threat density, the intelligent agent “decides”
which path to choose. If a desired path is too dangerous, the agent may reevaluate this
path later in the campaign after SAMs have been suppressed and the threat density in the
area decreases. This behavior is illustrated in Figure 78. As illustrated in the figure, during
the first two hours, only paths 2, 8 and 11 are chosen for ingress. Six hours into the conflict,
path 14 becomes desirable due to the proximity to certain targets and the reduction in the
overall threat level. As the simulation continues, the apportionment of engagements across
different corridors changes as the agent decisions are influenced by a changing distribution
















































































































































































































a change in the radar cross section of the platform and an alteration in the decision logic
that triggers different cognitive behaviors.
The previous paragraph and supporting data in Figure 78 demonstrate how an intelli-
gent agent changes behavior as its perception of the threat environment changes for a given
aircraft configuration. To demonstrate how an agent can be “tuned” to make different deci-
sions, another experiment was performed in which a single engagement was evaluated in the
presence of different technologies at the aircraft and engine level. Using the neural network
surrogate models for the afterburning and non-afterburning engine previously discussed and
the Breguet range equation, a simulation was executed where the aircraft and engine were
varied parametrically and the preferred airspace corridors for the engagement were tracked.






















































Figure 79: Analysis of Preferred Routes Through Airspace Corridors for a Platform with
Variable Technologies and a Fixed Threat.
In general, the agent prefers to ingress through corridor 14; however, there are conditions
where it chooses from a group of other corridors. The multivariate plot shown in Figure
80 shows the correlation between the corridor choices and aircraft/engine design variables
by color-coding the different corridors selected. Discrete color bands are clearly visible in
the RCS row. According to Figure 80, when the RCS is between 0.4 and 1.0, the agent
tends to prefer corridor 14. As the RCS decreases, it then prefers corridors 8, 10, and 2 in
that order. Since the RCS is a direct component of the route selection algorithm, it has the
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largest influence on the selection of a route. This is also a function of the weighting value
placed on the RCS value within the route selection algorithm to put a heavy bias toward
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Figure 80: Multivariate Analysis Showing the Relative Sensitivity of Route Selection to
Aircraft Technology Variables.
The behavior of the agent as a result of technology infusion can also be observed using
the Pareto chart shown in Figure 81. From this figure, it is again clear that RCS is the
single greatest contributing factor to an agent’s route selection. The remaining parameters
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that contribute 80% towards the variability of this selection include platform speed, fan
pressure ratio, and fan efficiency. It is important to note that the Pareto chart and resulting
distribution of corridor selection is based on the ranges of the input distributions to the
Monte Carlo simulation used to generate the data. The maximum ranges of the neural
networks as defined in Table 18. Lift-to-Drag ratio was varied from 5 to 15, empty weight





























Figure 81: Relative Contribution of Technology Parameters to Route Selection.
This experiment demonstrates that not only does the agent make decisions that differ
as the number of SAM sites in a given corridor are reduced over time, but it also changes
its decision based on its own physical characteristics. These characteristics are “tuned”
by surrogate models inside the intelligent agent. Since the agent seeks the “best” way to
accomplish his objectives, tunable cognition models cause the agent to automatically exploit
technologies provided to maximize their benefit in the simulation.
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5.7 Step 7: Map Technologies to k-Factors
According to Hannay and McGinn, “the basic function of technology is the expansion of
the realm of practical human possibility” [192]. A simulation can be used to assess any
phenomenon for which a model has been created. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the
SOCRATES methodology for capability-based technology evaluation, several representative
candidate technologies and the means to simulate them are discussed in the subsequent
sections.
5.7.1 Propulsion and Aerodynamic Technology Advancements
Technology assessment studies have long examined the impact of aerodynamic, structural,
and propulsion system improvements in isolation, and only in recent years have advances in
modeling and simulation enabled a holistic analysis of technologies related to both engines
and airframes with a quantification of uncertainty [284, 296]. The next logical step is
the extension of this analysis process to the system-of-systems level to quantify tradeoffs
between candidate propulsion and airframe technologies with respect to capability-level
metrics. To bound the problem space, this research studies technologies under consideration
by the AFRL Vehicles Directorate (VA) and Propulsion Directorate (PR) including [101,
229]:
• High L/D Tailless Aeroconfiguration (VA)
• Efficient Propulsion Installation (VA)
• Full Envelope Weapon Release (VA)
• Light Weight Thermal Structures (VA)
• Efficient Transonic Planform (VA)
• Affordable Multi-Role Structure (VA)
• Durable High Temp Core and Fuel Efficient Turbine Engine (PR)
• Fuel Efficient Expendable Turbine Engine (PR)
• Fuel Efficient Expendable Scramjet (PR)
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These technologies primarily involve drag reduction, increases in propulsive efficiency,
weapon release and vehicle operation at transonic speeds, weight reduction, higher turbine
temperatures, and improved specific fuel consumption. While each of these technologies
can be analyzed in isolation, the SOCRATES methodology is used to compare aircraft and
propulsion technologies against the same set of assumptions and with respect to the same
capability-level metrics.
5.7.2 Sensor Technologies for TCT Attack
The problem of time critical target strike that confounded operations in the Persian Gulf
War and Kosovo can be partially addressed by developing new sensor capabilities that in-
clude “deep-look, long-dwell, all-weather/day-night operations and acceptable survivability
in the face of advanced air defenses” [3]. The AFRL Sensors Directorate is pursuing ad-
vanced capabilities and processing algorithms such as Automatic Target Recognition and
Sensor Fusion that enable the identification and discrimination of TCTs amidst background
clutter [443].
Since models of these high fidelity sensor algorithms are not available for this research,
a simple model that uses the radar range equation is used to model the ability of a platform
to detect and track targets in its surrounding environment. By modulating the sensor
range, technologies related to signal-to-noise reduction, increased sensor power, and better
discrimination algorithms can be modeled at the most basic level. Using the SOCRATES
methodology and the aforementioned modeling and simulation environment, the benefit
of sensor technologies are quantified in relation to vehicle and architecture technologies for
LRS. The primary focus of sensor technologies is on the TCT attack mission where onboard
sensing becomes a critical driver in target tracking and engagement.
5.7.3 Advanced Standoff Weapons
One tactic for LRS is to employ high speed platforms and weapons to perform the “engage”
function of the kill chain in a shorter amount of time. This concept is supported by General
David M. Edgington, director of global power programs in the Air Force acquisition office
who, along with Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Moseley, advocates a new Long Range
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Strike bomber by 2018 “to be able to strike targets in near-real time.” Edgington also noted
that the current bomber fleet “lacks survivability, especially during daylight hours” [205].
One potential strategy for LRS is to ignore the development of a costly new platform and
pursue advanced standoff weapons that can be employed from existing legacy platforms in
the current fleet.
Although the 2006 Congressional Budget Office study on alternatives for long-range
ground attack systems did not recommend a specific alternative for LRS, the study high-
lights an “arsenal aircraft” armed with supersonic cruise missiles as a low-risk, low-cost
alternative that provides reasonable response time and adequate global coverage [37]. A
number of studies have examined cruise missiles of various speeds and ranges for a variety
of LRS-like missions [338]. For example, a proposed concept, the Revolutionary Approach
to Time-critical Long Range Strike (RATTLRS) is envisioned as a “high-supersonic cruise
missile capable of speeds greater than Mach 3 that can be launched from Navy and Air Force
platforms including surface ships” [465]. Goals for RATTLRS include high-supersonic speed
(Mach 3-4), long range (up to 1000 km), fuel efficiency, and the ability to attack mobile,
time-critical, or hardened/buried targets [173].
Subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic cruise missiles must be compared to air vehicle
and C2 technologies to assess the relative contribution of these revolutionary weapons to
increasing the speed of the kill chain. While aerodynamic and trajectory models specific to
the high-speed flight regime are difficult to develop, a first-order assessment of the viability
of these weapons can be conducted by modulating the speed, range, drag coefficient, and
fuel efficiency of the munition concepts in question. Using a simplified parametric missile
model within FLAMES, a variety of munition architectures can be compared to the suite
of air vehicle technologies within the same scenario and using the same assumptions.
5.7.4 Comparison of High Speed Weapons and Area Dominance Munitions
In contrast to the previous approach, a non-intuitive paradigm for munition development
uses extremely low speed munitions, pre-positioned near potential targets that loiter and
wait for specific target information provided by the battle manager. This concept is referred
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to as the “Area Dominance Integrating Concept” and involves “continued presence of a
constellation of lehal, minature, high endurance, multi-shot, persistent munitions capable
of cooperatively striking high priority targets” [339].
The first example of such a system is the marriage of the RQ-1 Predator reconnaissance
UAV with the AGM-114 Hellfire missile to create a remotely piloted attack platform. The
MQ-1 armed Predator was tested in 2001 and implemented operationally in early 2002.
Another example is the Lockheed Martin Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS),
a turbojet powered 100 pound “area dominance” munition that loiters after release for up to
30 minutes at 750 feet to identify and attack targets using a LADAR25 seeker [261]. Other
area dominance munition concepts such as the Low Cost Mini Cruise Missile (LCMCM)
and Dominator are under development at the AFRL Munitions Directorate at Eglin, AFB











Figure 82: Examples of Some Proposed Area Dominance Munition Concepts [146, 248].
5.7.5 Improving the Targets-per-Sortie Rate
The Gulf War Air Power Survey notes that Operation Desert Storm was the first time a
single sortie could be assigned to a single target with a high probability of target destruction.
In 1999’s Operation Allied Force, the B-2A bomber “delivered up to 16 GPS-guided GBU-31
joind direct-attack munitions (JDAMs) from 40,000 ft, usually through cloud cover, against
hardened enemy targets, including command bunkers and air defense facilities” [254]. In
25Often incorrectly referred to as “laser radar,” Light Detection and Ranging (LADAR) uses the properties
of optical scattering to identify and range distance targets.
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September 2003, the B-2A bomber demonstrated the capability of deploying eighty Mk-82
500 lb JDAMs at eighty separate targets [402]. A key architecture technology is the number
of engagements or targets per sortie. The model used for ground attack in the simulation
allocates one bomb per target per sortie. When multiple munitions are equipped on a single
platform, the battle manager can allocate multiple targets to the platform, until its fuel falls
below a defined threshold or all munitions are expended.
Increasing the number of munitions per platform enables a study of the effects of
multiple-target-per-sortie missions in conjunction with other technology factors described
in this section.
5.7.6 Advanced Radar Absorptive Materials
According to Watts, flight at Mach numbers above 2.4 pushes the limits of current radar ab-
sorptive materials (RAM) [478]. The Alternate High Frequency material (AHFM) program
at the AFRL Materials and Manufacturing Directorate developed a new spray-on coating
for the B-2 bomber that allowed retention of stealth characteristics while minimizing main-
tenance time due to the previously used tape-and-caulk method [442]. One key technology
area to be traded with platform and munition attributes is the amount of stealth needed to
prosecute missions against a hostile IADS.
5.7.7 Defining a Baseline
The evaluation of technology performance and quantification of technology gaps is difficult
without establishment of a baseline against which to compare. As mentioned in Section
2.4.2.3, the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber is the closest system to the LRS capability need
statement with a primary shortcoming in responsiveness due to its subsonic speed. Since the
multi-target attack, high-survivability, large payload, and extended range characteristics of
the B-2A serve as a “best-in-class” example of LRS capability, this system is used as the
baseline against which technology impact factors are referenced26. A reasonable munition
baseline is the GBU-31 JDAM, a gravity dropped glide bomb; however, the JASSM is
26Stonier gives the RCS of the B-2A as 0.01 m2 and the F-117A as 0.1 m2. The F-117 value is used to
make the bombers susceptible to notional Iraqi threats
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intended as an air-launched medium-range subsonic cruise missile which could also serve
as a suitable baseline. A propulsion system of the caliber of the Pratt and Whitney F-119
that powers the F-22A Raptor is considered an acceptable engine baseline, although precise
values for component efficiencies and turbine temperatures can only be inferred from open
source literature. The baseline values defined by these assumptions are defined in Table 20.
Table 20: Baseline Values for Technology Impact Factors.
Factor Value Source
GTOW 154,211 kg (340,000 lbs) Ref. 467
Empty Weight Ratio 46.5% Ref. 16
Thrust/Weight Ratio 20.40% Ref. 467
Payload Weight Ratio 11.70% Ref. 467
W/S 68 lb/ft2 Ref. 16
CD 0.03 Assumed
CL 1.5 Assumed
TSFC 0.67 lbf/lbm-hr Ref. 277
Radar Cross Section 0.1 m2 Ref. 386
Platform Speed Mach 0.85 Ref. 467
Weapon Speed Mach 0.85 Ref. 16
Weapon Range 24 km (15 miles) Ref. 16
Weapons Up to 80 (4 Used) Ref. 402
Fan Efficiency 91% Assumed
Turbine Temp (T4) 1778◦K (3200◦R) Assumed
5.7.8 Determining Technology Impacts
Kirby advocates the use of a Technology Impact Matrix (TIM) to quantify the maximum and
minimum benefits of a technology in terms of technology k-factors that are applied to dis-
cipline level metrics [240]. This approach is valid for exploratory forecasting where specific
technologies are being analyzed for their impact on a system. While the previous sections
highlight some candidate technologies, these are representative examples of the type of trade
studies that should be performed to assess system, subsystem, and architecture technologies
for a LRS system architecture. A notional TIM is shown in Figure 83. Blue shaded tech-
nologies represent platform and subsystem technologies identified by AFRL, yellow shading
represents other platform technologies, tan shading highlights munition technologies, and
light green shading identifies architecture technologies. The positive and negative factors
in this matrix indicate the approximate increase or decrease in the k-factor representing
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the metric identified and is representative only: AFRL documentation and associated
literature does not enumerate exact values for the technology impact factors.
They are thus estimated by the author.
Using the TIM as a list of representative technologies and impacts, it is feasible to
bound the distribution of k-factors with respect to the maximum positive and negative
impacts as shown in Figure 83. These bounds are represented in the range of the design of
experiments used to create surrogate models in Steps 8 and 9 of the SOCRATES method.
If the surrogate models are appropriately created, the resulting surrogate model-enabled
tradeoff environment enables parametric variation of any technology included within the
range of the design of experiments. Finally, it is important to note that several of the
technologies such as the Loitering Area Dominance Munition require a discrete variation in
the system architecture as opposed to modulation of one or more k-factors. This is because
such architecture technologies use physics or cognition models to calculate MoEs that differ
from the baseline case.
The flexible nature of the simulation environment created for this research allows new
technologies to be easily added to the TIM in Figure 83. The subsequent sections show
how the example technologies in this matrix can be rapidly analyzed using the paramet-
















 k-Empty Weight Ratio











 k-Turbine Temp (T4)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.8 Step 8: Execute Simulation
Using the three simulations identified in Section 5.2.1.6, cases were executed using a series
of Pentium IV computers based on the availability of machines with FLAMES runtime
licenses. An execution utility based on Tangen’s initial investigation was written for the
ModelCenterR© framework to import each DoE run into the FLAMES database and track
the output results [394, 30].
For the hardened, deeply buried target and decapitation strike scenario, a 20,000 case
space-filling design was used. The time critical attack mission was executed using a 2,500
case space-filling design for the baseline architecture and a 2,500 case space-filling design
for the area dominance munition-based architecture. These selections were made based on
the number of variables in each study and the amount of computational resources available.
Finally, the three scenarios were integrated together into a holistic scenario that mimics a
short campaign in support of GSTF objectives.
In the HDBT strike scenario, the Baghdad National Air Operations Center was assigned
leadership, IADS, and C3 signatures of 81, making it the highest priority target in the sce-
nario. A single platform based at the Khamis Mushait airbase in Southern Saudi Arabia was
available for the engagement and was allowed to utilize any of the twenty airspace corridors
illustrated in Figure 74. The simulation time was constrained to five hours (simulated). A
20,000 case space-filling design based on the DOE shown in Table 21 was used to execute
the cases.
The same space-filling design was used to execute the simulation for the decapitation
strike scenario. The primary difference between the two scenarios is that the aircraft in the
HDBT scenario has 5 hours to complete its mission. In the decapitation strike scenario, the
aircraft has only 90 minutes to strike the target in question.
For the TCT attack scenario, the number of variables was reduced to simplify the trade-
off study because additional tactical parameters were examined. To further simplify the
analysis, only MoEs related to targets killed were tracked. As a result, the IADS elements
were removed to speed up the simulation and TSFC was set to zero for all aircraft elements
to eliminate the confounding effect of refueling. Targets were located by an airborne sensor
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Table 21: DOE Ranges for the HDBT and Decapitation Strike Scenario.
Variable Low High
GTOW 35,000 lbs) 1,200,000 lbs
Empty Weight Ratio 0.4 0.55
Thrust/Weight Ratio 0.35 1.5
Payload Weight (lbs) 1,000 60,000
W/S 20 lb/ft2 150 lb/ft2
Drag Coefficient (CD) 0.01 0.09
Max CL 1.5 3
PKill 70% 100%
Radar Cross Section 0.001 m2 1 m2
Platform Speed Mach 0.85 Mach 4
Weapon Speed Mach 0.85 Mach 6
Fan Pressure Ratio 1.5 3
Overall Pressure Ratio 15 40
Turbine Temp (T4) 1556◦K (2800◦R) 1889◦K (3400◦R)
Enemy Radar Power 10 100
Enemy SAM Density 0% 100%
with a variable sensor range and relayed directly to subordinates. In the baseline scenario,
the subordinates were fighters loitering in northern Saudi Arabia. Each fighter was armed
with up to four air-launched missiles with a range of 185 km (100 nm) and a speed of up to
Mach 4. The PKill of this munition is 70%. Five airborne sensors each control six fighters
and follow a pre-defined patrol pattern in regions of Iraq. These patrol regions were pre-
selected based on the presence of TBM launchers in the area. TBM launchers fire missiles
at targets in nearby Israel according to a pre-determined pattern, and move/hide according
to the activity diagram shown in Figure 67. The ranges of the DoE used to analyze the
baseline case are highlighted in Table 22.
The TCT attack scenario was also executed using the area dominance munition concept.
In this case, four area dominance munitions were mounted onboard each of five airborne
sensors and released at the time of target detection. The airborne sensors fly the same
search patterns as in the baseline case. The area dominance munitions fly out to the target
area, attempt to locate the target, and release a submunition at the target. The PKill of
each submunition is 70%. Due to their small size and long loiter time, the area dominance
munitions necessarily have a much lower speed range than the fighter aircraft in the baseline
case. An identical pattern of SCUD launchers and launch timings was used for the area
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dominance and baseline cases. In addition to the parametric variation shown in Table 22,
several tactical variations for the area dominance case were also examined:
• Doubling the number of AD munitions
• Increasing the dispersion of the AD loiter pattern
• Doubling the number of munitions and increasing the dispersion
• Tripling the number of munitions and increasing the dispersion
The results of each of these cases are examined in detail in a subsequent section.
For the GSTF attack scenario, six LRS platforms were used to strike targets over a
period of three days (three eight-hour segments). The run time for these simulation cases
was between five and twenty minutes, depending on the input parameters used. As a result,
a 20,000 case DOE was deemed to large to be executed in a reasonable time frame. A smaller
DOE consisting of 2,000 case space-filling design was executed using three computers over
approximately five days. To increase the likelihood of generating surrogate models with
adequate fits, a smaller design of experiments (both in terms of number of variables and
their ranges) with ranges shown in Table 24 was used. For these runs, PKill of the friendly
weapon was set to 100% and the TSFC was not decomposed into its lower-level elements.
The results of this set of runs is described in the next section.
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Table 22: DOE Ranges for the TCT Attack Scenario (Baseline Case).
Variable Low High
Platform Speed Mach 0.55 Mach 5.45
Submunitions 1 4
Target Speed (mph) 15 60
Target RCS (m2) 0.01 100
Target RCS (m2) 0.01 100
Sensor Range, Locator (km) 2 100
Sensor Range, Attacker (km) 2 100
Table 23: DOE Ranges for the TCT Attack Scenario (Area Dominance Munitions).
Variable Low High
Platform Speed Mach 0.45 Mach 1.1
Munitions 1 4
Target Speed (mph) 15 60
Target RCS (m2) 0.01 100
Target RCS (m2) 0.01 100
Sensor Range, Locator (km) 2 100
Sensor Range, Attacker (km) 2 100
Table 24: DOE Ranges for the GSTF Attack Three Day Scenario.
Variable Low High
GTOW 100,000 lbs) 800,000 lbs
Empty Weight Ratio 0.4 0.55
Thrust/Weight Ratio 0.35 0.7
Payload Weight (lbs) 5,000 30,000
W/S 80 lb/ft2 120 lb/ft2
Drag Coefficient (CD) 0.01 0.09
Max CL 1.5 3
Radar Cross Section 0.001 m2 1 m2
TSFC (lbm/lbf -hr) 0.2 0.9
Platform Speed Mach 0.85 Mach 4
Weapon Speed Mach 0.85 Mach 6
Weapon Range 24 km (13 nm) 75 km (41 nm)
Enemy Radar Power 10 100
Enemy SAM Density 0% 100%
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5.9 Step 9: Generate Surrogate Models
As previously mentioned, surrogate models not only enable intelligence for agents within
the simulation framework, but can also be used to enable rapid trade studies on the output
results. The difference between these two uses is that in the first case, surrogate models
are generated a priori, inserted inside the simulation, and exercised at runtime to provide
information to intelligent agents. On the other hand, surrogate models used for design space
exploration are created around the output data of the entire simulation after the results are
generated.
Since thousands of cases are executed to generate surrogate models with excellent cov-
erage of the design space, a key question that arises is “why not just use this data and
skip the surrogation process entirely?” Certainly, this data is the most accurate available
since the output data has been run directly through the simulation code. The only source
of error in this data is from the models used to generate the data; however, this is the only
data available, and trade studies can only be performed using the values in the data ta-
ble. In contrast, a correctly constructed surrogate model has predictive capabilities within
the ranges of the design of experiments that allows generation of additional “evidence” for
making decisions.
Under the current circumstances, it may not be possible to generate surrogate models
due to the number of cases required and the run time needed to generate one case; however,
this does not invalidate a generalized methodology. In early 2002, a bank of ten Sun
workstations was utilized 24 hours a day for a week to generate 1,024 cases for a NASA
technology study [283]. In contrast, by 2006 the same amount of data could be generated
using a single Windows-based platform in less than eight hours. In some cases, analysis
data is used in the absence of surrogates and future work with the Air Force will leverage
Grid computing to generate larger data sets for regression.
5.9.1 The HDBT and Decapitation Strike Scenarios
The results of the HDBT and decapitation strike scenarios were analyzed using the BRAINN
tool. The goodness of fit metrics for the four neural network equations (targets killed and
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platforms lost for each of the two situations) are shown in Table 25.
Table 25: Goodness of Fit Statistics for HDBT and Decapitation Strike Predictive Neural
Networks.
HDBT Strike Decapitation Strike
Targets Platforms Targets Platforms
Parameter Killed Lost Killed Lost
Validation Data % 25 25 25 25
Test Data % 5 5 5 5
Training Time (s) 3600 3600 3600 3600
Iterations 2 2 2 2
Hidden Nodes (Low) 6 6 6 6
Hidden Nodes (High) 14 14 14 14
Training % Correct 99.6143 98.7787 98.7571 99.9429
Validation % Correct 98.76 97.52 96.78 99.64
Test % Correct 98.8 98 96.9 99.7
Optimum Nodes 6 8 10 8
Number of Points 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000
The error in these two cases is quite low. The neural network incorrectly predicts
the results of only 366 out of 20,000 cases for the decapitation strike case and only 128
out of 20,000 cases for the HDBT strike case. Nevertheless, not all scenarios have results
this “well-behaved.” A technique is needed to identify the sources of error and prioritize
the execution of additional cases to increase the resolution of the design in this region.
For each case in which the simulation has been run, both an actual and predicted value
for the platforms lost and targets killed equation are available. The 494 cases where the
neural network fails at the predicted response can be analyzed as a subset of the data.
The multivariate analysis tool in JMPR©, usually used for analyzing correlations between
variables or performing the inverse design technique, can also be used to identify what
groups of cases have in common. In this case, the multivariate plot is used in Figure 84
and Figure 85 to identify regions where points are clustered. Histograms are shown at the
intersection of each design variable, and are generally uniformly distributed. A uniform
distribution is an indication that the error in the predicted response is not a function of
the variable in question. On the other hand, when munition range is near the minimum







































































































































































































Figure 85: Analysis of Error for the Decapitation Strike Case (366 Incorrect Predictions)
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for emphasis. This means that either there is a problem with the model at low munition
ranges or more cases must be run at these treatment settings to provide the neural network
with enough data to make a valid prediction. In this case, it was determined that a fast
platform cannot release its weapon and have it fall to the target along a ballistic trajectory
at weapon ranges below a certain threshold. The ranges were set to provide “bomb-like”
and ”long range cruise missile-like” cases for the HDBT and decapitation strike; however,
the resolution at the lower end of the design space is poor because the cases are uniformly
distributed from small to very long ranges.
This example demonstrates a technique for ascertaining the source of error in a complex
multidimensional problem using a graphical visualization technique in combination with
statistical analysis, and is used in the two subsequent scenarios to identify areas where
additional runs are needed.
5.9.2 The Time Critical Strike Scenario
The results of the output DOEs from the TCT strike scenarios were regressed using the
BRAINN tool. Because the number of variables was much smaller than in the other sce-
narios, the BRAINN tool typically reached convergence in under one minute, as opposed to
the hour-long runs executed for the more complex scenarios. The goodness of fit metrics for
the TCT strike baseline scenario using fighters located in Northern Saudi Arabia is shown
in Table 26. The results from the area dominance case are shown in Table 27.
While the R2 values for the baseline case are reasonably high, the goodness of fit metrics
for the area dominance case are substantially lower. This may be due to some of the other
confounding factors in the area dominance scenario related to how and when the TBM
launchers are detected and tracked. Another major difference between the two scenarios is
the fact that the starting location for the baseline case is almost always the same, while the
starting location for the area dominance case is unknown. Despite numerous attempts to
improve the fit of the equation or trace the cause of the confounding factors, the goodness
of fit metrics did not improve significantly. The trade studies performed for this scenario
uses the actual data from the baseline and variation runs as described in Section 5.8.
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Table 26: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Time Critical Strike Baseline Scenario.
Parameter TBM % Killed TBM Killed Missiles Fired TBMs Fired
Validation Data % 15 15 15 15
Test Data % 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25
Training Time (s) 3600 3600 3600 3600
Iterations 10 10 10 10
Hidden Nodes (Low) 5 5 5 5
Hidden Nodes (High) 25 25 25 25
Training R2 96.33 96.19 96.17 96.37
Validation R2 93.20 93.16 93.70 93.30
Test R2 96.38 96.07 95.09 96.31
Optimum Nodes 21 17 19 17
Number of Points 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200
Table 27: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Time Critical Strike Area Dominance Scenario.
Parameter TBM % Killed TBM Killed Missiles Fired TBMs Fired
Validation Data % 15 15 15 15
Test Data % 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25
Training Time (s) 3600 3600 3600 3600
Iterations 10 10 10 10
Hidden Nodes (Low) 5 5 5 5
Hidden Nodes (High) 25 25 25 25
Training R2 83.27 83.24 93.88 83.05
Validation R2 84.34 84.61 94.68 83.15
Test R2 80.76 82.01 93.28 80.53
Optimum Nodes 11 9 15 9
Number of Points 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200
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5.9.3 The GSTF Attack Three Day Scenario
As described in Section 5.8, originally a 2,000 case space-filling DOE was used to execute
the simulation runs for the GSTF attack three-day scenario, and 1,000 random cases were
used to validate the neural network equations. The number of cases was chosen based on
the amount of time it took to generate a single case and the level of resources available to
execute cases. The goodness of fit metrics for the targets killed (continuous) and platforms
lost (discrete) equations are shown in Table 28.
The goodness of fit statistics for the predictive neural network equation are shown in
Figure 87. The model fit error (see Section 5.5.5) is indicative of the ability of the model to
predict the values of the 2,000 cases used to generate the model. The model representation
error describes the ability of the model to predict the values of the additional 1,000 random
cases that were not used to create the model. The second error measure exceeds +/- 23%
for the targets killed response and 12% for the platforms lost response.
An analysis of the error in the previous case using the graphical technique described in
Section 5.9.1 indicated that a majority of the errors in the GSTF attack case occurred at
high SAM densities: there are simply not enough treatments at this level for the neural
network to be able to develop accurate predictions. An further analysis of the 333 outlier
cases from the first training pass is shown in Figure 86. Based on the observation that
cases at low platform speed and TSFC have a high degree of error, an additional 500 cases
were executed with a speed between Mach 0.85 and 1.6 and a TSFC from 0.2 to 0.4. An
additional 2,000 random cases were executed with SAM densities ranging from 0.8 to 1.0 to
provide more treatments in a high threat environment. Of the 5,000 cases executed, 4,625
were valid (3,854 regular, 771 validation).
Another observation made from the data is that while a quantitative assessment of
the number of platforms lost is desired, since there are so few results at treatment levels
between zero and six, the fit of the neural network equation at these levels is poor. When
the response is reduced to a boolean that is unity when any platforms are lost, the predictive
capability of the neural network equation improves dramatically: the error of the boolean
































































































Figure 86: Analysis of 333 Outlier Cases Contributing to High Predictive Error.
Using the resulting 4,625 cases, a second set of neural networks was created. The
goodness of fit metrics for these equations are shown in Table 29. The model fit error
and model representation error for the second iteration are shown in Figure 88. After re-
executing additional cases in the regions with high numbers of failed cases, the error has
been reduced to within an acceptable range for technology forecasting.
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Table 28: Results from GSTF Attack Three-Day Scenario Predictive Neural Network
Training.
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Targets Killed
Validation Data (#) 750 750
Test Data (#) 250 250
Training Time (s) 3600 3600
Hidden Nodes (low) 6 6
Hidden Nodes (high) 16 16
Iterations at Each 4 5
Training % Correct or R2 92.4 94.8298
Validation % Correct or R2 82.4 92.5264
Test % Correct or R2 86 91.245
Optimal Nodes 6 14




























































































































































Figure 87: Model Fit Error and Model Representation Error for the GSTF Attack Three-
Day Scenario Predictive Neural Network Training.)
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Table 29: Results from GSTF Attack Three-Day Scenario Predictive Neural Network
Training (Round 2).
Response
Parameter Platforms Lost Lost (Boolean) Targets Killed
Validation Data (#) 750 750 750
Test Data (#) 250 250 250
Training Time (s) 3600 3600 3600
Hidden Nodes (low) 5 5 6
Hidden Nodes (high) 11 15 16
Iterations at Each 4 4 5
Training % Correct or R2 91.8197 100 97.3937
Validation % Correct or R2 85.5714 98.5714 96.1215
Test % Correct or R2 87.7828 99.5475 95.9102
Optimal Nodes 5 10 14




























































































































































Figure 88: Model Fit Error and Model Representation Error for the GSTF Attack Three-
Day Scenario Predictive Neural Network Training (Round 2).
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5.10 Step 10: Perform Trade Studies and Evaluate Tech-
nologies
“What this task requires in the way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of
unity and a power of judgement, raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which
easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities an ordinary mind
would labor to identify, and wear itself out in doing so.”
-Carl Von Clausewitz,
On War [100]
According to Kass, “the characteristic that separates experimentation from all other re-
search methods, is manipulating something to see what happens” [233]. The first nine steps
of the SOCRATES method created a “virtual laboratory” that is a parametric, surrogate-
model enabled, hierarchical tradeoff environment. The step that remains is to use the en-
vironment to understand the impact of technologies on top-level capabilities and facilitate
reasoned decision making. Although the surrogate model encapsulates some degrees of free-
dom related to the operational assumptions and scenarios employed, the “dials” available
to the user still allow near-infinite variation of the properties of the system-of-systems.
First, the heart of the SOCRATES method is the ability to perform quantitative analysis
across hierarchical levels of the system of systems. Using the inverse design technique
developed by Mavris, Biltgen, and Ender, capability goals at the top level can be related
to system attributes and technology characteristics at the system and subsystem level [62].
Using this technique, tradeoff studies and “what-if” games can be performed dynamically
and parametrically to identify regions of interest for technology development.
Also, surrogate models enable the analysis of data in bulk: once they are created, the
time it takes to generate a single result becomes trivial. As mentioned in Section C.11,
probabilistic techniques can be used to quantify uncertainty in estimates and assess the
probability of meeting targets across multiple MoEs.
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Finally, techniques and methods for visualizing data without creating a “sensory over-
load” are needed. Multi-dimensional information must be displayed in a manner that en-
ables decision making and does not confound identification of a solution with too many
degrees of freedom.
5.10.1 Visualizing the Results
According to the National Academy of Sciences, a major shortcoming of analysis of simulation-
based data is that “commercial off-the-shelf visualization techniques are not yet available
for high-dimensional data and dynamic data” [310].
The large amount of data generated in the analysis of military simulations is difficult to
interpret without advanced visualization capabilities. Mavris has recognized JMPR© by the
SAS Institute as a leader in statistical analysis and visualization. Graphics are central to
statistical analysis in every platform inside JMPR©. Some of these platforms include “the
prediction profiler, which shows response surface slices through each factor; the contour
profiler, which shows horizontal response surface slices with respect to two factors at a
time, and the surface profiler, which shows a 3-D rendered surface” [109].
The prediction profiler, summarized in Section C.10.2, is useful for viewing the partial
derivatives across the opportunity space and interpreting interactions between variables.
The contour profiler extends this one-dimensional analysis into two dimensions. Its primary
function is constraint analysis and requirement satisfaction, as shown in Figure 115. A
Pareto chart, described in Section C.10.1, is useful for determining the causal relationships
of the variability of a response under certain conditions. JMPR© also features distribution
analysis using histograms. When discrete values are explored, a “mosaic plot” can also
be created. This feature is also useful in determining the cause of observed behaviors and
is often used to trace the impact on a response back to one or more dominant factors.
Typically, these factors can then be fixed at a given value to explore the variability due to
other factors while certain values are held constant.
Throughout this research, the JMPR© multivariate analysis tool used to enable inverse
design and capability discovery by visually displaying the relationships between multiple
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variables. While this tool is generally used to visualize the correlation between several
variables, when used as described in Section C.4, it provides a unique capability to visualize
trends and regions of interest. When coupled with surrogate models and the built-in Monte
Carlo simulator, the JMPR© multivariate analysis is used to quickly explore the design space
as degrees of freedom are locked and unlocked. It is important to note that this is not
a tool for the novice, but for the expert. Initially, the multivariate analysis tool can be
confusing because of the richness of the data it provides. A user’s initial apprehension is
often overcome when the benefits of quickly manipulating inputs and outputs and querying
data in multiple dimensions are realized.
In the subsequent sections, the aforementioned visualization platforms is used where
appropriate, noting that the choice of visualization platform must be tuned to the analysis
question being answered and the type of results desired: there is no universal plot that
depicts all the information to answer every question27.
5.10.2 Establishment of a Capability Baseline
The primary focus of the SOCRATES methodology is to enable quantitative evaluation of
how well a candidate system architecture and a portfolio of technologies provide a capability.
According to the JCIDS manual, Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) are the primary means
to evaluate how well a current or proposed solution provides capabilities to accomplish
tasks:
“Use of the MoEs for the assessment is a key component in determining the
existence of a [capability] gap and evaluation of proposed solutions... when pos-
sible, use the MoEs integrated with other forms of assessment such as modeling
and simulation, high resolution planning, wargaming, etc., to develop a clearer
picture of the [capability] gap, its significant factors and its relative importance”
[461].
27As a disclaimer: the dynamic visualization views developed for this dissertation are difficult to depict
in static form. Where possible, multiple angles and settings are included. In general, the settings are dialed
to values that tell an interesting story in a two-dimensional, immovable form.
244
The MoEs defined in Section 5.2.2 are therefore the capability-level metrics against
which a solution is measured. The difference between desired thresholds in MoEs and the
MoE values calculated using current best-in-class solutions defines the multidimensional
capability gap for each capability. If no gap exists across all MoEs, then current solutions
fulfill the warfighter’s needs and no new procurement is necessary28.
When proposing a new system or technology, the cost of the proposed solution must
be compared against potential benefit in these capability-level metrics to assess whether
the decision to proceed is a good one from the warfighter’s perspective. To perform this
comparison, it is necessary to establish baseline values for current capability against which
proposed solutions can be measured. Since the baseline must be consistent in terms of as-
sumptions and scenario(s) with the technology-infused solutions to be compared, a classified
“official” statement of current capabilities is of little use: the baseline must be calculated
using the modeling and simulation environment constructed for the evaluation of proposed
solutions and validated against real world systems where available. This process is relatively
straightforward after a parametric modeling and simulation environment has been created:
the user simply “dials in” the settings that represent present-day systems, executes the
simulation, and records the MoEs.
The baseline was established by executing the GSTF three day attack scenario using the
parameters of the B-2A Spirit as summarized in Table 20. Six B-2A bombers were used.
A screenshot of the FLASH playback file is shown in Figure 89.
To eliminate the dependance of the scenario results on the munition, the probability
of kill for the weapon is set to 100%. If the platform reaches the target and releases
the munition, it is destroyed. Since the bombers do not attack TBMs, the hostile missile
launchers fire 74 SCUDs into allied territories and no SCUD launchers are killed. An
increase in technology is needed to improve this MoE as the B-2 bomber and many of its
contemporaries have no means to engage time critical targets.
28Due to the constant evolution of threats to national security, this situation does not usually persist for
very long.
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Figure 89: FLASH Playback File of the Baseline Scenario.
Only two of the six B-2 bombers survive the first attack wave and all six bombers are
eliminated within eight hours of the scenario start and twenty targets are killed. These
results serve as a baseline of the capabilities of present day systems against the modeled
threat.
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5.10.3 Bottom-Up Analysis of Some Candidate Technologies
Step 7 of the SOCRATES methodology identified a series of notional technologies or tech-
nology areas for exploration (see Section 5.7). The enumeration of these technologies not
only helps define the models that must be created, but also establishes several example
technologies that can be analyzed in a bottom-up manner to calculate their effectiveness.
The bottom up, or exploratory forecasting technique is described by Frick as a “push of
opportunities” [158].
A complete analysis of candidate platform and munition technologies (T1-T10, T12-T14,
and T17) for the HDBT and Decapitation strike missions would require 32,768 runs to only
analyze these technology impacts. When incompatibilities are excluded, a daunting 10,240
combinations remain. Using surrogate models created around the HDBT and decapitation
strike cases, the execution of this number of runs is trivial: it is nearly instantaneous.
The purpose of the bottom-up analysis is to identify technologies that contribute to
a successful mission, that is, where the target is eliminated and the platform survives.
A Pareto chart that illustrates the relative contribution of each technology on successful
engagements is shown in Figure 90.





























Figure 90: Pareto Chart Illustrating the Relative Contribution of Fourteen Technologies
to the HDBT and Decapitation Strike Missions.
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For the HDBT strike, Technologies 8 and 12 (Fuel Efficient Expendable Turbine Engine
and Long Range Subsonic Cruise Missile) appear to have the greatest influence on the
variability of the response. This is reasonable since time is not a factor in the HDBT
mission, but increased survivability offered by standoff weapons is desirable. In contrast,
the technologies that contribute to the decapitation strike mission shown on the right of
Figure 90 are more evenly distributed across platform and munition technologies.
The prediction profiler can be used to ascertain the relative contribution of each tech-
nology with respect to the relative impact of all other technologies. An example of the
prediction profiler for the HDBT strike is shown in Figure 91 and for the decapitation
strike in Figure 92. This figure generally supports the results shown in Figure 90; how-
ever, it provides additional information. When the x -axis values are identified as nominal
parameters, the prediction profiler functions as a “one-variable-at-a-time” calculator. By
moving the hairline from one setting to another, the impact of activating a technology can be
calculated using the surrogate models in real time. In this manner, a manual optimization
of the technology profile can be conducted with respect to capability-level MoEs; however,













































































































Figure 91: Technology Evaluation Prediction Profiler for the HDBT Strike Mission.
In Figure 91, it again appears that only Technologies 8 and 12 contribute significantly
to the overall success of the mission, whil there are a number of technology combinations














































































































Figure 92: Technology Evaluation Prediction Profiler for the Decapitation Strike Mission.
The next question that evolves from this analysis is “what is the minimum number
of technologies needed to ensure a successful engagement for each of the two scenarios?”
Recall that in the constructive simulation, the evaluation of effectiveness is a function of
the threat and other scenario assumptions. As a result, this question is further bounded by
the caveat “against a fixed threat.”
The distribution analysis histograms and mosaic plots shown Figures 93 and 94 for the
HDBT and decapitation strikes respectively illustrate the distribution of the number of
technologies for successful engagements. In general, the HDBT strike requires between five
and seven technologies while the decapitation strike requires between six and eight technolo-
gies to be successful. It is also interesting to note that there is no single technology which
improves the decapitation strike baseline to enable a successful engagement: the minimum
number of technologies needed is two. The maximum number of allowable technologies is
eleven, bounded by the fact that some technologies are incompatible.
A histogram can again be used to further decompose these results to understand when
certain technologies are preferred. The concept of technology portfolios, bundles, or thresh-
olds is useful for this analysis. Risk is generally reduced by implementing a very small
number of new technologies in the release of a new system and reserving revolutionary ad-
vancements for those technology areas where breakthroughs contribute most significantly





















































































Figure 94: Analysis of the Number of Technologies in a Successful Decapitation Strike
Portfolio.
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93 and 94 can be used to differentiate technologies into “bundles” as shown in Figure 95
for the HDBT strike and Figure 96 for the decapitation strike. The length of the bars in
these figures is indicative of how often a given technology tends to appear in a technology
bundle comprised of n technologies, where n is a number from one to eleven. For example,
in the HDBT case, there are four technologies that can produce a successful engagement
without the addition of any other technologies. Also, there are no cases where Technol-
ogy 9 and Technology 14 appear in a technology bundle for the HDBT strike: hypersonic
cruise missiles do not contribute to effectiveness when time is not a critical mission element.
When the frequency of occurrence approaches approximately 9%, this tends to say that the
technology is equally likely to be present in a portfolio for the HDBT mission.
Although these two figures are cumbersome, they essentially synthesize information from
the previous histogram and the Pareto chart: although Technologies 8 and 12 contribute
most significantly to the effectiveness of an engagement, only Technologies 1, 2, 5, and 7
can produce a successful engagement in isolation. These technologies tend to be more likely
to be included in the portfolio for a smaller portfolio size; however, as the portfolio size
grows, Technologies 8 and 12 tend to be included.
This behavior is also highlighted in Figure 96 for the decapitation strike. The histograms
with peaks on the left tend to indicate technologies preferred for smaller portfolio sizes
while histograms with peaks to the right indicate that these technologies are favored as
portfolio size increases. For the decapitation strike scenario, no single technology can ensure
a successful mission; however, there is one two-technology portfolio (Technology 3 and 5).
In contrast to the HDBT case, the hypersonic missile technologies have a benefit when time





















































































































Figure 96: Analysis of the Probability of Occurrence of Candidate Technologies in a
Successful Decapitation Strike Portfolio.
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5.10.4 Using Inverse Design to Understand the Design Space
Inverse design, a technique for treating any variable as an independent variable described
in Section C.4, is a useful means to set targets in top-level capability metrics and identify
design solutions that meet multidimensional capability needs. Central to this technique
is the use of Monte Carlo simulations to populate the design space with a large number
of points and a dynamic graphical visualization of the results. The multivariate analysis
feature of the JMPR© software package is one of the visualization techniques that will be
used in subsequent sections to perform the inverse design technique and identify technology
areas using a top-down capability-focused approach.
5.10.4.1 Analysis of Sensitivities for an LRS Campaign Simulation
The first exploratory test of interest is an evaluation of the sensitivities of several MoEs
to the available degrees of freedom for a three day LRS campaign. First, a Pareto chart






























Targets Killed Platforms Lost
Figure 97: Important Factors on MoEs for the GSTF Three Day Scenario.
The most significant contributor to targets killed is the SAM density. This is because
dialing down SAM density controls the guaranteed rate of SAM destruction using Effects-
Based Decomposition for SEAD assets. Turning this dial always kills targets. As expected,
SAM density is a major contributing factor to platforms lost. A surprising outcome of the
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data analysis is that within certain bounds, the platform speed is actually a detractor with
respect to both MoEs. An analysis of the cases causing this unexpected result revealed
that high speed platforms require high thrust leading to high fuel flow rates. This causes
the intelligent agents operating the platforms to return to base frequently to refuel, limiting
their effectiveness over the 24 hour simulation period. In fact, since their decision logic is not
perfect and since unexpected engagements may occur during the egress to base, platforms
sometimes run out of fuel while attempting to return to base, contributing negatively toward
the “platforms lost” metric. While long range and high speed are desired, this analysis points
to the fact that perhaps high speed dash as opposed to high speed cruise is a desirable trait
for an LRS system.
The 4,625 cases executed for the GSTF three day scenario can also be analyzed using
the multivariate analysis as shown in Figure 98. A color-coding scheme (ROYGBIV) was
used to represent cases where all six platforms were lost as red and no platforms lost as
violet. Initially, the entire space was filled with red points that made it difficult to observe
the other trends. This is because the three-day scenario is exceptionally difficult and all
platforms are lost in 89.3% of executed cases. The data in Figure 98 can be supplemented
using a color map on the correlation values between each of the design variables and the
MoEs as shown in Figure 99. In this figure, red indicates a perfect positive correlation (as
indicated by the red color on the diagonal) and blue indicates a perfect negative correlation.
Black boxes are drawn around the variables with the strongest magnitude of correlation.
In the GSTF three day scenario case, platform speed, SAM density, and TSFC have the
strongest negative impact on targets killed. Interestingly, the color map identifies platforms
lost and targets killed as negatively correlated. While these two dependent variables are
theoretically independently calculated from each other, they are actually heavily correlated.
As more platforms are lost, not only are there fewer LRS assets to prosecute the remaining
targets, but the enemy SAM sites have fewer adversaries to attack with a finite number of
missiles. This is a quintessential example of the nonlinearity of combat: losing a wingman
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Figure 99: Color Map on the Correlations of Independent Variables and MoEs for the
GSTF Three Day Scenario.
In addition to the sensitivity analysis for the individual technology factors, a key at-
tribute in capability-based technology evaluation is the quantification of the ability of pro-
posed technologies to exceed the state of the art. The multivariate analysis showing a
comparison between the baseline case and successful cases throughout the design space is
shown in Figure 100.
As previously mentioned in Section 5.10.2, the present day baseline configuration de-
scribed in Table 20 kills 20 targets in eight hours while losing all six platforms. Figure 100
shows 384/4625 cases for the GSTF scenario where more than 20 targets are killed and less
than six platforms are lost. The color scheme indicates high losses (hot colors) and low
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losses (cool colors). The black square in the figure indicates the value of the baseline case.
When the black square is surrounded by colored points, this indicates that little technology
infusion is needed in that dimension because the 384 cases have similar thresholds of the
technology metrics in that dimension. On the other hand, when the black square is far
from the centroid of the colored area, an area for technology infusion or design variation
from the baseline case is highlighted. For example, the baseline case has high TSFC and
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Baseline Shown as Black Square
Figure 100: Comparison of the Capability Baseline to 384 Cases that Improve the State-
of-the-Art.
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The list of comparison points is further narrowed to the 22 cases for which more than 20
targets are killed with zero platform losses in Figure 101. The same observations as in the
previous figure are true for Figure 101 as well with a slight caveat: most of the successful





















































































Baseline Shown as Black Square
Figure 101: Comparison of the Capability Baseline to 22 Best-in-Class Cases.
The distribution plots in Figures 102 and 103 enable better visualization of these trends.
The first figure shows how the technology factors and design variables are distributed for
the 384 “good” designs that improve on the capability baseline. These designs tend to have
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Speed RCS Mun. Range Mun. Speed Radar Power SAMs Killed TSFC
Figure 103: Distributions of Design/Technology Factors for 22 of the Best GSTF Designs.
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Figure 103 shows how these trends evolve when only the 22 best-in-class solutions are
considered. Notably, the speed for these points generally falls in line with the “sweet spot”
of about 750 knots that is explained in the next section. These aircraft also tend to use long
range munitions and have good fuel consumption; however, they are all also operating in
a benign threat environment. This underscores both the value and difficulty of parametric
analysis: while the variability of the threat adds flexibility, narrowing to a specific answer
is difficult.
Fortunately, the neural networks generated for the GSTF scenario can be used to gen-
erate large volumes of additional data while holding some factors constant. A Monte Carlo
simulation of 1,000,000 points was executed using uniform distributions on all design pa-
rameters and arbitrarily setting the SAM density to 50% and the Enemy Radar Power to
15 dB. Of the 1,000,000 cases, those with losses of 100% and kills below a threshold of 20
(defined by the performance of the baseline case) were eliminated to leave 88,258 Monte
Carlo runs. Several interesting trends emerge when these cases are analyzed. First, the
dataset can be divided into those solutions in which 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 platforms are lost
respectively.
The zero loss and five loss case are further examined in Figures 104 and 105 respectively.
While the GTOW, Empty Weight Ratio, and Thrust-to-Weight ratio of the zero loss case
is biased toward solutions with higher values, the results for the five loss case are fairly
uniformly distributed. Lift coefficient has little variation for either case. Curiously, it
appears that solutions with higher drag coefficients are preferred in the cases when zero
platforms are lost. The opposite is true for less successful engagements. Both solutions
tend to favor long munition ranges, but there is a definite preference to a certain value of
payload weight in the zero loss case. The same preferred range for speed emerges again in
this analysis. There is also a clear preference for solutions with very low radar cross section
and thrust specific fuel consumption in the zero loss case.
Of the 88,258 GSTF Monte Carlo runs with a fixed threat and platform losses less than
six, 3,987 cases can be identified for which the number of platforms lost is zero. These cases
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Figure 106: Multivariate Profiler for 3,987 Zero-Loss, Fixed Threat, GSTF Cases.
In this figure, the color banding represents the number of targets killed and is grouped
in units of 20 as shown in the figure legend. Several interesting behaviors are seen in this
plot. First, an interesting Pareto frontier is visible in area 1. Here, solutions with either
low TSFC, low speed, or some combination of the two are valid. A similar Pareto frontier is
visible in area 2 between speed and RCS. The lack of points in the upper right corner of this
plot indicates that aircraft with high cruise speed and high RCS are unsuccessful. Since high
speed actually has a positive impact on survivability, the observed trend must a secondary
effect related to the low GTOW tendency of these solutions. In area 3, highly desirable
solutions in terms of targets killed are located in the center of the region with less effective
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solutions radiating outward from the range of speed values observed throughout this work.
There is an area of maximum effectiveness that matches a particular drag coefficient to a
certain speed regime. Curiously, there are no solutions in regions 5 and 6. The void in
region 5 is attributed to high T/W and high speed cases. Failures in this region are a
function of the high fuel burn of these solutions. While the plot shown in region 6 has a
higher concentration of cases in the desirable upper left corner, it is interesting to note that
some marginally effective solutions are viable for aircraft with poor fuel consumption at all
munition ranges. Finally, in area 6, an interesting banding pattern is observed. This plot is
magnified in Figure 107 where it is evident that the most effective solutions are those with
low drag coefficient and low fuel consumption. The different bands identify thresholds of
effectiveness and illustrate a primary dependence of effectiveness on the correct definition
of these two parameters. The red ”X” in Figure 107 indicates the area of least effectiveness
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Figure 107: Relationship Between Drag Coefficient and TSFC for Zero-Loss, Fixed Threat,
GSTF Cases.
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This section highlights sensitivity analysis for a three-day simulation of many interoper-
ating assets. While the technology-related parameters that contribute to effective capability
delivery cannot be precisely identified with ease, the parametric tradeoff environment pro-
vides a graphical means for identifying the sensitivities of various technology and design
variables on each other. Furthermore, the analysis of data does not stop with the execution
of cases and the generation of surrogate models. Due to the many degrees of freedom and
the layers of complexity, graphical visualization techniques must be used to “tell the story”
that supports design decisions. The power of surrogate models for rapid manipulation of
data and the use of probabilistic techniques to generate off-design cases were demonstrated
for a single scenario with some assumptions fixed. It is easy to see how the scope of the
problem quickly grows out of control.
To further illustrate how to use the SOCRATES method for decision making, subsequent
sections analyze specific “analysis questions” that arise in the development of a Long Range
Strike system architecture. The surrogate model-enabled parametric tradeoff environment
is queried in different ways and various graphical tools are used throughout to develop
answers to these questions.
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5.10.4.2 Identifying the Thresholds for Speed and Fuel Consumption
In a 2005 interview, General Jumper said “higher, faster, farther... is not an absolute
measure. We have to figure out where it’s useful to us... Can it carry a practical payload?
Can it get there and return? Can you take advantage of all this velocity” [411].
High speed efficient propulsion systems are a focus area for AFRL and other technology
development organizations. The SOCRATES method can be used to identify requirements
for speed and TSFC using modeling and simulation. Using the surrogate models created
for the GSTF three day attack scenario, a 5,000 case Monte Carlo simulation was executed
holding all factors constant at their baseline values except the platform speed and platform
TSFC. The resulting multivariate analysis, supplemented with an inset three-dimensional
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Figure 108: Multivariate Analysis for Speed and TSFC for the GSTF Three Day Attack
Scenario.
In this figure, cases where more than 80 targets are killed are color-coded red. The
other colored areas represent 70 targets killed (orange), 60 targets killed (green), 50 targets
killed (blue), and 40 targets killed (purple). As shown in the multivariate analysis, there is
a “sweet spot” for speed and TSFC for this mission in this scenario with all other factors
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held constant. This region of interest migrates around the design space as other factors are
changed. A three-dimensional contour profiler illustrating dynamic visualization is shown
in Figure 109. The Z -axis of the contour plot is the predicted number of targets killed and
the X and Y -axes are speed and TSFC respectively. A nominal case where the inputs of the
surrogate models are set halfway between their minimum and maximum ranges is shown in
Figure 109. Using the parametric slide bars to the right of the figure, the character of the

































Figure 109: Interactive Three Dimensional Contour Plot Showing a Nominal Case.
In general, solutions with high TSFC values and speeds beyond a certain value are
not attractive in terms of targets killed. This is a function of the range of GTOW values
used, limited fuel volumes for the payloads employed, the unrefueled range required in the
simulation, and the 24 hour time limit imposed on the simulation.
The subsequent figures illustrate how the inputs to the surrogate model can be inter-
actively changed to produce new three dimensional contours on the fly29. An increase in
thrust-to-weight ratio is shown in Figure 110. Here, the maximum point for targets killed





































































Figure 111: Interactive Three Dimensional Contour Plot Showing a Decrease in
Thrust/Weight Ratio.
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and platforms lost remains at the same X-Y coordinates but increases in magnitude. In
contrast, as illustrated in Figure 111, a decrease in thrust-to-weight ratio decreases the first
peak and shifts the maximum point to a different locus in the speed vs. TSFC space. This
new point is in the supersonic regime with extremely low TSFC. Essentially, for a fixed
GTOW, vehicles with a lower thrust-to-weight ratio have less thrust available and hence
burn less fuel at maximum power regardless of TSFC. If such low TSFC values could be
obtained through technology infusion or a change in the propulsion system architecture,
supersonic solutions become attractive.
Figure 112 shows how the character of the space changes as short range munitions are
used. As the munition range is decreased to around 15 km (8 nm or 50,000 ft), the magnitude
of targets killed decreases across the design space. While the munition range has no direct
impact on the probability of kill, this tradeoff demonstrates the coupling between MoEs.
When munition range is lower, platforms must ingress closer to the target before weapon
release. This exposes them to more SAM sites, increasing the number of platforms lost.
As more platforms are lost, the number of targets killed decreases in a nonlinear manner.
There is also a secondary effect: long range weapons are released sooner. The sooner a
weapon is released, the sooner that platform can be retasked to a new engagement, which
contributes to increasing target kills.
To further illustrate the power of the technique, in Figure 113 the SAM density is
decreased from 50% to 15%. With fewer SAM sites to destroy platforms, the number of
targets killed increases to its previous level. Although the bombers operate with short range
munitions, the lower SAM density decreases their likelihood of being killed and therefore
increases the overall effectiveness of the solution.
The final permutation illustrated in Figure 114 further examines the parametric threat
by changing the power of the enemy’s radar from 50 dB to 15 dB. As with the previous
example, a decrease in radar power has a similar effect to lowering the SAM density. The





































































Figure 113: Interactive Three Dimensional Contour Plot Showing a Decrease in Munition
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Figure 114: Interactive Three Dimensional Contour Plot Showing a Decrease in Enemy
Radar Power.
5.10.4.3 How Large and How Fast?
Two key requirements for a future LRS system are the size and speed of the vehicle. Con-
cepts from a 40,000 lb lightweight fighter to a behemoth air vehicle with a GTOW approach-
ing runway limits of 1,200,000 lbs have been proposed. Similar variation from subsonic to
hypersonic bombers have been advocated for the LRS mission. The surrogate models can
be queried to address these tradeoffs as a function of other design variables, assumptions,
and threats. A tradeoff between gross takeoff weight and platform speed using the JMPR©
contour profiler is shown in Figure 115. In this example, the contour profiler is used to
evaluate the predictive neural networks for targets killed and platforms lost for the HDBT
and decapitation strike scenarios. Constraints are applied to color-code regions where either
a platform is lost or no targets are killed for both scenarios. The white space therefore indi-
cates a feasible design region where both missions can be accomplished without any platform
losses. As a caveat, the “answer” yielded by this study is a function of the assumptions
shown in Table 30.
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The contour shown in Figure 115 shows that the design space is constrained on the
upper portion by excessive gross weight which makes it impossible to fly the distances
required for the CL and CD values given. The left side is constrained by the speed for the
decapitation strike mission: below approximately Mach 1.6, this aircraft cannot kill any
targets regardless of the GTOW. At the lower ranges of GTOW, the available fuel is so low
after the empty weight ratio and payload weight are taken into account that the platform
cannot complete the mission without running out of fuel. This is highlighted in the contour
profiler as all four constraints are active at low GTOW.
The contour profiler also allows the values of any variable to be changed in real-time,
which means that the resulting contours can take any number of shapes depending on how
the assumptions of the problem are varied. To illustrate the dynamics of the problem,
all design variables and assumptions are held constant except for the value of the drag
coefficient. While the previous paragraph stated that the aircraft cannot fly at very high
gross weight values with the drag coefficient given, this statement was actually a theory
that was tested by varying the contour profiler to determine what behavior was causing the
infeasible region to appear. When the drag coefficient is lowered dramatically by 50%, this
constrained area disappears as shown in Figure 116. This trade study illustrates the value of
decreasing platform drag. When the drag is lowered, the constraint on the HDBT Platforms
Lost recedes. Since the empty weight ratio and TSFC are unaltered, the amount of fuel
and the fuel flow rate are essentially held constant. When the drag is reduced, the thrust
required is reduced. Since the overall fuel burn decreases as thrust decreases (also observed
as an increase in L/D in the Breguet Range Equation), the platform range increases and the
likelihood of losing the platform due to fuel depletion decreases. As a result, for a constant
cruise speed, a platform of lower GTOW is viable.
This analysis was also performed for the GSTF Attack Three Day Scenario and summa-
rized in Figure 117 and the design space differs greatly. This example shows the maximum
feasible area for the GSTF Attack case. Here, there is a “sweet spot” of GTOW and speed.
Since the platform flies at its maximum speed throughout the mission, excessive platform
speeds have a negative impact on mission success due to increased fuel burn.
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Table 30: Assumptions and Design Variable Ranges for the Analysis in Figures 115 and
116.
Variable Figure 115 Figure 116
Empty Weight Ratio 0.482 0.482
Thrust/Weight Ratio 0.60 0.60
Payload (lbs) 30,500 lbs 30,500 lbs




Radar Cross Section 0.38 m2 0.38 m2
Weapon Speed Mach 0.85 Mach 0.85
Weapon Range 295 km (160 nm) 295 km (160 nm)
Fan Pressure Ratio 2.2 2.2
Overall Pressure Ratio 26 26
Turbine Temp (T4) 1697◦K (3054◦R) 1697◦K (3054◦R)
Enemy Radar Power 22 22
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Figure 116: Contour Plot of GTOW vs. Speed for the HDBT/Decapitation Strike Mission























Figure 117: Contour Plot of GTOW vs. Speed for the GSTF Attack Mission.
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5.10.4.4 Allocation of Speed and Range: Platform or Munition
Another trade involves the allocation of speed to either the platform or the munition. Where
does speed have the greatest benefit on the number of targets killed? Figure 118 shows the
distribution of platform speed for the HDBT and decapitation strike cases when the target
is killed and no platforms are lost. The distribution of successful engagements for the HDBT
case is entirely uniform, indicating that there is no preference toward platform speed when
the simulation time is five hours. On the other hand, when the simulation is constrained to
ninety minutes in the decapitation strike case, the distribution of points shows a bias toward
higher speeds: the lower part of the distribution is missing. Further analysis indicates that
















































Figure 118: Impact of Platform Speed on the HDBT and Decapitation Strike Scenarios.
Additionally, it is desired to examine the relative importance of platform speed versus
weapon speed. How should technology development resources be allocated between a high-
speed platform and a high-speed, long-range munition? This tradeoff is illustrated by taking
the same data and examining the distribution of points with respect to munition speed
and range for the HDBT and decapitation strike cases as shown in Figure 119. Again,
the distribution is cut-off, indicating that there tends to be a bias toward higher speed
munitions for the decapitation strike case. While this analysis identifies trends, it is not
possible to use these plots to identify either where the speed should be allocated or under












































































Munition Range Munition Speed Munition Range Munition Speed
HDBT Strike Decapitation Strike
Figure 119: Impact of Munition Range and Speed on the HDBT and Decapitation Strike
Scenarios.
To further analyze the situation, a composite capability metric called “Success” was
devised to identify cases where targets killed was equal to 1 and platforms lost was equal
to zero. Using the ANOVA procedure, a Pareto chart that indicates the dominant factors
contributing to a successful engagement can be identified for the HDBT and decapitation
strike scenarios as shown in Figure 120. As illustrated in the figure, the most important
factor in a successful engagement is a long munition range. This is due to the fact that
a standoff weapon keeps the platform out of the SAM envelope. If the munition range
is sufficiently long, the design of the platform has no impact on survivability because the
platform never comes under attack. When the surrogate models are queried, for very long
standoff ranges, the platforms lost metric is always equal to zero. This tends to highlight
the value of the missileer solution introduced in Section 2.4.3.
The Pareto chart on the left of Figure 120 shows that platform speed is the fourth most
important variable, accounting for about eight percent of the variability of the response.
The GTOW and payload weight plays a significant role in the HDBT mission due to the
ability of the platform to carry the heavy loads anticipated. Munition speed has almost
no impact on the success of the HDBT mission. This is not true for the decapitation
strike mission, as the munition speed is the third most important parameter for a successful
engagement. As the Pareto chart indicates, the importance of munition speed is actually





































Figure 120: Analysis of Variance for Allocation of Speed Between the Platform and
Munition.
This answer changes significantly as the variability due to munition range is removed
from the picture. In Figure 121, the weapon is fixed as a short range bomb. In this
case, the most important factor for the HDBT mission is the density of enemy SAM sites,
which obviously impacts the “platforms lost” element of successful engagements. In the
decapitation strike scenario, when the weapon is fixed as a short range bomb, the platform
speed becomes the dominant factor. Figure 122 shows the results when the weapon range is
fixed at 1,500 km (810 nm). For the HDBT case, munition speed now becomes a dominant
factor only because the two most important platform variables remain GTOW and payload
weight and all other factors relate to the range and survivability of the platform. Since the
weapon is released far outside the range of the threat, the impact of the remaining factors is
minimal. In the case of the decapitation strike, both the platform speed and munition speed
are near the top of the list in the Pareto chart. While it is interesting that the platform
speed and munition speed change roles between the two plots, further analysis indicates
that the relative importance of these two factors is highly dependent on the settings of



































Figure 121: Analysis of Variance for Allocation of Speed Between the Platform and


































Figure 122: Analysis of Variance for Allocation of Speed Between the Platform and
Munition (Fixed Weapon, Long Range).
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This trade study illustrates one of the fundamental results of this work. When technol-
ogy metrics are analyzed with respect to top-level capabilities using modeling and simula-
tion, definitive answers are few and far between. The are so many degrees of freedom in the
problem that certain dimensions must be temporarily locked to recognize any discernable
pattern. This phenomenon is akin to the concept of the total derivative. While a partial
derivative is a well defined trend that can be viewed with respect to all other variables held
constant, when all variables are allowed to change over large ranges, the result is a trade
space where essentially any answer can be obtained provided that certain design variables
and assumptions are set to desirable levels. To this end, the aforementioned graphs provide
some information about the character of the trade space, and while the dynamic tradeoff en-
vironment enabled by surrogate models is useful for demonstrating the type of information
that can be gleaned from these models, presenting “snapshots” of the design space without
a detailed understanding of the underlying assumptions can be extremely misleading to the
decision maker.
The allocation of speed and range between platform and munition was also examined for
the GSTF three day scenario as shown with a contour profiler in Figures 123 and 124. Note
that the axes on Figure 124 have been reversed to make the figure more readable. In these
figures, solutions that use long range high speed munitions are in the upper left corner. In
Figure 123, this region corresponds to the maximum in terms of targets killed. This region
is also where the fewest platforms are lost as shown in Figure 124. The stepwise character
results from the use of neural network equations to match this discrete response. While
these figures illustrate the benefit of long range high speed munitions, there is no clear
“knee in the curve” where the behavior jumps from one region of effectiveness to another.
The contour plots shown in these two figures provide a detailed measure of the sensitivity
of the response, but do little to quantify the exact values of the requirements needed to
meet capability thresholds due to the number of assumptions that go into their creation.
The Pareto chart in Figure 97 indicated that platform speed has a greater impact than
munition speed in the scenario examined. Using the interactive dynamic environment, the
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Figure 123: Contour Plot of Munition Speed vs. Munition Range for the GSTF Three






























Maximum Losses with Short Range Weapon
Minimum
Losses
Figure 124: Contour Plot of Munition Speed vs. Munition Range for the GSTF Three
Day Scenario (Platforms Lost).
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contour plots for the targets killed and platforms lost responses are shown in Figures 125
and 126 respectively. In contrast to the relatively flat surface observed in the relation
between munition speed and range, when the design space is examined in terms of platform
speed an interesting trend emerges. There is a region around approximately 750 knots
where platforms are most effective at prosecuting targets. This “sweet spot” is based on
the conditions of the scenario and the characteristics of the threat; however, it is also related
to the physics of the problem. The thrust required can be calculated for a given speed and
drag coefficient and related to the design variables by:
Thrust = Drag =
1
2






Fuel burn is a function of TSFC and thrust at a given flight condition. The behavior in
Figure 125 therefore reflects the fact that higher speed platforms require more thrust, burn
more fuel, and therefore have a limited range for a fixed fuel volume. The squared term in
Equation 19 defines the behavior in this figure.
Figure 126 exhibits the stepwise character observed previously due to the discrete nature
of this response. The “sweet spot” for platform speed is also reflected as a region of low
platform losses for long range munitions. The increase in platform losses in the left of the
figure is due to the same behavior reported above for increasing speed. Additionally, in
the upper right corner of the figure the response increases again due to the combination of
low speed platforms with short range munitions that cannot survive against the modeled
threat.
The highlighted value of long range munitions is not a surprising result; however, the
identification of a specific range of platform speed that results from the interplay of fuel
burn and the threat is an interesting conclusion. This provides an excellent example of how
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Figure 125: Contour Plot of Munition Speed vs. Munition Range for the GSTF Three



































Figure 126: Contour Plot of Munition Speed vs. Munition Range for the GSTF Three
Day Scenario (Platforms Lost).
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5.10.4.5 How much survivability is enough? An analysis of Speed and Stealth.
A fundamental trade that has plagued aircraft designers since the advent of stealth tech-
nology in the 1970’s is the allocation of speed and stealth to the platform. This trade is
confounded by a myriad of other factors, including the design of the weapon, engine, and
the parameters of the threat in question. The assumptions used to demonstrate a tradeoff
between speed and stealth are given in Table 31.
Table 31: Assumptions and Design Variable Ranges for the Speed vs. Stealth Comparison.
Variable Value






Fan Pressure Ratio 2.25
Overall Pressure Ratio 27.5
Turbine Temp (T4) 1722◦K (3100◦R)
Enemy Radar Power 55
Enemy SAM Density 100%
With these degrees of freedom fixed, the total derivative of the trade study can still take
on any value as shown in Figure 127. In this figure, successful engagements are colored
blue and unsuccessful engagements are colored red. The only discernable trend from this
figure is that for very low GTOW values and high payload values, the aircraft design is not
feasible (no room for fuel) and hence the engagement is unsuccessful. When the munition
and platform variables change simultaneously, no trends are clearly visible. To overcome
this difficulty, the tradeoff between speed and stealth was performed for three fixed weapon
cases for the decapitation strike mission. In the first case, a subsonic short range bomb is
used. In the second case, a long range (610 km/324 nm) subsonic cruise missile is used.
The final case holds the range of the cruise missile at 610 km and increases the speed of the
missile to Mach 3.75. These three cases are color-coded as blue, green, and red in Figure
128.















































Constant Aircraft Scaling Parameters
Figure 127: Multivariate Analysis for a Speed/Range/Stealth/Weight Trade Study.
128. The axes of the figure show the speed of the platform on the Y -axis and the radar
cross section, a measure of stealth, on the X -axis. The upper left corner therefore indicates
the fast and stealthy solution, and the lower right corner indicates a subsonic, non-stealthy
configuration. When the blue points are examined, a clear Pareto frontier is visible between
speed and stealth. The curve at the bottom of the blue region shows that for short range
weapons, a slower platform requires a lower RCS for iso-survivability. If the platform speed
is increased, the RCS can be increased commensurately along the Pareto frontier while
still maintaining effectiveness. Essentially, a faster platform can be less stealthy and still
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be successful. This Pareto frontier is not evident in the green or red cases that indicate
successful engagements for standoff weapons. This is because only in the blue cases does the
platform come close enough to the adversary to be detected. RCS therefore has a minimal
impact on platform survivability when standoff weapons are used. The primary difference
between the red and green areas are that the faster munition allows iso-effectiveness at a
lower platform speed. In this scenario, platform speed and weapon speed can be traded
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Figure 128: Tradeoff Between Platform Speed and Stealth for Three Fixed Missiles (Blue
= Subsonic Bomb, Green = Subsonic Cruise Missile, Red = High Supersonic Cruise Missile).
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This figure indicates that for this scenario, stealth is only a desirable characteristic when
standoff weapons are not an option. While all three weapon combinations are successful in
the blue shaded region, a military planner would tend to prefer less expensive bombs than
long range standoff munitions in this case; however, if the platform speed and radar cross
section cause the platform to be in the green or red regions, a more expensive munition is
necessary to ensure platform survival.
Finally, it is important to note that these trends hold for the case defined in Table
31. The location of the “knee-in-the-curve” for the blue Pareto frontier changes as the
assumptions are altered. The analysis of the data can be a cumbersome process because

































Region of Maximum Survivability
Figure 129: Three Dimensional Surface Profiler for Platform Speed and RCS for the
GSTF Three Day Scenario.
The answer to this question changes somewhat as the parameters of the scenario and the
design assumptions of the platform change. A three-dimensional tradeoff between platform
speed and RCS with respect to platforms lost for the GSTF three day scenario is shown in
Figure 129. Here here is a certain region where survivability is maximized. The exact values
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that bound this location are a function of the other design variables and the parameters of
the threat: increasing enemy radar power or SAM density causes the space to form a plateau
at the maximum level of platforms lost. For the scenarios examined, the LRS aircraft asset
is very sensitive to an evolving threat.
5.10.4.6 Evaluation of Speed and Persistence
Both speed and persistence have been identified as desirable attributes for a future LRS
system; however, do both of these factors need to be maximized to ensure mission success?
At one end of the spectrum, a fast long-range cruise missile could be employed from any
number of platforms. As mentioned in Section 5.7.4, the opposite end of the spectrum is
an “area dominance” munition designed for maximum loiter time at low speed. Using the
SOCRATES methodology, these two disparate concepts can be compared against the same
top-level MoEs.
Four MoEs are tracked for the TCT attack mission: the percentage of TBM launchers
killed, the number of TBM launchers killed, the number of TBMs fired, and the number of
blue munitions fired. An analysis of these MoEs shows that they are very closely correlated.
To analyze the source of variability of the MoEs, the ANOVA procedure was performed
for each of six mission variations for the TCT attack scenario. The number of cases for each
of the subsequent variations was constrained by the number of runs that could be executed
in 48 hours. Note that as more munitions are added, the number of cases decreases. This
is because each area dominance munition has an onboard radar, and frequent track-quality
radar calculations in FLAMES are computationally expensive.
1. Baseline Case (3200 cases, dark blue)
2. Area Dominance (3200 cases, red)
3. Area Dominance + Dispersed Formation (835 cases, green)
4. Double Munitions + Dispersed Formation (567 cases, pink)
5. Double Munitions (546 cases, orange)
6. Triple Munitions + Dispersed Formation (384 cases, light blue)
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The Pareto chart, color coded for each tactical variation according to the above scheme,
is shown in Figure 130. After the first two cases were executed, the TBM RCS was de-
termined to have little effect on the detectability of the target and was removed from
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Area Dominance (3X) + FormationArea Dominance (2X)
Figure 130: Pareto Chart for the TCT Attack Scenario Divided by Tactical Variations.
For the baseline case, the impact of the fighter’s sensor is greater than that of the area
dominance cases. In general, the speed of the TBM and the range of the onboard sensor
are the next most dominant parameters after the airborne sensor’s range. The speed of
the platform/munition and the payload weight (which defines the number of submunitions
carried) is in the noise by comparison.
The data generated from the simulation runs for each of the aforementioned variations
is shown using multivariate analysis in Figure 131.
This figure shows three MoEs, the number of TBMs killed, the number of friendly
munitions fired, and the number of hostile TBMs fired as the key tracked metrics in the
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Figure 131: Multivariate Analysis for the Time Critical Strike Scenario.
and the number of munitions/submunitions it can carry. The next two parameters define
the hiding characteristics of the enemy and the next two parameters define the sensor
subsystems of the attacker and locator respectively. The final parameter is a switch that
represents the color-coded tactical variation according to the numbering scheme mentioned
above. As an example of how this data can be used for capability analysis, the filtered
Monte Carlo technique can be applied to this multivariate analysis to identify situations
where more than thirty TBM launcher are killed as shown in Figure 132. As illustrated
in the figure, only fighters with high speed missiles are capable of reaching this threshold
value for the TBM killed MoE.
The same set of data can be further used to analyze the “best-in-class” solutions for
each of the six tactical variations. Figure 133 shows a zoomed-in version of the upper-right































































Figure 132: Time Critical Attack Designs That Kill More Than 30 TBMs.
variation. The top solutions in each column are highlighted and the remaining cases are
excluded to produce the multivariate plot in Figure 134 that depicts the top solutions for
each variation. As shown by the insets in the lower left of the figure, there are thresholds
of effectiveness for each of the color coded variants. Also, the population of “best-in-class”
solutions tends to be located in the region with both sensor ranges maximized.
At first glance, it also appears that the best area dominance munitions are capable
of attacking faster moving TBMs, however, unhiding the blue points reveals that they do
universally better in all dimensions. An analysis of the Pareto frontier between TBM speed
and TBM killed reveals that the non-dominated solutions are those with double and triple
munitions. The final example analysis performed on the TCT attack scenario examines the
impact of munition type and the use of dispersed formations. A series of Pareto frontiers







































































































Figure 134: Analysis of “Best-in-Class” Solutions for TCT Attack.
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area represents the solution region encapsulated by area dominance solutions. The colored
lines are the thresholds for each variation respectively. Surprisingly, all evidence supports
the notion that the dispersed munition formation is less effective than when all munitions
loiter near the airborne sensor. This must indicate that the likelihood of reaching a target
is increased when the munition starts near the sensor that originally located the target,
implying that for this scenario, directly launching targeted weapons may be more effective
than a netted force of geographically distributed weapons. Further development of cognition
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Figure 135: Pareto Frontiers for TCT Attack Effectiveness.
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5.10.4.7 Evaluation of Evolving Threats
Many entry-into-service dates from 2018 to 2037 have been proposed for a future LRS sys-
tem. Implicit in these definitions is the anticipated threat that an LRS system architecture
must be effective against. Since these threats evolve rapidly over time, a “point solution”
at one of these arbitrary dates is not appropriate. One of the key aspects of the results
from the SOCRATES methodology is a parametric exploration of adversary characteristics
in conjunction with blue force assumptions, tactics, designs, and technologies. A simplified
depiction of this tradeoff is shown in Figure 136 for two different parametric aircraft oper-
ating in the same scenario. The contour profiler depicts contours of platforms lost (green)
and an arbitrarily selected threshold of 70 targets killed (blue region). The axes represent
the two adversary parameters of the predictive neural net equation for the GSTF three day
scenario: SAM density and the enemy radar power. As the figure illustrates, there is a
small feasible region at low SAM density and low enemy radar power. Changing the input
variables to the neural network as shown in the right side of Figure 136 causes little change
in the platforms lost contours but opens up a region of effectiveness where the platform
can eliminate more targets below the SAM density threshold of 20%. Unfortunately, no
combination of the input variables significantly increases effectiveness as the threat density
and enemy radar power increase.
Since it is difficult to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the contour profiler shown
in Figure 136, a three-dimensional view that depicts the two threat axes with respect to
the targets killed MoE is shown in Figure 137. In this case, the far corner represents high
SAM density and high enemy radar power. This surface is also parametrically variable
with respect to platform and munition design variables. Increasing the weapon range, for
example, dramatically shifts the surface upward. There is a preferred bound on the platform
speed around Mach 1.5. Very low speeds are inefficient for prosecuting large numbers of
targets within the 24 hour time window while very high speeds use excessive amounts of
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Figure 137: Three Dimensional Surface Profiler for SAM Density and Enemy Radar
Power.
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5.10.5 Comparison of Technology and Numbers
To play the devil’s advocate, what if one took a page out of the Soviet playbook and simply
replaced advanced technology solution with greater numbers of low-tech solutions? The
baseline scenario used six B-2A-based platforms. To assess the sensitivity to changing the
number of platforms, simulations with variations of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 25, 30
and 40 platforms were executed. The results for the MoEs of targets killed and platforms
lost are shown in Figures 138 and 139 respectively. The best technology-infused six platform
case resulted in the neutralization of 263 targets. Surprisingly, this threshold was exceeded
when over sixteen standard platforms were used. As shown in Figure 138, more than 25
B-2A aircraft are capable of prosecuting all targets in the scenario30.
The platforms lost response shown in Figure 139 provides additional insight into the
complexity of the problem. As more aircraft are added to the simulation, the percentage
of the total platforms lost decreases exponentially. This refers back to the “wingman phe-
nomenon” observed in Section 5.10.4.1. The very presence of more platforms means that
the defending SAM sites must divide their fire among the observed threats instead of con-
centrating firepower against a single adversary. This implies that, at the very least, a strike
package should be accompanied by drones or other aircraft that saturate the defender’s
view of the battlefield.
This example demonstrates how numbers and technology are interchangeable to a de-
gree; however, the number of platforms must be increased by 166% to achieve parity with
the best technology-enabled solutions. Other dimensions such as logistics, training, and
maintenance are needed to completely compare these two classes of solutions. Finally, it is
important to note that for the relatively benign scenario used, even if all sixteen combat
coded B-2A bombers were used, more than half would be lost in the first 24 hours of com-
bat. This fact alone is one of the key drivers for the pursuit of highly effective advanced
technology solutions.
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Figure 139: Sensitivity of the Platforms Lost Response to the Addition of More Platforms.
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5.10.6 Quantifying Uncertainty
“There are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t
know we don’t know.”
-Donald Rumsfeld
While definitions of uncertainty abound in the literature, it is literally, the presence
of something we do not know or cannot quantify. The previous analyses were performed
in a deterministic manner, that is, a single input produces a single output with absolute
certainty. Although the demonstrated method quantitatively traces technology impacts
through multiple levels in a system-of-systems, as with all forecasting activities, the initial
establishment of technology impacts is an imprecise art. Probabilistic techniques have
emerged as a popular means to quantify uncertainty because of their statistical validity and
ease of use. For example, Kirby utilized probabilistic techniques and Soban implemented a
probabilistic system-of-systems effectiveness methodology to address this issue [240, 378].
Monte Carlo simulations, summarized in Section C.11, can be can be used to obtain
probabilistic results from deterministic tools. Because they typically require thousands of
runs their direct implementation on a physics-based code may not be feasible or practical.
On the other hand, surrogate models run very quickly. The surrogate models created in
Step 9 of the SOCRATES method are therefore ideally suited to implement probabilistic
analysis of technology benefit. Quantification of uncertainty using probabilistic techniques
and its impact on capability-based technology evaluation is addressed only briefly in this
section. The recommendations section identifies a need for additional research in this area.
The first observation regarding the technology uncertainty is that precise statements
regarding capability satisfaction cannot be made when uncertainty is present. This is illus-
trated in Figure 140.
In the left side of the figure, four discrete solutions are depicted against axes of effective-
ness and cost. The ideal solution is therefore in the upper left corner where effectiveness is
















































Deterministic ProbabilisticFigure 140: Notional Depiction of Four Points without Uncertainty (Left) and with Un-
certainty (right).
optimum solution, point 3 is the least expensive, and point 4 is clearly the worst. When
probability distributions are added and their effect is observed as shown in the right side
of Figure 140, the “answer” is less clear because of the spread of the distributions around
the deterministic value. In the probabilistic view, points 1, 2, and 3 have distributions that
overlap. Therefore any of the three points could be located in the overlapping region with a
finite probability. In a probabilistic sense, these points are now indistinguishable although
their probability of overlap can be calculated. Point 3, which previously would have been
eliminated due to low effectiveness, now has a wide range of potential effectiveness. On
the other hand, Point 4 has a relatively small distribution that does not intersect the other
three. The only conclusion that can be reached in this analysis is that Point 4 is still the
least ideal solution.
This analysis can be extended to the observation of Pareto frontiers in the effectiveness
vs. cost space as shown in Figure 141. The locus of non-dominated solutions shown by the
blue points on the left side of Figure 141 form a clear Pareto frontier. The solutions along
this frontier form a pool from which an “optimum” can be selected depending on how the
customer chooses to weight the two axes.
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Figure 141: Analysis of Probabilistic Pareto Frontiers.
frontier, the clear delineations disappear as shown on the right side of Figure 141. For
example, the two red points have overlapping distributions, meaning that either point could
be at the other’s location. The uncertainty distribution around the dark green point extends
deep inside the region of dominated solutions. This means that there is a finite probability
that this point is no longer along the frontier and a previously dominated solution may have
taken its place. The construction of a line tangent to the probability distributions of the
outermost points (purple line) forms a new Pareto frontier, which indicates the absolute
threshold of effectiveness and cost with uncertainty included. It is also important to note
that the true boundary could be located inside the blue line when uncertainty is evaluated.
This conceptual analysis is demonstrated using the surrogate models developed in Step
9 of the testbed demonstration in Figure 142. This figure builds upon the deterministic
analysis shown in Figure 108 for the GSTF three day scenario. The upper left corner of
the figure shows the relationship between targets killed and platform speed when speed and
TSFC are varied uniformly across the allowable range. The other three insets in the figure
show how this distribution of points changes and becomes more “fuzzy” as random noise is
added to the targets killed response. Normal distributions with a standard deviation of 1,
2, and 3 are shown for illustration. The blue points are the 1,000 original baseline points
and the black points indicate 100 Monte Carlo runs added to each of the baseline cases.
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As the figure shows, the boundary between the two variables becomes much less defined.
In the deterministic case, the “best-in-class” solution occurs at a speed of about 700 knots
and 30 targets killed. When uncertainty is added, the mean speed value shifts somewhat,
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Figure 142: Addition of Random Noise to a Design Space Exploration of Speed and TSFC.
In addition to applying noise distributions to the output variables, uncertainty distri-
butions can be applied to the input variables. Using an example from the TCT attack
scenario, an application of normal distributions to three input variables is shown in Figure
143. The variation in the sensor ranges and TBM speed can, for example, simulate dif-
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Figure 144: Application of Larger Uncertainty Distributions to Input Variables.
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TBM launchers are killed by this aircraft configuration. Using a normal distribution with
standard deviations as labeled in Figure 143, the expected number of TBMs killed ranges
from 14 to 27 and the top row of metrics take on a characteristic teardrop shape. When the
spread of the distribution is increased as shown in Figure 144, the range of expected TBMs
killed ranges from 6 to 32. Figure 145 shows the combination of uncertainty distributions
on the input variables combined with a 100 case Monte Carlo distribution on the output
parameters. The blue line in this figure highlights the boundaries of the distribution as
drawn in Figure 144 using fewer cases.
When uncertainty distributions are included on either the input or output parameters,
it quickly becomes difficult to differentiate between variation caused by uncertainty and
variations caused by a change in one or more design variables at one or more hierarchical
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Figure 145: Application of Uncertainty Distributions to Input and Output Variables.
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5.10.7 Using The FLASH Playback Files to Understand Agent Decisions
The FLAMES Scenario Highlighter, or FLASH, is a component of the framework that
enables playback of recorded scenario files. These two-dimensional and three-dimensional
animations of the simulation results act as a “God’s Eye” view of the conflict. Although
such results are sometimes coupled with imagery and high-fidelity terrain data to produce
digital eye candy and high-profile special effects, the playback files also allow a user to debug
agent behaviors and discover tactical decisions being made by the agents. Two playback
files can also be executed side-by-side to view the differences between two simulations. In
this manner, a designer can see where the agents digress from a certain course of action as
a function of the technologies they are provided. Although difficult to depict on paper, the
baseline FLASH scenario file was often compared to DoE results throughout this work to
debug the scenario and identify unanticipated behavior.
By saving the playback files associated with each DoE run, after narrowing the design
space to a region of interest, the designer can review the playback files in that region. Since
each file takes several minutes to view, it is not practical to watch every playback file. The
multivariate filtering technique can be used to narrow down the number of scenario playback
files to be viewed.
An example of a FLASH playback file is shown in Figure 146. This example shows
thirty B-2A platforms attacking a series of targets in Iraq. The group of platforms flies
out together in four small clusters and “breaks” in a starburst pattern after reaching the
end of the first corridor. This screenshot is taken approximately 2 hours into the scenario.
Here, one platform has been lost in the 4th Air Defense Sector in northern Iraq. Another
platform is shown firing an air-to-ground munition and egressing back towards an airspace
corridor. In this playback file, agents follow the corridors, release munitions, and return to
base as programmed.
A later screenshot of the same playback file is shown in Figure 147. Here, many plat-
forms are shown egressing through Path 11, a popular low-threat route. This route is not
intersected by any SAM sites and is also one of the shortest routes to attack targets in













Figure 147: FLASH Scenario Playback File Showing Route Selection.
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returning to their Saudi base to rearm. The blue platforms interspersed between them are
about to be reassigned to other targets in Eastern Iraq or in Baghdad. Here, the designer
is trying to ensure that the platforms make logical selections in their choices of airspace
corridors. This is one of the only ways to check the validity of the objective function used
for route selection.
Zooming into the playback file at a later time (Figure 148) shows the agent behavior





About to Release Weapon
Attacking a Biological Weapon Facility
Path 11
Figure 148: FLASH Scenario Playback File Showing Route Selection and Aggressor Be-
havior.
First, in the upper left corner, a B-2A bomber is flying along a corridor and preparing to
attack a palace in the northwest corner of Baghdad. To the east of center, three platforms
are ingressing along a route. When they reach the end of the route, a course is plotted
toward a target of interest. Just west of the center of the city, a B-2A bomber is about
to release a short range bomb on a biological weapon facility. After releasing the weapon,
it turns around and egresses along Path 11. Also, for some reason there is a platform in
the middle of the city in a very high threat area. This platform is attacking the biological
weapon facility south of the city center. Tracing its behavior through the playback file
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indicates that its course was plotted in this manner due to its starting position close to
Path 11 and the persistent threat that remained in other corridors around the target area.
Based on the distance and threat, the agent decided to “take its chances” by plotting a
direct course over an unknown threat area rather than routing itself over a longer, known,
dangerous route. The platform survives and egresses out via a different route.
As a final example of how the playback files are used to understand the agent’s tactical
decisions that arise from the simply programmed rules, a playback file from the TCT attack
scenario is shown in Figure 149. In this example, area dominance munitions are dispensed
from controlling UAVs that search the battlefield for time critical targets that move and








Figure 149: FLASH Scenario Playback File for the TCT Attack Scenario.
The first behavior that is observed is the lone area dominance munition in the southwest
corner of the screen. Why is this agent so far from its commander? The munition was
released approximately 30 minutes earlier to attack the TBM launcher in the lower left
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corner. The munition was assigned by its UAV toward the start of the scenario. The
observed behavior is the munition flying back toward its commander’s search region to
dispense its remaining submunitions. It continues to fly until it runs out of fuel.
Also, there is a cluster of munitions released from the UAV labeled “1.” These munitions
are requested by the UAV labeled “2” which has expended all of its munitions in attempts
to kill other targets. UAV “2” is flying a search pattern over a region of high density
time critical targets. As it detects these targets, it requests assistance from another nearby
UAV that still has munitions. As mentioned in Section B.3, the central tenet of agent-
based modeling is the emergence of complex behaviors that result from simple rules and
goals programmed into individual agents. The FLASH playback file provides a means for
observing the emergent behavior and assessing the validity of the results.
When viewed with subject matter experts and operators, the use of FLASH playback
files also stimulates discussion about the scenario and its results. Since many simplifying
assumptions are made throughout any analysis process, when experienced analysts view
the playback file, their first impulse is to say “that would never happen like that!” This
is a good impetus to query the subject matter expert as to how the simulation should
be modified to emulate more realistic behavior. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to elicit
this information before the experts see that the simulation is “wrong.” After eliciting this
information, the designer should return to Step 3 of the SOCRATES method and ripple the
necessary modifications through the analysis process. Iteration through these steps ensures
buy-in from subject matter experts and exploits the flexibility of the method.
5.11 Review of the Methodology Demonstration
In this chapter, a ten step methodology for capability-based technology evaluation for
systems-of-systems was demonstrated on a testbed problem of interest to the United States
Air Force. The first three steps set the objectives and bounds of the study, identified a suit-
able scenario in the public domain, and developed a series of physics and cognition models
to support the simulation of technologies. Step 3 is arguably the hardest of these three
steps. While many of the example models included in the FLAMES framework were used
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as a backbone, much coding and validation of the behaviors in the simulation was required.
This step of the SOCRATES methodology is greatly aided by off the shelf simulations and
model components that have been created for other initiatives. Integration of many dis-
parate models with variable assumptions and levels of fidelity is sometimes required, but
adds to the complexity of the implementation.
In Steps 4-6, a majority of the new methodology development related to the operational
level hypotheses is detailed. A method for decomposing strategic objectives to actionable
tactical actions was coupled with an intelligent “Meta-General” for battle management.
When used in tandem, the targeting and weaponeering functions that are usually driven
by human operators is automated to facilitate large-scale technology exploration. This is a
critical enabler for quantitative technology assessment of systems-of-systems. Additionally,
an innovative method of applying surrogate models to individual agents was implemented.
Using these performance-based surrogates, the agent gains a perception of its own abilities in
its current environment and alters its decision logic to take advantage of infused technologies.
Steps 7 and 8 set up and execute the necessary code runs to evaluate technologies and
create surrogate models around the simulation where appropriate. The use of surrogate
models to rapidly perform trade studies on the simulation results is another major advance-
ment in this research. This is the first known application of the technique to a highly
complex military system-of-systems simulation. The surrogate model-enabled trade envi-
ronment highlights the migration from point designs to parametric design space exploration.
Step 10 is not “review results” but rather, advocates “what-if?” gaming using the assembled
environment. Steps 1-8 are required to generate a single case and get a single result. The
additional time required to generate surrogates is minuscule compared to the amount of in-
formation that can be obtained from the environment using the simulation-based surrogate
models.
This chapter demonstrated that the proposed methodology is a valid means to obtain
quantitative results of large-scale military systems-of-systems simulations involving a num-
ber of heterogeneous interoperating elements, but only scratches the surface of what can be




“This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is,
perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
-Winston Churchill
The purpose of this dissertation was to document the development of a methodology for
capability-based technology evaluation for systems-of-systems. This topic was driven by an
urgent need for a structured method to perform disparate trade studies on potential tech-
nologies early in the product life-cycle to facilitate resource allocation toward technologies
with the highest payoff towards one or more military capabilities. The research objective
was therefore stated as follows:
Research Objective: The focus of this research is on the development of a
valid, defensible, and practical methodology that facilitates a quantitative as-
sessment of technology potential of systems-of-systems with respect to capability-
level gaps and provides information to decision-makers early in the design
process.
First, a methodology was proposed in Chapter IV and developed through a proof-of-
concept exercise in Chapter V. Using the testbed modeling and simulation environment
created in Chapter V, a series of surrogate models were created that enabled quantita-
tive assessment of potential technologies with respect to top-level capabilities. Since the
SOCRATES method fulfils this basic condition, it is a valid technique for capability-based
technology evaluation.
The traceable, structured analysis enabled by a linked hierarchical series of surrogate
models constructed around a simulation framework form the basis for defensible engineer-
ing conclusions. Any assumption can be identified and changed. Sources of error can be
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traced both within models and at the surrogate level. In fact, the error metrics for all
equations developed are contained in this dissertation. A key attribute of the SOCRATES
methodology is that the data speak for themselves. Accurate models, properly constructed
surrogates, and effective visualization are used to defend conclusions made by the analyst.
The practicality of the method depends on the reason for the study and the resources
available. The work performed to validate the SOCRATES method was conducted by a
single individual and involved the construction of many experiments, some of which are
chronicled here. For this reason, many of the steps in the process were executed in a serial
manner; however, steps 1-3 can usually be performed in parallel. The same is true of steps
4-7 and steps 8-10. Simple quick-turnaround studies that do not have a heavy dependence
on the scenario may not require the SOCRATES method. Furthermore, in the rare cases
where tactics play a negligible role in technology implementation, steps 4-6 may not be
needed to perform capability-based analysis. The SOCRATES method is preferred to a
brute-force approach to analysis-of-alternatives, but is not a panacea that can be applied
to any military SoS technology study.
As a somewhat surprising observation, application of the SOCRATES methodology does
not immediately yield clear answers to capability-based technology assessment problems.
At the start of this research, such answers were completely obscured by the complexity of
the problem. By developing and applying the proposed methodology, some “answers” are
now less obscured by this complexity. The structured process advocated in this work pro-
vides a means to wade through multiple degrees of freedom and develop multidimensional
tradeoff studies that provide more information at the early phases of the design and acqui-
sition process for large-scale systems-of-systems. Further research must delve deeper into
the complexity quagmire. A key challenge is the translation of complex information into
graphical and visual terms that human analysts can understand and use to make resource
allocation decisions.
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6.1 Summary of Technology Evaluation Results
Given that the purpose of the SOCRATES methodology is to provide decision makers
with insight into technology allocation decisions with respect to capability-level MoEs, it is
necessary to review the observations made in the example technology assessment exercise.
The first major observation is that the results are scenario dependent. Changing basing
assumptions, enemy threat laydown, force structure, weapon loadouts, and the C2 archi-
tecture can dramatically alter the results. This underscores the need to assess potential
technologies across a range of scenarios before making resource allocation decisions.
Interestingly, the results fall into two camps: intuitive and non-intuitive. Some of the
more intuitive results can be summarized as follows:
• Traditional wisdom says that stealth is an important characteristic of next-generation
aircraft; however, this is only true when standoff weapons are not employed. If mu-
nitions with sufficient standoff capability can be employed in large numbers and with
appropriate precision and lethality, the “missileer” concept (see Section 2.4.3) may be
highly desirable. Although individual munitions may be extremely expensive, thou-
sands of munitions may be expended for the purchase price of a single stealth bomber.
• On the other hand, standoff weapons are unlikely to be able to deliver extremely large
payloads required for some heavy bunker-busting weapons. The HDBT mission may
be a niche capability best served by ballistic missiles with heavy, penetrating warheads
that impact at extremely high velocities.
• Persistence in a denied access environment enables the use of lower cost close-range
precision munitions and also allows the platform to search for fleeting targets. “Stealth
technologies” contribute to survivability in this regime; however, further analysis is
needed to determine the best mix of airframe shaping, absorptive coatings, and on-
board/off-board jamming.
• High-speed, long-range munitions show an expected benefit in engaging time critical
targets. Long-range munitions of all speeds provide a benefit in engaging stationary
targets. Further analysis must examine the flight dynamics of these weapons and the
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integration of the sensor to provide target tracking during high-speed flight conditions.
While intuitive results tend to confirm that the integrated set of models is doing the
right thing, they also do little to help aid the decision maker. Dr. Thomas A. Cruse, Chief
Technologist of the Air Force Research Laboratory asked in 2005, “What does this process
do for me that I don’t already have? How does it reveal something non-intuitive?” [114].
Cruse’s comments highlight the importance of being able to use simulation and agent-based
modeling techniques to discover non-intuitive results. Some of these interesting conclusions
include:
• The importance of the sensor for the time critical strike mission was far greater than
anticipated. This implies that the “find” portion of the kill chain is much more difficult
than the “engage” portion for these types of missions.
• Increasing platform speed does not provide a universal increase in performance. There
is a particular speed where the constraints of drag and fuel consumption intersect to
provide the best mix of speed and range. Originally it was anticipated that increas-
ing platform speed would always increase effectiveness. This implies that there is a
scenario-dependent balance between platform speed and munition speed/range that
must be further quantified with higher fidelity models.
• Platforms and munitions with high success rates required ridiculously low TSFC. The
natural progression of propulsion systems to increase flight speed is turbofan, ramjet,
scramjet, and rocket. Unfortunately, each change in propulsion system architecture
tends to increase the TSFC. Perhaps a dramatic change in propulsion system archi-
tecture to focus on low TSFC rather than high thrust is needed to enable high-speed
flight. Further exploration of revolutionary concepts such as pulse detonation engines
or alternative fuels may be needed to enable next-generation high speed flight.
• Area dominance munitions were expected to be the single greatest “game changing”
technology evaluated in the proof-of-concept exercise. Surprisingly, area dominance
munitions were outperformed by standard aircraft loitering outside the hostile coun-
try. This was traced to the small number of munitions used. To achieve maximum
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effectiveness, area dominance munitions must be collaborative, use netted communi-
cations, and be employed in large numbers over the area of interest. The cost of such
a CONOPS is a factor to consider in their employment.
As the systems-of-systems nature of the problem is modeled in more detail, the number
of non-intuitive results is expected to increase dramatically. A quantitative assessment
methodology based on modeling and simulation can address issues such as the lack of
empirical data for next-generation weapons systems concepts, the uncertainties associated
with rapidly adapting enemies, and the complex issues that evolve in the study of network
centric operations.
While the aforementioned conclusions highlight the utility of the SOCRATES method,
a key advancement is the ability to perform tradeoffs across multiple degrees of freedom,
integrate multiple models at various levels of fidelity, and visualize the kinds of tradeoffs
that were previously not possible with other technology evaluation methods.
6.2 Subjective Evaluation of the Methodology
Section 1.2 reviewed some existing methods for technology evaluation, and Section 1.2.8
evaluated these methods based on a set of important attributes. The SOCRATES method
is compared against the same baselines in Figure 150.
The primary focus of the SOCRATES method is on the quantitative analysis of tech-
nologies. The quantification of technology potential and a traceable analysis of technologies
to capabilities and vice versa is enabled through the use of a hierarchical object-oriented
constructive simulation environment. The use of surrogate models promotes both flexibility
and reusability. First, a wide range of studies can be performed by parametrically varying
SoS elements and assessing their impact on top level capabilities. Second, the environment
is reusable and the generation of multiple surrogates under different conditions results in a
library of models that can be used for a variety of studies. Placing the myriad of required
assumptions parametrically under control of the designer also promotes reusability as hos-
tile capability adapts and changes over time. These four factors are all rated as “excellent”
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Figure 150: Qualitative Comparison of the SOCRATES Methodology and Other Tech-
nology Evaluation Techniques.
these attributes.
Since the method relies on the creation of models and the development of a simulation,
even when models are reused from other studies, the speed of the method can never be
classified as excellent. The use of surrogate models provides a benefit in this dimension,
but the construction of the underlying physics-based analysis environment is a necessary
penalty on speed.
The hierarchical surrogate-enabled tradeoff environment developed using the SOCRATES
methodology demonstrates both the parametric nature of the method and the scalability to
large-scale systems-of-systems. The work in this dissertation combines elements from both
TIES and QTA to synthesize a method that contains best-in-class elements of each.
Finally, the proposed methodology can only be rated as “good” in terms of affordability
and simplicity due to the complexity of the modeling and simulation environment and knowl-
edge of techniques such as neural networks and advanced visualization. The SOCRATES
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method is always outdone by qualitative methods in terms of simplicity, speed, and afford-
ability; however, the primary focus of the method is on high quality, traceable, quantitative
answers that these other methods lack.
Through the combination of desirable elements from the aforementioned techniques
and the infusion of new methods from other disciplines, the SOCRATES methodology
emerges as an excellent option for capability-based technology evaluation for systems-of-
systems. Over time, further cross-fertilization will undoubtedly lead to the development of
new and different methods to address challenges in this class of problems; however, based
on the results of the proof-of-concept exercise, the SOCRATES methodology demonstrated
applicability to the challenge problem provided.
6.3 When Should SOCRATES Be Used?
Technology evaluation requires time and resources that could otherwise be spent developing
the technologies themselves. Building a modeling and simulation environment, executing a
design of experiments, and playing “what-if” games certainly takes longer and costs more
than ignoring the process altogether. The SOCRATES method is useful when technology
solutions themselves are different architectures, which is the case for systems-of-systems in
a net-centric context. Whenever the interactions between systems are difficult to quantify
using expert opinion or seminar war games, SOCRATES provides a structured process to
trace technology impacts to capability level metrics.
According to Brown, technology analysts need to “pick the right tools for the right
questions to answer in the right time with the right level of fidelity” [75]. Steps 1-3 of the
SOCRATES methodology speak to this issue and steps 4-10 of the process explain how to
carry out a technology forecasting activity in the context of a systems-of-systems problem.
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6.4 Review of Lessons Learned
The SOCRATES methodology relies on the fusion of techniques outlined in the hypotheses
in Chapter III. Through a proof-of-concept exercise in Chapter V, technology evaluation
for a Long Range Strike system architecture was demonstrated. The relation between the
proposed hypotheses, research questions, and technical challenges are concisely summarized
here:
• A “virtual laboratory” using a hierarchical, object-oriented, constructive simulation
framework encapsulated within neural network surrogate models can be used to rapidly
and quantitatively trace the benefit of proposed technologies to top-level capabilities
and vice versa.
• Surrogate modeling approaches can be used not only around the simulation to decrease
analysis time, but also inside the simulation to provide intelligence to individual agents
and battle-management super agents.
• It is possible to leverage advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence to
provide a first-order approximation for human decision making, thus enabling large
numbers of simulation runs without manual intervention.
• Intelligent decomposition of problem elements using systems engineering techniques,
morphological analysis, SysML, and others leads to analysis simplification without
losing the essence of the problem.
• Graphical visualization techniques are needed to understand the volumes of data gen-
erated for technology assessment.
The most important lesson learned in the implementation of the methodology is to sim-
plify the analysis framework when possible and avoid unnecessarily complex problems. Even
if they are “solved” by the experiment, the analyst never knows it because the complex-
ity of the problem obscures the answer. A “spiral” approach to modeling and simulation
where simple models evolve into a higher fidelity analysis with more elements is highly
recommended.
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6.5 Revisitation of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The SOCRATES methodology resulted from the infusion of techniques and methods pro-
posed as hypotheses. These hypotheses directly address research questions that arose in a
review of the technical literature to develop an understanding of the challenges associated
with the example problem and the roadblocks to its solution. The answers to the research
questions are reviewed here in detail:
1. How can the impact of technologies infused at the system level be analyzed
at the system-of-systems level and compared to measurable performance metrics
related to capabilities?
An object-oriented, hierarchical, constructive simulation is used to trace system level
technology impacts to the system-of-systems level using quantitative MoEs. Physics-based
models enable quantitative analysis, k-factors assist in mapping physical parameters to
notional technologies, and the inverse design/multivariate analysis technique enables trace-
ability across multiple hierarchical levels. (Hypotheses 2.1, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3)
2. How can military simulation runs be executed without a human in the
loop to make strategic and tactical decisions?
Intelligent agents can simulate basic strategic and tactical decisions both at the battle
management level and at the implementation level. A neural network equation enables
rapid analysis of potential alternatives and surrogate models at the platform level facilitate
technology exploitation. Although it was initially assumed that the intelligent agents would
learn and adapt to new situations and develop new tactics on-the-fly, adaptive agents con-
found technology analysis. A “dumb” agent with a good technology may be outperformed
by a “smart” agent with a sub-par technology. This would lead an analysis to wrongly
conclude that the inferior technology was in fact worth investing in. An approach where
agents were imbued with intelligence a priori and then exercised in a simulation addressed
this issue.
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After the “Meta-General” and exploiting agent concepts were developed, the QFD tech-
nique for prioritizing military objectives was developed to simplify the translation of strate-
gic objectives into actionable tasks that agents could perform. The linkage of these three
operational level hypotheses addressed the challenges posed by research question 2. (Hy-
potheses 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 4.8)
3. Should the goal of the methodology be to identify an optimum technology
portfolio that maximizes effectiveness or to seek a balanced portfolio that is
robust across envisioned operating conditions?
Although it seems like this research question answers itself, there is a wide variety of
literature available on systems-of-systems optimization. This is a combination of operations
research techniques and extensions of optimization algorithms developed in the multidiscipli-
nary optimization community to new problem domains. In the case of technology evaluation
for evolving military capabilities, neither of these is appropriate or desired. A technology
portfolio must be balanced across operating conditions, and theoretically balanced across
multiple scenarios and for different capabilities against different threats. This research
question is addressed with anecdotal references because the computational resources of the
day do not permit full treatment of the aforementioned degrees of freedom. (Hypothesis 2.3)
4. How can the scale of the problem be appropriately reduced without losing
the essence of the problem?
Engineers by their nature worship complicated things. Where systems-of-systems are
concerned, this approach is a recipe for disaster. The large scale of the problem and the high
degree of interactions necessitate an approach to limit the analysis activity to the significant
few degrees of freedom. The concept of the matrix of alternatives was used throughout this
work to scope the problem, and even to scope the methodology. It is a very simple and
convenient technique for enumerating the potential options and highlighting those selected.
When it comes to the development of the conceptual model and the implementation of
software code to realize the desired behaviors, some examples from the SysML were used
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to indicate how the problem can be further scoped. SysML diagramming is becoming more
widespread in systems engineering with the recent release of the full standard. A greater
use of this technique is recommended when distributed simulation development is necessary.
(Hypothesis 4.5)
5. For a given problem, what is the best way to determine the necessary
elements of a system architecture?
Here, the need for a solid foundation in systems engineering is demonstrated. Func-
tional decomposition, SWARMing, and brainstorming techniques are all critical functions
for problem definition, concept selection, and program management. The word “best” in
this research question is slightly disconcerting, because there are many other ways to define
a system architecture for technology identification. The easiest way is certainly to receive
a list of what is to be modeled in a specification from the customer; however, such detail
is seldom available. In this dissertation, functional decomposition is likely the best of the
identified techniques at tracing function to form. This helps limit unnecessary complexity
in the simulation and is key to facilitating the calculation of capability-based MoEs without
the confounding influence of unnecessary simulation elements. (Hypothesis 4.6)
6. How can the simulation process be sped up to allow examination of the
design space in a reasonable time frame?
Despite the fact that the number of transistors on an integrated circuit doubles roughly
every two years, design studies that took months in the 1960’s still take months. Instead
of obtaining the same information in less time, analysts leverage advances in computing to
obtain more information in the same time. Inversely, the amount of information available
in a unit time is proportional to computing resources and how they are used. Surrogate
modeling approaches enable high-fidelity modeling at high speeds. The implementation
of surrogate models around the simulation environment allows off-design cases within the
original design space to be very quickly analyzed, reducing the number of trips back to
the computer cluster to re-run cases to observe new behaviors. As another side benefit,
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surrogate models can also be exercised to visualize the results with relative ease. Surrogate
models are the single most important enabling technique in this dissertation. (Hypothesis
4.7)
7. What sampling techniques and modeling techniques are valid for non-
linear systems-of-systems simulations?
Designers are always in search of the “perfect” technique to address a certain class of
problems. Usually, comparisons of similar techniques in the same field result in only small
performance improvements; however, in this research, neural network surrogate models of-
fer marked improvements in accuracy over traditional polynomial response surfaces due
to the nonlinear behaviors observed throughout the design space for the military system-
of-systems. Their primary drawback is the increased complexity to create and the large
number of cases needed. A space-filling design based on a sphere-packing scheme was ex-
perimentally found to be the most appropriate for generating surrogate models for this
problem domain. (Hypotheses 4.8 and 4.9)
8. How can the importance and sensitivity of individual elements (or degrees
of freedom) of the system architecture be evaluated?
The first and most logical choice to address this research question is the implementation
of the ANOVA procedure across the hierarchical modeling and simulation environment.
Subsequently produced Pareto charts provide a means for understanding the sensitivities
of capability-level metrics on meaningful changes made at the system and subsystem level.
The only drawback to the ANOVA approach is that the assumptions and the ranges of
variability on the input parameters may change, and this can alter the character of the
Pareto chart.
The Prediction Profiler was introduced as a dynamic, graphical means for evaluating
the sensitivity derivatives across the hierarchical model. In fact, when neural networks
are used with the prediction profiler, these sensitivity derivatives may not even be linear or
curved: they may take on dramatically different shapes in different areas of the design space.
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Unfortunately, the use of this tool for solution discovery can be time consuming because it
functions as a one-variable-at-a-time calculator. Essentially, the prediction profiler enables
the visualization of the partial derivatives of capability with respect to all contributing
metrics while all assumptions and design/technology factors are held constant.
The most powerful (and sometimes most confusing) of the tools used to perform sen-
sitivity analysis is the multivariate analysis tool, used throughout this dissertation as a
means to view the total derivative of capability variation as all variables are simultaneously
changing. While this view shows an unprecedented amount of information, interpretation
is never straightforward. Many factors are changing at once, and the variability must be
carefully traced to its causal factors. (Hypothesis 4.10)
9. How can uncertainty be quantified for this class of problems?
While uncertainty quantification is not the primary focus of this work, Section 5.10.6
shows how Monte Carlo simulation can be used with neural network surrogate models to
rapidly perform design exploration studies and quantify technology uncertainty both on
input variables and output metrics. (Hypothesis 4.11)
The matrix of alternatives from Chapter III is revisited here in Figure 151. As previously
mentioned, there are over 4.15 x 1022 different methodology options enumerated in this
matrix. The selected options identify only a single thread through the matrix and define
the SOCRATES methodology outlined in this dissertation. Over time, new alternatives may
be developed and cross-fertilized from other fields. If the methodology becomes accepted,
the options in the matrix of alternatives will converge to a set of best practices applied




1 2.1 Hierarchical System-of-Systems Yes No
1 2.1 Level of Heterogeneity None Low Medium High
1 2.1 Type of Simulation Live Virtual Constructive Interactive
1 2.1 Programming Approach Custom (hardcoded) Object-Oriented
2 2.2 Make Decisions in Simulation Human-in-the-Loop Decision Tree Computer Assisted
Artificial 
Intelligence Other
3 2.3 Methodology Focus Optimization Robustness Other
2 3.1 Prioritize Targets Random Experience QFD OEC/MADM Other
2 3.2 Incorporate Tactics Hold Constant Include All Use Static Mapping Optimize for Each Technology Other
2 3.2 Type of Battle Manager Agent Reactive Deliberative Mixture Human





2 3.3 Type of Subordinate Agent Reactive Deliberative Mixture Human










1 4.1 Type of Models Physics-Based Empirical Hybrid Other
1 4.2-3 Analyze Technologies k-Factors Unified Tradeoff Environment Other
1 4.4 Trade Study Attributes Point Design Bottom-Up Top-Down Middle-Out Other
4 4.5 Reduce Scale of Problem Committee Approach SysML
Matrix of 
Alternatives Other None





6 4.7 Speed Up Processes None Linear Approximations Qualitative Mapping Surrogate Models Other




Neural Networks Radial Basis Functions Kriging Other
Random Full Factorial Box-Behnken D-Optimal Uniform
Orthog. Array Space-Filling Central Composite Latin Hypercube Other













7 4.9 Sample from Design Space
Figure 151: Matrix of Alternatives for Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Research
Questions.
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6.6 Recommendations for Future Work
“Let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.”
-Sun Tzu
If you ask an engineer how many more cases he needs to run, the answer is always “just
one more.” On the other hand, if you ask an architect how many bricks he needs, the
answer is “one less than too many and one more than not enough.” While this dissertation
could in theory go on forever, there will always be another building, another mountain, and
another challenge for another day. Some suggestions for future work are offered here.
The development of a methodology for capability-based technology evaluation for systems-
of-systems was confounded by the large number of degrees of freedom. Most of these di-
mensions had to be fixed to produce meaningful results with the resources available. The
first potential avenue to explore is a comparison of multi-domain solutions such as air vs.
land vs. space. These were not examined in this work due to the disparate models needed
to compare multi-domain concepts. Another area of interest is the expansion of the agent-
based tactical exploration. Can agents develop new tactics? Can they share the tactics
with other agents? Multi-agent learning and evolution is a fast-growing area of research.
Political dimensions such as overflight rules, basing restrictions, and rules of engagement
would provide an interesting diversion in international affairs and technology policy. The
assessment of a single capability across multiple geographic regions with varying terrain is
a logical extension of the demonstration in this work. The same can be said of developing
an integrated suite of systems that provide multiple capabilities. This is, after all, more like
the idea of designing “a military” instead of one element within it. Other treatments could
include a capability analysis of legacy systems with new technologies. Decisions on when
to decommission existing systems and spiral in new systems and capabilities is a good col-
laborative area for operations researchers, aerospace engineers, and technology developers.
On the hard-core physics-based modeling side, it would be of interest to see how the
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aforementioned methodology can be combined with high-fidelity models such as CFD aero-
dynamics codes for hypersonic drag calculations, finite element models for missile and air-
craft structures, or six degree-of-freedom trajectory tools for missile and aircraft flight
mechanics. Control systems received no treatment in this work, and propulsion systems
got less attention than originally planned. The rigors of developing the methodology for a
simple test case prevented resources from being allocated to these issues, but that does not
mean they are not of interest.
The methodology demonstrated dealt largely with the evaluation of effectiveness. Little
consideration was given to affordability and life-cycle cost models. Future work should in-
clude MoEs related to these factors and attempt to formulate a holistic life-cycle cost model
that addresses investment concerns, budgetary concerns, and operational issues. Further-
more, the analysis performed in this work assumed that all operational assets had the equip-
ment, munitions, and fuel they needed to prosecute their mission. Adding the umbrella of
logistics support brings a complicating but critical element into the fray. The design of a
system-of-systems robust to resupply shortages, denied basing, changing alliances, and fuel
restrictions would be of great interest to the operational community.
In terms of methods development, a greater treatment of uncertainty and its quantifi-
cation is desired. An easy-to-use yet intuitive means to quantify uncertainty at multiple
hierarchical levels would add value to the existing process. Other surrogate modeling tech-
niques such as Gaussian Processes may offer advantages in some problem domains. Agent-
based modeling was chosen over the complimentary system dynamics approach for battle
management; however, can a more generic framework be constructed with the latter?
This section not only highlights the myriad of opportunities in the study of systems-of-
systems, but also underscores an important life lesson: no matter how hard you work and
how much you do, you are only scratching the surface of scientific discovery.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
“I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know
nothing.”
-Socrates
The quote by Socrates is apt to describe the dilemma faced by systems-of-systems ana-
lysts: problems facing the community seem intractable due to the complexity of the prob-
lem. This complexity is inherent in our daily lives from weather to traffic to the movement
of financial markets. A scientific understanding of the underlying phenomenology of the
interconnected web of systems all around us is a long way off.
Just because something is difficult does not mean it is unworthy of study. In this
dissertation, methods and techniques to account for complexity in large scale systems-
of-systems were explored. A methodology to enable quantitative technology evaluation
of systems-of-systems using modeling and simulation was successfully demonstrated for a
Long Range Strike system architecture. The dynamic tradeoff environment created in this
demonstration is useful for decision making and analysis of large volumes of data in an
interactive visual manner.
But what about the answer? What is the best mix of technologies for a future Long
Range Strike System? Unfortunately, direct answers are hard to come by; however, the
proposed method provides insight into the problem that was previously obscured by layers
of complexity.
For example, one discovery is that the analysis of technology sensitivities is inherently
more useful than direct technology impacts. Since so many degrees of freedom are available,
locking them down for the purpose of getting an answer has almost no meaning. In fact,
there is literally no analyst or decision maker at any level that can specify the values of all
the unknown parameters simultaneously. The SOCRATES method facilitates the creation
of a parametric tradeoff environment to direct discussions about the sensitivities in different
regions and facilitate “what-if” games between technologists and decision makers.
The power of visualization cannot be underscored. The result of an analysis is just a
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table of numbers. Trends are invisible until they are presented in a visual manner. Using
dynamic interfaces, some of the assumptions can be analyzed parametrically and the results
can be displayed visually. The inherent processing power of the human brain is far more
useful than any number of Pentiums.
Finally, the use of a computer-simulated alternate reality for generating data and draw-
ing conclusions in a “virtual laboratory” is a capability that analysts only ten years prior
could only have dreamed of. As the techniques developed in this dissertation are combined
with advances in computing power, modeling software, and the cognitive sciences, one can
only wonder how the problems of the future may be addressed.
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APPENDIX A
REVIEW OF STRATEGIC HYPOTHESES
A.1 Hypothesis 2.1: Quantitative Technology Evaluation
Using a Hierarchical Object Oriented Constructive Sim-
ulation
Although the overall desire of the proposed methodology is to quantitatively assess the
impact of technologies at the system-of-systems level, can this even be done analytically?
Several notable questions arise:
• Is the system under test a hierarchical system-of-systems?
• How heterogeneous are the elements of the system-of-systems?
• What type of simulation should be used?
• What programming approach is desired?
A review of existing methods for technology evaluation for systems-of-systems identified
a dearth of techniques that quantitatively assess the impact of technologies across hierar-
chical levels. Systems-of-systems are dominated by interactions between components and
emergent behavior that is difficult to predict with qualitative methods. As a result, the need
for quantitative evaluation of technology impacts against top-level capabilities necessitates a
modeling and simulation environment. A literature search was conducted to understand the
type of simulation needed, decode the detailed jargon of the field, and identify simulation
tools that facilitate analysis goals.
A.1.1 Defining the Lingo: Introduction to Military Simulation Terminology
In the military simulation community, it is important to make clear the distinctions between
terms, as each has a specific meaning attached to it. The purpose of this section is to
delineate between terms that are used throughout this work and establish a common basis
of understanding through definition.
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A.1.2 Understanding Effects, Capabilities, Tactics, and Strategy
“All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is
the strategy out of which victory is evolved.”
-Sun Tzu
The military modeling community is rife with lingo, acronyms, and terminology that
must be crisply defined to communicate effectively across companies and government insti-
tutions. The first step in formulating a methodology is developing the linguistic database
to understand the issues associated with military modeling. For example the terms policy,
doctrine, and strategy are often confused and sometimes used interchangeably. While these
terms are all distinct, they are interrelated.
• Policy is guidance that states what is to be accomplished [431]. Policy is dictated at
the national and international level by the President of the United States (POTUS),
Congress, the United Nations, or other international bodies such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). National security policy is documented by the PO-
TUS in the National Security Strategy (NSS) while military policy is defined by the
Secretary of Defense in the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Military Strategy of
the United States of America [80, 360, 306]1. Furthermore, “within military opera-
tions, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of
engagement” [431]
• Doctrine “consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their
actions in support of national objectives” [468]. “Doctrine states that airmen should,
for example, seek to achieve air superiority, but doctrine does not focus on what
platforms should be used to achieve that effect” [431]. It explains how a job should
be performed to achieve an effect.
• The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is “a verbal or graphic statement, in
broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or
1Although these documents are identified as “strategy,” they are actually statements of policy.
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series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign
plans and operation plans” [468]. According to INCOSE, the CONOPS “describes
the way the system works from the operator’s perspective” [217].
• In contrast to CONOPS which are broad statements that are seldom system specific,
an Operational Concept is “an abstract model of the operations of a specific sys-
tem or group of systems, usually developed as part of the acquisition process and
used throughout the design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E) phases of
the system life cycle” [42]. A single CONOPS can encompass multiple operational
concepts.
• Strategy, which comes from the Greek stratos (army) and ago (to lead), is “the
art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a syn-
chronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational
objectives” [468]. It defines a plan of action, matching means to ends. According to
Clausewitz, strategy is “the theory and the use of combats for the object of the war”
[100]. Military theoreticians such as Bernard Brodie claim that strategy has been
constant throughout the history of warfare [74].
• Tactics, from the Greek tasso (to arrange), encompass the methods or procedures
used to achieve a goal. According to Clausewitz, a tactic is “the theory of the use of
military forces in combat” [100]. Tactics can be grouped under strategy. A series of
planned tactics employed to reach a desired end state are one method use to describe
the concept of operations. Because the adversary makes decisions after each friendly
play, the conditions of the game are constantly changing. As such, the exact sequence
of tactics planned in the CONOPS may not yield the desired end state. Also, the
enemy can quickly adapt if the same tactics are repeatedly used. Unlike strategy,
tactics are ephemeral and are often tied to the technology of the day.
• Effects are the “full range of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a
specific action” [431]. Direct effects refer to measurable quantities of military progress
such as damage caused, ships sunk, etc. Indirect effects refer to quantities that are
more nebulous but contribute significantly to warfighting objectives such as morale
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and momentum.
• The term Use Case has become increasingly popular in industry. A use case defines
how a user uses a system. If the user is a pilot, the use cases are tactics or procedures.
If the user is a general, the use cases are strategies, operational concepts, or CONOPS.
The system-of-systems triangle shown in Figure 10 can be extended to a pyramid called
the “PASS Pyramid.” PASS is an acronym that defines the four sides of this pyramid:
principles, actions, stakeholders and systems. The relationships between the four sides are
illustrated in Figure 152.
Finally, these terms can be further clarified by an analogy to the game of chess. Chess
is a game with defined rules, which are a statement of policy. This policy defines the
objective: win the game through the elimination of the opponent’s king. This is the desired
effect. Doctrine dictates that the player uses his pieces to achieve this effect. It does not
specify which pieces to use and in which order to use them. Strategy will dictate the general
disposition of the player, whether he is primarily defensive or offensive or under which
conditions he changes disposition. The allowable moves of each piece (or asset) are the
tactics that may be employed. A knight may employ the tactics of “move two spaces in
a direction and one space in a perpendicular direction” whereas bishops may employ only
diagonal tactics. Pieces that have more flexibility in their tactical options (for a given state
of the game) are generally more effective. A planned series of tactics that proceeds to an
end state embodies the concept of operations (CONOPS). Since it is not possible to forecast
what the opponent will do, the CONOPS may have to be altered depending on the state of
the game.
All assets can provide a single capability : to eliminate hostile pieces from the board2.
The degree to which the pieces can eliminate other pieces can be seen as their measure of
effectiveness in providing that capability. One would generalize that the queen is therefore
the most effective piece on the board, and the pawn is the least effective; however, this is
not the case. As mentioned in Reference [454], a capability is provided “under specified
2though it could be argued that all pieces except the king can provide the capability “sacrifice yourself




















































Figure 152: The Principles, Actions, Stakeholders, and Systems (PASS) Pyramid.
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conditions.” In the opening move of the game the queen cannot move. Therefore, her
effectiveness under these conditions is zero because she cannot provide the elimination
capability. A queen also has an effectiveness of zero after she is eliminated or when it is the
other player’s turn.
Alterations of existing pieces to provide new movement directions would be an exam-
ple of the development of new tactics. One side may employ new tactics with the same
assets which could provide an asymmetric advantage depending on the state of the game.
Teleportation from one square to any another would be an example of a tactic that would
greatly increase the survivability of the king. Although it is difficult to distinguish between
technologies and tactics in the game of chess since the pieces are all similar except for their
tactical employment, one example would be an increase in speed that allows the friendly
player to make two moves in the time the hostile player can make a single move. This
“technology” would greatly increase the effectiveness of the faster piece and may outweigh
a superior tactical advantage of certain standard pieces. A final example of technology
would be a “stealth” ability, whereas the opposing player did not know the location of the
king. In this situation, the attacker would have a difficult time developing a concept of
operations that centered on the king. A reasonable strategy would be to eliminate all other
pieces and then begin to search the board for the hostile king. Clearly, this technology
yields a tremendous tactical advantage as it modifies the strategy, CONOPS, and tactics
that the friendly player must employ. This situation is similar to the challenge faced in the
elimination of time-critical targets in an anti-access environment [68].
A.1.3 Scope and Timescales for Military Simulations
Different types of simulations exist and are often defined by the timescale over which critical
events occur.
A campaign is “a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strate-
gic or operational objective within a given time and space.” A campaign has a geographic
location, or theater, associated with it. Furthermore, a campaign is considered concluded
once an overall desired effect is achieved (eg: sufficiently degraded the enemy’s offensive
332
capabilities to the point which they are no longer a threat). A campaign is oriented on
the enemy’s centers of gravity and employs all available sea, air, land, space, and special
operations forces in a simultaneous and synchronized manner [372].
The related military operations within a campaign are missions: “the tasks, together
with the purpose, that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason therefore” [468].
The purpose of a mission is also to achieve a desired effect; however a mission generally
involves a smaller force structure or a more limited timeframe.
In the course of performing a mission, tactical conflicts may occur between friendly and
hostile forces. These are called engagements. In summary, a campaign occurs one or more
theaters and is comprised of a number of missions which themselves may contain multiple
engagements. A one-on-one or a few-on-few scenario can be considered an engagement.
When more assets are involved or when there is a clear motivation behind coordinated
action, this is usually referred to as a mission. The largest scale operations are considered
campaigns.
All three of these actions end when some desired effect is achieved with the strategic
importance of that effect increasing as one moves up the hierarchy. The time frame and
scope (see Table 32) of the conflict may also indicate which action is taking place:
Table 32: Scale and Time Frame of Three Major Classes of Simulations.
Category Scale Time Frame
Engagement One-on-One or Few-on-Few Minutes to Hours
Mission Several-on-Several Hours to Days
Campaign Many-on-Many Days to Years
A.1.4 Types of Simulations
Simulation can be defined as “the process of imitating a real phenomenon with a set of
mathematical formulas” [9]. Simulations allow designers to examine changes on a system
without affecting the actual system. Modeling physical systems in a virtual environment
provides insight into the behavior of a complex system and its interaction with other systems
[126].
Simulations are classified into three distinct types. Live simulations involve real people
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using real (or simulated) hardware in the real world. For example, mock trials may test
legal prosecution and defense teams while army units may practice combat maneuvers in
the desert with live rounds. Virtual simulations are a broad class of simulations that involve
real people using simulated systems. The most definitive example of a virtual simulation is
a flight simulator. Commercial flight simulation tools approach real-world accuracy. Using
virtual simulation, humans can practice unusual or dangerous maneuvers such as Space
Shuttle reentry techniques without actually endangering human life. Virtual simulation is
widely used to provide realistic and cost effective training aids. The third type of classifica-
tion used is constructive simulation. These simulations rely on simulated people interacting
in a simulated world, and while humans often stimulate events in the environment, the
outcome is not primarily determined by them [451]. Constructive simulations typically rely
on computers to simulate realistic human behavior in a representative environment. Mil-
itary wargames typify constructive simulation. Many popular computer games including
the Electronic Arts
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, etc) and Command and
Conquer
TM
are examples of commercially available constructive simulations.
Interactive simulation, or “human-in-the-loop” simulation, is a type of simulation that
crosses the boundary between virtual and constructive simulations. A fully virtual simula-
tion is categorized by continuous human input while a completely constructive simulation
requires no human intervention once the simulation begins. In a fully constructive sim-
ulation, a SimCity
TM
gamer could open a saved game file and let the game run without
intervention. Similarly, a fully virtual simulation is one in which a pilot would fly in a
virtual environment independent of other traffic or air traffic control. Interactive simula-
tions combine elements of both types, for example, to allow human pilots to attack ground
targets whose movements are governed by artificial intelligence. These types of simulations
are summarized in Figure 153.
It is interesting to note that the final permutation between real/simulated worlds and
people involves simulated people operating real-world systems. While not classified as a
type of simulation, this model of operation would refer to autonomous systems such as ISR
UAVs or intelligent agents such as the MicrosoftR© Office Assistant interfacing with real
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Figure 153: Taxonomy for the Classification of Simulations.
people. It is important to note that it is often difficult to directly classify a simulation as
live, virtual, or constructive. Realistic simulations may incorporate elements of different
classes. The use of simulation tools for concept evaluation and selection is a continuum of
the three major classifications. Different phases of the design cycle rely on different types





Begin With the End in Mind 
Design 
for testPull tools 
forward for
application across































Sys Design System Dev DT&E IOT&E
Mission Environment
Concept Dev
Must be a real time, frame based environment…EAAGLES and not FLAMES
Figure 154: Evaluation Continuum Over the Project Life Cycle [336].
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Recently, advanced technology in the form of new munitions has permeated the existing
military architecture as a cost-effective means of implementing additional capabilities using
legacy systems. Unfortunately, this integration is primarily confined to the system acquisi-
tion and sustainment phases of major weapon systems programs. According to Schrage, an
IPPD process that provides more detailed information in the early design phases reduces the
total cost of ownership while enabling transitional capabilities [369]. As previously men-
tioned, this process is enabled through computer simulation in the concept development
and system design phases. As shown in Figure 154, in this stage of the product life cycle a
majority of the simulation activities should involve constructive simulation.
A.1.5 Utilization of Constructive Military Simulations for Technology Evalu-
ation
Recently, research into technology evaluation for systems-of-systems has involved military
campaign modeling. Soban used the Integrated Theater Engagement Model (ITEM) to
develop a probabilistic system effectiveness framework for aircraft survivability [378]. ITEM
is used for joint simulation of air, land, and naval warfare systems has a strong emphasis on
visualization and uses a graphical user interface [38]. The key observation made by Soban
is that a large amount of computational analysis effort is traditionally spent optimizing
an aircraft system with little regard for how it performs in its operational environment.
Soban extended design methods for aircraft design such as probabilistics and robust design
to the campaign level and demonstrated that various difficulties with model integration and
abstraction could be solved through traditional systems engineering approaches applied at
the campaign level.
Soban noted that surrogate modeling approaches of the time had difficulty modeling
discontinuous behaviors, such when the detection range of a SAM is lowered to the point
that the aggressor aircraft are not detected at all. She also noted that code selection impacts
process implementation to a great degree. While the PoSSEM methodology developed by
Soban is independent of a simulation code, the complicating nuances of ITEM impacted
her ability to fully explore desired degrees of freedom. Soban recommends the selection of
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simulation tools that are flexible, lack a steep learning curve, and can be reasonably inte-
grated into computational frameworks. To make decisions in the PoSSEM proof-of-concept
demonstration, Soban used decision trees with finite probabilities resulting in four analysis
pathways that required surrogate model generation but notes that for larger problems the
number of pathways to explore grows exponentially. Depending on the simulation tool, this
technique may or may not be valid.
Frits formulated a system-of-systems-based robust design environment for undersea
weapons and developed the necessary tools to demonstrate the impact of tactics on tor-
pedo design [159]. Frits noted that although more than 15 government undersea warfare
simulation tools exist, all accurate undersea engagement simulations were classified or un-
available for academic research. To demonstrate the impact of tactics on design, Frits
implemented a minehunting simulation in MATLABR© that utilized a time-marching analy-
sis of a notional mine detection, classification, and neutralization vehicle. Frits concludes
that research into complex systems-of-systems would be aided by generic engagement mod-
eling tools. To fully integrate tactics into the conceptual design environment, Frits notes
that parametric tools that “account for the myriad of tactical decisions possible without
resorting to a man-in-the-loop style analysis” are needed [159].
A.1.6 Review of Existing Military Simulations
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Organization (DMSO) maintains a database of all
approved military simulations, models, data sources, and other utilities for the analysis and
evaluation of military simulations called the Modeling and Simulation Resource Reposi-
tory (MSRR). Currently, there are over 500 simulation tools approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force
[448]. Of these, thirty-seven simulations are designated by Air Force organizations [425].
The characteristics of major simulation codes utilized by the Air Force are summarized in
Figure 155. Of the constructive simulations listed in Figure 155, only FLAMES (highlighted
in green) is designed to function from the subsystem to campaign level.
Furthermore, while the identified tools have been approved by the DMSO, a simulation
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Figure 155: Comparison of Major Air Force Simulations (Compiled from data in Reference
[425]).
framework must be available for public use and affordable to acquire and maintain. These
constraints eliminate several simulation tools from consideration as a framework for the
proof-of-concept in this dissertation.
Also, implementing a realistic modeling and simulation environment that allows flow-up
of technologies from the engineering subsystem level to capabilities at the campaign level
traditionally requires the linkage of a variety of simulations. One criterion that is therefore
useful in the selection of a simulation framework that supports integration of models across
the simulation hierarchy.
Another criterion in the selection of a simulation framework is the suitability of the tool
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to facilitate large-scale system-of-systems studies. According to Painter, object-oriented
simulations, now the standard in the military simulation community, are appropriate for
this task [333].
A.1.6.1 Benefits to an Object-Oriented Approach
Flexible military simulations can be enabled through the use of object-oriented constructs.
Object-oriented programming (OOP) is a programming paradigm widely popular in com-
puter science and “brings a discipline to the process of writing code which can produce
software that is modular, maintainable, and extendible” [398]. OOP is the computational
equivalent to a system-of-systems: the computer program is composed of a collection of
individual units called objects. This flexible approach allows objects to send and receive
messages in addition to processing data [16]. This is in contrast to the traditional view
of programming in which sequential instructions were given to the computer, a result of
the punch-card era. It is believed that the term “object-oriented programming” developed
literally from the grammatical meaning of the word “object” which is always attached to
a verb. Since “object does verb”, it is easier to develop simple functions and link them
together. Subject-based software has ambiguous and complex requirements that lead to
monolithic computer programs. This is analogous to defining a system using functional
decomposition (top-down, verb/function oriented) or physical recomposition (bottom-up,
noun/subject oriented) [333]. Although there are several different types of OOP, there are
some general characteristics that all languages and frameworks share:
1. Objects: Self-contained modules that correspond to various aspects of the problem.
They include “a local state and the set of operations that are allowed to change that
state” [398].
2. Abstraction: The ability of objects to focus on essential details only and ignore
some aspects of the information that it is processing. Like individuals, the objects
can perform a variety of functions depending on their state and the input conditions.
They may not need all types of information to achieve a desired function in certain
situations.
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3. Encapsulation: Users can only interact with objects through intended methods. An
interface is provided to the user to identify what the input and output methods are.
It is not necessary for other objects to see the methods and processes inside the code.
This is similar to the way extensive details are enclosed within a response surface
model.
4. Inheritance: Objects can be defined which are modifications or subclasses of existing
objects. For example, a fighter aircraft inherits methods and processes from the
aircraft object, which in turn inherits aspects from the vehicle object.
5. Polymorphism: Objects can inherit methods from other objects, but their internal
routines may cause them to handle those methods differently. For example, if a human
receives a command to “move quickly,” it moves its legs and begins to run. If a car
receives the same message, it throttles up the engine and spins its wheels faster. In
this way, desired effects can be easily enumerated in terms of the actions required to
achieve them.
The above characteristics provide several benefits which are key to this research. First,
the definition of small modules is ideal for various levels of systems required in a system-of-
systems approach. Modularity also allows extremely rapid creation of multiple aircraft of
different types that may even have slight variations to reflect pilot skill. Second, abstraction
plays a key role in the design for systems that perform multiple functions. Nearly all items
in a military system-of-systems effectiveness framework perform multiple actions under
a variety of conditions. Message passing between modules can simulate network centric
warfare or allow objects to operate collaboratively. Third, encapsulation provides a way to
simulate the chain of command and account for operational uncertainty. Soldiers are trained
according to some known procedures and have certain tactics available. The general tells
his troops to perform a given mission (message call to the objects) and they execute the
necessary methods with the information they have. The general does not tell each soldier
when to arm his weapon, where to point it, and how often to shoot. Next, the idea of
inheritance is helpful to rapidly create a computer model of an architecture, as many items
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have similar methods such as move, fight, defend, and flee. Polymorphism allows easy
switching of physical systems that are intended to provide the same effect. Polymorphism
and inheritance both help standardize interfaces between code modules.
This section is only a cursory overview of several aspects of this immense field for which
countless volumes and entire disciplines have been developed. It is evident that a modeling
and simulation environment that utilizes an object-oriented approach is key to successfully
developing a large-scale simulation capability for multiple types of interacting systems that
must communicate with other heterogeneous assets to achieve a desired effect. OOP also
makes the implementation of an agent-based artificial intelligence framework easier (Section
A.2.7) and will allow the implementation a variable fidelity approach to subsystem modeling
with minimal code updates (Section 5.3.1.7). For all of these reasons, simulation frameworks
that use OOP must be utilized or written to support system-of-systems design.
A.1.7 Selection of a Simulation Framework
The implementation of a system-of-systems effectiveness evaluation environment for the con-
ceptual design of large scale military system architectures requires a constructive simulation
(see Section A.1.4). Ideally, this tool should be commercially available, object-oriented, valid
across the entire military simulation hierarchy, and flexible enough to allow the modeling of
any type of system with variable levels of fidelity. After reviewing the commercially avail-
able and government-owned simulations shown in Figure 155, only the FLAMES framework
by Ternion, Inc. meets all of the standards of effectiveness and availability listed above.
The FLexible Analysis Modeling and Exercise System (FLAMES) is a framework used
to build constructive simulations that relies heavily on an object-oriented programming
approach3 [397, 28]. By creating objects within the FLAMES framework and defining the
linkages between objects, a user can create a constructive simulation for systems and engi-
neering analysis, testing, training, mission planning, entertainment, and a wide variety of
other applications. Due to the object-oriented nature of the framework, FLAMES objects
(or models) can be created from the engineering subsystem level to the campaign level
3Programming purists note that FLAMES is not a constructive simulation. It is a framework that can
be used to build them.
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provided that the appropriate interfaces between the various hierarchical levels are defined.
FLAMES objects can also be created which define linkages to live and virtual simulations.
The framework comes with a number of “example models,” which, when modified and
extended can provide reasonable approximations of the systems necessary to demonstrate
military architectures. FLAMES has been applied to a wide variety of problems including
network centric systems analysis [495], conceptual weapons system design [486], directed
energy weapons performance [413], and military engagements [344]. The open source ar-
chitecture of FLAMES provides the flexibility to model nearly any system at any level of
detail, a majority of the industry and government activities using the software are either
classified or proprietary at this point.
FLAMES is actually a family of several customizable products based on the C/C++
programming language. The products comprising FLAMES include:
• FORGE: FLAMES Operational Requirements Graphical Editor. Graphical interface
to the FLAMES database. Allows creation of scenarios, units, and hardware models.
The 2-D and 3-D interface lets a user view the scenario as it is created.
• FIRE: FLAMES Interactive Runtime Executable. Executes a scenario created in
FORGE. Can run in batch mode and be executed from the command line.
• FLASH: FLAMES Scenario Highlighter. Plays back an executed scenario. Visualiza-
tion options include 2-D and 3-D playback. FLASH can also be used simultaneously
with FIRE to view the action as it is occurring.
• FLARE: FLAMES Analysis and Reduction Environment. Converts output data to
SQL tables for mining and analysis. For simple analyses FLARE can be replaced with
custom exporters that extract the necessary data using C++ scripts.
































Figure 156: Information Flow in the FLAMES Framework.
To understand FLAMES, it is necessary to understand its origins. In software engineer-
ing, a framework is “a defined support structure in which another software project can be
organized and developed” [16]. A framework to an engineer is his/her file cabinet, library,
computer, and engineering knowhow and contains support programs, code libraries, and
other software to assemble a coding project. Software developers use frameworks because
the development of large scale software projects is inherently distributed. Pieces of code are
written by different developers that may be geographically separated4. FLAMES is written
by software developers and hence follows a very structured, object-oriented approach. In-
stead of a single monolithic entity constructed for one purpose, FLAMES is instantly recon-
figurable with a variety of custom modules, interfaces, and user-defined models. Although
it comes with several example models to demonstrate the functionality of the software for
campaign analysis, these models are designed only to serve as starting points for custom
development by the end user. In fact, the object code for the FLAMES suite of tools is
provided and the code is actually recompiled when new models are created! This level of
4This is of course identical to the scenario faced in modern engineering design; however, the engineering
community is poorly equipped to adapt since monolithic engineering firms are not as ephemeral as software
development entities.
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control over the functionality of a commercial product is unprecedented outside the soft-
ware engineering field. It is ideal for the development of a flexible modeling and simulation
environment for military campaign analysis and technology forecasting.
Hypothesis 2.1: A top-down capability-based evaluation of technologies can
be performed using a holistic, object-oriented, hierarchical simulation of systems-
of-systems.
A.2 Hypothesis 2.2: Using Artificial Intelligence to Re-
move the Human from the Analysis Loop
One of the most severe roadblocks in the formulation of a simulation-based method for
technology evaluation is the fact that most military simulations use a human-in-the-loop
to make decisions. A major philosophical decision at the strategic level concerns the desire
to use artificial intelligence in the form of machine learning and agent-based modeling to
address this issue. Concerns related to this decision also dominates the hypotheses at the
operational level.
A.2.1 Decision Making in Design and Optimization
Decision making is “the cognitive process of selecting a course of action from among multi-
ple alternatives” [16]. This psychological construct is an important part of many professions
and of every day life, especially design. According to Hazelrigg, “The selection of design
parameters for an engineering system ... constitutes an allocation of resources. [There-
fore,] design is a decision making process, and the selection of design parameters represent
decisions” [198]. The science of decision theory, which concerns mathematics, statistics,
philosophy, psychology, and economics is concerned with studying how decisions are made.















Figure 157: Three Major Categories of Decision Making.
A.2.2 Human Decision Making
Humans are very good decision makers. The cognitive processes and elements of a human
brain can quickly analyze data, extract information from memory, and determine the ap-
propriate course of action. For this reason, a human is often included in many military
simulations. Generals with extensive training in tactical maneuvers, military strategy, and
the capabilities of various military units are extremely efficient decision makers. For some
large-scale military simulations, it is most effective to include these human decision makers:
the number of simulation runs executed is often one or few, and the simulation occurs over
a matter of days, sometimes synchronized with a real-time clock to mimic the chain of
command in actual combat [115, 156].
Additionally, there are many different “ways” to make decisions. Multiple-criteria de-
cision making (MCDM) is a class of techniques for making decisions “in the presence of
multiple, usually conflicting, criteria” that impact the value of an alternative [210]. Deci-
sions made under uncertainty involve probabilistic theory. Fuzzy logic, possibility theory,
and game theory can also be used to make decisions under certain conditions [332]. The
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study of human decision making is a large area of research in the field of psychology.
A.2.3 Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) encompasses Multiple Attribute Decision Mak-
ing (MADM) and Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM). Many treatises are avail-
able on these topics including References [210] and [488]. MADM has been applied exten-
sively to a wide range of problems including commercial transports [240], unmanned aerial
vehicles [291] and ballistic missile target vehicles [60]. This research does not rely heavily
on MCDM techniques for a user interface; however, a MCDM calculation using an Overall
Evaluation Criterion (OEC) is used to prioritize targets within the testbed simulation. The
theory behind this application is explained in Section B.1.
A.2.4 Decision Trees
A popular method of analyzing decisions is through the use of a decision tree: a graph
of possible decisions and their consequences. Each node in a decision tree represents a
point in time where a decision is made. Multiple branches from a node represent decisions
that can be made at that time. An example of a decision tree is shown below in Figure
158. In this example, the red circle represents the first decision for which there are nine
resultant paths represented by the blue circles. Each blue circle may have one or more
branches. The number of pathways through this decision tree is fifty. The nodes do not line
up temporally because decision nodes may be reached at different times. Also, some green
nodes, representing the final state of the simulation for this small example, can be reached
from multiple blue decision points while some can only be reached by one decision node.
A decision tree has limited applicability for decision making. For example, at the red
node, the decision maker can choose any of the nine blue paths. Which one should be
chosen? It can be argued that the blue node with the maximum utility should be chosen.
Moving to this node, the decision maker now has several green nodes available; however,
not all green nodes are available. By selecting the optimum blue node, the decision maker
may have globally suboptimal green nodes as the available final decision pathways. As this






Figure 158: Decision Tree for Three Decisions at Different Points in Time.
pathway in the tree. Since the problem grows exponentially with the number of nodes and
connections added, the number of pathways to explore can quickly become unmanageable.
Decision trees form the concept of chess-playing supercomputers like the famous Deep Blue
computer that defeated Gary Kasparov in 1997. Capable of analyzing over 200 million
possible decision pathways per second, Deep Blue fathoms a decision tree “with the position
on the physical chessboard acting as the root position. The moves searched become the
tree branches, and the positions searched become the branching points” [209].
As is the case with the chess playing example, when an adversary is involved, the
available options on the decision tree become functions of the other player’s options. This
is often called a game tree in game theory [151]. The issue of campaign simulation using
decision trees is further compounded by the realization that each individual engagement can
be treated as a single game, and a campaign is a sequence of many simultaneous interacting
games.
Furthermore, this decision tree takes a purely deterministic view of the problem. If
the value of each node is probabilistic, it becomes necessary to find the expected value of
each decision before it is made. In a military simulation, this can mean that each pathway
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must be explored thousands of times with different values for noise parameters to assess
robustness of a given pathway. For non-trivial problems, there are not enough computers
in the world to discover a solution.
A.2.5 Computer Assisted Decision Making
“In many cases during the design process the analyst is interested in criteria which are either
non-quantifiable or for which there are no available numerical models” [79]. To address this
issue, Buonanno developed a method for using Interactive Genetic Algorithms (IGAs) to
combine quantitative physics-based analyses with qualitative measures that rely on expert
input. Using a graphical interface combined with a genetic algorithm, designs which score
well in terms of numerical objective function are displayed to the user who ranks them as
”bad, poor, ok, good, and best.” The use of physics-based tools to narrow the design space
is in contrast to traditional IGAs that are based solely on qualitative judgements by human
operators. Takagi notes that the decision-maker’s error increases with time and approaches
a random process [393]. The approach developed by Buonanno could be used in a wargame
if a human decision maker is used. The desire to entirely remove the human from the loop
in this research drives the selection of an artificial intelligence-based approach to battle
management and decision making described below.
A.2.6 Artificial Intelligence in Decision Making
A difficulty arises when constructive simulation is used to examine a wide array of concepts
over larger time scales. It is not practical to sequester a thousand generals for ten years to
serve as battle management decision makers as millions of code runs are executed. In fact,
humans tire quickly when utilized as decision makers in repetitive interactive simulations
[393]. To facilitate large design space exploration without the need for a human-in-the-loop,
an approach is needed that allows a computer to serve as a surrogate decision maker. This
approach was famously depicted by the War Operation Plan Response (WOPR) computer
in the 1983 film WarGames [299].
WOPR is designed to play numerous war games, learning from the outcomes of each,
and optimally respond to potential nuclear attack scenarios [16]. In the climax of the
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Figure 159: The War Operation Plan Response (WOPR) Computer Testing Scenarios at
“NORAD” in the 1983 film WarGames [299].
film, WOPR plays through all possible scenarios in the game “Global Thermonuclear War”
before concluding that there is no winning strategy (see Figure 159). This fictional account
provides a starting point for the development of a computational cognitive decision making
model.
Many treatises are available on the psychological and computational aspects of decision
making, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and cognitive engineering. While a
fully autonomous, human-like “Meta-General” is desired, thousands of computer scientists
have been at work for fifty years to develop this type of capability. This research focuses
on a smaller subset of techniques to prove that AI can be incorporated to some degree
in a capability-based design environment to remove the human from the loop. Instead
of focusing on the detailed theory behind decision making, the purpose of this section is
to provide background on several possible options for this “Meta-General” and suggest a
course of action for this research.
Because of the large number of runs needed to perform a design space exploration or
forecast the impact of technologies, it is not feasible to have a human in the loop to make
strategic and tactical decisions. As a result, a technique that reliably approximates human
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decision making in an object-oriented simulation is needed. One promising approach is
agent-based modeling.
A.2.7 Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling
“Some people worry that artificial intelligence will make us feel inferior, but
then, anybody in his right mind should have an inferiority complex every time
he looks at a flower.”
-Alan C. Kay
Complex systems are categorized by emergent, dynamic, non-linear behavior derived
from interactions between lower level components. The field of agent-based modeling and
simulation (ABM/S) uses a bottom up approach to the design of complex systems that
relies on creating relatively simple “agents” and defining the interactions between agents
in such a way to generate realistic system level behavior with relatively unsophisticated
subsystem elements. According to Ilachinski, “agent-based simulations of complex adaptive
systems are predicated on the idea that the global behavior of a complex system derives
entirely from the low-level interactions among its constituent agents” [212].
Through the appropriate establishment of rules, objectives, and rewards for a group of
agents, some decisions can be made automatically without human interaction. “The major
strength of ABM/S comes from the fact that it is a simple, versatile, and flexible method
that is well suited for studies of complex non-linear systems” [258].
A.2.8 Agents
The building blocks of an agent-based simulation are called agents. Agents, also called actors
or players, use the principle of artificial intelligence to emulate the behavior of humans.
In a military simulation they represent assets available to perform actions such as tanks,
aircraft, soldiers, and ships. Two main branches of focus emerge for the use of agents:
design/analysis, and simulation. Design/analysis is primarily seen in the software industry
and has been in development for more than a decade [222, 473]. Here, agents serve as
construction tools for the development of software and software architectures. Another
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design and analysis example is the use of agents for mechanical assembly operations [185].
Software agents called “bots” are also used to automate certain computational tasks such
as web surfing (web spiders), instant messaging (chat bots), and online shopping [16].
Definitions of the term “agent” abound in the literature:
• “An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through
sensors and acting upon that environment through effectors” [363].
• “Autonomous agents are computational systems that inhabit some complex dynamic
environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing so realize
a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed” [265].
• “Intelligent agents continuously perform three functions: perception of dynamic con-
ditions in the environment; action to affect conditions in the environment; and reason-
ing to interpret perceptions, solve problems, draw inferences, and determine actions”
[197].
• “An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of an environment that
senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and
so as to effect what it senses in the future” [157].
As with biological organisms, agents operate in an environment and react to stimuli
based on cognitive processes that seek to achieve one or more goals. Essentially, an agent
can be loosely defined as “a surrogate life form.” While simple agents act as surrogate life
forms in the most basic sense, the term intelligent agents is used to extend the basic
definition by adding two general characteristics of higher-order life forms, autonomy and
adaptiveness. First, an intelligent agent has control over its own actions. Agents have a
series of actions which they are allowed to perform as they attempt to maximize their own
utility function. They autonomously interact with their environment, gathering information
through sensing mechanism and making decisions based on their perception of the world
around them. As the world changes, agents can also adapt and change their behavior based
on what they “know” and what they perceive about their environment. Intelligent adaptive
agents are inherently more realistic surrogates for human decision makers due to their ability
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to alter goals and beliefs based on information acquired about their environment.
The use of autonomous intelligent agents for simulation has roots in Cellular Automata
which was originally developed by John von Neumann and Stanislaw Ulam in the 1940’s
to find a reductionist model for biological evolution [212, 213, 472]. Simulations use agents
to give traits, characteristics, or personalities to individual pieces within a larger context.
Using this basic approach, agent-based simulation has been used to model economics [400],
the air transportation system [258, 259], endangered bird populations [65], human behavior
[328], land based combat [212], and many other dynamic systems. Reference [414] contains
a comprehensive survey of collectives and agent-based models and identifies over a thousand
references on the topic.
Agent-based simulation has also found its way into the motion picture industry to reduce
the time it takes to render detailed scenes with hundreds of “actors” and to create more chal-
lenging artificial intelligence for computer controlled opponents. Notable examples of this
technology include the large 3-D rendered battle scenes in The Lord of the Rings [245, 317]
and Troy [476]. Computer games have also benefited heavily from advances in agent-based
simulation. To be entertaining for long periods of time, real-time strategy (RTS) games
must have computer players and interactive agents that have complex behavior that varies
according to user inputs. Real-time strategy games trace their origins to Stonkers (Imagine,
1983), The Ancient Art of War (Broderbund, 1984), and SimCity (Maxis, 1989). The RTS
genre was defined by Dune II (Westwood, 1992), and other notable games include Warcraft
(Blizzard, 1994), Command and Conquer (Westwood, 1995), Total Annihilation (Cavedog,
1997), and StarCraft (Blizzard, 1998). The recent development of Massively Multiplayer
Online Games such as Air Warrior (Kesmai, 1987), EverQuest (Sony, 1999), and Final
Fantasy XI (Square-Enix, 2002) combine hundreds of human players with intelligent agents
(called non-player characters, or NPCs) in a massive, interactive, online world.
What place do video games have in scientific research or military modeling and simula-
tion? In one example, based on the success of first-person tactical strategy games such as
Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six (Ubisoft, 1998), and Medal of Honor (Electronic Arts, 1999),








Figure 160: Video Games Utilizing Agent-Based Simulation [178].
simulation called AWE (asymmetric warfare environment) to train military personnel in
urban combat before they enter the combat zone [178]. Examples of some of these video
games are shown in Figure 160. The level of effort in the creation of some video games is
on par with the most complex military simulations. Most video games take one to three
years to complete, have a staff of over a hundred developers, and cost between $1 and $15
million dollars to produce. According the market research firm NPD Group, PC and console
hardware and software sales exceeded $11 billion dollars in 2004 [16]. For comparison, the
FY 2005 budget request for the United States Missile Defense Agency, the largest single
line item in the DoD budget, was approximately $8.8 billion dollars [322].
As an example of crossover between the entertainment and “serious gaming” industry,
Breakaway Software of Hunt Valley Maryland produces entertainment titles such as Civi-
lization but also develops simulation tools such as netStrike, 24 Blue - Flight Deck, and the
mōsbē simulation toolkit [6].
A.2.9 Concept of Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation
Since the use of agent-based modeling relies on the emergence of complex behavior from the
lower-level interactions among constituent agents, it is necessary to review the elements of
agent-based modeling and simulation as shown in Figure161. The concept relies on several
elements:
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1. Goals: What the agent is trying to do. Can include “rewards” for successfully com-
pleting objectives.
2. Beliefs: What the agent thinks about the world around itself according to informa-
tion provided. Beliefs can be true, false, or somewhere inbetween, depending on the
sophistication level of the agent logic.
3. Information: Data about the environment in which is is placed. Usually derived
from sensory input, but can also come from communication with other agents.
4. Senses: The methods by which an agent can gather information about its environ-
ment.
5. Decisions and Actions: A series of potential decisions or actions that can be pre-






























Figure 161: Concept of Agent-Based Modeling (adapted from Reference [258]).
By gathering information through its senses, an agent examines the goals and beliefs in
its construct and attempts to determine which action brings it closer to its goals. This is
a feedback process which involves interaction with its environment. The general concept
behind agent-based modeling is that by performing actions on its environment, the agent
changes that environment, albeit ever so slightly. The agent then examines the changed
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world through its senses, examines whether its previous decision was helpful or harmful
with respect to its goals and the process repeats. The goals of an agent can be changed
through interaction with a controlling super-agent or human. This is discussed in more
detail in Section B.2.1.
A.2.10 The Continuum of Intelligent Agents
There are many types of agents at varying levels of complexity. A continuum of possible
agents is shown in Figure 162.
Reactive Agents Deliberative Agents







Figure 162: Continuum of Agents.
The simplest types of agents are called reactive agents. These agents have simple rules
that may be formulated as if/then statements or table lookups depending on probability.
They are often deterministic and do not require a learning mechanism. Reactive agents
simply respond to stimuli in a predictable manner.
At the other end of the spectrum are deliberative agents. Deliberative agents are
highly intelligent, utilize reinforcement learning mechanisms, and sometimes can be self-
reprogrammable or reconfigurable [88]. Individual assets such as fighters and SAM sites
likely reside toward the left end of the spectrum, while artificial intelligence-enabled bat-
tle managers would epitomize deliberative agents. The development of highly accurate
deliberative agents is an area of continuing research in computer science and mathematics.
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A.2.11 Preferred Architecture for Multi-Agent Systems
Lewe describes several key categories of agent-based simulations including simulations with
independent agents, an information layer, groups of agents, and a hierarchical structure
[258]. The hierarchical multi-agent system (MAS) is most appropriate for military campaign

















Figure 163: Multi-Agent System with Hierarchical Organization (extended from Reference
[258]).
In this case, the super agent is either a human or an intelligent agent as shown in Figure
161. The super agent is representative of the general, secretary of defense, or commander-
in-chief. This agent can communicate information to his combatant commanders. These
commanders can exchange information and often do in large battles or joint force operations.
Each commander can also communicate with the combatants under his command; however,
he cannot communicate with the combatants in other units. In fact, having these extra
communications pathways can result in the same agent receiving multiple and conflicting
goals depending on the objectives of the agents at the combatant commander level. Finally,
the lowest-level agents interact directly with the environment and pass information back up
the chain of command to the super agent. In real life, this exchange of information is not
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lossless: information exchange takes a finite amount of time and commanders are inclined
to report the more optimistic details to top-level warfighters.
This hierarchical architecture differs slightly from the pure agent-based modeling and
simulation concepts outlined by Lewe [258] and Ilachinski [212]. In these frameworks, the
complex behavior at the system-of-systems level is entirely derived from the behavior of a
small number of relatively unsophisticated agents with simple rule sets. The pure agent-
based paradigm holds well for large-scale systems with many similar assets, typified by
land-based combat, ant populations, and ecological models. In contrast, air combat more
closely relates to that of special forces or the single combat warrior due to the smaller
number of highly integrated heterogeneous assets. Pure agent-based techniques are good
for discovery and development of new tactics with static assets, exploring high-level behav-
iors and policies, and understanding the behavior of military systems under a variety of
battlefield conditions. While a pure agent-based approach solves several problems related
to system-of-systems, the “set-up the agents and watch them play” mentality provides too
little resolution to the decision making environment to be of practical use for the selected
problem of interest.
A.2.12 Paradigms for Creating Adaptive Intelligent Agents
One challenge in agent-based modeling is the determination of “how intelligent” agents
should be. The WoLF (“Win or Learn Fast”) approach developed by Bowling features a
variable learning rate, where the agent reduces the learning rate when it is performing well
(the agent becomes more “cautious” because adversarial agents may adapt) and increases
the rate of learning when it is performing poorly [69]. Due to the confounding effect of
agent learning on technologies, in this work intelligent agents on either side do not adapt
to the patterns of the adversary.
Another question regards the scope of the problem. Casti notes that “in contrast to sim-
ple systems—like superpower conflicts, which tend to involve a small number of interacting
agents—or large systems... which have a large enough collection of agents that we can use
statistical means to study them ” a medium-sized number of agents should be used to study
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emergent behavior [89]. This number may range from dozens to hundreds of intelligent
agents.
A.2.13 Other Key Concepts
Non-linear behavior is that which is not directly proportional to the change of an input
value. As Gleick eloquently notes, “nonlinearity means that the act of playing the game
has a way of changing the rules” [168]. In contrast, linear relationships are proportional to
the change of input parameters.
Chaotic behavior identifies random outputs of a deterministic mapping [213]. In chaos
theory, the idea that small perturbations of a large dynamical system can produce large
variations on the overall system was referred to by Lorenz as the butterfly effect5 [262].
A collective is “a large system of agents where each agent has a private utility function”
[414]. These agents are amalgamated together and the performance of the overall system
is measured using a world utility function. The coordination of these utility functions
is analogous to decomposition techniques such as collaborative optimization in the MDO
community [72].
In most constructive simulations, agents are limited to local information, that is, no
single agent has access to the information available to all other agents. Such clairvoyance is
counter to the Clauswitzian notion of the “fog of war” [100]. Information is gathered through
sensors, perceived through cognitive models, and distributed through communications.
Decentralized control means that there is “no God-like ‘oracle’ dictating what each
and every part ought to be doing” [214]. Although the battlespace may have global com-
manders, there is no direct line of communication between non-adjacent levels of the com-
mand hierarchy shown in Figure 163. While decentralized control is a central feature in
many agent-based simulations, the United States Air Force operates under a paradigm of
“centralized control and decentralized execution” [431]. This doctrine is the reason why a
top-level battle manager is needed to pass information to individual agents.
5The butterfly effect refers to a meteorological theory that the small disturbance caused by the flapping of
a butterfly’s wing becomes amplified due to the chaotic nature of weather patterns to changes the atmosphere
on a large scale. Lorenz postulates that long term behavior of chaotic systems is impossible to forecast.
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A.2.14 Creating Intelligent Agents
There are many paradigms in the literature for creating “intelligent” agents. Several promis-
ing techniques for this class of problems are summarized in the subsequent sections.
A.2.14.1 The Brute Force Approach
Since the value of a decision is not known beforehand, one way to make decisions in the
simulation environment is to simply try every possible combination of decisions using a
grid search and select the best option. In an engagement or one-on-one simulation, it is
trivial to simply run through all possible engagement actions and select the best one. In
a larger campaign model, since every engagement depends on the results of the previous
engagement, the “brute force” technique is not computationally efficient.
A.2.14.2 Adaptive Agents by Trial and Error
When the value is of a given decision is not know a priori, a useful technique is to allow
agents to adapt to changes over time. Beginning as “naive” agents, they develop intelligence
by trying different actions to see what works by using external sensors of the environment
in which they operate.
While this approach has had much success in many fields, it is not entirely appropriate
for this type of simulation, which is further confounded by the element of time. For example,
on the first day of the war, the battle manager would decide to send out some F-18’s to see
how they do. When they all get shot down, it would try some Tomahawk missiles. The
agent would likely conclude that F-18’s are bad and Tomahawk missiles are good. If the
agent was penalized for the cost incurred by using many Tomahawk missiles, it would keep
trying F-18’s every so often to see if they can penetrate enemy defenses. Meanwhile, every
time it tries the F-18 solution, it actually loses n more F-18’s because this is happening
during the analytical simulation. This trial-and-error approach is (hopefully) not how the
military operates. Generals do not randomly send elements into battle to see how they do:
they know what to do. Battle management agents need to know how to win the war with
the correct series of actions in the shortest possible time... or at least come close to it. It is
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impossible to always be correct in the establishment of strategy, but the ability of the U.S.
military to observe the enemy, analyze intelligence, and gather data ensures that the battle
management process is more reasoned than a simple trial-and-error process.
Approaches from game theory can easily calculate the optimum strategy for a given
situation, but since the value of the game, dispositions of the players, and number of players
are changing over time as the game is continually played, the selection of an optimum
strategy through trial and error is not appropriate for this class of problems.
A.2.14.3 Knowledge-Based Systems and Machine Learning
A knowledge-based system (KBS) is useful for querying a database of information. This
is usually done by asking a series of questions that go through a process of elimination to
narrow the search space in the database to one answer. A major drawback to knowledge
based systems is the amount of time needed to populate the database. Also, in most cases,
extensive rule-sets must be specified for how to made decisions regarding the options in the
database. Furthermore, the rule sets are usually hardcoded for what was in the database
when the rules were written. Adding new information necessitates a redesign of the decision
making algorithm.
Despite these drawbacks, simple “if-then” type rule sets are adequate for the cognitive
models of simple reactive agents. In an object-oriented framework, several generic cognitive
models can be created that describe basic responses to specific stimuli. As previously
mentioned, reactive agents need not be adaptive and intelligent provided that their rule set
sufficiently incorporates the necessary behaviors of interest.
Deliberative agents such a the battle manager are not well suited for static knowledge-
based systems; however, a modification to a dynamic and adaptive KBS is of interest.
An entertaining example of an adaptive knowledge-based systems is the neural network-
based 20Q handheld game [1]. The game is played by thinking of something and answering
questions posed by the user interface. An example of the question sequence for “a fighter
plane” is shown below in Figure 164.
20Q has assembled its knowledge base from responses of game players over the past
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Q17. I am guessing that it is a fighter jet?
Right, Wrong, Close
Can you live in it? Depends. 9.
Can it be used for recreation? Sometimes. 10.
Is it located in the sky? Yes. 11.
Can you buy it? Depends. 12.
Is it commonly used? Yes. 13.
Can it save your life? Yes. 14.
Can you use it with your friends? No. 15.
Is it used by the police? No. 16.
It is classified as Other.1.
Do you use it at work? No. 2.
Is it soft? No. 3.
Is it smaller than a loaf of bread? No. 4.
Is it worth a lot of money? Yes. 5.
Does it move? Yes. 6.
Does it travel on roads? No. 7.
Can it be refilled? Yes. 8.
Figure 164: 20Q Online Game, Results for “Fighter Plane.”
nineteen years [1]. As time goes on and more people provide it with more information,
the connectionist algorithms in the routine add more information to the database and
more closely approximate the human decision making process. This adaptability is of great
interest in the development of an intelligent battle management agent. The field of ma-
chine learning is interested in circumventing the drawbacks of traditional knowledge-based
systems to have the system “discover” new knowledge and solutions through continuous
feedback.
Ilachinski notes that there are four major categories of machine learning techniques6
[213]:
1. Analytic Learning: Analytic learning systems require a thorough understanding
of the general underlying problem type and must have available a large number of
problem-solution exemplars. The technique relies on adapting solutions to problems
that it identifies as being “close to” known solutions to known problems.
2. Inductive Learning: Inductive learning requires an external “teacher” to produce
problem samples. The teacher grades the system’s attempts to use its stored knowl-
edge to try and solve each problem in turn. The teacher’s grade is then used to update
the system’s knowledge.
6The bulleted list is directly quoted from Ilachinski (2004), page 198.
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3. Neural Network Learning: The neural net (also called the Connectionist) approach
consists of applying a learning algorithm (such as back-propagation) to adjust a set of
internal weights in order to minimize the “distance” between calculated and desired
solutions to selected problems. Given a set of training problem-solution exemplars,
the learning algorithm produces a network that, in time, is able to correctly recognize
the pattern implicit in all input (i.e. problem) and output (i.e. solution) pairs.
4. Genetic Algorithm (or Selectionist) Learning: Selectionist learning systems ex-
ploit the learning capability of a genetic algorithm to “evolve” an appropriate knowl-
edge base.
While Ilachinksi notes that the most appropriate method for decision making is the
genetic algorithm, this is merely a more sophisticated “trial and error” approach (see Section
A.2.14.2). In the military simulation, the amount of trial and error should be reduced as
much as possible as “failed” cases contribute to abysmal scores in terms of measures of
effectiveness. If the battle manager is not a strategic genius, it is difficult to distinguish
between the time delay for the battle manager to “get smart” and the relative effectiveness
of a given technology. An technique that uses one or more of the above approaches is
needed.
A.2.14.4 The Tactical Genius
The ultimate in battle management is a brilliant tactician that knows exactly what to
do in every situation; however, the question is posed, “do such humans even exist?” The
asymmetric advantage of modern technology greatly increases the effectiveness of each sortie
but reduces the opportunity to gain combat experience. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, USAF
bombers flew 505 out of 41,404 sorties (1.2%) and only eleven B-1, four B-2, and 28 B-52
bombers were used in the 28 day conflict [304]. Developing a database of tactical information
based on the limited experience of active duty pilots in a low-threat environment using a
knowledge-based system may not yield accurate results against different types of threats.
Constructive simulation can be used to develop a computer-based tactical genius, similar
to the training of the computer in the climax of the 1983 film WarGames (see Section A.2.6).
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One potential approach is to create at random a large number of notional missions, randomly
select equipment to be used on each mission based on high-level parameters for each type of
equipment, fly the sample missions, and evaluate the outcome of each. After a large enough
sample of missions is performed, the battle manager can obtain sufficient knowledge to infer
what should be done in similar situations. As described by Hawkins, “There will be no need
or opportunity for anyone to program in the rules of the world, databases, factors, or any of
the high-level concepts that are the bane of artificial intelligence. The intelligent machine
must learn via observation of its world” [195].
This machine learning approach is closest to the aforementioned analytic learning tech-
nique though it may use elements of the neural network or genetic algorithm approach to
provide adaptivity. An application of this approach is summarized in Section 5.5.
Hypothesis 2.2: Techniques from machine learning and agent-based mod-
eling can be leveraged to provide an intelligent battle manager with an “under-
standing” of basic strategic and tactical decisions.
A.3 Hypothesis 2.3: A Comparison of Optimum and Ro-
bust Technology Portfolios
Optimization, literally the pursuit of that which is best, is inherent in every process in our
daily lives. The term optimization generally connotes an iterative analysis process and the
mathematical techniques used therefore [470]. In engineering, optimization “is traditionally
thought of as weight minimization, ignoring consideration of other attributes” [406]. The
ultimate “optimization” of an LRS system architecture and its accompanying portfolio of
technologies relies on the selection of an appropriate objective function that considers the
multidimensional tradeoffs endemic to this problem.
Despite recent trends in the literature, optimization of systems-of-systems should not
merely be seen as an extension of techniques developed in the multidisciplinary optimization
community [44, 111, 237]. Numerical optimization is extremely difficult with the large
numbers of variables and discontinuous behaviors present in this class of problems. It is well
known that decomposition of a highly complex problem and optimization of the subproblems
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often produces globally suboptimal results. Also, numerical optimization techniques for
multiple objectives, typical of military problems with multiple MoEs, are difficult to set up
and validate [122]. Most importantly, because systems-of-systems are seldom operated at a
single “design point” and since the actual operating conditions for a system are difficult to
forecast many years ahead of time, optimization of a technology portfolio for a single design
mission is not appropriate.
The term robust is used to describe “a system that has demonstrated an ability to re-
cover gracefully from the whole range of exceptional inputs and situations in a given environ-
ment” [22]. It is postulated that a more useful objective for a technology-evaluation method-
ology is a portfolio that is robust to changing operational conditions, evolving threats, and
multiple scenarios is more useful for long term planning.
Air Force policy statements support this observation. In 2004, General Jumper stated
that the Air Force leadership recognizes “that operational shortfalls exist early in the kill
chain and are applying technologies to fill those gaps” noting that a robust portfolio is
needed to address these shortfalls [29]. Echoing these comments, Davis notes that capabil-
ities must be “flexible, adaptive and robust” [120]. Finally, Titus states that the goal of
capabilities-based planning “is to plan for robust, flexible forces, capable of meeting a wide
variety of threats, rather than an ‘optimal’ force for a narrow set of threats” [412].
These comments, made by experts in the field, support the assertion that a robust
portfolio is more useful than one optimized for a point solution. The implementation of this
desire into a simulation-based quantitative technology evaluation environment may require
an iterative approach to procedural optimization. As noted by Noble and Tanchoco, “the
procedural approach is a trade-off process where the objective is modified as the design
proceeds. The solution that results is the solution that satisfies all the design objectives
in the best manner” [321]. Since new capabilities and objectives evolve rapidly throughout
the life-cycle of the program, the design too must evolve to meet these changing needs.
Hypothesis 2.3: For systems-of-systems, determination of a technology
portfolio that is robust to changing threats and variable operating conditions
is more useful than a portfolio optimized for maximum effectiveness.
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APPENDIX B
REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES
Research Question 2, “How can military simulation runs be executed without a human
in the loop to make strategic and tactical decisions?” is the critical issue associated with
simulation-based analysis of technologies. Simulation is often dominated by human decision
makers that tire quickly when asked to analyze a myriad of repetitive situations [393]. In
Section A.2, artificial intelligence was identified to address this research question. The
next two hypotheses explore the AI paradigm in more detail and identify new methods for
using machine learning and intelligent agents to emulate human decisions and enable rapid
simulation-based technology evaluation across a large design space.
B.1 Hypothesis 3.1: Applying QFD and MADM to Target
Prioritization
Research into systems engineering techniques and multiple-attribute decision making method-
ologies can be synthesized into a method for prioritizing targets based on the relationships
between the strategic objectives and the target set(s) to which the target belongs. The
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) technique is a systematic mathematical process used
to translate the “Voice of the Customer” into the “Voice of the Engineer.” Developed by
Dr. Yoji Akao and Dr. Shigeru Mizuno in the 1960’s, QFD has found widespread applica-
tion in the development of products for the aerospace, automotive, electronics, and other
industries1. According to Dieter, a survey of 150 companies taken in the late 1990’s indi-
cated that 71% of these companies had adopted QFD in that decade. Of these companies,
83% believed that the QFD tool “increased customer satisfaction with their products, and
76% felt it facilitated rational design decisions” [135]. Quality Function Deployment is also
commonly known as the House of Quality due to the trademark shape of the matrix used to
1A primer on the QFD methodology can be found in the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook [217].
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perform the method, as shown in Figure 165. The term “deployment” refers to the ability
to deploy the results of this matrix to lower levels, where the engineering characteristics
or“how’s” in the first matrix become the “what’s” for the lower tier.
While the traditional formulation for the QFD matrix is to translate customer require-
ments into engineering characteristics, the same “transfer function” can be applied to strate-
gic objectives and target sets2. In this formulation, all of the “rooms” of the QFD are not
used, rather, only the main room of the QFD called the interrelationship matrix is of inter-
est, as shown in Figure 166.
Using the relative importance of a customer requirement and the interrelationship ma-
trix that relates the customer requirements to the engineering characteristics, the relative
importance of each engineering characteristic can be calculated using Equation 20. This
technique is extended to the calculation of the relative importance of each target set with





While many techniques for multiple-attribute decision making abound in the literature,
the simplest and most effective approach to this problem is the use of an overall evaluation
criterion (OEC). An OEC encapsulates multiple objective functions into a single numerical
index that enables comparison of two or more products or processes. Examples of overall
evaluation criteria include grade point averages, rankings in figure skating, or the “star”
ratings given to motion pictures. In the case of these OEC’s, the metrics of measurement
are identical and the basic OEC is simply the average of the different scores. In other cases,
dissimilar metrics such as speed, weight, and range may be used requiring a normalization of
the parameters as shown in Equation 21. In this case, parameters that should be maximized
are scaled with respect to the baseline in the denominator while the opposite is true of
metrics like cost and weight that should be minimized. Greek letters indicate the relative














2A demonstration of this technique applied to the Iraq scenario is shown in Section 5.4.1.
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I I I J J I J I J I J I I I I J
Adequate Payload 3 H F F F F H F H F F G G G
Tunable IR Signature 9 F F F G H F F F F G G
Hardbody IR 9 F F F H H G H
RCS 9 F G F F
Emulate Mult. Trajectories 3 H H F F F F H F G F G G
Vulnerability/Lethality 5 F F G F G G F F F G G
Accuracy 3 G H F G F H
Low Cost 5 F H F H H F H F F G H G H G
ASAP 5 G H F H H F H F G H G H H H G
Highly Producible 3 H H H H H F F G G G H F
Recycle Time 5 F F H H H G F G
Multi-Launch Site 5 H F F H H G G
Transportability 1 G F F F H F
Mobile Launch 5 F F F F G G H F H
Treaty Compliance 1 F F G F F F G F F
Target Data 9 G H G H F H G G G
Support Equipment 1 F F H F F H F F H G G H
Environmentally Friendly 3 F F H F F H H
Range Safety 7 G H H G G F F G
Reliability and Maintainability 3 G H H H G H F G
Propellant Safety/Compatability 7 H F F H F G F F H
487 474 413 399 339 319 296 295 263 241 241 211 193 141 140 67
0.6711 2.003 3.924 0.0981 0.702 1.703 7.7 0.392 3.207 4.279 7.945 4.986 2.69 4.286 5.811 3

































Figure 165: Quality Function Deployment Example for a Long Range Liquid Booster
Target Vehicle [63].
 18
populated by analyzing each square and asking the question “How does (this engineering 
characteristic) impact (this customer requirement)?” The answers for this room are also a 
numerical ranking from 1 to 10; however, a non-linear 1-3-9 scale is again highly 
encouraged. In this case, 1 = Weak Relationship, 3 = Medium Relationship, 9 = Strong 
Relationship. The corresponding symbols of triangle, open circle, and filled circle, 
respectively, are used to represent 1, 3, and 9. These symbols relate to the heritage of the 
tool: at the horse track near the Kobe Shipyard in Japan, these symbols stand for show, 
place, and win r spectively.  
 
The objective of the QFD tool is to translate the above information into a numerical 
importance weighting for each of the engineering characteristics. This weighting can then 
be carried on to other concept selection tools and multi-attribute decision making 
techniques. The first five rooms are all that is mathematically necessary to calculate this 
ranking. The overall ranking at the bottom of the matrix is the sum of each column, as 
seen in room 8. A simple version of the basic rooms required for the QFD tool is shown 
below in Figure 3. 
Part Count Specific Impulse Motor Weight
Customer Requirements Importance Min Max Nominal
Long Range 3 9 9
Low Cost 9 3 9




Figure 3: Numerical Example of a Simple QFD Matrix. 
In this simple example, three customer broad customer requirements: long range, low 
cost, and high reliability are given. As the importance column indicates, the general 
design philosophy of this missile would be for a highly-reliable, low cost approach, 
instead of a performance-centric approach. The three brainstormed engineering 
characteristics that may influence the customer requirements are part count, specific 
impulse, and motor weight. Their associated directions of improvement are given below. 
Motor weight is given as nominal because although a minimum weight motor is generally 
lower cost, the motor weight will be constrained by the range required for the design.  
Figure 166: Using the QFD Interrelationship Matrix to Map Customer Requirements to
Engineering Characteristics.
367
Target prioritization uses both of the above concepts. The OEC technique is used to
calculate the relative “threat level” of a target across twelve target sets. The QFD technique
is used to calculate the relative importance of each of the target sets with respect to the
customer’s strategic objectives, scaling the OEC to reflect different priorities in the scenario.
Hypothesis 3.1: Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and Multi-Attribute
Decision Making (MADM) techniques can be used to prioritize targets based on
desired strategic objectives.
B.2 Hypothesis 3.2: Using Intelligent Super-Agents to Cre-
ate an Intelligent Battle Manager
In addition to the myriad of requisite inputs, military campaign codes usually necessitate
a human-in-the-loop to examine the condition of the battlefield and direct assets [228].
Automated simulations have traditionally been constrained by hard-coded rule sets that
only permit certain actions. Simulations are usually executed on a grand scale and are
essentially computerized sand-table games to evaluate force level effectiveness.
Soban overcame the human-in-the-loop problem through the use of decision trees. While
this technique was used to demonstrate the validity of the PoSSEM methodology, Soban
notes that it is impractical for extremely large simulations as the number of cases that must
be run to generate discrete sets of response surface equations for every branch becomes
unmanageable [378].
Both Frits and Soban examined the implication of tactics in a modeling and simula-
tion environment; however, the modeling techniques of the time permitted only one or two
variables to be changed [159, 378]. To incorporate and objective function that encompasses
multiple MoEs and develop a robust simulation capability that adapts to changing condi-
tions, decisions must be made as the campaign progresses and the snapshot of the scenario
changes in time3.
The problem of how to incorporate changing tactics and situations in the design process
3Section A.2.1 summarizes the decision making process in more detail and Section A.2.7 introduces the
concept of agent-based modeling and simulation, which is an enabling technology for this research.
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is a daunting one. While the human-in-the-loop solution is valid for small numbers of
runs, it is not practical for the generation of response surface equations. Also, the lack of
reproducibility with human decision making invalidates many of the statistical techniques
required for a rigorous study of the problem [393].
A promising technique that takes advantage of advances is the fields of computer sci-
ence and machine learning is the use of artificial intelligence to simulate human decision
making. In Section 3.4.5, the assertion was made that “techniques from machine learning
and agent-based modeling can be leveraged to provide an intelligent battle manager with an
‘understanding’ of basic strategic and tactical decisions.” A proposed approach to leverage
this technique is addressed in the subsequent section.
B.2.1 Creating an Intelligent Battle Manager
“If the machines could just talk to each other, we would know [where the
launcher is, what weapon is available to take it out, where the missile will hit]
instantly.”
-General John P. Jumper,
Regarding “Predictive Battlespace Awareness” [338]
Military decision making is driven by generals and battle managers who analyze the
battlespace and make decisions on how to task available units into missions. The generals
make these decisions based on their training and experience. In the absence of well-trained
generals or military tacticians to make decisions in an interactive simulation, can intelligent
agents be developed that mimic the actions of a general?
Experience is “active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation
of knowledge or skill” [22]. It is hypothesized that if an agent-based battle manager or
“Meta-General” can be provided with enough “experience,” it can make intelligent decisions.
Since a campaign is made up of many similar types of engagements, one approach would
be to execute a simulation in two modes: training and analysis. In the training mode, an
algorithm would generate a large number of engagements at random with a variable platform
and threat. Strategy and supporting tactics would be also be created stochastically and the
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outcome of the choices made against the threats provided would be assessed and assigned
a measure of effectiveness. In the analysis mode, the Meta-General observes a situation
on the battlefield and uses a table-lookup to find the best available solution to address the
threat based on its prior experience from the training mode. These two methods of using a





Training Mode: Single Mission, Several Engagements, Executed Many Times
Analysis Mode: Single Scenario with Multiple Targets, Multiple Missions, and 




Figure 167: Two “Modes” of Operation, Training and Analysis.
Since table lookup algorithms for large, multi-dimensional tables are slow, the pre-
ferred approach is to use neural network surrogate models to regress the expe-
rience information from the training mode. This requires more up-front setup but
allows the exploratory simulation to run much faster. The result is an equation that tells
the Meta-General what course of action will be most successful based on an assessment of
the threat environment.
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B.2.2 Decision Making with the Meta-General
At distinct intervals during the simulation, the Meta-General fuses information from avail-
able sensors with which it can communicate to obtain a common operating picture that
describes the state of the battlefield. With this information, the Meta-General uses the
neural network equations mentioned in the previous section to compare the situation it
observes with other situations it has been trained to recognize. For each target in the exist-
ing target list, the Meta-General iterates through available platform/weapon pairings and
evaluates the neural network equations to identify those that have the highest probability
of success against the detected targets under the conditions specified. The pairings are
constrained by asset availability and rules of engagement. As hostile assets are eliminated
from the battlefield, the Meta-General continues to observe a changing situation and alters
its strategy according to the training it has received. To avoid confounding between the
Meta-General’s knowledge and technology effectiveness, the Meta-General does not learn
and adapt in analysis mode.
In summary, the rationale for the selection of strike packages is defined by the amount of
training the Meta-General receives for a range of threats, the spectrum of capability within
the hostile country, blue base and asset availability, tactics, and available technology levels.
Using intelligent super-agents, the human can be removed from the analysis pathway, per-
forming only the initial setup, training, and validation of the Meta-General. This addresses
the need to remove the human from the loop when executing hundreds or thousands of
cases using constructive simulation.
B.2.3 Drawbacks to the Meta-General Training Approach
Unfortunately, to train the Meta-General, it is necessary to encapsulate a number of rules
within the simulation to reduce the number of variables necessary for the neural network
regression. Large number of variables also make validation of the Meta-General’s behavior
cumbersome. If fundamental changes are made to the cognitive models of systems in the
architecture (for example, the physics of how airplanes fly or the heuristics involved in
air-to-air engagement), the Meta-General has to be retrained. If additional “plays” are
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added to the playbook, the Meta-General can rely on his previous training for the old plays
and simply receive supplemental training on new plays. However, if the simulation code or
underlying models are fundamentally changed, the Meta-General must be re-trained from
scratch. Depending on the complexity of engagements, this could be a computationally
expensive process.
Hypothesis 3.2: An “intelligent battle manager” created using agent-based
modeling, machine learning techniques, and surrogate models can remove the
confounding effect of tactics on technology evaluation.
B.3 Hypothesis 3.3: Using Surrogate Models to Provide
Intelligence to Individual Agents
A difficult problem in a system-of-systems is how to exploit technologies to show a mea-
surable benefit in the presence of a myriad of interacting factors that can confound the
impact of technologies. Agent-based modeling (See Section A.2.7) is an technique that can
be leveraged to address this challenge.
While the cognitive battle manager or Meta-General can be trained to develop a strategic
battle plan, Air Force Doctrine notes that it is inappropriate for air tasking authorities to
micromanage the tactics and operation of individual assets [177, 431]. After receiving
the Air Tasking Order (ATO) that directs platforms to targets, individual assets (agents)
carries out their orders by following a predefined series of rules that are often quite simple.
Cognition models that define this rule set are exercised to plan an optimum route to the
target, monitor fuel and weapon loads, and determine a course of action if the agent is
engaged enroute to its target. Since the outcome of the mission depends on the world
around the agent, a question arises: what if the agents can forecast what will happen in the
future and their behavior can be tuned to maximize the probability of mission success?
While most cognition models use hard-coded rule sets whose paths are activated when
discrete events occur, an intelligent agent can “predict” potential future actions if it has
enough information about possible situations that may arise during the mission. One way
of providing an intelligent forecasting capability is the use of surrogate models to evaluate
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performance for a variety of different conditions. Inputs to the surrogate model include:
• What the agent knows about itself through its own state vector.
• Information about the surrounding environment gleaned through sensors on the agent.
• k-factors on agent-level performance representing the infusion of technologies.
If any of the three input classes are altered, the agent is driven to alter its cognitive path
based on the predicted performance as calculated by the surrogate model. For example,
when a blue fighter detects a red fighter in the vicinity, it must decide to engage or escape.
The first static rule set determines whether or not the agent has air-to-air weapons. If such
weapons are available, the next decision depends on the agent’s belief about its capability
relative to an adversary.
The decision on whether or not to engage is therefore a function of an agent’s per-
ception of its own performance and can be defined in terms of a Performance Vector of
Attributes (PVA). An example of some performance metrics that can be included in a PVA
are top speed, turn rate, radar cross section, and other vehicle level attributes. These
metrics are a function of the agent’s current state vector: altitude, speed, drag coefficient
(related to the amount of external weapons and fuel tanks), g loads, etc. Since the PVA
is simply a mathematical relationship that calculates overall performance a function of the
agent’s physics-based parameters and the operational environment, a surrogate model can
be constructed to rapidly approximate this mathematical relationship over a wide range of
operating conditions.
In some cases, the agent’s decisions also depend on the PVA of a potential adversary.
In this case, the agent can calculate its PVA and relate it to the estimated PVA of the
enemy. Since it is not possible to know the exact state of the adversary, some uncertainty
surrounds the determination of its PVA. The two PVA’s can be compared and the agent
decides whether or not to engage the adversary:
∆PV A = PV A(Blue) − PV A(Red) (22)
The threshold on the allowable ∆PV A is defined by the doctrine settings. The amount of
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“intelligence” about its surroundings and the knowledge provided to a given agent can be
defined by the user.
Both polynomial and neural network equations can be used to provide intelligence and
tunability to assets using this technique depending on the complexity of the behavior to be
forecast. As an example, two F-15 aircraft can be placed side by side. Aircraft A is enabled
with intelligence from surrogates and Aircraft B is not. If an engine technology is applied
to both aircraft, both agents may see improved TSFC or thrust-to-weight ratio. Using a
surrogate model, Aircraft A is able to relate how the new technology impacts its abilities
because the surrogate relates the change in TSFC to a change in total vehicle performance.
Using surrogates to provide awareness and intelligence to the agents is more representative
of a real-world environment where pilots are trained to exploit new technologies as opposed
to executing random missions with no knowledge of how the aircraft has been impacted by
technology infusion.
This approach differs slightly from an adaptive neural network-based approach because
the performance space for a simple asset such as an aircraft can be calculated as a function of
vehicle attributes a priori and surrogate models can be generated. A central tenet of agent-
based modeling is that the simple interactions between intelligent agents reveal complex
emergent behavior and dynamics that cannot be easily programmed. This postulate can
be used to allow asset-level agents to exploit the benefits of technology by using surrogate
models to provide intelligent forecasting to “simple” individual agents whose combined
interactions produce an overall desired effect that can be measured against capability-level
MoEs.
To test whether this technique can be practically applied, surrogate models were gener-
ated for an aircraft using an energy-based formulation for the calculation of thrust to weight



































Where: T/W is the thrust to weight ratio at an instant in time
q is the dynamic pressure
S is the wing area
β is the weight fraction (W /W TO)
W TO is the takeoff gross weight
K1 is the coefficient for drag due to lift
K2 is the profile drag due to other factors
n is the instantaneous load factor in g’s
CD0 is the zero lift drag coefficient
V is the velocity in ft/sec
h is the altitude in ft
and g0 is the acceleration due to gravity
Four surrogate models were created for top speed, climb, instantaneous turn, and horizontal
acceleration. Using the above variables as inputs, an aircraft can calculate the thrust/weight
ratio required to perform each of the four activities at a given instant in time. With an
engine deck and knowledge of its current weight, the aircraft agent can also calculate its
current thrust/weight available. The difference between the available and required values
is related to the specific excess power of the aircraft in each of the four activities. The
instantaneous performance vector of attributes for the aircraft can therefore be calculated
as:
PV A = α (∆SpeedPower) + β (∆TurnPower) + γ (∆ClimbPower) + δ (∆AccelPower) ...
(24)
Where the weight coefficients are threat dependent. For example, if the nearby threat is
an air-to-air fighter, turn rate may be more important than horizontal acceleration whereas
a nearby SAM threat may prioritize horizontal acceleration and top speed in the PVA. In
this manner, agents can exploit technologies through an increase PVA which defines their
proclivity to engage a nearby target. Technologies impact the components of the PVA and
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a positive difference in PVA relative to an adversary may cause an agent to engage. The
decision on the threshold of ∆PV A is governed by doctrine. An example of the surrogate
models used for the speed category of the PVA is shown in Figure 168.
Improved TSL/WTO
Baseline






Figure 168: Example of Surrogate Models to Provide Intelligence and Tunability to
Agents.
The upper left contour profiler represents the baseline configuration mapped against
flight speed and altitude. The bright green surface above the grey mesh at zero indicates
the flight envelope for which the agent has an advantage in top speed (holding all other
settings constant). If a technology is infused that improves lapse rate, as shown in the
upper right corner of the figure, the bright green area above the grey meshed area increases,
meaning that the agent is inclined to engage the enemy at a greater speed and lower altitude.
The same trends are evident for technologies that reduce zero lift drag and improve the sea
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level thrust-to-weight ratio. Using this surrogate model, the agent can tell how much better
it is in various dimensions due to the application of technology. Similar surrogates can
be provided to explain the capability of its weapons, avionics, self-protection, and ally
performance. These surrogate models are aggregated together into a PVA which is used to
make decisions within the cognitive logic. Similarly, surrogate models can be created using
the energy-based formulation for adversary aircraft, although the PVA of hostile assets is
bounded by some uncertainty since the friendly agent cannot know everything about the
adversary’s state vector. A series of surrogate models can be combined with cognitive models
to “tune” the agents to better utilize technologies and advanced tactics to accomplish their
mission.
B.3.1 Validity of the Proposed Approach to Battle Management
As military organizations move toward network centric operations the capabilities provided
by computers and communications offer the possibility of consolidating complete battlespace
control under a single commander. This research proposes an approach that utilizes ad-
vances provided by network centric technologies; however, does not advocate that the battle
manager directly control the actions of individual agents. This approach is consistent with
Air Force doctrine: “Centralized control4 and decentralized execution of air and space power
are critical to effective employment of air and space power” [431]. Under this paradigm,
the command and control elements “maintain a broad theater perspective in prioritizing
the use of limited air and space assets to attain established objectives in any contingency
across the range of operations5” [431]. According to Operation Desert Storm Joint Forces
Air Component Commander (JFACC) Charles Horner, the “unqualified success of [the] air
campaign validates [the] concept” of centralized control by allowing the most effective use
of all available assets and avoiding duplication of effort [208].
4It is important to note that decentralized control “can lead to actions being taken that may conflict
with one another” [41].
5This paradigm originated in the 1943 version of the War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command
and Employment of Air Power: “The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset... control of
available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander
if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited” [459].
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Due to the inherent flexibility and versatility of aerospace forces, “decentralized exe-
cution permits the flexibility to maximize tactical success” [430]. The execution is decen-
tralized through the delegation of the authority to perform the required actions to capable
lower level commanders and airmen. While “modern communications technology provides
a temptation towards increasing centralized execution of air and space power,” history
demonstrates that removing tactical authority from local commanders can have disastrous
results [98, 177, 431].
The proposed approach of using an intelligent “Meta-General” for battle management
(Section B.2.1) and tunable cognition models for execution (Section B.3) maximizes flexibil-
ity and versatility while avoiding rigid, predictable actions. Furthermore, the identification
and development of new tactics that exploit technologies would not be possible using a fully
centralized control and execution approach.
Hypothesis 3.3: At the agent level, intelligence can be provided by surro-
gate models and tunable cognition models that allow the agent to forecast future




REVIEW OF TACTICAL HYPOTHESES
C.1 Hypothesis 4.1: Physics-Based Models are Most Ap-
propriate
A model is a “a simplified description of a complex entity or process” [22]. Since all models
are approximations, the statement by Box and Hunter that “all models are wrong; some
models are useful” is apt [71]. Nevertheless, since resource availability limits the amount
of physical testing for systems-of-systems, models are needed to understand the underlying
behavior and phenomenology of actual systems. A popular type of model is an empirical
model, which is based on a regression of historical data. This type of model is extremely
accurate for the development of concepts that are similar to the database from which the
model is derived; however, they perform poorly for extrapolations beyond the state-of-the-
art. The rule-of-thumb equations in Roskam’s series on airplane design are examples of
empirical models [356].
In contrast, physics-based models are derived based on physical principles governing
the actual performance of systems. While simplifying assumptions such as “rigid body”
or “point mass” are often used, physics-based models can capture the behavior of systems
for which no historical data is available. Examples of physics-based models include the
Breguet Range Equation, free-body diagrams, equations of motion, and the energy-based
sizing formulation defined by Mattingly [278].
A hybrid (or semi-empirical) approach is typical of many synthesis and sizing codes
such as FLOPS and ACSYNT [40]. These codes use physics-based models to a degree, but
are also calibrated or validated using historical data. As such, these models are usually
applicable to a range of designs that extrapolate beyond the historical database to a degree,
but are inappropriate for completely unconventional designs.
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Since physics-based models require no calibration other than the validation of the math-
ematical phenomena being modeled, their infusion into the FLAMES example models is the
preferred approach. The use of simplified physics-based models is sufficient to demonstrate
the proposed methodology; however, the object-oriented nature of the FLAMES framework
supports a variable-fidelity approach to modeling that facilitates replacement with higher
fidelity models over time.
Hypothesis 4.1: Physics-based models, implemented across hierarchical levels, are most
effective because they can be mathematically validated.
C.2 Hypothesis 4.2: k-Factors are an Effective Way to
Quantify Technology Impacts
One of the research questions in Section 3.2 identifies the need for a methodology for quan-
titative technology identification. Since many phenomenological tools “are typically based
on regressed historical data, limiting or removing their applicability to exotic concepts or
technologies,” one useful way in which the impact of technologies can be quantitatively
measured is through an application of a technology k-factor to the discipline-level metrics
of the appropriate contributing analysis in the military simulation hierarchy [293].
k-factors can be seen as scale factors on these discipline-level metrics, either increasing or
decreasing the value from a baseline. An example of such metrics for an aircraft includes the
lift-to-drag ratio, TSFC, drag coefficient, and empty weight. Infusing a new, lightweight
materials technology could be tracked as a decrease in k-weight. Using a lighter empty
weight as an input to a range analysis program would result in an increase in aircraft range
due to the ability to carry more fuel for the same gross takeoff weight. Similarly, decreases in
drag coefficient could be correlated to increased acceleration or turn performance in combat
maneuvers. An example of the use of technology k-factors for an aircraft sizing routine
is shown in Figure 169. In this example, a simple sizing routine based on the Breguet
range equation was used to evaluate range and gross takeoff weight while the cruise speed
was calculated from a force balance for straight and level flight using a generic equation
for engine lapse ratio from reference [278]. The prediction profiler shown in Figure 169
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depicts the partial derivatives of aircraft range, cruise Mach number, and aircraft weight as
a function of lower-level design parameters and four technology k-factors.
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Figure 169: Using k-Factors in Aircraft Design.
This quantitative method of technology assessment has been demonstrated for several
integrated engine/airframe combinations and also across a military simulation hierarchy
[240, 79, 378]. Mavris, Ender and Biltgen extended this hierarchical approach to map
k-factors using a top-down approach to identification of system-level and capability-level
attributes [280].
This k-factor approach can be extended to the capability-level by tracking the perfor-
mance of increased range, higher speed, and lower weight solutions against capability-level
MoEs. Using a hierarchy of linked surrogate models with k-factors as inputs, technolo-
gies at the system and subsystem level can be traced to high-level capabilities. Finally,
a probabilistic approach to technology modeling used by Kirby can be implemented using
the linked surrogate model approach [240]. Distributions of k-factors can be applied at the
system and subsystem levels. These distributions result in “constellations” or “islands” of
capability at the top level resembling the Joint Probability Distribution functions shown in
Figure 193 in Section C.11.
The k-factor technique has been proven to work well with surrogate models and is used
in conjunction with the methodology described in Section B.3 to optimize the selection
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of tactics as technology k-factors are changed to represent technology infusion, technology
refresh, and spiral development approaches.
Hypothesis 4.2: The concept of k-factors has emerged as a useful method for mapping
technology impacts to surrogate model inputs.
C.3 Hypothesis 4.3: A Hierarchical Tradeoff Environment
is Needed for Technology Analysis
Baker formulated a tradeoff environment that uses surrogate models to assess the simul-
taneous impact of requirements, vehicle characteristics, and technologies for the design of
aircraft [50]. This technique is called the Unified Tradeoff Environment (UTE) and was
further extended by Soban, who noted that the necessity to analyze a vehicle in the correct
context “evaluated as a system fulfilling its intended function” requires that the top level
measures of effectiveness are functions of the measures of performance at the mission and
vehicle level. She thus formulated a multi-level UTE, shown in Figure 170 to link surrogate
models at various hierarchical levels, represented graphically by a prediction profiler. The
metrics along the y-axis of the prediction profiler become the inputs along the x -axis at
the next highest level. When analyzing a multi-domain problem, it is possible that contin-
uous variables may not be able to track multiple systems. An aircraft has design variables
such as wing area and TSFC while a ballistic missile use mass ratio and specific impulse.
The potential for discontinuous options further drives the development of the UTE to the
formulation shown in Figure 171, which shows how multiple discrete systems may provide
measures of performance to the mission and campaign level UTE’s. Furthermore, certain
types of technologies at the subsystem level may be applicable to multiple systems. This
underscores the complexity of the system-of-systems problem: everything is related to every-
thing. A screening approach for systems-of-systems is needed that identifies the subset of
parameters across all systems and technologies to allow decomposition of the problem to a
manageable size.
Hypothesis 4.3: A hierarchical, integrated tradeoff environment is needed to analyze
metrics at multiple levels.
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System MoE = fn( MoP1, MoP2, MoP3, etc)
MoP = fn( Xreq, Xdesign/econ, Xtech factors)
System Measures of Effectiveness are functions of vectors of 
subsystem Measures of Performance, which in turn are functions





































Figure 170: Multi-Level Unified Tradeoff Environment for Analysis of System Effective-
ness [378].
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Figure 171: Multi-Level Unified Tradeoff Environment for System-of-System Analysis of
Multi-Domain Problems [62].
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C.4 Hypothesis 4.4: Bottom-Up and Top-Down Analysis
is Used for Capability Assessment
The primary benefit of surrogate modeling approaches is the ability to perform bottom-up
or exploratory design. Exploratory design, also called parametric design, is when surrogate
models are purposefully varied in a deterministic manner to examine the impact of a specific
change in design on the overall response. This is identical to running the actual simulation
as an analysis tool with the notable exception of decreased run time. The campaign tool
mentioned in the previous sections takes approximately 9 minutes to generate a single run.
Embedded inside this tool is a missile analysis code that takes approximately 5 minutes to
run. Manual transfer of data between the two codes also slows the analysis process. By
encapsulating the missile code within the campaign code and generating neural network
approximations around them, the user can get reasonably accurate estimates of the model
responses in less than a second instead of thirty minutes.
Exploratory design allows a user to try a myriad of designs very quickly simply by chang-
ing the input parameters of the response surface equations. This can be done by physically
entering all model coefficients or by using the prediction profiler tool shown in Figure 191.
As a matter of process, a deterministic exploratory design environment is a requirement
and enabler for probabilistic design techniques1. To be able to do probabilistic design, one
first has to master deterministic, parametric design.
This design technique is useful for system-of-systems approaches as inputs for different
systems can be varied using a one-variable-at-a-time approach. In this manner, a system
architecture is visually optimized and multiple solutions that satisfy the same top-level
criteria can be manually located. One of the primary goals of this work is to enable system-
of-systems level trade studies to be performed at the system and subsystem level. While
exploratory design offers a way to perform these trades using a brute force approach, the
next section addresses the topic of inverse design, which uses probabilistic techniques to
partially automate the search for an elegant solution to the same problem.
1This is not true if the run time of the suite of analysis tools is already shorter than one second. To
date, no reasonably accurate engineering application for aircraft design that meets this constraint has been
demonstrated.
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Probabilistics coupled with surrogate models are the two enabling techniques for inverse
design. Similar to the popular Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) approach advo-
cated in DoD 5000.2-R, inverse design treats any variable as an independent variable. In
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Figure 172: The Steps of the Inverse Design Process.
The inverse design approach is illustrated in Figure 172. Once a suite of design tools has
been identified and linked, surrogate models are created for the suite of tools. The purpose
of this step is to speed up the process to the point where running cases is trivial as a large
number of cases are needed to do trade studies for a system-of-systems process2. Next, a
Monte Carlo simulation is used to execute the suite of tools over a range of input variables
at various hierarchical levels. Inverse design is actually accomplished by doing
forward design many times using MCS. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are
“clouds” of capability solutions at various hierarchical levels. Analyzing these clouds using
2Knowledge gathering via simulation is a function of computing power and available time. Surrogate
models decrease the amount of time required for finite computing power. As computers advance, designers
can choose to get the same information in less time or more information in the same amount of time.
Historical trends indicate that design organizations prefer the latter in most cases.
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a multivariate profiler allows rapid design trades and identification of regions of interest.
Using this technique, it is possible to highlight a desired capability in relation to system-
of-systems level metrics and identify potential designs at the system and subsystem levels
(See Figure 172). The relationship between forward design and inverse design is shown in
Figure 9. Although systems engineering is a top-down process, many engineers “think” in
bottom-up terms because that is what they do: make purposeful changes in the things they
can control and examine the outputs of the process. The inverse design process, aided by
functional decomposition, the DoDAF views, and the matrix of alternatives technique, is
aimed at identifying physical systems that provide the required capabilities. A bottom-
up reconciliation process utilizing a hierarchical modeling and simulation environment is
still needed to assess how the physical systems perform with respect to capabilities. As
new technologies develop and capabilities evolve, the process shown in Figure 9 continually
reconciles the differences between capabilities desired by the warfighter and those provided
by system designers.
The inverse design process is best viewed through a multivariate analysis matrix that
relates each variable to every other variable. This graphical technique, shown in Figure
173 is useful for analyzing any variable as an independent variable. In a linked, graphical
analysis environment such as the JMPR© scatterplot matrix, highlighting desired thresholds
for capability-level MoEs in the top left corner simultaneously highlights those points in
all other dimensions. This technique is useful for identifying trends and groupings. Mul-
tidimensional behaviors can be viewed by human operators using a combination of colors,
symbols, density plots, and constraint lines.
In the example shown in 173, capability-level MoEs are a function of both enemy at-
tributes and friendly attributes (the top-level “circuit” is identified by a dotted black line).
The attributes of the friendly system are in turn specified by system and subsystem-level
surrogate models for an aircraft, weapon, and weapon engine. Using a multivariate plot in
JMPR©, it is possible to highlight points (representing system solutions) that meet certain
thresholds with respect to any variable and identify where these points fall in every other
dimension.
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A simplified form of the multivariate profiler for the military simulation developed by
Ender is shown in Figure 174 [289]. This example uses a notional Long Range Strike asset
firing powered missiles in a battlespace occupied by SAMs and TCTs. The system-of-
system level MoEs representing capability metrics are shown in the upper left hand corner
while system and subsystem design parameters are shown in the lower right corner. Several
conclusions can be drawn by visually examining the dispersion of points. The first plot
shows targets killed versus platforms lost. The desirable region for this plot is minimum
platforms lost and maximum targets killed, identified by the green highlighted region. The
red region indicates the least desirable system solutions in regards to these two metrics. The
second plot shows enemy capability in terms of the range and speed of hostile SAMs. In this
plot it is evident that the green points prefer the lower half of the plot and the red points
have a greater population in the upper half: our systems perform better against SAMs
with low shoot-back range. Next, friendly capability in terms of weapon range and weapon
speed is examined. In this plot, the green points favor long range, high speed weapons and
the red points represent “low capability” friendly weapon solutions. The lower right corner
plot shows cruise Mach number versus diameter of the weapon. The results are somewhat
inconclusive at first glance, although statistical tests on the red and green regions provide
salient information about the region as a whole. Additionally, the conclusions can be reached
more definitively by narrowing the design space through successive eliminations of designs.
Since only the green region is desired, the black and red points in Figure 174 can be
hidden to clarify the decision making process. These points represent solutions that do not
meet a threshold of at least 80% targets killed and no more than 30% platforms lost. A
zoomed in version that examines blue capability against red capability for the green points
identified is shown in Figure 175. In the left side of the figure, red points representing short
range, subsonic weapons can he highlighted and colored red. Blue points representing long
range hypersonic missiles can be colored blue. The right side of Figure 175 identifies what
types of targets in terms of enemy capability blue forces can prosecute with different levels
of friendly capability.
The concept of the Pareto Frontier is useful to explain optimality in two simultaneous
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Figure 173: Multivariate Plot for a System-of-Systems Problem.
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Figure 175: Using Inverse Design to Discover Capability Solutions at the System Level
[289].
dimensions. In a two dimensional space, a point that is Pareto Optimal is one that has
maximal utility in both dimensions with respect to all other points in those dimensions.
Pareto optimal points represent an optimal design depending on how the two dimensions
are weighted. A Pareto frontier is therefore the locus of all Pareto optimal points in those
two dimensions as depicted by the red points in Figure 176.
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Pareto Front Identification
• A design is Pareto-inefficient
(dominated) if one or more metrics 
can be improved without 
worsening others
• A Pareto-inefficient design may be 
improved to a Pareto-efficient
design without tradeoff  
• Each Pareto-efficient point 
represents the optimal design for 
some weighting of metrics
• The Pareto front is the locus of all 
Pareto-efficient designs
• Clustering of Pareto-efficient 
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of design space 
Visualization of Pareto-efficient vs. Pareto-
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Metric 1 margin for 
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Figure 176: Illustration of a Two Dimensional Pareto Frontier [270].
In Figure 175, the curved green line represents the Pareto frontier for enemy capability:
blue cannot prosecute targets with greater range or shorter dwell time than this frontier
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without losing more than 30% of platforms or killing less than 80% of targets. As the right
side of the figure shows, the blue points tend to be closer to the Pareto frontier than the red
points. Short-range subsonic solutions cannot prosecute targets with short dwell time or
long shoot-back range. This plot shows that developing long range hypersonic missiles has a
beneficial impact on blue’s overall capability. The multivariate profiler can be further used
to examine specific technologies that provide this capability, evaluate the development or
production cost of candidate solutions, or impose additional design constraints that could
not be modeled using physics-based tools and military simulation codes.
As noted by Daskilewicz and German, the identification of the Pareto frontier is less
obvious in multiple dimensions. In Figure 177, a three-dimensional Pareto surface that
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Figure 177: Illustration of a Three Dimensional Pareto Frontier [270].
When this surface is viewed in two dimensions, Pareto optimal points appear dominated
in one or more of the dimensions although they are optimal in a third. The multivariate
inverse design technique seeks to identify multidimensional optimality and trace desired
capability thresholds to individual design solutions.
Inverse design is a powerful technique that enables decision making for systems-of-
systems. Because complex interdependencies in the system-of-systems are not known a
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priori, a large number of cases must be run to provide good coverage in the multivariate plot
and discover system solutions that satisfy MoEs at the capability level. This is accomplished
using a Monte Carlo simulation over the range of inputs (forward design) and viewed from
a capability-standpoint (inverse design). Because the number of cases needed is so large,
surrogate models allow evaluation of these cases in a reasonable amount of time. Finally,
software and visualization techniques are needed to assimilate the large amounts of data
generated in a system-of-systems design problem so that reasoned and defensible decisions
can be made regarding capabilities, systems, and technologies.
Hypothesis 4.4: The inverse design technique is useful for setting targets at the top
level and tracing these targets to measurable system attributes and technology performance
metrics.
C.5 Hypothesis 4.6: A Matrix of Alternatives and the Sys-
tems Modeling Language are Useful in Reducing the
Scale of the Problem
Part of the complexity in systems-of-systems problems is caused by their large scale, which
breeds many cross-system interactions. In this section, techniques for mapping the dimen-
sionality of the problem and separating those SoS elements that contribute significantly
to the MoEs of interest are described. The first technique, the matrix of alternatives, is
primarily used for the design of the conceptual model while the SysML technique can be
used to diagram the conceptual model and implement the computer model.
C.5.1 Matrix of Alternatives
Morphological Analysis (MA), a revised version of a technology forecasting approach postu-
lated by Mendeleev in 1869, was developed by Fritz Zwicky, a Swiss-American astrophysicist
and aerospace scientist in 1966 [415]. MA is “a method for investigating the totality of re-
lationships contained in multi-dimensional, usually non-quantifiable problem complexes”
[350]. This non-quantifiable analysis often relies on judgement more than analytical results.
From the Greek morphe, meaning shape or form, the general definition of morphology is
“the study of form or pattern” [350]. Zwicky generalized the technique from scientific fields
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such as anatomy, botany, geology, and biology.
MA is performed in the systems engineering process using a morphological matrix.
Also called a matrix of alternatives, the technique is a decomposition of the important
parameters for a given problem and a listing of potential solutions for each dimension often
by decomposing the solution space into a series of rows and columns. An example of a
matrix of alternatives for selecting a pair of pants is shown in Figure 178. In this example,
the various factors that describe a pair of pants are categorized and listed down the left
side while the options for each factor are enumerated across the columns. Although this
matrix only has fourteen rows and a handful of options per row, there are over 26 million
combinations that can be synthesized from the options provided. By selecting a single
design option in each row as shown in Figure 178, this combinatorial space can be narrowed
to a single option.
Waist 32 34 36 38 40
Inseam 30 32 34 36 Other
Composition Cotton Polyester Rayon Other
Fit Classic Relaxed
Elastic Stretch Yes No Hidden Waistband
Color Navy Black Khaki Mocha Other
Cuff None Cuffed
Pleated Pleated Double Pleat Flat Front
Flare Yes No
Wrinkle Resistance Wrinkle Resist No Iron Wrinkle Free None
Stain Resistance Yes No
Machine Washable Yes No
Fade Resistant Yes No





Figure 178: Matrix of Alternatives for Selection of a Pair of Pants [144]
Recent research led by Engler has developed the concept of the Interactive Reconfig-
urable Matrix of Alternatives (IRMA) [144]. IRMA combines design choices with a com-
patibility matrix to calculate the number of feasible design options after each downselect.
Using multi-attribute decision making, filters can be applied at each functional row of the
matrix to justify why a given concept is selected. Filters can be applied on the basis of
cost, schedule, technology readiness level, policy concerns, or other factors. The IRMA also
provides insight into how long it takes to analyze all the combinations produced by the
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matrix of alternatives. Systems-of-systems design requires the use of morphological matri-
ces to focus the modeling effort on the necessary elements. The engineering time required
to develop a myriad of models and the computational time to execute them even for the
simplest parametric study is on the order of decades. The IRMA facilitates reasoned, de-
fensible downselects of the product attributes to a concept space that can be adequately
modeled within a given time.
An IRMA for a Long Range Strike aircraft that uses powered weapons is shown in
Figure 179. This IRMA categorizes the LRS system into platform and missile options, and
enumerates several design choices for each factor. Using the drop-down options, the user
can select whether or not a particular option is to be considered and calculate how many
architecture options remain.
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After Iteration, A Single Family of Concepts
Figure 179: Interactive Reconfigurable Matrix of Alternatives (IRMA) for a Long Range
Strike System Using Air Launched, Powered Weapons [144, 289]
While an IRMA for an LRS system architecture can comprise air, land, space, and
near-space assets operating at multiple theaters to perform multiple capabilities, simplified
versions of the matrix of alternatives for friendly and hostile assets are used in the proof of
concept demonstration in Figures 48 and 49.
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Finally, in addition to its use for concept selection, the matrix of alternatives is also used
throughout this work to identify the methodology options at each phase of the synthesis
process and highlight downselections as they are made. Examples include Figures 20 and
22.
The Systems Modeling Language, or SysML is a subset of the Object Management
Group’s UML 2.0 specification [388]. Its parent, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) is
a modeling and specification language used by software engineers, but can also be used to
model hardware, business processes, organizational structure, and systems engineering [16].
SysML is an extension of UML 2.0 for systems engineering and has support from the In-
ternational Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) and the Object Management Group
(OMG). SysML grew out of the shortcomings of the UML 1.1 standard including the lack
of the deployment diagram to address hierarchical system architectures, the inability of the
object sequence diagram to link to sub-sequences or extended Use Cases, the absence of
linkages to requirements, and the inability to model parametric equations [194]. The UML
2.0 standard improved this situation somewhat, but only allowed a single level of hierarchy
and did not address the lack of requirements and parametric equations. The goal of the
SysML “customization” of UML 2.0 is:
“to provide a standard modelling language for systems engineering to analyse,
specify, design, and verify complex systems, intended to enhance systems qual-
ity, improve the ability to exchange systems engineering information amongst
tools, and help bridge the semantic gap between systems, software, and other
engineering disciplines” [387].
SysML uses some of the extensions of UML 2.0 and also extends the language with
special classes for systems engineers as shown in Figure 180. The purpose of these specifi-
cation languages is to map out complex engineering projects, thus eliminating duplication
of effort and ensuring that the appropriate interactions are tracked throughout the product
life cycle. The UML, adopted in 1997, is used to create meta-models, which in software
engineering refer to high-level abstractions of code. Another way of describing software
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modeling is designing software without writing code. This is useful for large, distributed
software engineering projects where geographically distributed programmers write pieces
of code that must be integrated into the entire enterprise level product. The parallel to
system-of-systems engineering is direct.
UML 2.0 SysML
Common Diagrams: Activities, Block Definitions, Internal Blocks, Sequences, 
State Machines, Use Cases
New Diagrams: Allocations, Parametric Blocks, Requirements
UML Reused
By SysMLNot Needed by SysML New to SysML
Figure 180: Overlap between UML 2.0 and SysML Standards. (Adapted from [12])
As illustrated in Figure 180, the objective of the SysML group was to use as much
UML 2.0 as possible and avoid excessive creation of new types of diagrams. In fact, the
requirements diagram and parametric equations diagram are variations on existing UML
2.0 diagrams [194]. Requirements diagrams also provide a means to interface with textual
requirements that may be held in a resource repository. This is an important element
of requirements analysis and requirements management. The parametric equation diagram
allows equations that relate parameters in the model to be included in the SysML depiction.
When complex physics-based analysis tools are used at the system level, these diagrams tend
to be redundant. The parametric equation diagram is useful if the SysML is used as the
actual programming language for system design.
Aside from different diagrams and nomenclature, the use of the two standards is the
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same. According to Fowler, there are three primary ways of using the UML: sketch, blue-
print, and programming language [155]. Sketches are used to roughly diagram approaches
and alternatives early in the design process and are analogous to conceptual and preliminary
design. Blueprinting, on the other hand, involves the detailed creation of the entire struc-
ture of the code. This is similar to the detailed design phase of aerospace engineering where
specification drawings are prepared for manufacturing. Lastly, while the UML can be used
as a programming language, it is often not efficient to do so: the sketches and blueprints are
independent of programming language. In this research, the sketch and blueprint approach
is used to lay out the structure of the LRS problem for implementation in FLAMES.
UML and SysML are standards. They define a method for creating diagrams that de-
scribe a product or process. While the rules defined by the UML and SysML standards
can be implemented using a white board or pencil and paper, a number of software tools
including RationalR© RoseR©3, TelelogicR© System Architect4, and ARTiSAN Studio5 have
been developed. These tools provide a user interface for the creation of UML diagrams.
As indicated by the footnotes, there is much change and consolidation in the UML tool
industry to keep up with diverse customer needs and the growing desire for major institu-
tions to align their enterprise-wide software products. All three tools support the DoDAF
architecture views, and both Rational Rose and ARTiSAN Studio have been used to dia-
gram the LRS architecture. As of October 2005, “ARTiSAN is the only vendor that offers
and implementation of the current specification of SysML” [4]. As an example, the DoDAF
OV-2 view for mission planning shown in ARTiSAN Studio in Figure 181.
To demonstrate the use of SysML for blueprinting code modules, an activity diagram for
a SEAD aircraft is shown in Figure 182. Activity diagrams “are a technique to describe the
procedural logic, business process, and work flow” [155]. They are similar to flowcharts and
functional flow block diagrams except that they allow parallel behavior which in software
3IBM acquired Rational Software on December 6, 2002 and has integrated Rational tools with its enter-
prise software solutions [11]. The Rational product catalog has been recently extended to include Software
Architect, Software Modeler, and System Developer.
4Telelogic acquired Popkin Software on April 18, 2005 [32]. Telelogic also makes the DOORS requirements
management product.
5Formerly Real Time Studio
396
From the DoDAF architect’s point of view, the user interface provided by the Profile makes the 
underlying UML/SysML artifacts transparent. For example, when the users want to create an SV-
1, the Profile UI provides a “Create SV-1” command  (through menus and toolbars) rather than 
requiring the user to create a SysML Structure Diagram. The underlying SysML diagram, model 
elements, their properties and relationships are created and maintained in the dictionary 
automatically by the Profile. 
 
 
Figure 5 – User Interface tailored to DoDAF 
In Figure 5, note the transparency of the underlying UML/SysML model elements. For example, 
the toolbars provided represent DoDAF entities, the type of the selected item is a DoDAF type 
and so on. 
Stereotyped Diagrams 
The DoDAF products that are diagrams are supported by the Profile as stereotypes of 
UML/SysML diagrams. Where the DoDAF specification provides for more than one kind of view 
for a product, each kind is supported by the Profile. For example, in the case of OV-5 – the 
Operational Activity Model – the DoDAF specification provides for both a functional hierarchy, a 
swimlane view and a data flow view. The Profile provides three distinct diagram types: an OV-5a 
as a stereotype of the UML Class Diagram to capture the functional hierarchy, an OV-5b as a 
stereotype of a UML Activity Diagram to capture the swimlane view and an OV-5c as a 
stereotype of a UML Activity Diagram to capture the data flow view. In addition, the Profile 
scripts assist the user in creating and maintaining a hierarchical organization of the various 
diagrams within and across DoDAF products. 
10 2005, ARTiSAN Software Tools Dodaf With UML/Sysml And Artisan Studio   
Figure 181: Using ARTiSAN Studio to Model DoDAF OV-2 View [349].
engineering indicates that multi-threading or parallel processing can be used to handle
more than one activity simultaneously. In military simulation, the activity diagram can
be used to describe the potential actions a vehicle can perform which is useful in mapping
the cognitive behaviors that must be developed to allow the asset to perform the identified
actions. Activity diagrams are also similar to Petri Nets [471]. An activity diagram for a
fighter aircraft flying strike or SEAD is shown in Figure 182.
Sequence diagrams “describe how a group of objects collaborate in some behavior”
[155]. A seque ce diagram is subtype of intera tion diagrams along with the communication
diagram, interaction overview diagram, and timing diagram. Sequence diagrams are similar
to functional architectures and functional flow block diagrams [130]. These are useful in































Figure 182: Example Activity Diagram for a Fighter Aircraft.
State machine diagrams (or state diagram) are used to describe the behavior of a system
by describing certain “states” and the methods used to traverse from state to state. These
diagrams are another way of looking at the same type of information in a sequence diagram.
Instead of focusing on the actions (verbs) like the activity diagram, a state diagrams focus
on the states (nouns). Example states for a fighter aircraft include waiting on the runway,
taking off, weapons locked onto target, bomb bay open, under attack from the ground,
under attack from the air, or dead. Various methods define how the aircraft moves from
state to state, for example, if the “intercept blue fighter with red missile” method is used
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successfully, the state of the blue fighter changes from “under attack from the air” to
“dead.” State machine diagrams are used to outline the necessary physical and cognitive
elements needed to create an object-oriented constructive simulation for the Long Range
Strike system.
The last diagram that is critical in this research is the Use Case Diagram. Use cases are
“the specification of a sequence of actions, including variants, that a system (or other entity)
can perform, interacting with actors of the system” [388]. SysML does not provide a means
for writing use cases, rather, the use case diagram allows the designer to amalgamate all the
created use cases together. Given a number of use cases for the systems in an architecture,
the use case diagram can help systems engineers plan scenarios and missions that involve
the elements of the architecture.
Why are these standards considered “advanced design methods?” While software mod-
eling has been popular since the 1980’s and ubiquitous since the mid-1990’s, detailed concep-
tual modeling for systems-of-systems has not seen widespread acceptance until the adoption
of the DoD Architecture Framework standard in August 20036. In fact, while there are a
number of books written about UML for software modeling, as of late 2005, SysML-related
literature is limited to white papers and Powerpoint presentations. A structured method for
examining the complex linkages in an architecture is important because integrating systems
acquired with a service-centric focus into joint operations has shown that after-the-fact in-
tegration and interoperability is difficult at best. The implementation of UML and SysML
in systems engineering enhances understanding of complex interactions between systems in
a system-of-systems architecture and enables concepts like network centric operations and
capability-based acquisition.
While many companies have been involved in this type of work, the specific approaches
used are usually proprietary. SysML is an advanced design technique because its mastery
and mainstream use facilitates the development of a process for system-of-systems engineer-
ing that is publicly available.
6While the official DoDAF version 1.0 was released on August 30, 2003, precursors to DoDAF were
released as the C4ISR framework in 1996 [389]. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense published version
1.0 of the Ministry of Defense Architecture Framework (MoDAF) in September 2005.
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The implementation of the LRS problem using SysML to diagram the necessary elements
of the FLAMES simulation is detailed in Section 5.3.1.7.
Hypothesis 4.6: A matrix of alternatives is a useful technique for reducing the scale
of the problem using a defensible downselection process. The Systems Modeling Language
is useful for diagramming code and programming modules.
C.6 Hypothesis 4.7: SWARMing, Brainstorming, and Func-
tional Decomposition are Useful Techniques for Deter-
mining the Necessary Elements of a System Architec-
ture
The System Wide Assessment and Research Method, or SWARM, is a technique that is
fundamental to the understanding of a problem. SWARMing occurs as the first step in
the design process, and is essentially a massive knowledge-gathering technique. As part
of a comprehensive problem definition method, SWARMing includes literature searches of
a variety of sources, identification of new methods that must be developed in order to
analyze and assess the system, and the selection of tools relevant for the design. This ini-
tial knowledge-gathering serves as a rapid training phase for project participants. During
SWARMing, team members “learn the lingo” of the design community and build a foun-
dation on the relevant systems so they can have relevant and meaningful discussions with
the customer. SWARMing builds knowledge and confidence, especially when designing a
system outside the realm of expertise of the designer.
The necessary elements for the system-of-system implementation of the Long Range
Strike Capability is determined through SWARMing. After a downselection process has
been performed, detailed model construction in the FLAMES tool is aided by the SWARM
technique, as myriad data on military systems must be collected from a variety of sources
to accurately model the aspects of the Long Range Strike system-of-systems. The primary
difficulty in system-of-systems engineering is the large scale of the problem. Brainstorming,
“a process undertaken by a person to solve a problem by rapidly generating a variety of pos-
sible solutions” is “to the morphological method what simulation by Monte Carlo method is
to the combinatorial analysis” [22, 234]. While numerous brainstorming techniques abound
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in the literature, a general tool for this purpose, MatchWare OpenMind, is “a powerful,
visual learning tool designed to help you develop and organize ideas. Based on the proven
Mind MappingR© theory, it enhances creativity, clarifies thinking and improves memory”
[273]. The mind map, an example of which is shown in Figure 47, serves the same general
purpose as a large white board and post-it notes: organizing the scope of the project.
The combination of heterogeneous systems to develop the desired effects (caused by
the emergent behavior of the system-of-systems) involves complex integration and therefore
effective project management skills. The Architecture for Information Systems (ARIS) is
a business development tool that allows best practices and processes to be mapped. Files
and documents can also be attached to any step of the process, as ARIS functions as a data
management system for complex processes [211]. These brainstorming tools help identify
which elements and linkages between them are required to analyze a desired capability.
Hypothesis 4.7: SWARMing and brainstorming were identified as techniques that are
useful for scoping the problem and defining the appropriate “control volume” to be ana-
lyzed using modeling and simulation. A functional decomposition is a systems engineering
technique that is useful in relating operational activities to system functions.
C.7 Hypothesis 4.8: Surrogate Models Enable Rapid High
Fidelity Analysis
Unfortunately, a major technical challenge in executing inordinately complex, large-scale
constructive simulations is the long run time associated with their execution. According to
the National Science Foundation, the way simulations are performed must be revolutionized
to “incorporate new discoveries that simplify and enhance multiscale, multidisciplinary
simulations” [35]. To avoid “analysis paralysis,” a technique is needed to speed up the
execution of the simulation to enable large simulations to occur in reasonable timeframes.
Surrogate models7 are an approximation technique for replacing existing analytical mod-
els with a suitable substitute. Surrogate models in the form of response surface equations
were first introduced by Box and Wilson in 1951 and developed extensively throughout the
7This term has gradually replaced “metamodel” in advanced design nomenclature as metamodels are
associated with low-fidelity approximations in the software engineering community (see Section C.5.1).
401
1950’s. After several failed attempts in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the first successful widespread
application of surrogate models in the aerospace community was initiated by Tai, Mavris,
and Schrage in 1995 [70, 392].
Since the exact relationship between responses and input variables may be difficult to
define analytically, a surrogate model is an empirically assumed model that approximates
these relationships. These “models of models” can be highly accurate if appropriately
created and form the basis of modern advanced design for their wide range of applicability.
AFRL Chief Technologist Dr. Thomas Cruse notes that “response surface methods are
highly effective over a range of design levels from conceptual to final” [113].
One process by which surrogate models are created is called Response Surface Method-
ology (RSM). RSM approximates the inherent dependence of functional responses (outputs)
to a series of design variables (inputs) using a least-squares regression approach to the de-
termination of unknown model coefficients. The resulting response surface equation (RSE)
provides an efficient means to query the design space using a simple equation as opposed
to running the full code. The execution of code runs to maximize the effectiveness of the
RSM technique with minimal expenditure of computational effort can be realized through
application of design of experiments.
Surrogate models provide a number of benefits to advanced design. First and foremost,
the replacement of complex design tools with surrogate models has the potential to greatly
reduce design cycle time. Although the initial setup of the response surface models can be
time consuming, usually a by-product of trying to generate adequate output data at the
extremes of the design space using computational tools not designed to do so, the run time
with surrogate models is an order of magnitude or more less than that of the actual code.
Since RSEs are simple equations, they are not operating system or platform specific. Often,
they can be exported into spreadsheets for use as decision making tools for engineers and
managers alike.
Addressing one of the technical barriers identified in Section 3.1, surrogate models can
handle the dichotomy between large-scale and high detail that is endemic to simulation
activities. While a brute force technique would simply run the highest fidelity models
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available for every asset in the system over every assumption, scenario, and set of doctrine
and tactics, a more elegant solution would be to use the ANOVA procedure to assess which
of these factors contributes the greatest amount to the variability of the response for the
scenario(s) identified. While a full high-fidelity simulation is desired for every radar, missile
motor, and turbine blade, realistically something must be given up to explore the design
space in a reasonable time frame. Anobject-oriented simulation environment lends itself to
































Figure 183: Decomposition of Model Fidelity into Five Manageable Levels.
As shown in Figure 183, this variable fidelity approach can be decomposed into five
levels where the lowest level is a simple numerical value and the highest level is a linkage
to a physics-based modeling tool. While level five models yield the highest fidelity and
degrees of freedom, they suffer in terms of setup time and execution speed. A reasonable
compromise is to use high-fidelity surrogate models where appropriate for assets at multiple
levels in the military simulation hierarchy. An object-oriented environment is ideal for the
variable fidelity approach as multiple levels of fidelity can be encapsulated within a single
object. A pseudocode example of this encapsulation is shown below:
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object AWACS(fidelity_level, vector_of_attributes)
if (fidelity_level = 1)
Pfind=0.95




elseif (fidelity_level = 3)
Pfind=f(visibility, altitude, power)
elseif (fidelity_level = 4)
Calculate RSE using vector_of_attributes (call RSE module)
else
Execute physics-based code with state vector
end
end object
A variable fidelity environment is also useful for tracking combinations of qualitative
and quantitative information. If it is not possible to develop a physics-based model for a
given asset, qualitative values can be used to assess the sensitivity of the capability-level
MoEs to the variation of that asset.
Large scale collaborative design is aided by surrogate models. Typically, the primary
concern when industry teams collaborate is the protection of intellectual property. Since
many behaviors of a computational tool can be encapsulated within a response surface
equation, the code itself cannot be reverse engineered. Surrogate models can be created
for a specific problem by defining input parameters in a narrow range for the problem
of interest. The original code is still needed to examine other problems of the same class.
Furthermore, disciplinary experts can create surrogate models using their in-house tools and
then export them to other entities as a “currency” of communication in collaborative design
activities. This alleviates the need for complex B2B data transfer solutions, collaborative
Internet-based infrastructures, or even the physical shipment of man and machine to the
collaboration venue.
Surrogate models can also be used to provide intelligence to assets in an agent-based
framework. By providing a series of surrogate models that calculate measures of perfor-
mance based on the state of an asset, intelligent agents can query the provided surrogates to
determine their optimum operating conditions. In this manner, these intelligent agents can
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“know” a lot about their surroundings and their potential to interact with them. This fea-
ture is used to provide realistic military campaign simulation without a human-in-the-loop
(see Sections 5.5 and 5.6).
Response surface equations have been used in a wide variety of research activities includ-
ing propulsion systems [244, 358], power systems [320], commercial aircraft [285, 290, 329],
unmanned vehicles [295], helicopters [287, 368], tiltrotors [286], missiles [63, 142, 251], sur-
face ships [281, 282], network switches [279], and torpedo design [154, 159]. RSEs have
also found use in the design of systems-of-systems including the U.S. air transportation
system [127, 161, 258], military aircraft survivability [377, 378], air defense weaponry [141],
and Long Range Strike aircraft [289]. This list is certainly non-inclusive: response surface
methodology has been the foundation of advanced design research at ASDL since 1995 [392].
Hypothesis 4.8: Surrogate modeling is a proven approach that balances speed and
accuracy to enable rapid design space exploration.
C.8 Hypothesis 4.9: Neural Networks Enable Modeling of
Discontinuities and Nonlinearities
Two types of surrogate models, polynomials and neural networks are summarized below.
As noted by Daberkow, neural networks provide advantages for very complex non-linear be-
havior or large numbers of independent variables when the traditional polynomial approach
breaks down [116]. Neural networks are of great interest for the system-of-systems design
problem for which this difficulty is notably present.
C.8.0.1 Polynomial Response Surface Equations
A large scope of literature is available on the use of polynomial response surface equations for
design (see Section C.7 and this work does not delve deeply into the theory behind them. As
an overview, the second-order polynomial equation used is based on a second-order Taylor
series expansion:













bijxixj + ε (25)
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Where: y is the approximated response
xi are the design variables
b0 is the intercept
bi are regression coefficients for main effects
bii are coefficients for quadratic effects
bij are coefficients for interactions
ε is the approximation error
The coefficients, b, are found through a least-squares regression of data resultant from
an intelligently constructed design of experiments. Since the coefficients are not a function
of the design variables themselves, the regression is termed linear. The goodness of fit
for a polynomial RSE can be verified using the five step process outlined by Barros and
Kirby [55]. Typically, face-centered central composite DOEs have been demonstrated to
minimize correlation between independent variables for problems with less than thirty design
variables. Jimenez and Balestrini generated polynomial response surface equations for a
supersonic transport using a latin hypercube with 78 dimensions [223]. Polynomial RSEs
are generally valid for the approximation of many engineering processes; however, they do
not work well for highly nonlinear or discontinuous responses.
C.8.0.2 Neural Network Surrogate Models
An artificial neural network is “an interconnected group of artificial neurons that uses a
mathematical or computational model for information processing based on a connectionist
approach to computation” [16]. The fundamental idea in this connectionist approach is
that the computational elements themselves are very simple, but like biological neurons
in human brains, the connections between the neurons define very complex behaviors and
computational abilities.
The technique can trace its origin to a 1943 article by neurophysiologist Warren Mc-
Culloch and mathematician Walter Pitts entitled “A Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent
in Nervous Activity” [297]. As in biological systems, a single neuron can be connected
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to many other neurons to create very complex networks of structures. Artificial neural
networks have found widespread application in pattern recognition and classification, con-
trol processes, speech recognition, optical character recognition, autonomous robots, and
the development of adaptive software agents. Their ability to model processes also makes
them ideal for regression tasks, especially those with discontinuous or highly non-linear
responses. Johnson provides an overview of how to use neural networks with the JMPR©
statistical package [224]. Other introductory works include references [337] and [383].
Although there are many types of neural networks including stochastic neural networks,
radial basis functions, and committees of machines, the most common type of neural network
and the technique used with success in the modeling of systems-of-systems is a feedforward
neural network [141]. This type consists of several layers of interconnected neurons. Typi-
cally, three layers are used: the input layer, the hidden layer, and the output layer, shown
in Figure 184. As noted in the figure, a single response has a given number of inputs, Xn,
and an unknown number of hidden nodes, Hm, whose optimum configuration is problem
dependent. This number can be found using numerical optimization.
Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer


















Figure 184: Typical Structure of Layers in a Feedforward Neural Network.
The power of neural networks comes from its ability to model non-linear behaviors. This
is often accomplished through the use of a sigmoid curve as the transfer function between
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the input layer and the hidden layer. Also called the “squish” or “squash” function, the
sigmoid reduces the neuron’s activation level to the range of [0,1]. As an added benefit,
the sigmoid function has a very simple derivative, which is needed to perform the back-
propagation feature during the training process8. A step function or hyperbolic tangent





This transfer function is used to calculate the numerical value of each of the hidden










Where: aj is the intercept term for the jth hidden node
bij is the coefficient for the ith design variable
Xi is the value of the ith design variable
Hj is the value of the jth hidden node
and N is the number of input variables
The response is found using a linear function applied to the value of the hidden node as
shown in Equation 28. The equation shown is for the general case of k responses. Coefficients
c and d are scale factors that represent the intercept and a scalar on the interval [0,1]
respectively.





8Without this non-linearity, neural networks are reduced to linear matrix multiplication problems.
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Where: ck is the response scaling intercept term for the kth response
dk is the response scaling coefficient for the kth response
ek is the intercept term for the kth response
fjk is the coefficient for the jth hidden node and kth response
Hj is the value of the jth hidden node (Equation 27)
and NH is the number of hidden nodes
Equations 26 through 28 can therefore be combined to develop a general form of the neural
net equation:
















Where: N is the number of input (design) variables
Xi is the value of the ith design variable
Hj is the value of the jth hidden node (Equation 27)
aj is the intercept term for the jth hidden node
bij is the coefficient for the ith design variable
ck is the response scaling intercept term for the kth response
dk is the response scaling coefficient for the kth response
ek is the intercept term for the kth response
fjk is the coefficient for the jth hidden node and kth response
and NH is the number of hidden nodes
That is, for k responses R and N design variables X, the neural network equation can
be developed by selecting a number of hidden nodes NH and determining values for the
unknown scaling coefficients a, b, c, d, e, and f over the limits of summation illustrated in
Equation 29. The process by which the scaling coefficients are determined is called training
the neural network, and typically occurs through back-propagation of errors through the
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structure of neurons called a network. The training process can be time intensive due to the
large number of unknown coefficients. Johnson developed a technique using the MATLABR©
neural networks toolbox [128] that utilizes optimization algorithms to maximize the R2 value
of the neural network equation by manipulating the number of hidden nodes and the values
of the scaling coefficients [225]. Using Johnson and Schutte’s Basic Regression Analysis
for Integrated Neural Networks (BRAINN) tool, a user can also specify the training time
allowed or the number of discrete training attempts at each node. In this manner, the
optimum configuration of the neural network equation (Equation 29) can be determined
with minimal operator intervention. This training and optimization process is summarized
in Figure 185. Inside the tan box, the training process guesses initial values of the coefficients
of the neural network equation (Equation 29. For a given number of hidden nodes, the
evaluation of this equation with a given set of input values, X, lead to an estimated value
of the response, R. The algorithm compares the estimated R value to the actual value
from the output of the DOE runs and evaluates the error of the prediction. On the next
iteration, the training algorithm alters the coefficients and attempts to minimize the error
in the evaluated response. After this error has been reduced below a user-defined threshold
or the optimizer can make no more progress, the training process is complete. Within an
optimization process like BRAINN, the assumed number of hidden nodes is varied and the
training process repeats. BRAINN stores the results of all training passes for each user
defined number of hidden nodes and after a user-specified time frame, saves the “best”
equation formulated to date.
Multimodal and discontinuous behaviors can be captured well using neural network
response surface equations. While any surface can be approximated using this technique,
the equation for neural networks can be difficult to interpret as the standard form differs
greatly from the relatively simple polynomial response surface equation. Furthermore, the
selection of the number of hidden nodes is often problem dependent and can be difficult
without an optimizer: too few nodes incorrectly captures the behavior of the code while
too many leads to overfit problems [116]. Ender advocates generating random cases to be
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Figure 185: Training and Optimization Process for Neural Networks Using BRAINN.
representation error for an RSE. Random cases should not be used to develop the neural
network equation as this leads to increased error from high independent variable correlation.
Johnson recommends the use of a Latin Hypercube design to minimize correlation combined
with a two-level fractional factorial design to capture the extremes of the design space and
eliminate extrapolation of the model [224]. Initial research suggests that the goodness of fit
procedure detailed by Kirby and Barros [55, 240] is also valid for neural network response
surface equations.
Many other resources exist on the theory and application of neural networks to a wide
array of problems. The 1988 DARPA Neural Networks Study [17] details many of the uses
and applications of neural networks. Ender summarizes the theory behind artificial neural
networks [141] and Johnson and Schutte provide and overview of how neural networks can
be generated using the JMPR© software [224] and the BRAINN module [225].
C.8.0.3 Comparison of Polynomial and Neural Network Response Surface Equations
for Military Campaign Analysis
Neural network response surface equations are an enabling technology for the replacement
of military modeling and simulation tools with surrogate models. This is the result of
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the extreme non-linear and discontinuous behaviors exhibited by such models. Due to the
immaturity of the neural network technique at the time, Soban used polynomial response
surface equations to approximate the campaign code ITEM [377, 378]. This was statistically
valid due to the short time frames and modest number of assets in the simulation and
is analogous to the linearization over small ranges. While polynomial response surface
equations are a tried and true method that is applicable to a wide array of problems,
military simulations over large time scales with a wide variety of assets and discontinuous
changes in tactics and technologies requires the use of neural networks as surrogate models.
Red Advantage:
High SAM Range












Platforms Lost Overfit Error
Figure 186: Example of Three Dimensional Neural Network Model Showing Multimodal
Behavior.
Preliminary results from a campaign code written by Ender and Cole [289] using the
methodologies of Reference [51] were analyzed using both techniques. This MATLABR©
campaign tool features a notional country populated by SAM batteries and TCTs. Plat-
forms, departing from an airbase some distance from hostile territory fire powered weapons
at the targets. When all available degrees of freedom are active, the design space is highly
non-linear. For example, all asset ranges and speeds are variable. When the blue force
weapon range is greater than that of the hostile SAMs, the blue forces are invincible and
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vice versa. When TCT dwell time, used to simulate TCT “shoot-and-scoot” tactics, is set
low enough blue forces cannot fly out and attack targets before they disappear, making the
red TCTs invincible. This results in the multimodal behavior shown in Figure 186. The
overfit penalty for the neural net is evident in the upper left corner of the figure as the
plateau “dips” by several percent. This is likely due to the small number of cases run at
this extreme and can be remedied by better population of this area of the design space.
To further illustrate the benefits of neural networks for system-of-systems design of
military systems, a direct comparison of the two techniques is shown in Figure 187. A
second order polynomial with no transformations or higher-order terms is compared to a
neural network with 15 hidden nodes. Comparing the actual by predicted plots at the
top of the figure shows that in general, the neural network fits the data better than the
polynomial RSE. This is also manifested in a higher R2 value, a less scattered residual by
predicted plot, and a narrower distribution of error. Both models are plagued by several
outliers, meaning that more data samples may be needed in regions with high residual error
to enable either technique to better understand the character of that region. Also, in the
case of neural network equations, it was found that sometimes large outliers are present
when one of the terms in the denominator of one of the hidden node equations is near zero.
Slightly changing the input parameters remedies this problem.
It is important to note that a large number of scenario parameters are actually included
in the neural network equation. These parameters have the potential to completely change
the outcome of the campaign analysis and contribute greatly to the error in both models.
While the variable transformation procedure advocated by McDonald [298] and the addi-
tion of higher order terms may improve the fit of the polynomial equation, it never correctly
approximates the discontinuous behavior captured by the neural network equations. Before
the advent of more complex models, a typical way to address this issue involved stitching
together multiple polynomial equations at the transition points between discrete behaviors.
Unfortunately, this technique only works when the location of the “knee in the curve” is
known. In the study of complex systems, the location of these inflection points may be a


















-30-10 10 30 50 70 90110


















-20 0 10 30 50 70 90 110



























































































































Model Fit Error Mean
Model Fit Error Std. Dev.






Model Fit Error Mean
Model Fit Error Std. Dev.









Figure 187: Comparison Between Polynomial and Neural Network Response Surface
Equations for a Military Campaign Analysis Code.
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are an appropriate surrogate modeling technique for large simulations of systems-of-systems
over reasonable time frames.
Hypothesis 4.9: Neural Network surrogate models are appropriate for this class of
problems because they can capture discontinuities endemic to systems-of-systems.
C.9 Hypothesis 4.10: A Space-Filling Design is Ideal for
Design Space Sampling
A Design of Experiments (DOE) is “a systematic, rigorous approach to engineering problem-
solving that applies principles and techniques at the data collection stage so as to ensure
the generation of valid, defensible, and supportable engineering conclusions” [318]. This
statistical technique is concerned with selecting experiments to be performed that generate
the maximum amount of data with the minimal expenditure of time and money. It origi-
nated in 1918 when the director of the Rothamsted Agricultural Experiment Station in the
United Kingdom hired statistician Ronald A. Fisher to analyze historical records of crop
yields. The station “had records extending over decades for crop yields from extensive plots
of land each of which was treated with the same particular fertilizer” [71]. Additionally,
they had records of temperature, rainfall, and other environmental factors over the same
time period. This data, collected in a haphazard manner, did not answer some critical
questions despite the analysis technique applied. Fisher invented the design of experiments
to standardize the process by which data is collected for analysis [152, 153]. Experimental
design techniques have also been refined by Yule [489], Box, and Hunter [71], Scheffé [367],
Cox [102], and Taguchi [391].
C.9.1 Applications of DOEs
DOE is used for four general applications in engineering: comparison, optimization, screen-
ing/characterization, and modeling. Comparative DOEs can also be referred to as “one-
factor-at-a-time” experiments. These efforts are often time consuming and a single trial
typically yields only one piece of information. Comparative DOEs are the least efficient
technique for exploring a design space. Optimization DOEs are concerned with determin-
ing the optimal settings of the process factors to optimize the behavior of the response.
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The work of Taguchi was heavily focused on optimization [391]. While optimization DOEs
are a means to determine the optimum value, they are not as useful as modeling DOEs
which can also be used to calculate sensitivities for the responses and provide transparency
throughout the design space.
The next two techniques have much greater influence on the design of systems-of-
systems. Screening or characterization experiments are primarily used to determine what
factors are important in a given process, that is, differentiate the significant few from the
insignificant many. A “screening test” uses the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique
in combination with a two-level DOE to identify statistically significant impacts on the
variability of a given response (see Section C.10.1). Screening DOEs are useful in much of
engineering research and are especially critical in the design of systems-of-systems: it is im-
portant to know which factors contribute little to the variability of the response so they can
be defaulted in the analysis. Modeling DOEs are used to replace the experimental process
with a mathematical function that has thorough predictive power (good fit throughout the
design space) and high accuracy across the range of parameters specified. Modeling DOEs
are the most effective of the four techniques for system-of-systems design as they allow a
complex behavior, in most cases simulated by a suite of computer codes, to be approximated
by an equation. In summary, modeling DOEs are used to create response surface equations
(RSEs).
C.9.2 Types of Sampling Techniques (DOEs)
There are several types of Designs-of-Experiments used in the screening and modeling roles.
According to Montgomery, there are eleven features that impact the quality of a design
including a “reasonable distribution of data points throughout the region of interest,” mini-
mization of the number of experiments performed, and good predictability in the estimation
of model coefficients [55, 300]. Since different sampling techniques may have better applica-
bility to certain classes of problems, several different types of DOEs, illustrated in Figure
188, are examined herein.
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Figure 188: Types of Experimental Designs for Screening and Modeling Applications
(Adapted from [55]).
Screening DOEs are almost exclusively composed of two-level orthogonal arrays. These
can be seen as combinations of on-off switches that test different combinations of parame-
ters at their high and low values. The simplest kind of DOE to generate is a full-factorial
two-level DOE which requires 2n experimental runs and leaves no degrees of freedom for
error. The number of experiments can easily be reduced using a fractional factorial design:
“a factorial experiment in which only an adequately chosen fraction of the treatment combi-
nations required for the complete factorial experiment is selected to be run” [43]. Properly
chosen fractional factorial designs should be both balanced (all treatment combinations
have the same number of observations) and orthogonal (the sum of the products of each
vector in the design is zero) [318]. Balanced, orthogonal arrays have the property of low
independent variable correlation. They are typically of Resolution III, meaning the main
effects are confounded with two-variable interactions. For this reason, two-level fractional
factorial experiments are not appropriate for generating polynomial statistical models of
order 2 or higher as they can only model linear behavior.
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The “simplest” type of modeling DOE, a randomly generated DOE, is not really a
DOE at all since it is not created by a structured process. Random DOEs consist of
points stochastically distributed about the design space or a subset thereof. While these
designs are easy to create, they suffer from a high degree of independent variable correlation.
Random designs are usually not used to create models, but are good for examining the model
representation error of surrogate models [55].
Full factorial designs are a classical experimental design and a brute force approach
that essentially runs all combinations of variables at the levels specified. A three-level full
factorial design therefore requires 3n cases while a five-level design requires 5n. The curse of
dimensionality is especially evident in full factorial designs. Although the run time is large,
the extremes of the design space are well covered by this technique although the interior
of the design space is only sampled through the introduction of more levels and hence
drastically increasing the number of cases required. Full factorial designs are considered to
have infinite resolution as they have no confounding if the appropriate number of levels is
chosen for the degree of the model required [318].
Box-Behnken designs, proposed by G.E.P. Box in 1978, are independent quadratic de-
signs that do not contain embedded factorial or fractional factorial designs [318]. These
designs are similar in construction to the two-level screening test designs by Plackett and
Burman. Box-Behnken designs are formulated by combining two-level factorial designs with
incomplete block designs. They suffer from a complex aliasing structure (most are Resolu-
tion IV); however, they are efficient designs from the standpoint of run time. These designs
sample the edges of the design space as opposed to the corners, and therefore response sur-
face models using Box-Behnken designs suffer from extrapolation problems at the extremes
of the design space which leads to significant error. For this reason, these designs are typi-
cally avoided except in situations where the modeling tool requires extreme run times and
it is unlikely that corner point solutions will be considered.
D-optimal designs or saturated DOEs are non-orthogonal designs with correlated effect
estimates that represent the minimum number of cases that can be executed to develop
a model at a desired order [318]. Generation of D-optimal designs for optimality involves
418
maximization of the determinant of the Fischer information matrix [XT X]. D-optimal de-
signs generally result in poor coverage of the design space and should only be used when
the standard types of designs require too many runs or the design tools are known to fail
at the ranges required for the aforementioned designs.
A central composite design (CCD) is a fractional factorial design of Resolution V which
combines a two-level full-factorial design with “star points” located at a defined distance
from the center point. The location of the star points defines whether the design is inscribed,
face centered, or circumscribed. Face-centered CCD’s have been used widely for aerospace
applications [55, 240]. Interior sampling is absent save a single center point, but the extremes
of the design space are well-covered. As previously mentioned, this has advantages from a
modeling approach but can result in unconverged designs if the simulation tool generating
the responses cannot run when two variables are at their extreme values. Creation of CCD’s
for large numbers of independent variables (over 20) is a computationally intensive task as
the computational algorithm seeks to create rows of inputs that have no correlation to any
other row. To generate designs in a reasonable time frame it is often necessary to place a
threshold on the allowed correlation; however, the correlation generally becomes excessive
in central composite designs with more than approximately 30 independent variables.
Space-filling designs, which literally fill a n-dimensional space, “should be used when
there is little or no information about the underlying effects of factors on responses” and are
“useful for modeling systems that are deterministic or near-deterministic” such as computer
simulations [275, 366]. While random points can be used to fill a space, an alternative
scheme called “sphere-packing” is used to minimize the maximum distance between any
two points in n-dimensional space, akin to placing billiard balls into an n-dimensional box
[366]. Mathematical techniques to assess this distance have been developed extensively in
the literature [147, 227, 485]. “A good space-filling design is one in which the design points
are scattered throughout the experimental region with minimal unsampled regions; that is,
the voided regions are relatively small” [96]. As a result, space-filling designs can be effective
for neural network models when the exact location of inflection points in the design space
is unknown.
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Finally, Latin Hypercube (LHC) designs, developed by Ronald L. Iman, J. C. Helton,
and J. E. Campbell in the early 1980s, attempts to distribute points evenly through the
design space using a combination of uniform designs9 with a sphere-packing scheme [215].
The primary advantage of the LHC technique is that the number of runs required in the
design can be defined by the user depending on the density of coverage of the design space
desired. The LHC algorithm creates the desired number of runs, maximize the coverage
of the design space, and minimize independent variable correlation. LHC designs can be
made orthogonal (the entire sample space is sampled evenly); however, efficient orthogonal
sampling is difficult in practice because all random samples are generated simultaneously.
Generally, it is easier to specify a threshold for the allowed independent variable correlation
to minimize the error in the final design. Like other space-filling techniques, LHC’s have the
benefit of a rich sampling of the interior though they may be subject to high independent
variable correlation if improperly created. If a small number of runs is used, they do
not adequately cover the extremes of the design space; however, they do not suffer the
same correlation problems as CCD’s for a large number of independent variables. A latin
hypercube design was used by Jimenez and Balestrini to generate response surface equations
for a supersonic transport using forty design variables with reasonably low correlation [223].
One of the major disadvantage of a LHC is that the creation of designs with the uniform
constraint is much more time consuming than the sphere-packing scheme, as Fang and Wang
note, the number of readily available uniform designs is severely limited by the difficulty in
creating designs for many combinations of variables and runs [96, 147].
When modeling very complex nonlinear behaviors, Johnson advocates the combination
of latin hypercube designs with a fractional factorial design that extends to the extremes of
the design space [225]. Biltgen, Ender and Cole demonstrated that this technique is viable
for a system-of-systems formulation [289]. Since the uniform design constraint, which limits
the number of trials at a given level to one, is not an important aspect of experimental
designs needed for this work, a space-filling design is used. This assertion is supported
9A uniform design “minimizes the discrepancy between the design points (which have an empirical uniform
distribution) and a theoretical uniform distribution” [366].
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by Dr. Christopher M. Gotwalt, Senior Research Statistician with the SAS Institute, who
notes that a pure space-filling design is most appropriate for this type of computer simulation
[182]. When necessary, a central-composite design can be used to supplement the space-
filling design; however, for the large number of runs considered in this work, coverage of the
design space generally extends to the extremes without this supplemental DOE.
Figure 189: The MATLABR© Model Based Calibration MBC Toolbox (left) and the JMP
DOE Creation Tool (right) [274].
Graphical representations of the sampling techniques described above are shown in Fig-
ure 188 and the benefits and drawbacks of the techniques are generalized in Table 33. Many
computerized tools exist for the creation of experimental designs including Design Expert,
JMPR© [19], and the MATLABR© Model-Based Calibration Toolbox (MBC)[274]. Both the
MATLABR© MBC toolbox and JMPR© (shown in Figure 189) are used in this research based
on ease of use, simplicity, and speed.
Hypothesis 4.10: For non-linear systems-of-systems problems a space-filling design





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.10 Hypothesis 4.11: Sensitivities Can be Evaluated Us-
ing the Prediction Profiler and the ANOVA Tech-
nique
“Metallurgist: a pseudo scientist, who uses undetermined suppositions,
indefinite theories, and inexpressible hypotheses; which are based on unreliable
information uncertain quantities, and incomplete data; derived from
non-reproducible experiments and incomplete investigations; using equipment
and instruments of questionable accuracy, insufficient resolution, and
inadequate sensitivity, to arrive at timid, tentative cloudy, abstruse, and
non-committed conclusions prefaced by the phrase, ‘IT DEPENDS’ ”
Attributed to Douglas J. Robinson
The above quote, present on the cubicle wall of every materials engineer in the United
States, is just as suitable for systems-of-systems engineers as it is for metallurgists. The
phrase “IT DEPENDS” underscores the sensitivity of conclusions on assumptions. Since
in practice it may be difficult to truly answer an analysis question due to the confounding
complexity of the problem, this section examines techniques for assessing the sensitivity of
key metrics to input variables under the designer’s control.
C.10.1 Analysis of Variance
Analysis of Variance, or ANOVA, is a statistical procedure that aims to identify source of
variability in a process. This technique was pioneered by Sir Ronald Fisher [16]. Using a
two-level design of experiments that runs points at the extremes of the design space, the
ANOVA procedure can be performed and visualized using a Pareto Chart. Named after
Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian, who made the observation in 1906 that 20% of the population
owned 80% of the property, the “Pareto Principle” was later generalized by Joseph M. Juran
to state that 80% of the variability of a process generally comes from 20% of the causes [16].
This “80-20 rule” is rather a guideline that is problem dependent. A pareto chart is a type
of histogram that is useful for visualizing the impact of variability on a given response. A
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Pareto Plot for % Time Critical Targets Killed Pareto Plot for % Supersonic Platforms Lost
Figure 190: Illustrative Pareto Chart for Military Campaign Simulation.
The magnitude of the bars in Figure 190 illustrates the relative contribution of that
parameter to the overall variability of the selected response. The curved black line sums the
cumulative impact of the variables above that point and the green shaded region highlights
the variables which contribute to 80% of the variability of the response. The color codings
on the variable names indicate whether the parameter is under control of the friendly (blue)
player or the adversary (red) player.
It is important to note that the ANOVA procedure is valid for the variables selected and
the ranges those parameters are allowed to vary. In this example, the importance rankings
illustrated in the Pareto chart of Figure 190 are also a function of scenario parameters
such as force ratio (ratio of blue to red forces), percentage of time-critical targets on the
battlefield, and ratio of subsonic to supersonic platforms on the blue side. The green
shaded region represents the 80% threshold. Coincidentally, four variables compose 80% of
the variability for both responses. Variable names in blue represent design variables for the
missile, while red shaded names indicate noise parameters that are a function of the threat
situation in the scenario and cannot be defined a priori. Pareto charts depict variability of
the response. When the positive or negative variability on the response is depicted, this is
popularly called a “tornado chart.” For the parameter settings and ranges used, the most
critical parameters for killing time critical targets are the amount of time the target is on
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the battlefield, the cruise Mach number of the weapon, and the distance from the airbase
to the region of interest. The plot of blue supersonic platform losses indicates that SAM
range and distance to theater are the two primary factors, followed by characteristics of
the weapon. Over the range of variability provided, weapon design variables far outstrip
those of the platform. If any scenario parameters are changed, the outcome of this plot is
completely different, as scenario assumptions have a very large impact on the variability of
the response.
The ANOVA procedure the the Pareto chart are useful for determining potential causes
for observed behavior; however, since the range of the input variables plays a role in the
factor’s evaluation in the Pareto chart, it is difficult to generalize cause and effect relation-
ships. All observed trends are valid for a specific scenario and its underlying assumptions.
The static nature of the Pareto chart drives the need for a more dynamic sensitivity analysis
environment.
C.10.2 Sensitivity Analysis Using the Prediction Profiler
One of the primary advantages to surrogate models is the ability to perform parametric
sensitivity analysis and view trends across the range of design variables. A graphical tech-
nique inherent to JMPR© called the prediction profiler is a useful way to visualize these
sensitivities by changing one variable at a time and observing a change on the responses.
The prediction profiler evaluates the response surface equations and displays curved lines
called the prediction trace: “the predicted response as one variable is changed while the
others are held constant at the current values” [18]. An example of the prediction profiler
is shown in Figure 191. The vertical red lines indicate the current value of the X variables
while the horizontal lines correspond to the value of the responses. The individual cells can
also be interpreted as a the partial derivative of the response (Y-location) with respect to a
given design variable (X-location) with all other design variables held constant. Moving the
hairlines evaluates the response surface equations at new values, acting as a “calculator”
for real-time design space exploration and optimization. Also, the slope of each prediction





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































This can be used to determine the required code fidelity for a given input: steeper traces
indicate that the penalty for errors in a computational tool has greater overall impact on
the responses.
The prediction profiler shown in Figure 191 was generated using neural network equa-
tions and therefore has some unusual non-linear behaviors. Several of these behaviors have
been labeled in the figure. In the definition of scenario parameters, the percentage of SAM
sites killed is greatly dependent on the TCT fraction (1). TCT fraction is defined as the
ratio of time-critical targets to SAM sites. As this ratio approaches 1.0, the battlefield is
comprised entirely of TCTs, therefore, there are no SAM sites to kill, represented by the
precipitous drop. A similar drop-off is evident in (2). This reveals that for the other inde-
pendent variable settings, it becomes increasingly difficult to kill time critical targets with
a dwell time under 40 minutes. The percentage of platforms lost (3) increases dramatically
as the SAM range increases. The flattening of the curve on the left indicates that the
platform range is greater than the SAM range: platforms can fire weapons from outside
defended airspace and are hence nearly invincible10. When SAM range is greater than the
friendly shoot-back range, no platforms survive. Region (4) indicates that the platform
design variables have very little impact on the response. This is due to their small range
of variability. After examining the prediction profiler, the designer may wish to increase
the range of variability of the platform design variables, as their effects are “washed out”
by those of the scenario parameters and weapon design variables. The prediction trace
(5) shows a slight hump in the number of platforms lost. This corresponds to a weapon
cruise Mach number of 1.0, which penalizes the weapon range unfairly and thus contributes
to platform deaths because the platforms have to fly farther into defended airspace before
releasing weapons. The trace (6) shows that weapons with a Cruise Mach greater than
approximately 2.0 kill all time critical targets for the scenario settings specified. Trend (7)
appears counterintuitive: when weapon weight increases, more platforms survive. While
aerospace engineers generally try to reduce gross weight, heavier weapons carry more fuel
10Based on the scenario, it is possible for undetected SAM sites to shoot back. This is why the curve
approaches but does not reach zero. The probability of detecting all SAM sites is never 100%.
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and hence have greater range. Weapon weight (7) is correlated with fuel volume (9). Fi-
nally, the trend for weapon wing area (8) indicates that there is an optimum around 15 ft2.
This is a function of the other parameters of the missile design, but in general a missile
with too small of a wing expends thrust to stay aloft while a missile with a large wing area
has excessive profile drag.
In this manner, the prediction profiler can be used to debug analysis tools, discover local
optima, and identify trends in the analysis that merit further examination.
Hypothesis 4.11: The prediction profiler (essentially a matrix of partial derivatives)
or the ANOVA technique can be used to ascertain what variables are significant with respect
to the capability-level metrics.
C.11 Hypothesis 4.12: Monte Carlo Simulation Can Be
Used to Span the Design Space and Account for Un-
certainty
Probabilistics, meaning “relating to or based on probability,” dates to the Mid 17th century
[347]. Originally based on correspondence between Pierre de Fermat and Blaise Pascal, the
first textbook on the subject, On Calculating in Games of Luck, was published by Christi-
aan Huygens in 1657 [221]. Other contemporary contributors to probability include Jakob
Bernoulli, de Moivre, Laplace, Daniel Bernoulli and others [16]. Probability theory is a wide
field concerned with the liklihood of event occurrance, probability distributions, combina-
tions and permutations, games, and many other fields. Mavris observed that uncertainty
arising from ambiguous requirements, design and operational uncertainty, and unknown
analytical tool fidelity can be quantified using probabilistic techniques [292].
C.11.1 Monte Carlo Methods
The most accurate technique for probabilistic analysis is the Monte Carlo method. Named
after the famous Monaco casino, Monte Carlo methods were originally called “statistical
sampling.” The more colorful moniker was popularized by pioneers Ulam, Fermi, von Neu-
mann, and Metropolis [16]. The technique utilizes random or pseudorandom numbers to
stochastically simulate various physical and mathematical systems and has been applied
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to quantum physics, aerodynamics, solutions of integro-differential equations, and the de-
velopment of the atomic bomb. The method became widely applied with the advent of
digital computers, replacing tables of random numbers previously used for statistical sam-
pling. While many computerized tools for engineering design are not probabilistic, a viable
methodology is to encapsulate existing deterministic tools with a Monte Carlo interface
[323].
A typical use for Monte Carlo methods is to create a histogram of a process by running
a large number of cases using random or pseudorandom numbers. This histogram is also
referred to as a probability density function (PDF). The integral of the PDF between points
a and b yields the probability that a number falls between a and b:




This is analogous to the area under the PDF between a and b. The cumulative distri-
bution function, CDF, is the integral of the PDF and yields the probability that a random
number is less than a threshold value x :




In addition to purely random number generators (uniform distribution), many different
distributions can be used to characterize the inputs to a Monte Carlo analysis. The process
of using a Monte Carlo simulation to create a PDF and CDF is shown in Figure 192.
In a process formalized by Bandte, a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) over a range of input
parameters can be examined in multiple dimensions and compared using a joint probability
estimation approach [52, 53]. This technique is useful for comparing multiple dimensions
simultaneously and looking for correlations between output parameters. Kirby applied this
technique to the selection of technology portfolios across eight dimensions simultaneously
[241]. A joint probability distribution is shown in Figure 193.
Monte Carlo methods can be used for integration by approximating the integral of a func-
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Figure 193: Joint Probability Distribution.
430
points approaches infinity, the integral evaluated using the Monte Carlo method approaches
the true value of the integral. While numerical integration is usually straightforward in a
single dimension, the Monte Carlo method is useful for multidimensional integration over









Where Is is a multidimensional cube with s degrees of freedom and N is the number of
elements in the sequence of random numbers.
C.11.2 Other Probabilistic Techniques
In contrast to a pure Monte Carlo method, a Quasi-Monte Carlo method replaces the
set X1. . . XN with a low discrepancy sequence, also known as a sequence of quasirandom
numbers [191]. “Quasirandom numbers are generated algorithmically by computer, and are
similar to pseudorandom numbers while having the additional important property of being
deterministically chosen based on equidistributed sequences in order to minimize errors”
[418, 480]. Morokoff and Caflisch noted that for a number of example problems, the Quasi-
Monte Carlo method tended to yield more accurate results than a Monte Carlo method
using the same number of points [302].
Markov Chains, which are discrete time stochastic processes have the property that
the future is conditionally independent of the past, given the present. Queueing theory,
statistics, population process analysis, and Brownian motion are examples of stochastic
processes that can utilize Markov Chains. A random walk algorithm is another example
application.
In addition to traditional approaches where Monte Carlo simulation is used with a
simulation code and the more elegant approach where MCS is combined with surrogate
models, another approach used in probabilistic analysis is to approximate the probability
distribution function itself. “This is based on the notion that in order to obtain the cu-
mulative distribution function, not all probability levels need to be identified” [53]. One
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such technique, Fast Probability Integration (FPI) is a computer program developed at
the Southwest Research Institute for NASA Glenn Research Center [379]. FPI combines a
mean value method with a Most Probable Point analysis to determine the CDF for a single
response function. FPI is a valid approach when it is not possible to either create accurate
surrogate models or run a full MCS with the physics-based code. The acceptance of this
technique has been somewhat limited based on widespread limitations of the method cou-
pled with improvements in surrogate modeling techniques and advances in computational
power since 1995.
C.11.3 Uses of Probabilistics in Design
Probabilistics is a central concept in the robust design of systems and reliability analysis
[257]. While both use the same techniques and methods, the focus of reliability analysis is
usually in the extreme conditions of a distribution while robust design is focused on opera-
tion around a likely design condition. Probabilistic approaches have been used extensively
for the analysis of systems effectiveness [378], radar cross section prediction [206], missile
design [60, 63, 251], propulsion system selection [294, 358], economic uncertainty [288], and
space systems [365] to name a few.
Viability of designs through analysis of uncertainty is useful in determining how a given
design may be sensitive to variations in noise parameters. A typical example is the assess-
ment of economic metrics for commercial transport when load factors, utilization, and fuel
costs are used as noise variables. Probabilistics can also be used for large-scale design space
exploration, useful in the design of systems-of-systems.
Hypothesis 4.12: Monte Carlo simulations are a convenient and uncomplicated method
for quantifying uncertainty that have been used successfully for this class of problems.
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF ARCHITECTURE TERMS
“No person who is not a great sculptor or painter, can be an architect. If he
is not a sculptor or painter, he can only be a builder.”
-John Ruskin
The term architecture is central to the development of this work; however, the term
itself has a variety of ambiguous meanings. Architecture, whose Greek roots mean “first
craftsmanship,” is literally “the art and science of designing structures” [22]. The balance
between “aesthetic” qualities and a scientific understanding of the fundamental properties
of a structure in its environment is as critical for buildings as it is for military system
architectures. Architecture is governed by the principle of “form follows function,” which is
also a central tenet of systems engineering. There are many useful definitions of architecture:
• DoD defines an architecture as “a framework or structure that portrays relationships
among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity” [468]. This definition
is ambiguous because many experts agree that an architecture is not a framework.
• The DoD Integrated Architecture Panel developed a more rigorous definition1, “the
structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines gov-
erning their design and evolution over time” [136]. This statement is less confounding
and establishes that architectures contain things, connections between things, and
rules or standards regarding the elements in an architecture.
• Maier defines an architecture as “the structure (in terms of components, connections,
and constraints) of a product, process or element” [268]. This definition is consistent
with the DoD Integrated Architecture Panel definition.
1This definition is often erroneously credited as coming from IEEE standard 610.12. It is originally
credited to Dewayne E. Perry and David Garlan; however, the location of its original citation is unknown.
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• The IEEE Architecture Working Group defines an architecture as “the highest-level
concept of a system in its environment” [268]. This definition is most relevant to
capability-based design.
• Finally, an elegant definition proposed by Daw is “an organization of resources” [121].
The term “framework” is misleading: architectures are not frameworks. Although often
listed as synonyms, in the military simulation community, the two are greatly different
terms. An architecture is a collection of things. A framework is a computational (or other
modeling) environment that allows analysis of an architecture. In the information systems
community, frameworks are used to construct architectures. The archetypical framework is
the Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architectures, which uses a grid model that asks six
questions (What, How, Where, Who, When, Why) of five stakeholder groups [491, 492, 493].
The answers to these questions form the architecture. The “Zachman Framework” is shown
in Figure 194.
In software engineering, a framework is “a defined support structure in which another
software project can be organized and developed” [16]. Frameworks for these tasks may
include RationalR© Software Modeler [31] and MicrosoftR© Visual Studio [26]. In this research,
the term framework refers to the software tool used to perform simulations.
With the above distinction between architectures and frameworks in mind, the term “De-
partment of Defense Architecture Framework” (DoDAF) is less confusing. “The DoDAF
provides the rules, guidance, and product descriptions for developing and presenting ar-
chitecture descriptions to ensure a common denominator for understanding, comparing,
and integrating architectures” [27]. This framework is used to view architectures. The
DoDAF standard, developed by the defense acquisition community, facilitates large-scale
system-of-systems design by establishing standards for the depiction of architectures to
promote interoperability both across capabilities and between integrated architectures. Un-
derstanding the “views” of DoDAF is critical to capability-based design, network centric
warfare, and planning for joint operations that require the integration of multiple architec-
tures. The term “views” refers to different ways of looking at the same architecture and is

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































provides information to the user. DoDAF views are inherently hierarchical, multidimen-
sional, and very detailed. Properly defining these views is critical to requirements definition
and capability analysis.
According to Reference [27], the DoDAF views are:
• Operational View (OV): description of tasks and activities, operational elements,
and information exchanges required to accomplish DoD missions.
• Systems View (SV): description, including graphics, of systems and interconnections
providing for, or supporting, DoD functions.
• Technical View (TV): The minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, inter-
action, and interdependence of system parts or elements, whose purpose is to ensure
that a conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements.
• All View (AV): Provides information pertinent to the entire architecture but does
not represent a distinct view of the architecture. Sets the scope and context of the
architecture.
The operational view can usually be determined through brainstorming and functional
decomposition. It says what the architecture does. The systems view can be seen as a
type of physical decomposition that says what the architecture is composed of. This could
be a series of flowcharts or storyboards of what the architecture looks like. The technical
view is a more comprehensive view. If the operational and systems view can be considered
pre-conceptual design, the technical view is more appropriate in the preliminary design
phase. This defines how the elements of the architecture interact. With a function, form,
and method for interaction, the architecture is defined. The all view provides additional
higher level information but is excluded from some conceptual design formulations. The
flow down of information through the DoDAF views is shown in Figure 195.
Just as software engineers use frameworks to plan the content and structure of their
code, the DoD Architecture Framework provides a planning environment for military ar-


























Figure 195: Flow of Information from DoDAF Views to System Development Models
(Modified from Reference [349]).
architecture framework to support capabilities-based acquisition, and identifies the signifi-
cance of the architecture views as follows:
“Just as a building architect develops blueprints so that individual contractors
can determine the scope and requirements of their jobs, the systems architect
develops blueprints in accordance with the DoD Architecture Framework so that
individual program managers can determine the scope and requirements of their
systems” [134].
The DoDAF views depicted in Figure 195 function as the blueprints to describe the
various aspects of the architecture design. Dickerson also outlines a process for using the
DoDAF views for systems-of-systems systems engineering and acquisition, illustrated in
Figure 196.
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Using Architectures for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
 
12
The first four of the five groups of products can be generally associated with the four steps of 
classical systems engineering: 
 Requirements Analysis 
 Functional Analysis 
 Synthesis 
 Design Verification 
While FoS systems engineering must follow the principles of classical systems engineering, the 
complexity of the FoS and the preponderance of legacy systems in the FoS will limit the system 
engineer’s ability to apply these principles in practice. Performing requirements analysis to 
achieve specific FoS capabilities and developing a functional design for the FoS are, however, 
both manageable tasks. The architecture products that emerge from requirements and functional 
analyses become stable views of the FoS that are much simpler to understand than the underlying 
and constantly changing physical architecture. The FoS synthesis provides the critical mapping 
of legacy systems into the functional view of the architecture for the FoS and enables 
determination of how the remaining trade space might be used for new systems and system 
improvements. Performing FoS design verification is reduced in complexity by focusing on 





















Figure 2-1. Using the Architecture Framework in FoS Systems Engineering and Acquisition 
 
The following paragraphs describe each of the five Architecture Framework product groups and 
introduce the Framework products that are used to support them. This basic overview of the 
architectural methodology is intended to provide the reader with a foundation that will be 
expanded through a demonstration of how the products are used in practice in the case studies 
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Figure 196: Using th Architecture Framework f r Systems-of-Systems Systems Engineer-
ing and Acquisition [134].
D.0.4 What is the Difference Between a System-of-Syste s and an Architec-
ture?
The distinction between systems-of-systems and architectures is a subtle but important one
that is best explained by analogy. The architecture diagram for a Canon PowerShot digital
camera is shown in Figure 197. The function of the depicted architecture is to take pictures
and either store them on a computer or print them for viewing. Necessary elements include
the camera, a power source, a storage medium, an interface to the printing/storage device,
and the printing/storage device. Selecting an item to perform each of these functions defines
the system-of-systems. Choosing between the compact photo printer, the card photo printer,
or a Bubble Jet printer results in a different system-of-systems within the same architecture.
Similarly, replacing the PowerShot S2 IS (a 5 megapixel digital camera with a 12x optical
zoom) with the new PowerShot S3 IS (identical except for a 6 megapixel resolution) produces
a new system-of-systems within the same architecture.
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Figure 197: Architecture Diagram for a Canon PowerShot S2 IS Digital Camera [84].
An example of a different architecture that performs the same function is the use of
a film camera instead of a digital camera. The power source is still a battery, albeit film
cameras typically use fewer batteries than digital cameras. The storage medium would be
film as opposed to memory cards. Most notably, the direct interface to the printing medium
does not exist for film cameras: printing pictures requires a photo lab, a photo technician,
developing chemicals, and a transportation system to deliver the film to the photo lab. The
invention of the digital camera altered the traditional architecture for a mature function:
taking pictures.
The above architectures operate within the framework of photography. The function
performed by the photographic architecture is to capture an image; however, an image could
also be captured within the framework of painting. A painting architecture would require a
painter, paints, a canvas, and a subject to be depicted. This illustrative example shows how
the same function can be performed in different frameworks, using different architectures,
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and with alternative components that define different systems-of-systems.
The camera example is illustrative of a heterogeneous system architecture: the function
“capture an image” is performed using system elements that are functionally related but
physically distinct2. For this research, the focus is primarily on the application of
technologies to different systems within a relatively static architecture. This sit-
uation most closely resembles the motivating challenge of technology refresh for an existing
military system architecture.
2In contrast, a homogeneous system architecture has elements which are also physically similar and have
identical interfaces such as a brigade of M-1 tanks or an LGB model train set.
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APPENDIX E
REVIEW OF PHYSICS-BASED MODELS
E.1 Physics-Based Model for Aircraft Flight
While many models are used within the FLAMES simulation to calculate mission effective-
ness, the primary model created for this research is a performance model of a fixed wing
aircraft. The code was written in C and compiled using MicrosoftR© Visual Studio 2003.
This chapter summarizes the equations used in the development of the simple aircraft flight
model and describes the equations used. All units used by the FLAMES kernel are in SI.
When assigned by the battle manager, an aircraft in the FLAMES scenario is com-
manded to fly at maximum speed to engage the target. To calculate the necessary forces
on the aircraft, the current altitude of the aircraft is used to get the atmospheric density,






The weight of the platform is calculated as the sum of the empty weight, current payload
weight, and the current weight of fuel in the aircraft. If the aircraft needs to turn to reach
its intended position, the flight model receives as an input the commanded turn G. A check
is performed to see if the commanded turn G and commanded roll rate exceed the limits of
the platform as defined by the user prior to execution. In addition to these limits, the turn
can be constrained by the lift available from the aircraft. The maximum turn acceleration





Where CL is the maximum lift coefficient of the aircraft in its current configuration, q is
the dynamic pressure, S is the user defined wing area, and W is the instantaneous weight
of the aircraft. The load factor in a turn is therefore the minimum of the lift-limited turn
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and the commanded turn G of the aircraft. From the load factor, the turn radius, R, and









Next, the drag on the aircraft, D, is calculated as a function of dynamic pressure, drag
coefficient, and wing area according to Equation 37
D = CDqS (37)
Where CD is defined by the user as an element of the aircraft DOE. Next, since the
battle manager commands the aircraft to fly at maximum speed, a calculation is needed to
see if this speed is achievable with the thrust and drag of the aircraft at the current flight
altitude and speed. The desired axial acceleration of the aircraft to reach the commanded











+ D + W cos θ (39)
Where W is the aircraft weight and θ is the angle between the aircraft’s flight direction
and the velocity vector. If the thrust available from the aircraft’s engine exceeds the thrust
required, then the thrust required is the actual thrust and the aircraft accelerates toward
the commanded speed at this time step. On the other hand, if the thrust required is greater
than the thrust available then the aircraft is not be able to accelerate to the commanded
speed until some fuel is burned off or the altitude is increased to lower the magnitude of
drag.
The speed at the next time step is then calculated by adding the resultant axial ac-
celeration to the current velocity to get the speed at the next time step. The position of
the aircraft is also updated to incorporate the velocity at the current time step and the
orientation of the aircraft is updated to take into account the roll angle if a turn is required.
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Next, to calculate the new weight of the aircraft, the fuel is decremented by the amount
of fuel burned at this time step using Equation 40.
∆Fuel = −TSFC × T ×∆t (40)
If the fuel falls below zero at any point in the mission, the aircraft is destroyed.
These equations are repeated for each aircraft at every time step. The time step value
is a user defined parameter in the FLAMES scenario. Experimental observation indicated
that a parameter on the order of 1-2 seconds is appropriate to balance run time and fidelity.
While aircraft cruise is relatively insensitive to large time steps, aircraft and missile turn
calculations produce inaccurate results for time steps greater than five seconds.
E.2 Calibration of IADS Model
To support identification of technologies across a range of scenarios within the Iraq scenario,
it is necessary to establish a parametric threat model that represents the enemy IADS.
Characteristics of the KARI IADS system are summarized in Section 5.2.1.5. The Gulf
War Air Power survey provides a detailed recreation of the opening events of Operation
Desert Storm [105]. Historical references also identify the F-117A as the only aircraft that
bombed targets in downtown Baghdad on the opening night of the war. Reviewing this
account identifies likely gaps in the IADS radar coverage through which the F-117A was
able to maneuver. Using the FLAMES sensor coverage package, it is possible to calibrate
the input values for the Iraqi radars to develop a coverage map that provides access corridors
for F-117 aircraft and denies access to non-stealthy platforms such as the B-52 [399]. The
sensor coverage window used to calibrate the hostile radars is shown in Figure 198.
The sensor coverage is a function of altitude, which was defined as 12,000 m (39,370
ft). The region for which to calculate coverage was a polygon defined around the borders of
Iraq. All units with a “Red Ground Radar,” the primary sensor used by hostile units, were
added to the coverage list. Two options for radar coverage are available: radial and region.
“Radial coverage can be used to provide a very clear picture of the coverage of a single
sensor or of several sensors where each one’s coverage area does not overlap” but is not as
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useful for overlapping sensors [399]. For this reason, region coverage was used. Regions are
color coded areas that depict overlapping radars and are classified by the minimum number
of detections in that region. Four regions with detection levels of 1, 2, 5, and 10 minimum
detections were defined as green, blue, orange, and red respectively. As the color of a region
moves towards red, the probability of the selected platform being detected inside that region
increases. The purpose of the calibration exercise is to calculate the required transmission
power of the radar to match the the computed coverage area to the approximate coverage
areas discerned from the Gulf War Air Power Survey [105].
In addition to the unknown transmission power, the simple radar model created for
FLAMES based on the radar range equation requires a user defined frequency input, signal
bandwidth (MHz), noise figure, and signal-to-noise ratio which were set to 3000 MHz, 1.0
MHz, 3.0, and 1.0 dB respectively. If the frequency ± the signal bandwidth does not
encompass the frequency of the target’s RCS, it is not possible to detect the target with the
given radar. The other two factors were set to baseline values from the example FLAMES
ground radar model. The minimum detectable signal (MDS) is defined as:
MDS = kTsBNfSNR (41)
Where k is Boltmann’s constant, Ts is the standard temperature in Kelvin, B is the signal
bandwidth (MHz), Nf is the noise figure, and SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio. A detection
occurs when the received power of the radar is greater than the MDS, neglecting jamming.






Where PT is the power of the transmitter, GT is the gain of the transmitter, GR is the gain
of the receiver, λ is the wavelength of the transmitted signal, σ is the radar cross section of
the target, and R is the distance from the radar to the target. The gain values were fixed
for the antenna used by the “Red Ground Sensor.” After setting the radar cross section
for the F-117A and B-52H at the values noted by Stonier [386], an iterative process was
used to determine the baseline transmission power. This value was equal to 15 dBW. Using
this value, the sensor coverage diagrams for the B-52H and F-117A are shown in Figures
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199 and 200 respectively, which graphically shows the difference between non-stealthy and
stealthy platforms in terms of detectability. The percentage of Iraq covered by 1, 2, 5, and
10 minimum detections is summarized in Table 34. Based on this table, the B-52H can be
detected at least once over 61.94% of Iraq, which the F-117A’s stealth permits at least one
detection over about 33.03% of the country.
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Figure 198: Defining the Input Parameters for the Sensor Coverage Calculations.
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Figure 199: IADS Coverage Map of Iraq: B-52H Platform at 12,000 m.
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Figure 200: IADS Coverage Map of Iraq: F-117A Platform at 12,000 m.
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line at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iraq.html, Last Accessed April 2006.
[467] U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: B-2 Spirit.”
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82.
[468] U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Dictionary.” Defense Technical Information
Center, Joint Publication 1-02, Online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict,
Updated April 14, 2006. Last Accessed January 2007.
[469] Vanco, M. R., “Computer Program for Design Point Performance of Turbojet and
Turbofan Engine Cycles.” NASA TM X-1340, NASA Lewis Research Center, Febu-
ruary 1967.
[470] Vanderplaats, G. N., Numerical Optimization. Vanderplaats Research and Devel-
opment, Inc., 1999.
[471] Volovoi, V., “Modeling of System Reliability Using Petri Nets with Aging Tokens,”
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 84, no. 2, pp. 149–161, 2004.
[472] Von Neumann, J., “The General and Logical Theory of Automata,” in Cerebral
Mechanisms in Behavior (L.A. Jeffress, ed.), pp. 1–32, 1951.
[473] Wallace, A. and Boldyreff, C., “Agents and Agent-Based Design Approaches
to Engineering Design and Manufacturing.” Presented at the Computer Aided Pro-
duction Engineering (CAPE) Conference, 1999.
[474] Warden, J. A. III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. National Defense
University Press, 1988.
[475] Warden, J. A. III, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, p. 119. Battlefield of
the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL, 1995.
[476] Warner Home Video, “Troy.” Motion Picture, 2004.
[477] Watts, B. D., “Moving Forward on Long Range Strike,” tech. rep., Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004.
[478] Watts, B. D., “Long Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency, and Options,” tech. rep.,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2005.
[479] Weatherington, D. D., “Unmanned Combat Air Systems.” Powerpoint Presenta-
tion by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L)/PSA/Air Warfare, online
at www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006psa peo/weatherington.pdf, Last Accessed July 26, 2006.
479
[480] Weisstein, E., “Mathworld, The Web’s Most Extensive Mathematics Resource.”
Online at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/, Last Accessed October 2005.
[481] Withrow, M., “AFRL Demonstrates Quantitative Technology Assesment,”
news@afrl, July 2005.
[482] Wolf, R. A., “Multiobjective Collaborative Optimization of Systems of Systems,”
Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005.
[483] Wolfowitz, P., “Policy Memorandum, Cancellation of DoD 5000 Defense Acquisi-
tion Policy Documents,” October 30, 2002.
[484] Wolfram, S., A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media, 2002.
[485] Ye, K. Q., “Orthogonal Column Latin Hypercubes and Their Application in Com-
puter Experiments,” Journal of the American Statistical Association - Theory and
Methods, vol. 93, no. 444, pp. 1430–1439, December 1998.
[486] Young, R., “Modeling Conceptual Weapon Systems: FLAMES and Agent-Based
Modeling.” Applied Research Associates, Presented at the 2005 FLAMES User’s Con-
ference, June 2005.
[487] Young, M. J., “Agent-Based Modeling and Behavioral Representation.” AFRL
Horizons, Online at http://www.afrl.af.mil/techconn/index.htm, Document HE-00-
09, August 2000. Last Accessed August 2006.
[488] Yu, Po-Lung, Multiple-Criteria Decision Making, Concepts, Techniques, and Ex-
tensions. Plenum Press, 1985.
[489] Yule, G. U., An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics. MacMillan Publishing
Company, June 1969.
[490] Zaborowski, Michael E., “TBM Defense in the Gulf War: A Slim Margin of
Victory,” tech. rep., United States Army Command and Staff College, 1992.
[491] Zachman, J. A., “A Framework for Information Systems Architecture,” IBM Sys-
tems Journal, vol. 26, no. 3, 1987.
[492] Zachman, J. A., “The Zachman Institute for Framework Advancement.” Online at
http://www.zifa.com/, Last Accessed March 2006.
[493] Zachman, J. A. and Sowa, J. F., “Extending and Formalizing the Framework for
Information Systems Architecture,” IBM Systems Journal, vol. 31, no. 3, 1992.
[494] Zaerpoor, F., Weber, R.H., “Issues in the Structure and Flow in the Pyramid of
Combat Models.” Presented at the 68th MORSS, US Air Force Academy, June 20-22,
2000.
[495] Zeh, J., “Net-Centric Modeling, Simulation and Analysis.” Air Force Research Lab-
oratory, Presented at the 2005 FLAMES User’s Conference, June 2005.
480
VITA
Patrick Thomas Biltgen was born March 21, 1980 in Atlanta, GA to William and Judith
Biltgen. Although he spent most of his childhood in Marietta, GA, he attended Naperville
Central High School in Naperville, Illinois before enrolling in the Aerospace Engineering
program at the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1998. As an undergraduate, Mr. Bilt-
gen was a co-op student with Rolls-Royce in Indianapolis, Indiana and an undergraduate
research assistant under Dr. Dimitri Mavris at the Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory
(ASDL). He graduated from Georgia Tech, receiving a Bachelor of Science degree with high-
est honors in 2003 and a Master of Science degree in 2004. Over the past eight years, Mr.
Biltgen has worked with a number of industry and government sponsors in the areas of gas
turbine propulsion, missile defense, technology forecasting, strategic planning, and systems-
of-systems design. He is a member of Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Gamma Tau, AIAA, INCOSE,
and Kappa Kappa Psi. In 2003, he was the team leader for the first place AIAA Under-
graduate Engine Design Team and also led the first place 2004 AIAA Graduate Strategic
Missile Design Competition.
Mr. Biltgen is a recipient of the Tau Beta Pi Award, the Astronaut Scholarship, the
Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship, the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate
Fellowship, and the 2006 AIAA Orville and Wilbur Wright Graduate Award. He was also
selected as a pre-doctoral fellow in the 2005-2006 Sam Nunn Security Program under the
School of International Affairs and specialized in the implications of policy on the design of
future strike systems. He and his wife, Ashley, live in Atlanta, GA.
481
